Vol. 83, no. 1: Full Issue by Law Review, Denver University
Denver Law Review 
Volume 83 Issue 1 Article 9 
December 2020 
Vol. 83, no. 1: Full Issue 
Denver University Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
83 Denv. U. L. Rev. (2005). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 









Sturm College of Law







Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the
Solution of Representation Reinforce-
m ent ................................................................. Paul Boudreaux 1
Blaine's Name in Vain?: State Constitutions,
School Choice, and Charitable Choice .............. Jill Goldenziel 57
Corporations and Autonomy Theories of
Contract: A Critique of the New Lex
M ercatoria ......................................................... Nathan Oman 101
The Security of Our Secrets: A History of
Privacy and Confidentiality in Law and
Statistical Practice ........... Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr 147
COMMENTS
Roper v. Simmons and International Law ................... Stephen Arvin 209
Smith v. City of Jackson: A Pretext of Victory
for Employees ...................................................... Sarah Benjes 231





Courts at both the federal and state level are busy remaking the law
of eminent domain. Property rights advocates argue that courts should
scrutinize more closely government's ability to take property with plans
to transfer it to private developers. But asking courts to second-guess
the wisdom of governmental policy decisions cannot be a workable solu-
tion. Instead, eminent domain could be tightened by relying on the idea
of representation reinforcement, through which courts boost the interests
of those groups who are unlikely to have their voices heard in the politi-
cal realm. Across the nation, local governments are using eminent do-
main to discourage residency by poor persons. This article proposes
that eminent domain be constitutionally impermissible when it is both
used to take land destined for private hands and disproportionately hurts
the poor or politically disadvantaged.
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INTRODUCTION
Strange legal bedfellows are clamoring for limits on government's
power of eminent domain over private property. On the political right,
property rights advocates lament the ease by which governments have
been able to take private property for projects that libertarians view with
skepticism.' They cite cases such as Hawaii's colossal redistribution of
land in the 1980s, which the United States Supreme Court upheld despite
its resemblance to socialism, 2 and Illinois's selling its power of eminent
domain for a small "fee."3 On the left, advocates for the poor argue that
businesses with political and financial clout often are able to sway local
governments into taking land (with monetary compensation, of course)
from less powerful persons, including racial minorities, and then giving it
to more influential groups, under the guise of economic growth.4 They
point to cases in which local authorities "condemned" land from poorer
persons in order to serve the desires of corporate titans such as Donald
Trump and the General Motors Corporation. 5
1. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 83, 161, 177-81 (1985) (criticizing the broad reach of eminent domain at the end of the
twentieth century).
2. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-43 (1984). In Midkiff, the Supreme
Court approved Hawaii's wide-ranging Land Reform Act, through which the state used eminent
domain and took many parcels of land owned by large landowners and sold them to families who
had been living on the land as renters. See id. at 231-32. This program, which resembled socialist
land redistribution, was justified in part by Hawaii's unique history, in which a nearly feudal system
of landownership by a handful of leading families continued beyond statehood, which occurred in
1960. See id. at 232-33. In the 1960s, the government found that more than 90 percent of privately
owned land was held by only 72 private individuals. See id. at 232. It is questionable whether such
a land redistribution plan would have received the approval that it did if it had been undertaken in,
say, Texas or New York. Midkiffrelied on Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), in which the court
rejected a challenge to the District of Columbia's plan to redevelop "slums" and set forth highly
deferential standards for reviewing the government's decisions and exercising eminent domain, even
in cases in which the taken land is slated to be given to private developers. Midkiff, at 239-40.
3. See Sw. I11. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Il1. 2002). The Illi-
nois Supreme Court held that the Illinois system, under which local governments in effect held the
right to sell their exercise of eminent domain to private developers willing to pay a fee, exceeded the
government's powers under the Illinois constitution. Id. at 10-11.
4. See, e.g., Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 32-36 (2003) (giving a history of the
government's using the designation of "blight" to exclude poor persons and African Americans);
David H. Harris, Jr., The Battle for Black Land: Fighting Eminent Domain, NBA NAT'L BAR ASS'N
MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12, available at 9-APR NBAM 12 (Westlaw).
5. See Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1998); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Mich. 1981),
overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). In Banin, New Jersey's
Atlantic City casino development agency sought to take by eminent domain a small retail store, in
order to give developer Donald Trump more room for expansion of the Trump Plaza casino com-
plex. See 727 A.2d at 110. The New Jersey court departed from earlier precedent and held that the
action did not serve the "public interest." Id. at 111. A number of other state courts followed with
opinions more skeptical of governmental assertions of "public use." See, e.g., City of Springfield v.
Dreison Inves., Inc., Nos. 19991318, 991230, 000014, 2000 WL 782971, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2000) (overturning use of eminent domain for the purpose of the development of a privately
owned minor league baseball stadium); City of Novi v. Robert Adell Children's Funded Trust, 659
N.W.2d 615, 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). See also Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use
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In 2004 and 2005, the grumbling over eminent domain bubbled over
into the courts and into the public discourse. First, County of Wayne v.
Hathcock overruled the most notoriously deferential state court opinion
that allowed government to seize private land and turn it over to private
businesses in the name of economic development. 6 Second, four dissent-
ing Justices of the United States Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New
London,7 called for a significant tightening of the federal constitutional
law of property rights against eminent domain,8 although a slim majority
of the Court refused to budge from the precedent of a deferential stan-
dard of review.9 Third, in the wake of Kelo, critics from state legislators
to comic strip cartoonists have called for new steps to restrict govern-
ment's ability to condemn private property.' 0 This political and judicial
Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986 - 2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251, 257-61
(2004), for a discussion of developments in state courts.
6. 684 N.W.2d 765, 769-70 (Mich. 2004), overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). Poletown held that the taking of a neighborhood for
a new General Motors factory was a permissible exercise of eminent domain because the city as-
serted that it provided a "public benefit," which in turn satisfied the state constitution's requirement
that eminent domain be used for "public use." 304 N.W.2d at 459.
7. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), affg Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
In Kelo, discussed in Part I, landowners challenged the exercise of eminent domain by the City of
New London, Connecticut, which planned to use their properties for a development project, which
would include land for a new facility of Pfizer Inc. See id. at 2658-61. New London hoped that the
project would help revitalize its economically depressed downtown. Id. at 2658-59. The landown-
ers argued to the Court that the condemnation violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which states, "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
See id. at 2658; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court majority, which included Justices
Stevens (who wrote the Court's opinion), Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, upheld the city's
action, applying the traditionally deferential standard to reviewing eminent domain, through which
government must compensate the landowner. See 125 S. Ct. at 2665. The Court held that eminent
domain is constitutional as long as it to serve a "public purpose," even if the condemned land is
destined for private hands. See id.
8. See 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
joining in dissent).
9. See id. at 2663-65 (majority opinion).
10. The public reaction to Kelo has been remarkably vocal, especially in a year in which most
of the public debate centered on foreign affairs. See, e.g., Ken Hearny, High-court Seizure Decision
Sparks Uprising, BALT. SuN, July 24, 2005, at 4L, available at 2005 WLNR 11644508 (noting the
nationwide negative political reaction to Kelo, including the adoption of a resolution in the U.S.
House of Representatives deploring the decision); Shannon O'Boye, Politicians Trying to Ease
Public's Fear of Governments Seizing Property, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 27, 2005, at BI, avail-
able at 2005 WLNR 11795323 (noting legislative initiatives at both the federal and state levels to
restrain local governments); Rosa Brooks, It's Open Season on Private Property, L.A. TIMES, July
27, 2005, at B 13, available at 2005 WLNR 11848751 (criticizing Kelo). In an interesting example
of a seemingly dry property rights issue reaching unexpected locations, at least three nationally
syndicated comic strips have weighed in against excessive domain for private development. See Jeff
Millar & Bill Hinds, Tank McNamara (July 26, 2005), available at
http://cervo.net/comics/?id2-rm&coicdate=7 / 2F26 /2F2005; Bruce Tinsley, Mallard Fillmore
(July 18, 2005), available at http://jewishworldreview.com/strips/mallard/2000/mallard07I805.asp;
Scott Santis, Prickly City (Mar. 8, 2005) (on file with author) (one of a series of anti-eminent-
domain strips in a conservative-oriented cartoon). Also amusing was the effort of property rights
advocates to have the government of Weare, New Hampshire, use eminent domain to take the home
of Justice Souter by eminent domain and turn it into a motel. Hearny, supra.
At least some liberal commentators have come to the defense of Kelo, albeit somewhat
reluctantly. See, e.g., Editorial, Eminent Latitude, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A30, available at
2005 WLNR 9994769 (concluding that a higher scrutiny of "public use" would be troublesome);
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clamor may eventually revolutionize the government's authority, as the
critics have demanded."' It may also hamstring, however, local govern-
ments' ability to foster urban redevelopment.
12
A number of social phenomena have strengthened the chorus
against eminent domain, including its often-toothless "public use" re-
quirement. 13  First, the scales have fallen from the nation's eyes over the
effectiveness of urban "renewal" projects, some of which have been
driven as much by racism and profit-seeking as by a good faith desire to
renew urban areas.14 Moreover, many local governments, especially the
cash-poor central cities, are trying ever harder to raise revenue by attract-
ing businesses and wealthy residents - and discouraging the poor - thus
making an eminent domain an irresistible tool.' 5
Frustration with eminent domain has led to many proposals for re-
form. Suggestions in recent years include: (1) requiring more procedural
hurdles before a government can take property; 16 (2) limiting eminent
domain to cases in which the public, not a private party, retains the own-
Richard Cohen, Take Life, but Not My House, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at A19, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/AR2005072501334.htm (syn-
dicated column) (criticizing conservatives for caring more about government's taking of property
than of life).
11. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, The Death of Poletown: The Future of
Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock: Public Ruses, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 859-60 (2004) (suggesting that the "subject of public use is back on the
table, with a good chance of substantial change in the law across the country").
12. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1865-73 (2005) ("Property owners should not
be protected by narrowing the public use requirements so much that eminent domain can never be
used for economic development projects because then many of these projects could not be com-
pleted, nor any of their benefits to the community realized.")
13. As interpreted by most courts in the twentieth century, the public-use restriction has meant
merely that government had to assert that the condemnation served the public interest in some way.
See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241 (applying U.S. constitutional law) (citing Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954)); Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Mich. 1981) (applying
Michigan constitutional law), rev'd by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004).
For a sample of critiques of the toothless public-use standard, see, e.g., Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 934-38
(2003) (arguing that courts should employ in reviewing eminent domain the more skeptical standard
used in scrutinizing government "exactions" on private owners); Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsh, Making
Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207, 219-24 (2004) (calling for a tighter standard for
eminent domain destined for private ownership, especially when the property owners are politically
less powerful).
14. See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 7-47 (giving the history of the deferential standard and
blaming both racism and gullibility of the prospects of "urban renewal").
15. See, e.g., PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (1995) (arguing that local governments must inces-
santly seek to please business to attract dollars and balance their budgets).
16. Professor Garnett has provided a list of "short cuts" to eminent domain that could trigger
tougher judicial scrutiny. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 970-82. Among these is a "quick-take"
process designed to facilitate and speed up the condemnation process. See id. at 970-74. By impos-
ing more hurdles to eminent domain, as opposed to fewer, legal reform might be able to weed out
justifiable exercises from those that are suspect. See id. at 982.
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ership of the land; 17 (3) allowing private use of condemned land only
under limited circumstances, as set forth in the new Hathcock decision;
8
and (4) reversing the usual presumption of deference, so that the gov-
ernment has the burden of justifying the public value of its development
plan.' 9 In the last category, Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett has sug-
gested the skeptical standard that the Supreme Court has imposed in re-
viewing government "exactions" from land owners in return for granting
permits.20  Such reforms seem to harmonize with the Rehnquist Court's
activism in protecting property rights through the United States Constitu-
tion's Fifth Amendment.2 '
I contend, however, that a reversal of the presumptions under emi-
nent domain is bound to be unsatisfactory. Demanding more exacting
scrutiny of the justifications for eminent domain is likely to lead courts
into an inextricable bog of trying to assess and weigh the benefits of pub-
lic development projects - a fact-finding job that is a legislative, not ju-
dicial, function. Even if a court were to able to reach conclusions as to
the efficacy of public projects, the most likely successful challengers
under a complex balancing test would be wealthy, corporate, and institu-
17. The effort to restrict eminent domain is largely limited to targeting cases in which the
government does not plan to use the property for government purposes. See Katherine M.
McFarland, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Mandate for Stricter Scrutiny
for Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 142, 142-43 (2004). This ap-
proach is driven, of course, by the fact that the U.S. Constitution and those of many states limit
eminent domain to cases of "public use." See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; MICH. CONST. art. X, §
2. It is worth noting, however, that the arguments of "property rights" against eminent domain have
no force when government does take land for governmental purposes, such as for schools, police
stations, parks, etc. See McFarland, supra at 142-43, 146-47. It is difficult, therefore, to assert that
private property is "sacrosanct," Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 769, considering that almost no one
suggests that government is restricted from taking private property for a city office building.
18. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-85, 787. The Michigan Supreme Court wrote that eminent
domain destined for private ownership is permissible when (1) private assembly of large tracts of
land for "instrumentalities of commerce," such as railroads, would be financially difficult, because
of the incentive for landowners to "hold out," (2) the private ownership is still accountable to the
public, such as for highly regulated service industries, and (3) the condemnation is based on "public
concern" with the land itself, such as is the case with slum clearance. Id. at 781-84.
19. See, e.g., Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV.
285, 310-14 (2000) (arguing for a reversal of the presumption in favor of constitutionality when
taken land is destined for private ownership); Nancy K. Kubasek, Time to Return to a Higher Stan-
dard of Scrutiny in Defining Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REc. 3 (2003) (calling for a requirement
that government give "substantial evidence" of public benefits when taking property destined for
private ownership).
20. See generally Garnett, supra note 13 (arguing for judicial review of eminent domain
destined for private ownership using the standard for "exactions," set forth in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), where the Court found that an exaction must have a "nexus" to
the harm for which it purportedly compensates, and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391
(1994), where the Court established that the nexus must be "roughly proportional" to the harm).
21. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001) (holding that a property
right against a regulatory taking is not lost simply because the property is sold after the regulation is
imposed); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that a land use regu-
lation is a compensable taking of private property if it prohibits "all economically productive or
beneficial use of the land"); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (finding that an exaction must have a "nexus" to
the harm for which it purportedly compensates); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (establishing that the nexus
must be "roughly proportional" to the harm).
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tional property owners - hardly the categories of persons for whom we
should expend most of our sympathy over the abuses of eminent domain.
After all, eminent domain is perhaps the only major exercise of state
power in which poorer persons suffer more than they would in the ab-
sence of government.
Instead of having courts scrutinize the justification for taking prop-
erty, I propose that courts focus more straightforwardly on the individual
targets of eminent domain. In crafting my proposal, I rely on the "repre-
sentation reinforcement" theory of the late Professor John Hart Ely, who
argued that judicial review should concentrate not on particular outcomes
but on assuring that all categories of persons receive adequate representa-
tion in the political and legislative processes.2 2 I propose that eminent
domain should be impermissible in those instances in which government
takes the homes predominantly of poorer persons, and then transfers the
land to private parties. In these cases, we have strong reason to suspect
that the targets of eminent domain did not get adequate representation in
the legislative and administrative branches of government. A tougher
standard for eminent domain and "public use" should focus on trying to
ensure that poor persons are not forced to lose their homes simply be-
cause they are poor.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW, FROM THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
HATHCOCK AND KELO
With one of the more cryptic passages of the United States Consti-
tution, the framers ended the Fifth Amendment with a clause stating,
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation., 23 Nearly all state constitutions hold some sort of similar re-
quirement.24 What is missing from the Constitution is a statement of
authority for "taking" private property. The rather inchoate governmen-
tal power of eminent domain, fairly well established in English law by
the late eighteenth century, was simply assumed. 5 Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment does not squarely state that eminent domain can only be
exercised for "public use;" literally, the clause states only that just com-
pensation be given in those instances in which property is taken for pub-
lic use. Federal courts, however, have assumed that the public use refer-
ence is a threshold requirement for the exercise of eminent domain.26 A
number of scholars, including Professor Donald Kochan, have concluded
sensibly that the Fifth Amendment's drafters conceived of an eminent
22. See infra Part VI. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
25. See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 9-10 (discussing early American conceptions of eminent
domain).
26. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984).
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domain that would allow taking private property for useful public land -
roads are the classic example - but not for the personal desires or whims
of the king, as was sometimes the practice in England, or his future
American counterparts.27
Considering the limited governmental activities of the early repub-
lic, there was little need to parse the limits of the meaning of "public
use." Governments used eminent domain sparingly - land for an army
fort here, a post office there, a reservoir down the road.28 But the nine-
teenth century rush to the western American frontier, combined with the
rise of industrial capitalism, generated a new idea - that governments
could use eminent domain to foster economic growth by transferring land
to selected persons in the private sector. While states gave businesses
such as water mills prime space along river rapids,29 the federal govern-
ment granted enormous stretches of land to railroad companies in order
to bring railways, and thus western civilization, to the supposedly un-
tamed frontier.30 With hindsight, of course, we in the twenty-first cen-
tury view these land shifts with considerable skepticism. From the jaun-
diced public-choice view of government, nineteenth-century govern-
ments were susceptible, through corruption and other means, of being
swayed by corporate interests. The most outrageous example of nine-
teenth century perversion of government was the 1869 sale (later re-
voked, leading to a United States Supreme Court case) by the Illinois
legislature of the entire downtown Chicago waterfront to the Illinois
Central Railroad.31  Today's libertarians argue that government is not
needed to foster economic growth; in fact, government will only get in
the way. 32 If specific parcels of land are valuable for economic growth,
private parties will beat down the doors of their owners in order to de-
velop them. Even if government is not corrupt, there is no reason to
think that bureaucrats or legislatures are as good as private accountants
in figuring what which land purchases are potentially profitable, and thus
economically beneficial for the economy.
The nineteenth century examples established a precedent that there
are some circumstances in which the public welfare arguably may be
27. See Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 49, 65-71 (1998).
28. See McFarland, supra note 17, at 142-43, 146-47. See also Pritchett, supra note 4, at 7-
13, for a history of nineteenth century interpretation of the limits of eminent domain.
29. See, e.g., Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 728-30 (N.J. Ch. 1832).
30. See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 9-12 (discussing the debates over the use of eminent
domain to assist railroads and other nineteenth century businesses).
31. I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 439-64 (1892). See generally Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004) (presenting an extensive history of the
landmark litigation).
32. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177 (criticizing governmental intervention in private
transactions). See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT (1990) (statement of libertarianism).
2005]
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served by the government's transferring land from one private owner to
another. The current use of the land may be undesirable (for example, a
local polluter who meets federal and state laws and who can be forced to
move only through a government buy-out) or another land use might be
more desirable (for example, a ranch owned by an obstinate farmer that
sits on top of an especially large uranium mine in an age when nuclear
energy is considered essential).
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a great expan-
sion in the use of eminent domain to shape private development.33 Such
growth dovetailed with the greater vision for government that emerged in
the wake of the Great Depression, World War II, and post-war prosper-
ity, when government seemed a solution for social ills. Professor
Wendell Pritchett has recently detailed the twentieth century growth of
the idea of "urban renewal. 34 At the beginning of the century, the idea
of slum "clearance" was touted as a progressive means of helping the
urban poor.35 Using eminent domain to get rid of run-down structures
led to the term "condemnation" as a catch-all for government's taking of
private property. In today's under-populated central cities of vacant
buildings and parking lots, it is hard to imagine that the overcrowding of
cramped urban tenements was considered an urgent need a century ago,
and that simply condemning these structures was considered by progres-
sives to be a step toward bettering the lives of the urban poor, even if
demolition did not necessarily provide them better housing.36 A more
expansive conception of eminent domain, approved by deferential courts,
emboldened a variety of interests. Real estate developers, eager to take
advantage of the potential profits of development in central cities,
aligned themselves with the housing reformers.37 Big city mayors often
completed the chorus, as the prospect of a more affluent citizen base
seemed a worthy temptation. Spurred by these forces, state and local
authorities used eminent domain not only against "slums" but for areas
that were subject to "blight," a botanical term that defined an area that
seemed diseased and headed for slum conditions in the near future.
38
Once authorized to take property that fit rather loose definitions of
"blight," redevelopment authorities were able to condemn nearly at will.
In a classic example of the public-choice criticism of putatively public
33. See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 7-14.
34. See generally Pritchett, supra note 4.
35. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, urban social reformers such as Jane
Addams focused public attention on the health and safety problems of urban overcrowding. See,
e.g., Harold L. Platt, Jane Addams and the Ward Boss Revisited: Class, Politics, and Public Health
in Chicago, 1890-1930, 5 ENVTL. HIST. 194 (2000), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3854/is-200004/ai-n8890369#continue.
36. See id.
37. See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 2-6, 26-30.
38. See id. at 14-34, 38-39 (discussing the abuse of the term across the twentieth century
from its origin as a means of slum clearance to its modern conception as a catch-all of governments
that seek to condemn land).
[Vol. 83:1
EMINENT DOMAIN
welfare initiatives being a mask for private gain, these authorities seized
private property - often lower-income and African American neighbor-
hoods - in cities across the country. Shielded by the banner of housing
reform, these seizures were spurred largely by the prospect of profit for
private developers who sought subsidized land.39 So scornful are many
commentators today of the once-lauded urban renewal projects of the
mid and late twentieth century that they are often referred to derisively as
"Negro removal. ' 4°
By the mid twentieth century, American courts came to accept the
governments' arguments for deference. 41  After all, courts early in the
century had acquiesced to government regulation of land use through
zoning (over the muffled complaints that zoning was a mask for social
and class segregation) because of the apparent public welfare benefits of
separating land uses.42 The same arguments convinced courts that local
governments, not judges, were in the best position to determine what was
truly in the public interest. The landmark United States Supreme Court
case was Berman v. Parker, which in 1954 upheld the taking of dozens
of blocks of residential land in southwest Washington, D.C.43  (Ironi-
cally, the facts that most of the residents were black and that the redevel-
opment plans would price-out most poor black citizens were not issues in
the litigation, despite the fact that the case was argued shortly after the
school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education.44) The court
rejected the challengers' argument that, because the plan called for pri-
vately owned development, it failed the public-use requirement. Justice
William 0. Douglas, who had a soft spot for utopian ideas of land regu-
lation, wrote that judges must defer to local government's expert findings
as to the harms caused by poor housing stock and the benefits to the
community of replacing them through condemnation. 45
If there were any doubt as to the breadth of the government's
power, it was dispelled in 1984 by Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid-
39. See generally Pritchett, supra note 4, at 22-35 (discussing the rise of abuse of eminent
domain under the banner of urban "renewal").
40. Harris, Jr., supra note 4 at 12; Pritchett, supra note 4, at 47.
41. See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 37, 47 (discussing the rise of deference to eminent
domain decisions, culminating in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
42. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (rejecting a claim of
"right of property" and upholding the constitutionality of land use zoning restrictions under the
police power); see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6 (1974) (holding a town may
regulate the composition of households under land use law); State ex rel. Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458
S.W.2d 305, 310, 312 (Mo. 1970) (upholding laws that restrict land use on aesthetic grounds).
43. 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954).
44. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 36 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(holding that "separate but equal" schools were inherently unequal) af'd, Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (holding that states are ordered to take "all deliberate speed" to desegre-
gate)
45. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 (holding that courts must defer to the judgment of the
political branches on social issues, including the exercise of eminent domain); see also Vill. of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (Douglas, J., writing for the court and approving a zoning law
that excluded group houses for college students).
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kiff46 The Hawaii government adopted legislation that provided for the
seizure of large parcels of the island chain from owners who had inher-
ited them during Hawaii's near-feudal colonial history. After appropriate
compensation, the land was then sold to less affluent Hawaiians, mostly
tenant farmers who had already worked the land.47 After the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the quasi-socialistic redistribution to private citizens failed
to meet the public-use requirement, the Supreme Court reversed. 48 The
reach of eminent domain is equivalent to the reach of the police power,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the Court, citing the famously
amorphous power of state and local authorities to do just about anything
they desire if it serves a putative public interest and violates no other
right.49 As long as government provides compensation, therefore, it was
almost certain to fulfill its federal constitutional obligation.
Meanwhile, at the state level, the most notable - or notorious - case
was Michigan's 1981's Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of De-
troit. 50 Faced with a threat by the General Motors Corporation to move
production out of the city, Detroit seized an entire neighborhood, Pole-
town, in order to provide the automaker with the land, and the price, that
it wanted.5' Poletown was not a predominantly black neighborhood (and
Detroit had a black mayor by this time), but it was nonetheless no match
for the persuasion of Detroit's most prominent employer. 2 Echoing the
federal constitutional law, Michigan's highest court held that it must
defer to the city's finding of what was good for Detroit.5 3 This finding
was sufficient to satisfy Michigan's public use requirement until 2004,
when it was overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock.4 As explained
in Part V, Hathcock disallowed eminent domain destined for private
hands, except when there are "special concerns" with the old land use,
such as when the government seeks to remove a "blighted" land use - a
potentially large loophole that should continue to trouble property rights
advocates.
55
46. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
47. See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 234. Within the case there is a discussion on Hawaii's
"land reform" program of exercising eminent domain to redistribute land. Id. at 232-34.
48. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 245, rev'g, Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240 ("The 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers").
50. 410 Mich. 616 (1981) (en bane).
51. See Poletown Neighborhood Council, 410 Mich. at 636-37 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting)
(recounting the history of the Poletown controversy); see generally JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN:
COMMUNITY BETRAYED (1989).
52. See generally JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED (1989).
53. Hathcock, 410 Mich. at 638-39.
54. 471 Mich. 445, 482-83, rev'g Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410
Mich. 616 (1981).
55. County of Wayne, 471 Mich. at 475-76.
[Vol. 83:1
EMINENT DOMAIN
In contrast to Hathcock, the United States Supreme Court's 2005
decision in Kelo v. New London56 did little to change the federal prece-
dent. Had the Supreme Court tightened the federal constitutional law, it
would have restricted eminent domain at all levels of governments, by
virtue of the Fifth Amendment's application to the states.57 As it was,
the much-anticipated Kelo reinforced the deferential approach of the
federal courts and constituted a major disappointment to the property
rights movement.5 8 Time will tell whether it is only a temporary setback.
The eminent domain in Kelo was a good example of how local gov-
ernments are using the power to try to shape their economies. The City
of New London, Connecticut, which was long famous for its submarine
yards and naval station, has suffered from the end of the Cold War; as of
the late 1990s its unemployment was double that of the state average. 59
Like many "old economy" cities, New London saw salvation in luring
new technology companies to its borders. 60  Soon after Pfizer Inc., a
pharmaceuticals firm, announced tentative plans in 1998 to locate a re-
search facility in New London, an economic development corporation
established by the city submitted a plan for a multifaceted new develop-
ment complex around the Pfizer site.61  The ninety-acre development
plan, which was approved by the city in 2000, would include a "small
urban village" of shops and restaurants, marinas and a "riverwalk," new
residences, space for a naval museum, and room for plenty of offices.6 2
New London hoped to create 1000 new jobs, increase tax revenues, and
"revitalize" the city.63 Most of the land was purchased by negotiation;
56. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
57. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 243-44 (1897) (find-
ing the "takings" clause applies to state governments).
58. See, e.g., Ken Hearny, High-Court Seizure Decision Sparks Uprising, BALT. SUN, July 24,
2005, at 4L, available at 2005 WLNR 11644508 (noting the nationwide negative political reaction to
Kelo, including the adoption of a resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives deploring the
decision); Shannon O'Boye, Politicians Trying to Ease Public's Fear of Governments Seizing Prop-
erty, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 27, 2005, at BI, available at 2005 WLNR 11795323 (noting
legislative initiatives at both the federal and state levels to restrain local governments); Rosa Brooks,
It's Open Season on P~ivate Property, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2005, available at 2005 WL 11848751
(criticizing Kelo).
Some liberal commentators have come to the defense of Kelo, albeit somewhat reluc-
tantly. See, e.g., Editorial, Eminent Latitude, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A30, available at 2005
WLNR 9994769 (concluding that a higher scrutiny of "public use" would be troublesome); Richard
Cohen, Take Life, but Not My House, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at A19, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/AR2005072501334.html (syn-
dicated column) (criticizing conservatives for caring more about government's taking of property
than of life).
59. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 (discussing the downturn in New London's economy); see
generally JOHN PINA CRAVEN, THE SILENT WAR (2001) (discussing New London and submarine
construction in the Cold War).
60. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659 (referring to the town's hope that Pfizer and other "research
and development" businesses would rejuvenate the city).
61. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. It is interesting that the record did not show that the develop-
ment plan was a prerequisite or even a "carrot" to Pfizer's building in New London.
62. Kelo,125 S. Ct. at 2659.
63. Id. at 2658.
2005)
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
other parcels, including the homes of some of the eventual plaintiffs,
were targeted for eminent domain. 64 The properties were not "blighted;"
they were condemned because of the needs of the development plan.65
As with any modem American development, some of the home parcels
might be used for automobile parking.
66
The majority opinion in Kelo - written by Justice Stevens and
joined by four other relatively liberal justices, Kennedy, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer - rejected the plaintiffs' request to narrow the Fifth
Amendment's public-use requirement. The majority assessed the prece-
dent at the highest level of generality. In both Berman and Midkiff, the
Court had approved eminent domain projects in which some or all of the
land was destined for private ownership; both projects were intended to
help the localities' economies.67 Accordingly, the majority concluded,
the public-use restriction does not forbid taking land destined for private
hands; rather, the test remains simply whether the eminent domain serves
a "public purpose.', 68 Because courts must defer to the economic policy
judgments of local governments, 69 New London's eminent domain com-
plied with the Fifth Amendment.70 While the Court emphasized that the
New London project did not benefit any particular private party,7' this
observation skirted an important issue, which occurs in many other de-
velopment cases. Many exercises of eminent domain plainly do benefit
an identifiable private party, which sometimes promises to build in the
city only if it receives discounted land.72 The Kelo majority dodged the
point that a benefit to a specific private party may often accompany a
purported public benefit. Deciding whether the private or public benefit
is the leading motivation, and which benefit is merely "incidental," re-
mains a challenge for any more skeptical review under the Fifth
Amendment.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 2660.
66. See id. at 2659.
67. See id. at 2660-61 (discussing Berman and Midkiffl.
68. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661, 2663 (concluding that the "public use" requirement means only
that the project must serve a "public purpose").
69. Id. at 2668. The Court quickly dismissed the plaintiffs' alternative suggestion that courts
should permit eminent domain for economic development only when the court finds a "reasonable
certainty" that the purported public benefits would actually occur. See id. at 2667. Such a fact-
bound inquirywould be a dead-end; courts cannot and should not engage successfully in such sec-
ond-guessing of economic judgments. Id.
70. See id. at 2665.
71. Kelo, 125 S.Ct at 2661-62 (stating that the Hawaii law in Midkiffdid not benefit any class
of identifiable individuals). But the entire point of the Hawaii plan was to enable tenant farmers to
buy the land on which they worked; this specific class of individuals clearly gained, at the expense
of those landlords whose property was taken. This transfer may have served the public, but it cannot
be denied that it also helped a specifically identifiable persons.
72. See, e.g., County of Wayne, 471 Mich. at 452, 453 (stating new economic development is
contingent upon the government's provision of land), overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616 (describing how the corporation threatened to move the facility to
another city unless the government provided land).
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The five-justice majority in Kelo failed to make even a nod to the
leftist critique of eminent domain as tending to hurt lower-income resi-
dents. This may have been due in part to the advocacy of the plaintiffs
by attorneys for the Institute for Justice, a property rights organization,73
which appeared to offer only half-heartedly the liberal skepticism.74 It is
not hard to read between the lines of the majority opinion, however, a
trepidation over expanding property rights against the government. The
Court noted approvingly the "carefully formulated" redevelopment pro-
ject in New London and the supposed benefits that the project would
bring to the city.75 This focus on due process and community benefits
parallels the deferential approach employed by the more liberal justices
in cases asserting an unconstitutional "regulatory taking., 76  Indeed, the
only hopeful ground for future challenges noted by the majority appears
to be an assertion that the government is unfairly giving the land to only
one owner 77 or other evidence of "illegitimate purpose" - presumably,
for example, the bribery of government officials.
78
Finally, in an ironic twist, Justice Stevens noted that the theme of
"federalism" and the "great respect" owed to state legislative and judicial
judgments counseled against having the federal courts strike down local
political choices. 79 If the citizens of Connecticut consider the benefits of
private ownership more important than the benefits of economic devel-
opment, they are free to restrict eminent domain through either state con-
stitutional or statutory law. The Court cited both Michigan's Hathcock8 °
and California's prerequisite of a finding of "blight" before eminent do-
main may be used81 as examples of states giving some protections to
their landowners. Such protections, however, may not be very effective
in preventing eminent domain abuses, as I discuss in Part V.
73. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
74. See generally Transcript of Record, Kelo v. New London, 125 S.Ct 2655 (2005), 2005
WL 529436.
75. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
76. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1040-41 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on the similar factors in arguing for upholding a government's
prohibition of coastal land construction); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138
(1978) (upholding a city's historic landmark law that restricted the use of property, in large part
because of the due process afforded in the landmark designation process and the benefits provided to
the public).
77. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67. In response to the argument that "without a bright-line rule
[against eminent domain for economic development] nothing would stop a city from transferring
citizen A's property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more
productive use and they pay more taxes," the Court wrote that such an action, which would be
unlikely in an "integrated development plan," was "not presented in this case. While such an un-
usual exercise of government power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was
afoot, the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted if an when they arise." Id.
78. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
79. See id. at 2664 (citing Hairston v. Danville & W. R.R., 208 U.S. 598, 606-07 (1908))
(differences among states my lead to differing approaches to land use and land use law).
80. See id. at 2668 n.22 (citing County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004)).
81. See id. at 2668 n.23 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 33030-33037 (West
1997)).
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The Kelo dissent - penned by Justice O'Connor and joined by the
property rights-oriented Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas - assessed the eminent domain precedent at a much lower level
of generality. The dissenters were faced with the particular difficulty of
the twenty-year-old precedent in Midkiff, written by Justice O'Connor,
which stated that the power of eminent domain was coterminous with the
expansive "police power" of local governments.82 Disassociating herself
from this "errant language,"83 Justice O'Connor in Kelo followed the
approach of the Michigan court in Hathcock by seeking to limit eminent
domain to those specific situations in which the high court had previ-
ously upheld the government's conduct.8 4 There are three such catego-
ries, Justice O'Connor wrote.8 5 The first is when the public retains own-
ership of the taken land; the second is when the land is transferred to a
common carrier, such as a private railroad or utility; the third, most
amorphously, is when eminent domain stops some "affirmative harm"
inflicted on society.86  Harms such as the "blight" in Berman and the
"oligarchy" in Midkiff are examples. 87  The property rights justices'
adoption of this final category is especially ironic, considering that the
four dissenting justices concluded, in a significant 1992 regulatory tak-
ings case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,88 that it made no
sense to describe certain land uses as "harmful," as opposed to the gov-
ernment's merely gaining a benefit by requiring some other land use.89
Expediency once more ruled the day.
One fact that bothered the property rights justices is that unfettered
use of eminent domain may create a "specter of condemnation [that]
hangs over all property." 90 This may be true; but this specter has always
existed, in the form of condemnation for public ownership. Justice
O'Connor both alluded to the possibility of undue private influence -
"Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-
82. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 ("The 'public use' requirement is coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign's police powers.").
83. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The rationale for the "errant
language" reference was that the statement about "public use" being coterminous with the police
power was "unnecessary to the specific holdings of those decisions" - in other words, that it was
dictum. Two decades of law students would have to be re-educated.
84. See id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 2673-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. See id.
88. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Court in Lucas held that a regulation that deprives a land-
owner of all economically beneficial use of the land and that prevents the landowner from using the
land in a non-nuisance-creating manner triggers the payment of Fifth Amendment compensation for
the "total taking." See id. at 1027-31.
89. See id. at 1025 ("A given restraint will be seen as mitigating 'harm' to the adjacent parcels
or securing a 'benefit' for them, depending upon the observer's evaluation of the relative importance
of the use that the restraint favors."). Justice Scalia wrote the Lucas opinion and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas.
90. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory" 91 -
and rather perfunctorily cited the leftist criticism that "the beneficiaries
are likely to those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in
the political process, including large corporations and development
firms. 92 But one cannot help but think that what bothered the dissenters
even more was the quasi-economic fear that widespread eminent domain
will squelch private initiative - constitutional rights against unlawful
takings "ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards
against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's emi-
nent domain power," O'Connor wrote93 - and, perhaps most of all, that
eminent domain offends the principle of close-to-inviolate private prop-
erty rights. Justice O'Connor concluded by citing James Madison's
statement that "[T]hat alone is a just government, which impartially se-
cures to very man, whatever is his own."94 In sum, however, Kelo ap-
pears to have added little to the law or understanding of eminent domain
and how perceived abuses might be curbed.
Legal commentators of a variety of stripes have attacked the tooth-
less public-use standard. Richard Epstein, a libertarian, has lamented
that business plans and productive economic activity may be disrupted
by the specter of eminent domain hanging over the heads of private
property. 95 Lee Anne Fennell, approaching the topic from the viewpoints
of economic efficiency and distribution, wrote that eminent domain often
fails to provide for truly "just" compensation, especially for values such
as autonomy. 96 Nicole Stelle Garnett has argued that targets suffer un-
compensated psychological tolls, including "demoralization costs," of
being uprooted from their property. 97  Focusing on the fact that poor
neighborhoods are often the target of condemnation, Wendell Pritchett
has chastised the courts for their misguided "faith in the political sys-
tem's ability to operate in a non-discriminatory manner." 98 Outside the
91. Id. at 2676.
92. Id. at 2677.
93. Id. at 2672.
94. Id. at 2677 (citing James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted
in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland et al., eds., 1983)).
95. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177 (criticizing governmental meddling in private transac-
tions).
96. See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 957, 959
(2004). Professor Fennell argued that "the public use clause is meant to screen out takings for which
monetary compensation is not just." Id. at 1002. Among her proposals to rein in eminent domain
destined for private ownership is a system whereby those homeowners could give advance consent,
with a tax break, to eminent domain. See id. at 995-96. An earlier and influential economic analysis
of eminent domain and public use was Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
97. See Gamett, supra note 13, at 944, citing James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation
as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1305-06 (1985) (discussing the economic
costs of dislocation); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1215-16 (1967) (arguing that
just compensation does not account for the "demoralization" caused to targets).
98. See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 46.
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legal academy, activist David H. Harris, Jr. has pointed to eminent do-
main as a chief culprit in the loss of property by African Americans.
9 9
Historian James W. Ely, Jr. has relied on eighteenth century critics of
government in calling for the courts to rein in the "despotic power" of
modem eminent domain.'
00
In the face of sharp criticism from so many angles, why has eminent
domain been so resistant to change for so long? The chief reason is that
eminent domain was carried along in the wide stream of judicial defer-
ence to economic regulation in the twentieth century. In nearly every
realm, courts have deferred to the policy judgments of governments and
their delegate agencies. 0 1 Indeed, the entire umbrella of what became
known as administrative law has incorporated deference, with limited
exceptions for claims involving special enumerated rights for certain
individuals, such as free speech and race discrimination.102 While courts
in the early twentieth century were often skeptical of permitting the nas-
cent progressive movement to regulate private conduct - the so-called
Lochner era' 0 3 - land use was one of the first areas in which the courts
stopped their second-guessing and let local authorities use a free hand in
regulating private conduct. In the landmark 1926 zoning case, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp.,104 the Supreme Court, using what would
later be called "rational basis" review, deferred to the town's findings
that zoning served the public welfare. 0 5 With a few hiccups, courts at
both the federal and state level have followed Euclid and refused to sec-
ond-guess the substantive wisdom of land use regulations, as long as the
government proffers some public welfare rationale. The Court has even
99. See generally Harris, supra note 4.
100. James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed?, PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec.
2003, at 31, 32.
101. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (courts should defer to policy judg-
ments); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985); Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
102. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984) (federal courts must defer to the legal interpretations of agencies, in large part because the
agencies are part of the political branches of government, which are more responsive to the public);
U. S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977) ("As is customary in reviewing economic
and social regulation, . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and rea-
sonableness of a particular measure."); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 437-38 (Fla. 1972) (courts
should defer to the legislature on social and moral issues).
103. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding the law limiting the hours that
a baker could work violated a "right to contract"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697, 1718 (1984) (criticizing the "Lochner era" as the
assertion by judges of one political choice - libertarianism - over other choices of government).
104. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
105. See id. at 387-97. How can we reconcile the deference provided in Euclid and the contin-
ued strictness of the Supreme Court in reviewing other aspects of activist government until the late
1930s? Perhaps the answer is that zoning laws tended to provide benefits to the majority of affluent
citizens, whose homes were legally protected by zoning from the prospects of annoying businesses
or industry moving in down the street. See id. at 388, 394 (referring to apartments as "parasites" and
suggesting a "pig" doesn't belong in a "parlor"). By contrast, regulations regulating business con-
duct outside of land use, such as the employment regulations at issue in Lochner, tended to help less
affluent Americans at the expense of the capitalist class. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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given its imprimatur to laws that favor a particular character or lifestyle
for the locality - at least if the lifestyle is the single-family household.'
0 6
Only when government has violated procedural standards, such as regu-
lating land on the aesthetic whims of government officials, have courts
been more scrutinizing. 107
Land use regulation is impermissible, of course, when it violates a
specific constitutional right, despite claims of a public purpose. Gov-
ernment cannot use land law to infringe the right of free speech (it cannot
prohibit homeowners from putting political signs on their houses 0 8) or
the right against racial discrimination (government could not explicitly
segregate races through zoning, even in the separate-but-equal era10 9).
Should courts hold that eminent domain's public-use requirement consti-
tutes another right that overrides deference? There are a number of prob-
lems with taking such a step. First, although "public use" might be in-
terpreted to prohibit taking property when it is destined for private hands,
the Fifth Amendment does not make clear, either through its text or its
history, that this is the appropriate interpretation. Moreover, most consti-
tutional rights are enforced from the viewpoint of the citizen challenging
the government - we ask, for example, whether the person's right of free
speech has been restrained. With eminent domain, by contrast, most of
the proposals for a tighter standard tend to focus on the nature of the gov-
ernment's plans for the property, not on its effects on the private citizen.
From a challenger's point of view, there is little difference in effect be-
tween eminent domain for a county fire station, which is clearly constitu-
tional, and a similar taking destined for a private office and shopping
development. Finally, as explained below, most theories accept as con-
stitutional at least some uses of the power to condemn and then transfer
to private hands. It remains a challenge for law to develop a coherent
theory for limiting abuses of eminent domain.
106. Perhaps the height of this deference was Viii. Belle Terre v. City of Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a town's ordinance that was designed to keep
college students from renting group houses. A landlord and a group of students argued that such a
restriction violated various constitutional rights, including the right of association. In upholding the
ordinance, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in effect (Justice Douglas writing for the Court),
that if a town wanted to reserve its land for traditional families only, a court cannot interfere with
this substantive choice. Justice Douglas stated:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legiti-
mate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs .... The police power is
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean
air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Id. at 9.
107. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744 (1993) (city may not reject a land
use because of subjective aesthetic "feelings" of a government official).
108. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45-48 (1994) (enforcing a First Amend-
ment right).
109. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304, 310 (1880) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state law requiring all-white juries and holding that the 14th Amendment's equal protection
guarantee prescribed only race discrimination).
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II. TODAY'S EMINENT DOMAIN CONTROVERSIES
Eminent domain has been the target of a growing chorus of critics
in recent years. This criticism has been driven, in large part, by factual
developments. First, competition among governments has pushed them
to more actively manage their economies and to look for new ways to
attract businesses, jobs, and tax revenue. Moreover, local governments,
understanding that courts have deferred to nearly any exercise of eminent
domain, have decided to flex their power in new, and sometimes disturb-
ing, directions. These changes have forced a reevaluation of the legal
doctrine.
Political science commentators in recent decades have burst the
bubble of the civic republican model, which viewed government as a
body of sober representatives who deliberate and regulate private con-
duct solely in order to serve the common public interest." A more
skeptical perspective, the "public choice" school, argues that there is no
such thing as the "public interest," only initiatives that help one private
interest or the other."' Laws adopted ostensibly to help the public are in
reality the masked use of government to help one group at the expense of
others - be it business interests who are helped by regulation of their
competitors or outdoor enthusiasts aided by laws restricting private de-
velopment in parklands." 2 From another perspective, political scientist
Paul Kantor has argued persuasively that many local governments are no
longer in charge of their destinies." 3 Stung by movement of wealth and
jobs to favored suburbs, many American cities have become desperate to
retain and attract businesses and tax bases. As localities vie for business,
governments become victims of a ruthless "market" in which the demand
- the number of competing localities - greatly exceeds the supply of at-
tractive and job-creating companies.' 14 To lower the cost of doing busi-
ness in their communities, cities are encouraged to take steps such as
110. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1514 (1992) (stating that under the "civic republican model," "govern-
ment's primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to
reach consensus on the common good.")
111. See, e.g., William F. Shughar II & Laura Razzolini, Introduction: Public Choice in the
New Millennium, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE xxii (William F. Shughart II &
Laura Razzolini eds., 2001) (public choice rejects the notion of a "public interest"); JAMES
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 18 (1962) (discussing the role of
economic incentives in human behavior).
112. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (discussing the philosophical stance of public choice and its appli-
cation to many realms of American law).
113. See generally KANTOR, supra note 15, at 172-73 (arguing that with the loss of wealth and
power, cities have become dependent on attracting industry and business).
114. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)




giving tax breaks, curbing regulations, and lowering the cost of land
through creative use of eminent domain."
5
In recent years, governments have moved beyond using their pow-
ers merely to attract business. Localities also understand that attracting
wealthy residents is financially beneficial for the local budgets." 6 Not
only do wealthier citizens usually pay more in property taxes, they also
typically demand fewer government services - they tend to have fewer
children who need public schools, they tend to get involved with crime
less often, and they tend to need fewer government health services and
emergency assistance.' 17 As a result, today's local governments are en-
couraged not only to use eminent domain to shape the climate for busi-
ness, but also to try to shape the composition of their citizenry. Encour-
aging wealthier citizens is, of course, nothing new for local governments.
Since the early days of zoning, localities have used their land use power
for "exclusionary zoning," which discourages the poor, through tech-
niques such as restricting apartment construction and requiring that new
houses must sit on large, and thus expensive, lots. 1 8  Eminent domain
raises the stakes by giving government the disturbing ability to jettison
existing poorer citizens from the community. Accordingly, govern-
ments have pushed to the limits their power to condemn through "blight"
designations, as well as other exercises of eminent domain." 
9
115. In many areas of law, commentators have observed that governments compete for busi-
ness, and are dissuaded from regulating business, in order to improve their budgets and local econo-
mies. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 67, 91-94 (1996).
116. Counsel for New London, Conn., the town whose eminent domain is challenged in the
Kelo case, was quoted as saying, "We need to get housing at the upper end, for people like the Pfizer
employees. They are the professionals, they are the ones with the expertise and the leadership quali-
ties to remake the city - the young urban professionals who will invest in New London, put their
kids in school, and think of this as a place to stay for 20 or 30 years." Iver Peterson, As Land Goes to
Revitalization, There Go the Old Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at A25, available at 2005
WLNR 1273623.
117. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, E Pluribus Unum Urbs: An Exploration of the Potential Bene-
fits of Metropolitan Government on Efforts to Assist Poor Persons, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 471,
502-03 (1998) (discussing why poor persons are likely to impose greater demands on local govern-
ments).
118. See Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (an early and telling example of the aversion
to apartment zoning); South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
174 (1975) (the ground-breaking decision, under New Jersey law, requiring that localities diverge
from their usual aversion to apartment zoning and provide a "fair share" of low-cost housing); see
also James E. McGuire, The Judiciary's Role in Implementing the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Defer-
ence or Activism?, 23 SETON HALL. L. REv. 1276 (1993) (discussing the legislative response); Susan
Ellenberg, Judicial Acquiescence to Large Lot Zoning: Is It Time to Rethink the Trend?, 16 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 183 (1991) (discussing the practice of large-lot zoning, which often is touted as a way
of slowing "growth," but in fact merely spreads it out along a more sprawling are and raises housing
prices).
119. See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 13-26 (discussing the abuse of the "blight" designa-
tion, especially as a means of pushing away undesirable residents).
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The notion of competition among local governments to attract citi-
zens is also nothing new. In the 1950s, economist Charles Tiebout sug-
gested that the extraordinary number of small local governments in the
United States, even in each metropolitan area, serves the purpose of pro-
viding a "market" for governments.1 20 A citizen who desires low taxes
can pick a low-tax, low-service town, while another citizen who prefers
more services - such as an extensive public library or mental-health
counseling - can choose another community. This market for govern-
ments, however, poses a dilemma for compassionate local governments
that seek to provide financial or other assistance for poorer persons, in-
cluding the fostering of low-cost housing.12 1 Assistance for the less af-
fluent encourages them to migrate to the town; at the same time, the tax
burden pushes away more affluent persons. Local governments can thus
be trapped in a variant of the economic tale of the prisoner's dilemma:
Although many governments may desire to provide social services, they
are discouraged from doing so because of competition with their
neighbors.122 The only way out of this dilemma is for governments to try
to close off the market through more centralized government decision-
making, such as through metropolitan-wide governments. 23 Absent this
solution, governments have an incentive to try to jettison poorer people
from their community. While such an idea might strike one as shocking
or callous, it is actually a logical extension of Tiebout's recognition of
local government lawmaking as a market. Spurred by competition from
neighbors, or at least the threat of competition, local governments are
encouraged to maximize their tax bases and to minimize the number of
poor residents in their community by any available method, including
eminent domain.
1 24
There is ample evidence that localities across the nation are using
eminent domain to discourage poor residents and to encourage the afflu-
ent, either through attractive (and high-priced) housing stock or retail
facilities that both pay high taxes and attract an affluent clientele. This
120. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
Tiebout argued that allowing local government to craft their own laws is efficient, because it permits
in effect a market of governments, in which citizens, in theory, are able to pick and choose the type
of government and mix of services (or lack thereof, with the concomitant benefit of lower taxes)
they desire. See id. at 416-24.
121. See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 503-04 (arguing that poor persons are less likely
to be able to shop for governments efficiently, and that governments compete to discourage poor
residents).
122. See id. at 504, citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, EcoNoMics 506-
07 (10th ed. 1976) (discussing the mechanics of the "prisoner's dilemma").
123. See generally Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 504-06.
124. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 116, at A25 (discussing city of New London's desire to
attract upper-income residents through eminent domain); Bill Varian & Kris Hundley, Hillsborough
Set to Woo Scripps Deal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at 1B, available at 2004 WL
12973563 (discussing state government's agreement to pay for some salaries of professional em-




phenomenon cannot be revealed fully by reviewing legal decisions.
125
Many exercises of eminent domain never end up in reported court opin-
ions. After all, one of the perceived problems of eminent domain is that
it is often used against the poor and politically unsophisticated, who are
often unable to mount a legal challenge. A better barometer is found
through news reports of how governments across the nation have been
using, or abusing, eminent domain. Here is a sampling from the years
2004 and 2005:
e In Newark, New Jersey, the city is planning an upscale redevelop-
ment plan in the Mulberry Street area. Two-thousand condominiums
would make up the heart of the planned complex. The city is in the
midst of condemning thirteen acres as "blighted," including a mix of
small homes and businesses. The city business administrator was
quoted as justifying the plan by saying, "In the end, this thing is go-
ing to be here for 70 to 80 years as a tax ratable to the city."
' 126
* South of Newark, in Long Branch, New Jersey, on the Atlantic
coast, the town has used eminent domain to condemn the residences
of about 300 people, many of them black, for redevelopment pro-
jects. The president of the local chapter of the NAACP has com-
plained that "to use eminent domain to move people out just to move
in other people with money - that's just not right.' ' 127 Ironically,
New Jersey was an avatar of state constitutional law to encourage af-
fordable housing; each locality must actively provide for its "fair
share" of low-cost housing.1
28
* In Ardmore, Pennsylvania, the township has designated as
"blighted" much of the downtown business area, including an upscale
coffee shop and a sophisticated men's clothing store. The business
area would be remodeled into an "urban village" focused around a
commuter rail stop, which the town hopes will be able to win back
shoppers who have left for neighboring towns and their shopping
malls. Explaining the township's rationale, Bruce Katz, one of the
nation's leading commentators on urban policy, said, "[c]ities actu-
ally have very few tools at their fingertips to maintain their competi-
tive edge. I think eminent domain is a critical tool for these
places."' 129 Nearby Philadelphia's Society Hill, in which poor resi-
dents were jettisoned for a redevelopment project that started in the
125. See Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and
Trends, 1986-2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251, 257-61 (2004) (discussing eminent domain
and public use decisions over the past 20 years).
126. Jeffery C. Mays, Newark Residents in Limbo - $550 Million Redevelopment Stymies
Homeowners, THE STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 15, 2004, at 3 1, available at 2004 WLNR 18071799.
127. See Joseph Picard, Community Urged to Build Housing, ASBURY PARK FREE PRESS, Feb.
16, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WLNR 16589647.
128. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1975).
129. Matthew P. Blanchard, Ardmore Tailors the Concept of Blight, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 31,
2004, at A01, available at 2004 WLNR 3691422.
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1950s, is cited as an early exemplar of eminent domain to foster gov-
ernment-engineered gentrification.130
* Across the Delaware River in Camden, New Jersey, the old suburb
of Philadelphia plans to demolish hundreds of old houses in various
locations to make way for shopping complexes and condominium
and townhouse developments. Remarkably, for a city whose popula-
tion has fallen dramatically over the past fifty years, the government
claims that one reason for the use of eminent domain is to decrease
"density" in the area. Opponents of the condemnation assert that the
poor people in the community, most of whom are African American
or Latino, don't have the clout that the developers have. 131
* In New York City, Mayor Michael Bloomberg has proposed a "vi-
sionary plan" to keep businesses from moving to the suburbs by cre-
ating a giant new business center in Brooklyn, across from lower
Manhattan. The mayor's plan would create 5.4 million square feet of
office space and thousands of apartments, but would also involve
eminent domain to displace 131 families and nearly 100 busi-
nesses. 132  Meanwhile, in Manhattan, the city used eminent domain
to evict apartment owners near Times Square who refused to sell,
standing in the way of a new office building for the New York Times.
A blight designation was upheld by the New York courts.
13 3
* Across the country in Martinez, California, northeast of San Fran-
cisco, the city is considering the use of eminent domain to remove
low-cost housing for redevelopment - a controversial approach that
the city has rejected before. Although California law makes it com-
paratively difficult to use eminent domain for redevelopment -
among other things the condemnation of housing must be accompa-
nied by subsidies for low-cost housing construction - the practice has
a long history in the state and is becoming more popular. 1
34
* In San Diego, California, a new baseball stadium for the Padres
stands as the anchor of a boom in downtown development, which has
come at the cost of the removal of a number of low-income citizens
and small businesses, many of them Latino, through eminent do-
main.
135
130. See Stephan Salisbury, Society Hill Emerged Amid Tumultuous Times, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 17, 2004, at G13, available at 2004 WLNR 3701679.
131. See Erik Schwartz, Progress or discrimination?, COURIER-POST, Aug. 5, 2004, at 1B,
available at 2004 WLNR 16060884.
132. Hugh Son, Downtown Upswing: City Council Approves Sweeping Redo, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, July 18, 2004, at 47.
133. See Gideon Kanner, Not Always So Fit to Print, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 30, 2002 at A2 1; Gideon
Kanner, Feeding 'Times', NAT'L L. J., Jan. 7, 2002 at A29.
134. Liz Tascio, Redevelopment's Mixed Blessings Cities Use Agencies as Tools to Improve,
Profit, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 18, 2004, at A01, available at 2004 WLNR 3323021.
135. See Daniel B. Wood, San Diego Reinvents Itself - and Gentrifies, CHRISTIAN Scl.
MONITOR, Feb. 26, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 1642415.
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* In North Miami, Florida, the city is using eminent domain to help
give a "face lift" to the working-class town, which holds a large Hai-
tian population. A city attorney was quoted as saying that the pro-
ject, which will involve the demolition of low-cost apartments and
the construction of "upscale" condos, was "social engineering" that
will greatly improve the city's tax base. "If this works," the attorney
said, "everyone associated with it will be able to take pride in a once-
in-a-lifetime accomplishment."
36
* Nearby, in Riviera Beach, Florida, the town is planning an enor-
mous redevelopment project that would remove more than 2,000
houses, many of them low-cost and owned by African Americans, to
allow private development of high-rise condos, large houses, and
shops. The mayor defends the plan by pointing to the plan's tax
benefits, which may pay for better roads and new schools. "We will
eliminate poverty in Riviera Beach," he said. 1
37
9 In Alabaster, Alabama, the town declared as "blighted" a handful
of houses that refused to sell to a developer that planned a 100-acre
shopping center just off Interstate 65. The eminent domain plan re-
ceived nationwide attention after it was reported that Wal-Mart, the
whipping boy of suburban development, was reported to be an an-
chor of the shopping center.
138
* In Lakewood, Ohio, outside Cleveland, the suburb started eminent
domain proceedings against dozens of houses, apartments, and small
businesses, in order to facilitate the construction of new condomini-
ums and a high-end shopping mall. Defending the action, the mayor
said, "This is about Lakewood's future. Lakewood cannot survive
without a strengthened tax base. Is it right to consider this a public
good? Absolutely?"'
139
e In Ohio's capital, Columbus, a film called "Flag Wars" docu-
mented the painful transformation of the city's Near East Side, re-
cently occupied mostly by low-income African Americans, to "Olde
Towne," an area attractive to young urbanites, including many sin-
gle-sex couples, some of whom want the low-income residents to
leave. While the town has not yet used eminent domain, the film-
makers documented instances in which the city government facili-
tated the transformation by steps such as bringing a prosecution
against a vocal low-income resident for an unlawful "sign" concern-
ing his African heritage outside his house.
140
136. See David Ovalle, City is Banking its Future on Massive Redevelopment, MIAMI HERALD,
at IB, available at 2004 WLNR 6296749.
137. See Dennis Cauchon, Pushing the Limits of 'Public Use', USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2004, at
03A, available at 2004 WLNR 6257751.
138. See Patti Bond, Eminent Domain Issue in Alabaster, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 21, 2003,
at IA.
139. 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain: Being Abused? (CBS television broadcast July 4, 2004).
140. See Ty Burr, Documentary on Gentrification Loses Sight of the Big Picture, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2004, at C6, available at 2004 WLNR 3587487.
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9 In Washington, D.C., the city has declared "blighted" a sixteen-
acre area of the poor southeast part of the city, which includes small
businesses run by immigrants, in order to make way for a new shop-
ping center, and plans to use eminent domain to build a new baseball
stadium.141
* Finally, across the country in Las Vegas, Nevada, the government
declared "blighted" and condemned a number of old commercial
businesses in the once-cozy downtown to pave the way for a new
parking garage to serve the casinos of downtown Fremont Street,
which, ironically, is trying to compete with the larger casinos of the
Las Vegas Boulevard strip in America's fastest-growing city.'
42
III. GOOD AND BAD SCENARIOS FOR EMINENT DOMAIN
In this part, I explore some of the dilemmas that face proposals to
tighten eminent domain's public-use requirement. These dilemmas form
obstacles to reform for both property rights conservatives and advocates
for racial minorities and the poor. In order to flesh out these problems, I
conjure up a handful of stylized hypothetical scenarios, most of which
resemble some of the real examples of eminent domain that are filling
the pages of today's newspapers. These scenarios present arguably
"bad" uses of eminent domain and arguably "good" uses of eminent do-
main to foster economic development.
1. Playing Ball. Faced with a tough re-election campaign, a big-city
mayor lunches with the owner of an out-of-town baseball team that
has been losing money in its current home town. The owner asks that
the city provide the team with a parcel of land for the construction of
a new ballpark. The mayor mentions land that is currently occupied
by a few blocks of small houses, occupied mostly by low-income
families. "The people should pose no problem," the major says.
"We'll being willing to play ball, especially if you help me out in the
re-election campaign." Nods are exchanged. The city condemns the
neighborhood as "blighted," and the owner's businesses make contri-
butions to the mayor's re-election campaign.
143
2. Offshore Threat. The chief executive officer of a large manufac-
turing company is faced with declining sales in the face of stiff com-
petition from foreign competitors. The CEO leaks to the press that
141. See Tom Knott, Eminent Domain Threatens American Dream, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), May
20, 2004, at B02, available at 2004 WLNR 771498.
142. See Vin Suprynowicz, "The Taking... is Unconstitutional and Void," LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Sept. 14, 2003, at 2E.
143. Although cases of proven bribery are rare, the most infamous case of government yielding
to powerful and connected private interests in land matters was the sale of much of the Chicago
waterfront to the Illinois Central railroad in 1869. For a history of the politics of the sale, the possi-
ble corruption, and subsequent litigation under the public trust doctrine, see Kearny & Merrill, supra
note 31, at 924-30. For the story of a city's failed attempt to redevelop through construction of a




she will consider moving production "offshore" unless the company
can expand at its current location and incorporate a new hi-tech
manufacturing process. The state government fears the loss of jobs
associated with the plant. The CEO then announces a deadline of
three months for the state to sell, for a nominal price, a 100-acre
piece of property needed for the factory expansion. The 100 acres
include an aging strip mall and a few old apartment buildings. Urged
on by labor union leaders, the state government uses eminent domain
to take the 100 acres. The land is transferred to the manufacturer at a
well-attended media event, behind a banner "Saving Jobs, Building
Our Communities."
144
3. Halting "Decay." An older suburb just east of a big city includes
in its housing stock a large number of small "starter" houses and gar-
den apartments built when the area attracted an influx of workers
during World War II. While nearly all of the early residents were
young white families, in recent years most white families have pre-
ferred the suburbs to the west, which contain newer, larger houses
with two-car garages. In their place, the older suburb has experi-
enced an influx of immigrants, most of whom are Latino or African.
As a result of the demographic shift, the large chain stores leave and
are replaced by small thrift stores and carry-outs. Long-time resi-
dents in the old suburb campaign against the "decay" and eventually
join forces with a national shopping mall developer, which unveils a
plan to level the old shopping street and replace it with a gleaming
new upscale mall - if the county government agrees to take the land
by eminent domain. 
14 5
Each of the three scenarios above might be considered "bad" exer-
cises of eminent domain. In each, undue influence, economic pressure,
or racial and class bias has motivated the exercise of eminent domain.
Each might also raise potent objections under a tougher public-use re-
quirement. Now consider some other, perhaps "better" uses of eminent
domain:
4. The City Park. A growing city finds that a drawback in its origi-
nal layout is the lack of a downtown park. When an old hotel in the
city center is damaged by fire, the local government decides to exer-
cise eminent domain and condemn the building. The city transforms
the block into a central city square. To help pay for its maintenance,
the city enters into long-term leases in the park with a popular coffee
144. The most famous example of a powerful employer's using its economic clout to influence
local government's eminent domain was General Motors' successful effort to get Detroit to condemn
Poletown in the late 1970s. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455, 459-60 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770
(Mich. 2004). Ralph Nader and Alan Hirsch have characterized the struggle between General Mo-
tors and the Poletown residents "like a football game between Penn State and a junior college."
Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 226-27.
145. Consider the example of Silver Spring, Md., the town where the author grew up, and
whose downtown was transformed in the early 2000s as part of a "revitalization" of the old suburb.
See Paul Boudreaux, The New Silver Spring Isn't Golden to Me, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2003, at B08.
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bar chain, a gourmet sandwich shop, and a privately run underground
parking garage. 146
5. Building Avenues. Another rapidly growing city is troubled by the
fact that its downtown streets were laid out in the nineteenth century,
before automobiles, and are too narrow and crooked for today's
heavy commuter traffic flows from suburban residential areas. Be-
cause of the congestion, many leading city businesses are moving to
distant suburbs - a phenomenon that brings with it all the environ-
mental, land use, social, and excessive fuel use problems of "sprawl."
In an effort to curb the sprawl and encourage businesses to stay
downtown, the city and adjacent county join in a plan to take by emi-
nent domain dozens of private lots along four routes into downtown.
The plan is to tear down most of the old structures along these routes,
lay out wider avenues to the downtown (with room for a light-rail
system) and then re-sell the remaining land along the new arteries,
giving priority to those owners whose property would be taken. New
construction along the routes would be undertaken with the assis-
tance of a set of leading urban architects.
147
6. Widget Town. A group of economists conclude that a particular
region's resilient economy has long been bolstered by its reputation
as a center for the widget industry. Without this special reputation,
the economists conclude, the region's economy would be likely to
decline, as many other old industrial areas have done. When the
XYZ Widget Corporation, the region's largest, is offered lucrative
tax breaks by other cities, XYZ announces that it will take one of the
offers unless it gets financial incentives from its home state. The
state legislature decides to condemn by eminent domain some valu-
able riverside land adjacent to the airport, which had been set aside
for a planned park, and instead to build the park on the other side of
the river. The state then sells the condemned land at a discount to
XYZ, in return for a commitment to build a new widget plant and not
to move from the region for another thirty years.
148
7. Revitalization Complex. Another industrial city has not been so
lucky. Like many others, it has witnessed a drain of its middle-class
families to the suburbs, while high crime discourages others from
moving in. As the city's tax base dwindled, its schools and services
suffered. Although many city blocks lay vacant, no one has wanted
146. Pioneer Courthouse Square, the central square in Portland, Ore., which serves as the focal
point for the nation's most famously new-urbanist downtown, was opened by the city only in 1984,
after being a hotel and parking lot for most of its history. See, e.g., Pioneer Courthouse Square
History, http://www.pioneercourthousesquare.org/history.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
147. The modem conception of Paris, France, as being a city of wide boulevards, broad vistas,
and elegant architecture dates largely from the mid 19th century, when Napoleon III's prefect of the
city, Baron Haussmann, condemned huge swaths of the city for his grandiose boulevards. See gen-
erally DAVID P. JORDAN, TRANSFORMING PARIS: THE LIFE AND LABORS OF BARON HAUSSMANN
(1995).
148. Another way of looking at the Poletown matter is to see the city of Detroit wisely using




to risk new housing construction. Finally, a housing developer pro-
poses to build a large mixed-use complex of stores and condomini-
ums, along with a couple hundred low-cost apartments. To be suc-
cessful, the developer states, the complex has to be big enough to
provide a sense of security, and has to be close enough to the down-
town to attract single professionals. To fit the complex in, the devel-
oper plans to buy a number of vacant lots, but also needs the city to
condemn two blocks of occupied properties. The blocks currently
are home to a handful of old row houses, some of whose owners re-
fuse to sell. Persuaded by the prospect of finally finding a private
housing developer that will venture into the city, and by the prospect
that success might attract more developments, the city declares the
block "blighted," condemns it, and sells it for a nominal fee to the
private developer. 149
8. Playing Ball, Revised When the original ballpark plan in sce-
nario 1 falls apart because of a lack of sufficient parking and access
to highways, the newly elected mayor picks a section of downtown
near the interchange of two major freeways and close to existing
downtown parking lots that are usually empty in the evenings. An
independent engineering study concludes that the new location is the
best in the city for a new ballpark. Most of the property is occupied
by warehouses, many of which are abandoned or derelict. When the
engineering study is released, however, three warehouse owners de-
mand a price far higher than the fairly generous government offers.
The city then exercises eminent domain to take the warehouse prop-
erties for fair market value to enable completion of the ballpark pro-
ject.
50
Scenarios 4-8 set forth examples that might be considered more jus-
tifiable exercises of eminent domain. One might consider some or all (or
perhaps none) of scenarios 4-8 to be both worthwhile and fair. One
could argue that in each of these cases the govermnent has "used" the
property to serve the public interest. In scenario 8, in particular, eminent
domain might be justified because private property owners are encour-
aged to "hold out" when their property is fairly unique in fulfilling a pub-
lic housing need. Yet in all of these examples a private party has also
benefited unusually from the taking. In all of the examples except one,
private owners would take the title to the land. And even in scenario 4,
where the government has retained ownership of the "city park," the
149. In Kelo v.City of New London, the town condemned land in order to encourage wealthier
residents, not poorer ones, of course. See Peterson, supra note 116, at A25. In some jurisdictions,
however, any new development project must include a share of low-cost housing, in order to allevi-
ate the affordable housing crunch. See Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, Integrating New Ur-
banism and Affordable Housing Tools, 36 URB. LAW. 857, 858 (2004).
150. Washington, D.C., plans to build a new ballpark, in part through eminent domain, for the
new privately owned Washington Nationals baseball team. See Dana Hedgpeth, Supreme Court
Case Could Affect Baseball Stadium, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2005, at E01. Although the plan is to
keep the property in public ownership, the primary use of and profits from the property would be for
the private owners. See id.
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government has transferred some of the land to private hands through
long-term leaseholds.
If a critic of excessive eminent domain accepts the idea that non-
governmental use of condemned property may sometimes be justified,
then the critic must develop a test to separate permissible uses of eminent
domain from impermissible ones. The most straightforward and restric-
tive test would be to limit eminent domain only to those cases in which
the government retained the fee simple. Such a rule would be a very
strict interpretation of the public-use standard. It would allow govern-
ments to take land for roads, schools, and fire stations, but not to engage
in any development projects in which the land is sold to private interests.
Even this seemingly blanket rule might, of course, cause difficulties.
What if a governmental authority tried to evade the rule by keeping the
fee simple but then entering into a ninety nine-year lease with a private
business? If the rule prohibited the leasing of taken land, would this
prohibit the government from renting out a corner of a passport office
building to a private photo shop, or from leasing out space to a sandwich
shop in the county office center? Would the government be prohibited
from selling the property forever, even when it decided that the fire sta-
tion or post office should be moved elsewhere?
If law allows eminent domain in at least some cases in which the
government transfers the property to private owners, but not others,
complications arise in developing a more nuanced rule. Cases of proven
outright bribery probably should not be permitted; the prohibition might
be extended to cases of improper governmental behavior or bias, as in
the first "playing ball" example, scenario 1, above. But such bias is
likely to be difficult to prove. An even thornier problem arises in sorting
through development projects that are touted as serving the public inter-
est. Compare the examples of "halting decay," scenario 3, with "widget
town," scenario 6. In the former example, the government's argument
that eminent domain serves the public welfare is tainted with racism, or
at least classism. What some affluent residents may view as the "decay"
of a town may appear to other, less affluent persons as merely an evolu-
tion in the town's character in a more diverse America. Accepting that
racial motivation is impermissible, how is a court supposed to make such
a factual finding with exercises of eminent domain? It is true that judges
and juries often make difficult decisions about whether race forms a par-
tial or hidden motivation, in employment and other cases."' But the
well-known difficulties of such inquiries would be magnified in situa-
tions involving animus not against particular individuals, but against an
community. Moreover, in such cases it is not clear whether "disparate
151. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1201, 1215 (1996) (discussing the complexities of discerning racial motivation in legislative deci-
sions); Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979) (setting forth a standard for
claims of racial motivation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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impact" would be sufficient - that is, could a plaintiff make out a prima
facie case simply by showing that the eminent domain disproportionately
hurt members of racial minorities? 152 And how would the law handle a
town's "justification" that it undertook the redevelopment action for
purely financial reasons - that it needed more upscale development in
order to attract tax revenue in order to pay for schools, police, and social
services? 
153
In cases not involving race, the job for the courts becomes even
tougher. When a government argues that it needs eminent domain to
foster economic development, some may applaud the step. Others may
scoff, especially when one or more private businesses end up owning
much or all of the land. Critics may assert that it is private gain, not pub-
lic welfare, that has spurred the project. 154 How is a court supposed to
resolve such a dispute? One stumbling block is ascertaining whether the
locality is being honest about its true motivations. Should a court try to
figure out, as in scenario 7, the "revitalization complex" example,
whether the government's assertions of a public benefit are valid, or a
ruse for private enrichment? Perhaps an even tougher task would be to
revaluate the government's judgment that a project would be financially
beneficial for the locality. In scenario 6, "building avenues," would the
supposed public benefits of building new routes and constructing new
buildings be worth the condemnation of dozens of properties? The an-
swer seems murky. Because of the obvious pitfalls in having courts sec-
ond-guess the judgments of elected officials or their delegated agencies,
courts in the twentieth century essentially washed their hands of such
types of decisions. 55  Exercises of the local police power generally are
given only cursory review, 156 while the Fourteenth Amendment's "ra-
tional basis" test employs a similar standard of deference. 5 7  Indeed,
152. The doctrine that a practice may violate anti-discrimination laws, without proof of dis-
criminatory intent, if it exhibits "disparate impact" on suspect classes, was established in the em-
ployment discrimination case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430-32 (1971). Disparate
impact was made an explicit requirement with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166,
§§106, 107, 105 Stat. 1074, 1074-1076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k) (2004)).
153. A defendant may successfully defend a claim of disparate impact by showing that the
challenged policy or practice is justified as a nondiscriminatory "business necessity." See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 430-32.
154. In Kelo v. New London, argued before the Supreme Court on Feb. 22, 2005, the plaintiffs
argued the government should not be permitted to take property by eminent domain for the purpose
merely of fostering private economic development. See Brief for Petitioners at 12, Kelo v. New
London, No. 04-108 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2004).
155. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (courts should defer to policy judg-
ments); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985);
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955) (refusing to second-guess legislative motivations).
156. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984) (courts will not
review the underlying merits of the police power decision); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (deferring to town's decision to impose zoning restrictions).
157. Unless the claimant is in a suspect class, a governmental discrimination does not violate
the equal protection guarantee as long as there is a "rational basis" for the discrimination, tied to a
legitimate governmental end. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442,
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even when a regulation is fairly obviously spurred by a desire to foster
one business at the expense of another, courts have deferred, as long as
the government sets forth an argument of public benefit. 158 If law is to
impose a tougher standard for eminent domain, therefore, it must go be-
yond the traditional law of deference and answer the hard questions.
IV. QUANDARIES FOR THE RIGHT AND LEFT
Constructing a tighter law of eminent domain is bound to conflict
with some established legal assumptions. It is also bound to clash with
some of the principled stances of both property rights conservatives and
advocates for the poor. Critics from both the right and left may find that
development of a new eminent domain standard will entangle them in
some thorny legal quandaries that will complicate any reform.
A. The Right
Property rights libertarians such as Richard Epstein were among the
first to deplore the supposed excesses of the late twentieth century law of
eminent domain.159 The first quandary facing a property rights-oriented
approach to reform, however, is the matter of compensation. After all,
private property owners are always entitled to "just compensation" when
their property is taken by eminent domain.160  Most of the legal battles
over the property clause of the Fifth Amendment in recent decades have
concerned whether government regulation, causing a diminution in the
value of the land, constitutes a "taking" for which the owner is then enti-
tled to compensation.' 6' The goal of vigorous property rights advocates
in the courts, including Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice
Antonin Scalia, has been a wider obligation of governments to compen-
sate property owners. When faced with challenges to land regulations
that social conservatives view with skepticism - such as ecologically-
448 (1985) (zoning case); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Reid v. Rolling
Fork Pub. Util. Dist., 979 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1992) (land use case).
158. In Williamson, it appeared that the legislature had protected professional optometrists and
ophthalmologists at the expense of opticians by making it illegal for the latter to fit old glasses into
new frames. See 120 F. Supp. 128, 134, 137 (D. Okla. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The
Supreme Court, however, held that it is not the role of the courts to second-guess such policy
choices. 348 U.S. at 487-88. If there is any evidence that a classification serves some legitimate
end it will be upheld, even in the face of considerable evidence that the classification was adopted at
least in part as protectionism for one group over another. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469-70 (1981), rev'g, 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979).
159. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 1.
160. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (entitlement of "just compensation" when government takes
property for public use).
161. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (state must compen-
sate a landowner when a regulation eliminates all economically beneficial use of the land); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (a government cannot obtain an easement to serve
some legitimate governmental purpose, without payment of compensation); id. at 842 ("[I]f [the
government] wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it"); Penn. Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing it is
unfair for government to regulate land use so that a few regulated landowners bear all of the finan-
cial burden of providing a benefit to the community).
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driven limits on coastal construction 162 or laws barring the modification
of old buildings 163 - the front line of attack been to demand compensa-
tion, not to attempt the highly difficult task of second-guessing the pub-
lic-welfare decision on its merits. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in a
famous dissent, a property rights concern is that government should not
force individual landowners to sacrifice the value of their land for the
public good; instead, the government should compensate these landown-
ers.
164
In eminent domain cases, however, government has already con-
ceded that it must pay just compensation (even if the fair market value of
the property, which is the usual standard for assessing compensation,
does not always fully compensate a landowner for the psychological or
sentimental losses sometimes generated with eminent domain). 165  It is
true, of course, that the public-use requirement is a separate constitu-
tional requirement from the no-taking-without-compensation command.
Nonetheless, it would require a change in property rights philosophy to
support a tighter public-use test. Instead of focusing on the plain facts of
the monetary loss accompanying regulation, property rights advocates
will have to focus instead on the vaguer psychological and social losses
associated with eminent domain. 1
66
Indeed, a move away from compensation as the appropriate remedy
under the Fifth Amendment raises an even broader quandary for free-
market critics - a quandary of the fungibility of property. One of the
bases of free-market economics is the idea that the true "worth" of an
asset is best expressed through its monetary value in the market. 167 Dis-
tortions in the market are therefore considered to be "inefficient," in that
they decrease the overall wealth of society. 168  For a marketable asset
such as land, its value is best expressed by its fair market value. For
goods of equal value, rational consumers are presumed to be "indiffer-
162. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992) (holding that the
government must compensate the landowner for the "total taking" regulation, if regulation did not fit
within traditional nuisance regulation).
163. Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138-39 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (arguing that government should have to compensate the landowner for the decreased
value of property as a result of historic preservation law).
164. Id. at 141 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13, at 945 (discussing the psychological costs of losing one's
property by eminent domain); Fennell, supra note 96, at (describing the costs of a loss of "auton-
omy").
166. This is not to say that property rights conservatives fail to contend that property owners
suffer financial loss through eminent domain. Epstein, for example, bases his objections largely on
the cloud over profitable investment and development caused by the potential of eminent domain.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177-81.
167. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 ("[Flor what is the land but the profits thereofi?]" (quoting I
E. COKE, INSTITUTES § 1, at (1st Am. ed. 1812))); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM:
MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999) (discussing the
economic efficiency model of human behavior).
168. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1451-53 (1987) (touting the efficiency of the market and criticizing governmental meddling).
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ent" among them.' 69 To compensate property owners with the fair mar-
ket value of their land - a requirement of eminent domain - is thus to
make them whole. Assuming the relative fungibility of an asset such as
land, an owner whose property is taken by eminent domain should be
able to replace it relatively easily with the compensation award, accord-
ing to free-market economics.
This is not to say that the psychological and social losses associated
are not real costs, of course, to those whose property is taken by eminent
domain. 70 Nonetheless, these costs might justify only a modification of
the amount of compensation in order to make the owner whole, just as
awards for psychic injuries supposedly make tort plaintiffs whole. There
is no principle of "immorality" for violating "rights" in free-market eco-
nomics. Epstein, accordingly has focused not on the psychic harms
caused by eminent domain but by the more subtle and indirect financial
injuries supposedly imposed on business plans by the uncertain specter
of eminent domain.17' It remains a challenge for private-rights jurists to
transform these ideas into workable standards for a tighter law of emi-
nent domain.
B. The Left
Critics on the left face an ever greater array of quandaries. Both a
demand for a stronger right to retain private property (albeit in the name
of less-affluent property owners) and a call for a greater skepticism of the
government's exercise of its police power run counter to the major
thrusts of modem left-of-center property thought.
First, a limit on government's ability to exercise eminent domain
would almost necessarily implicate an expansion of a "right" to private
property, however defined. Yet modem left-of-center conceptions of
property almost uniformly de-emphasize the private, proprietarial nature
of property. As put by Professor Eric T. Freyfogle in his recent book,
The Land We Share, for example, "[p]rivate land in the law is an abstract
human construct" and "private property .. .is a social institution in
which public and private are necessarily joined.' ' 7 2  Citing Benjamin
Franklin's thinking that property is merely a creature of the legal system
and Thomas Jefferson's idea that government should "break up large
169. See, e.g., 2 Paul A. Samuelson, Commentary on Welfare Economics, in THE COLLECTED
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 1041 (Joseph E. Stiglitz ed., 1966) (discussing the
concept of consumer "indifference").
170. See Gamett, supra note 13, at 944, (citing James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation
as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1305-06 (1985) (discussing the economic
costs of dislocation)).
171. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177-81.
172. ERIc T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE 2, 7 (2003).
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landholdings," Freyfogle argued that ownership of property requires, as a
predominant feature, an obligation to the public interest.1
73
Indeed, left-of-center property theory emphasizes the authority of
government to thoroughly insinuate the public interest in private prop-
erty. It rejects the notion that private property is a "bundle" of private
rights, removal of one of which triggers compensation. 74 Liberal com-
mentators objected to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that government cannot regulate
to deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use for the property.
175
And they reject the skepticism of government expressed in the Supreme
Court's stringent standard of review of "exactions" from landowners
seeking permits. 176 Liberal property theory calls instead for a sweeping
deference to governmental decisions to regulate private property.1" En-
vironmentalists argue that pervasive regulations of air, water, and soil
use are justified by the historically under-appreciated interconnections
among these natural resources. 78 Liberal economic policy has empha-
sized the positive role that government can play in restricting, shaping,
and directing economic activity in certain positive directions. 79 A broad
power of eminent domain to foster urban redevelopment would seem,
therefore, to harmonize with this faith in government to mold economic
activity for the public benefit.' 80
A more skeptical standard for eminent domain would seem to align
leftist thought with the public-choice school of politics, usually associ-
ated with the political right. The public-choice theorists scoff at the
progressive notions of government's acting in the "public interest.,
1 81
173. Id. at5.
174. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (likening the owner-
ship of property to a "bundle of rights").
175. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and
Palla/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 334-68 (2004); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and
the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1433, 1438 (1993).
176. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (describing land use exactions as having an essential nexus to
the supposed harm for which they compensate); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 398
(1994) (stating that the exaction must be roughly proportional to the supposed harm).
177. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1039 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (calling for deference to
governments land use policy judgments).
178. Perhaps the most famous aphorism of environmentalists is John Muir's "[w]hen we try to
pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe." JOHN MUIR, MY
FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 110 (1908); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing the fragility and interconnection of ecosystems).
179. See, e.g., Minor Myers III, A Redistributive Role for Local Government, 36 URB. LAW.
753, 776 (2004) (discussing the role of Democratic politics, beginning with the New Deal, in giving
government a larger role n the nation's economy).
180. See, e.g., Brief for Law Professors Robert H. Freilich, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) No. 04-108, 2005 WL 176672 (arguing
for deference).
181. See, e.g., William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini, Introduction: Public choice in the
New Millennium, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE, at xxii (William F. Shughart 11 &
Laura Razzolini eds., 2001) (asserting that public choice rejects the notion of a "public interest");
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Such a concept is an illusion, they contend; most governmental decisions
merely serve one private interest group over another.' 82 Regulations that
purport to protect the environment for example, such as the restrictions
on coastal construction in Lucas, are not manifestations of the public
interest but merely a temporary political victory of those who enjoy rec-
reation on undeveloped beaches over those who would seek to profit
from beachfront houses. 183 To develop a skeptical law of eminent do-
main would be to reverse the traditional leftist trust of government to
regulate social matters and to ally itself, however marginally, with the
public-choice school and the skeptics of the whole notion of the "public
welfare."
In sum, a tougher public-use standard would create an extraordinary
tension with left-of-center property theory. It would seem difficult for a
coherent conception of property law to both (1) follow a deferential
standard toward the regulation of private property, with no requirement
of compensation, and at the same time (2) impose a demanding standard
of inquiry into government's exercise of eminent domain, which comes
with compensation.
V. ASSESSING IDEAS FOR A TOUGHER PUBLIC-USE STANDARD
Most existing proposals for a tighter law of eminent domain fit into
three categories. 184 First, eminent domain could be allowed only when
the government retains the fee simple ownership of the taken property. I
call this the governmental title approach. Second, the power to condemn
could be permissible only when there are special and specified attributes
of the property that justify eminent domain. Such a test, adopted by the
Michigan Supreme Court in 2004 in Hathcock,185 may be called the spe-
cial circumstances approach. Third, courts could construct a more exact-
ing scrutiny of the public-welfare justifications for taking property des-
tined for private ownership. This is the closer scrutiny approach.
The governmental title approach holds the benefit of simplicity.
Drawing on the Fifth Amendment's language of "public use," courts
could hold that governments cannot condemn land and then transfer it to
private parties. Eminent domain for roads, police stations, and fire sta-
tions would still be permissible, but condemnation for economic devel-
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 111, at 18 (discussing the role of economic incentives in human
behavior).
182. See generally Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355
(1999).
183. See generally DAVID LUCAS, LUCAS VS. THE GREEN MACHINE (1995) (describing the
developer's point of view of how he battled what he saw as the overly powerful forces of environ-
mentalism).
184. This list is not exclusive. For another of the growing number of articles criticizing the
20th century deferential law of eminent domain, see Nancy Kubasek Time to Return to a Higher
Standard of Scrutiny in Defining Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 3, Part V. (2003).
185. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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opment would not be. Professor Epstein, for one, appears to favor this
tighter interpretation of the public-use requirement.18 6 The governmental
title approach would also allow for the continuation of some of the sup-
posedly core purposes of eminent domain under liberal ideas of good
governance - public places such as parks, schools, and community cen-
ters.
But there are some serious drawbacks to the governmental title ap-
proach. Such a restriction would eliminate some putatively "good" uses
of the governmental power. Eminent domain in Part III scenarios 5
("building avenues"), 6 ("widget town") 7 ("revitalization complex") and
8 ("playing ball, revisited") each would be unlawful. One might view
such a restriction as the necessary cost of reining in the potential for gov-
ernmental abuse. Nonetheless, it would be an odd system of law that
allowed government to regulate private property so as to prohibit its most
profitable uses and to reduce its value by 80% or so and not owe com-
pensation, as is permitted under current law,187 yet prohibit government
from using eminent domain, with full compensation, for the purpose of
fostering a seemingly worthy cause, such as the low-income housing
revitalization complex in scenario 7. Moreover, if fee simple ownership
were the criterion, crafty governments could circumvent the restriction.
Governments could take property by eminent domain and enter into
long-term leases with private tenants, thus retaining ownership while
providing the land for private "use." The public-use standard could, of
course, be modified further to require that the land be subject to some
sort of governmental control or other restriction. Such compromises lead
naturally to the second approach for restricting eminent domain.
A special circumstances approach was followed the Michigan Su-
preme Court in 2004's County of Wayne v. Hatchock188 It was also pro-
posed by the dissenting United States Supreme Court justices in 2005's
Kelo v. City of New London.'
89
By overruling the infamous Poletown decision, Michigan took the
lead in developing a tighter state law doctrine of eminent domain. The
Hathcock case resembled Poletown in many respects: the county (which
encompasses Detroit and numerous suburbs) wanted to condemn a num-
186. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 170-73 (criticizing the unlimited reach of eminent domain).
187. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1915) (holding that a regulation
preventing owner from continuing to use the property as a brick kiln and deprived the owner of the
bulk of the value of the property was not unconstitutional); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (finding 75% reduction is acceptable); Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp.,
808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding 89% reduction is not a taking).
188. 684 N.W.2d at 775.
189. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor, joined by other property rights conservatives, sought to allow eminent domain
only when the condemned land (1) would be owned by the public, (2) is transferred to a private
common carrier, such as a railroad or utility, or (3) has been taken by government because of some
"affirmative harm" caused by the private land use. See id. at 2673-75.
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ber of privately owned parcels near Detroit's Metropolitan Airport' 90 for
the purpose of a 1,300-acre business and technology park. 19' The county
hoped that the "Pinnacle Project," which would include a conference
center, hotel, recreational facilities, and space for business, would create
thousands of jobs and add hundreds of millions of dollars of tax revenue
for the county.' 92 Much of the land would be transferred to private own-
ership. Wayne County secured hundreds of acres for the project through
voluntary sales, but nineteen owners refused to sell, triggering a county
condemnation proceeding.' 
93
Although not doubting the "public benefit" of the project, the
Michigan Supreme Court nonetheless held that the plan failed to meet a
state's constitutional public-use requirement for eminent domain. Al-
though it called private property "sacrosanct,"'' 94 the court did not impose
a governmental title requirement. 95 Rather, returning to pre-Poletown
precedent, the court concluded that eminent domain destined for private
ownership is sometimes permissible. 196  Three special circumstances
justify condemnation of land destined for private hands. First, con-
demned land may be transferred if a private project would face intoler-
able burdens of "assembly" without eminent domain; transportation cor-
ridors such as railroads and canals, which must follow fairly direct paths,
supposedly fit within this category.' 97 Second, private parties may re-
ceive condemned land if it remains "accountable" to the public through
pervasive regulation, such as electric and water power utilities.' 98 Third,
if the specific piece of land subject to condemnation is of "special con-
cern," then the government may seize and transfer it to private parties.'
99
In Michigan's In re Slum Clearance case of 195 1,200 the government's
desire to remove specific slums justified eminent domain, even though
the land was then sold to private parties. Because the Pinnacle Project in
Hathcock failed to meet any of these three special exceptions, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court held that it could not justify a constitutional exercise
of eminent domain. 20'
190. See Hatchock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
191. In today's business jargon, the word "technology" no longer means the use of science to
create useful things, but refers specifically to computer-related and microelectronic-related busi-
nesses.
192. See Hatchock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 769. Did the court really mean this? Is private property truly "sacrosanct," meaning
that it cannot be touched? Of course not. No one doubts that the county could have taken the plain-
tiffs' property for a police station, without any restriction other than to pay just compensation.
195. See id at 765.
196. See id. at 781.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 782.
199. Id. at 782-83.
200. 50 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Mich. 1951).
201. Hathcock, 689 N.W. 2d at 783-85.
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As do many courts when they make significant changes in the law,
the Michigan Supreme Court took pains to play down the shift. Charac-
terizing Poletown as a radical departure from earlier precedent, the court
modestly stated that it was merely returning to its earlier, more restrictive
approach to eminent domain.2 °2 Moreover, as often occurs when a court
ventures into new territory, the Michigan court failed to explain why its
citation of three special circumstances - and only these three - were the
only permissible uses of eminent domain of land destined for private
ownership. In particular, it seems difficult to distinguish why the re-
moval of an undesirable land use, as in the Slum Clearance case, justifies
eminent domain while the placement of a desirable land use, as in Hath-
cock, does not. The court's explanation that the act of removing a slum
is a public "use," while the Pinnacle Project would not be, seems uncon-
vincing.20 3 Both plans appear to create a putative public benefit, but
without permanent ownership by the public. Moreover, by allowing
eminent domain to be based on a stated undesirability of the current land
use, the reasoning in Hathcock would do nothing to affect the "blight"
determinations that form a very common basis for perceived abuse of
eminent domain. 204 By declaring property "blighted," a government can
avoid entirely Hathcock's tightening of the reach of eminent domain.
Nonetheless, despite the details it leaves unresolved, Hathcock may
prove to be a rallying point for property rights critics, by virtue of its
conclusion that "alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic
base of the community" is not a justification for eminent domain.
20 5
The Hathcock court's job was made easier by its decision not to fol-
low the third general approach to tightening eminent domain - the closer
scrutiny approach.20 6 By relying on old precedent that allowed eminent
domain only for specific purposes, the court did not have to wade into
the thorny ground of trying to second-guess the governmental assertions
of the public benefit to be realized by the planned redevelopment.
"There is ample evidence in the record that the Pinnacle Project would
benefit the public," the court wrote.20 7 "The development is projected to
bring jobs to the struggling local economy, add to tax revenues and
202. Id. at 784-85.
203. Just as eminent domain is of course not the only way to spur economic development,
eminent domain is not the only way to eliminate or ameliorate an undesirable land use. Voluntary
purchases, even with a premium, zoning changes, and orders under the law of nuisance are among
other ways for government to change land use.
204. See generally Pritchett, supra note 4, at 3 (outlining the history of abuse of the "blight"
designation).
205. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
206. The U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo also rejected such an approach. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at
2667-69 (rejecting the plaintiffs' alternative argument that the courts should assess whether a devel-
opment project is "reasonably certain" to provide significant public benefits). The dissenters also
did not suggest a closer scrutiny approach; they proposed instead that the federal constitutional law
follow the special circumstances approach. See id. at 2673-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (setting
forth the circumstances under which eminent domain would be constitutional).
207. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 778.
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thereby increase the resources available for public services, and attract
investors and businesses to the area, thereby reinvigorating the local
economy. 20 8 The judges did not attempt to evaluate whether the private
businesses that might profit from the Pinnacle Project pulled strings
within the Wayne County government. Nor did they attempt to scruti-
nize the magnitude of the supposed economic benefits of the plan or try
to balance this benefit with the psychological and social harm imposed
on the nineteen owners whose property was to be condemned. One can
easily understand why the court might have been reluctant to take on
such Herculean tasks. Nonetheless, many legal commentators have sug-
gested tighter judicial scrutiny as the preferred solution to the abuse of
eminent domain.
The greater scrutiny approach holds the promise of separating the
"bad" uses of eminent domain from the "good." Nonetheless, it faces
extraordinary hurdles. Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett has argued that
courts could subject eminent domain to the demanding scrutiny that the
Rehnquist Court called for in cases of "exactions" - when government
demands property concessions in return for granting a land use permit.
20 9
Under this test, the governmental exaction must have both a reasonable
nexus to and "rough proportionality" to the perceived harm that would
result from the permitted activity.210 While this type of scrutiny seems at
first blush to be a promising avenue for a tighter eminent domain stan-
dard, I suggest that, in practice, it is likely to be a dead end.
Exactions have been, in recent years, among the hottest battle-
grounds for the property rights movement. Using the Fifth Amend-
ment's right against uncompensated taking of private property,2 ' prop-
erty rights proponents have argued that governments unconstitutionally
condition the granting of land use permits. Justice Antonin Scalia, who
has been the leading advocate on the Supreme Court, has characterized
some such demands as "out-and-out... extortion."' 12 In Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
state agency's demand that beachfront-property-owners grant the public
an easement to the beach in return for a permit to rebuild their house.21 3
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia was dubious of the government's
assertion of the supposed police-power reasons for the easement exaction
- the commission had contended that the rebuilt house would interfere
with "visual access" to the beach and impose a "psychological bar-
208. Id.
209. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 936-37.
210. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (requiring an "essential
nexus"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring "rough proportionality").
211. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
212. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
213. Id. at 827-32.
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rier.''214 Finding such assertions to be inadequate, the Court held that
there must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and the property
owner's request.215 Justice Scalia did not hide his suspicion that the Cali-
fornia agency had simply used the building permit request as an excuse
to squeeze the easement out of the landowner.216 When a government
exacts, he wrote, "there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance
of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective. 217 It may be good public policy to improve public access to
the beach, he concluded, and the government may use "its power of emi-
nent domain for this 'public purpose,' . . . but if it wants an easement
across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it."
2 18
Judicial scrutiny of exactions tightened with Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard,219 which involved a demanding Oregon agency. In that case, a
plumbing and electrical supply store owner needed a permit to double the
size of her store and lay asphalt for a parking lot.220 In return for grant-
ing the permit, the city demanded that she comply with the city's "open
space" requirement (imposed in part to decrease the amount of stormwa-
ter that entered the storm sewers) and required that she dedicate a strip of
property along a floodplain for a stretch of a regional pedestrian/bicycle
pathway. 221 The city argued the pathway requirement was closely related
to the planned land use because a bigger store would generate increased
traffic.222 The Court held, however, that the exaction must be "roughly
proportional" to the plan's projected impact.223 In other words, the gov-
ernment's demands cannot be too large. An elephant gun cannot be shot
at a gnat. In Dolan, the city failed the test because it made no "individu-
alized determination" of the relative size of the projected impact; the
government must make some effort to quantify its demand and relate it to
the perceived impact of the land use plan.224
Parallels plainly exist between the abuses of exactions and the
abuses of eminent domain. Both governmental powers are susceptible to
governments using pretexts to justifying its actions. But the chief con-
cern with exactions - that government may be trying to avoid compensa-
tion - obviously does not exist with eminent domain. Compare Nollan
and Dolan with Hathcock. In Nollan, the government failed to provide
214. Id. at 838-39. Justice Brennan argued that courts should defer if the government's judg-
ment "could rationally have decided' that the exaction served an important objective. Id. at 843
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 837.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 841.
218. Id. at 841-42.
219. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
220. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
221. Id. at 379-80.
222. Id. at 389.
223. Id. at 391.
224. See id. at 391-93.
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persuasive evidence that the easement exaction was closely related to the
expected impact of the Nollans' larger house; the government was pre-
sumed to be trying to get something for nothing.225 There is no parallel
in Hathcock. There, the county was offering something to the landown-
ers: just compensation for their property.226 True, money might not fully
compensate a landowner for the psychic and social losses generated by
losing property; however, this is a potential complication with any exer-
cise of eminent domain, even in uncontroversial takings of land for gov-
ernmental title uses.2 2 7 Moreover, any parallel between exactions and
eminent domain breaks down when we analyze what government may be
"hiding" by pretext. With exactions, the typical abuse is that government
desires to create a public benefit - such as the beach easement in Nollan
or the bike path in Dolan - and uses the pretext of land use regulation to
have a landowner, not taxpayer funds, bear the burden of paying for it.
228
By contrast, with eminent domain, the assertions of pretext typically are
not that the authority is hiding its reasons for targeting the particular
landowner. 229 Rather, allegations of pretext typically concern the gov-
ernment's motivation for using eminent domain, such as the concern that
Detroit unwisely succumbed to pressure from General Motors in taking
the Poletown neighborhood. 230 By contrast, the Supreme Court in both
Nollan and Dolan stressed that the exactions inquiry was not to scruti-
nize the value of the asserted public benefit, such as the beach easement
or bike path, but rather to scrutinize the imposition of the burden on the
private landowner.23'
A tighter law of eminent domain could, of course, turn on a stricter
scrutiny of the government's motivations. Scrutiny of underlying rea-
sons is notoriously difficult, but not impossible. The laws against race
and sex discrimination charge courts with determining whether, say, the
motivation for firing an employee was poor job performance or unlawful
racial animus.232 The extraordinarily hard task of parsing motivation
from ostentation is justified in large part because of the importance of
excising such discrimination from society. Property rights advocates, of
course, might argue that the right to land should be given equal respect.
Even so, it is understandable why no court has taken on the onerous task
225. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42.
226. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771.
227. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13, at 945 (discussing the psychological costs of losing one's
property by eminent domain); Fennell, supra note 96, at 966-67 (costs of loss of "autonomy").
228. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391-93.
229. An exception is the category of claims that government has targeted a particular group
because of its race. See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 47 (assertions of "Negro removal").
230. See generally Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (overruling Poletown).
231. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391-93.
232. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv.
1201, 1214-15 (1996) (discussing the complexities of discerning racial motivation in legislative
decisions); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (setting forth a standard for
claims of racial motivation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of trying to scrutinize the true motivations of government in exercising
eminent domain.
Moreover, the second step of the exactions test - Dolan's require-
ment of "rough proportionality" - does not fit the problem of abusive
eminent domain.233 Under Dolan, the government must make at least a
rough assessment of the magnitude of the perceived harm with the prop-
erty owner's requested land use and then compare this with the exaction
demanded in return. With eminent domain, law might begin by calculat-
ing the public benefit of the project for which the property is being con-
demned. The government could be required to estimate how many jobs
might be created and how much money would be added to the local
economy each year. Such a requirement might be an effective way to
ferret out the worst abuses of eminent domain, such as a condemnations
incurred by bribery. But with most large-scale eminent domain projects,
however, the government already makes such calculations. For the Pin-
nacle Project at issue in Hathcock, for example, the county said that it
expected more than 30,000 jobs and millions of dollars to be added to the
economy.234 One might ask whether such figures were seen through
rose-colored glasses, but tighter judicial scrutiny would generate the
usual problems of tasking the courts with second-guessing the economic
conclusions of elected executives, legislatures, or their delegated agen-
cies.235 The usual solution in administrative law is merely to require that
the government show that it has done a decent job of compiling the rele-
vant data and explaining it; the final decision of whether to go forward
with a project is left to the political branches.236 Law might be able to
develop a doctrine that says, "If a court concludes that a development
project will provide little or no economic or public benefit, it should set
aside the condemnation," but this would be a tall order for any judge.
An even more fundamental dilemma in applying Dolan's "rough
proportionality" comparison is to figure out what to compare the per-
ceived benefits with. One obvious choice would be the amount of the
compensation. If the government has to pay $2 million dollars in com-
pensation to take land for a project that is expected to add a discounted
value of only $1 million for the local economy, this would seem to be an
unwise use of governmental power. But such an anomaly would not
seem to be a source of complaint for the landowners (who would get the
233. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
234. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770-71.
235. See, e.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 772 (noting that in the context of eminent domain the
court is limited to reviewing a public agency's determination that a condemnation serves a public
necessity only for "fraud, error of law, or abuse of discretion.").
236. See, e.g., Haw. Pub. Hous. Auth. v Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984) (deferring to the
government's findings as to the benefits of a project fostered by eminent domain); see also Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (courts should defer to policy judgments); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740
(1983).
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$2 million) as much as for the taxpayers; thus it would form a poor basis
for a personal property right. In essence, such a test would merely de-
termine whether the government is paying too much for the land. In fact,
landowners would be faced with the contradictory task of arguing, in
effect, that the government is paying them relatively too much for the
land. (If the just compensation could be re-evaluated to $500,000, for
example, the project would then seem worthwhile for the community,
even though the landowners would end up worse off.)
Moreover, balancing value with cost would be a difficult and con-
troversial task in eminent domain. Libertarians argue, with some force,
that government-sponsored projects often shift economic activity from
one set of businesses, which are not aided by the government, to another
set, which in effect are subsidized by the new development plan. 237 The
high-technology businesses that would be helped by Wayne County's
Pinnacle Project might simply take money and jobs away from other
companies that did not have the luck, or perhaps the political savvy, to
secure government assistance. At best, the skeptical critique goes, gov-
ernment-subsidized development simply moves jobs from one area to
another, and governments are caught in a dilemma of trying to out-
subsidize their neighbors to attract business.238 A quintessential example
is professional sports, in which governments quite openly pay, through
building multi-million-dollar stadiums and other financial incentives, to
lure teams away from other cities. 239 Like any instance of paying to get a
240reward, much or all of the financial benefits are lost with the payment.
Governments should refrain, the critique concludes, from interfering with
the free market.241
Political skeptics also point out that eager local governments often
have an incentive to inflate the expected financial benefits of develop-
ment projects. 42 Politicians realize that voters are attracted to those who
claim that they can give something for nothing - that by wise use of emi-
nent domain and other projects, they can claim to boost the area's econ-
omy. Those more sober candidates who emphasize the limits of gov-
237. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 168, at 1451-53 (touting the efficiency of the market and
criticizing governmental meddling).
238. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20
(1956) (arguing that competing local governments act as a "market" in which citizens may choose
where to live); see also KANTOR, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the incentive of cities to try to pay
to attract business).
239. See, e.g., Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums:
Policy andPractice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173 (2002) (discussing the variety of public financing).
240. See Peter Sepulveda, Comment, The Use of the Eminent Domain Power in the Relocation
of Sports Stadiums to Urban Areas: Is the Public Purpose Requirement Satisfied? II SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 137, 148-50 (2002).
241. See, e.g., National Platform of the Libertarian Party, Adopted May 2004,
http://lp.org/issues/platform-all.shtml (setting out Libertarian party's position re free market).
242. See, e.g., ROGER AND ME (Warner Bros. Inc. 1989) (filmmaker Michael Moore's first
movie, detailing, among other things, the ill-fated effort of his hometown, Flint, Mich., to succeed
with a theme park called "Autoworld").
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ernmental power are simply not as appealing. It is unlikely, however,
that courts can do a better job of policing this political phenomenon than
they can of assessing the true economic value of a development plan. In
sum, the approach to reforming eminent domain of requiring courts to
give greater scrutiny to governments' economic policy decisions is likely
to be a dead end.
VI. THE SOLUTION OF REPRESENTATION REINFORCEMENT
A rule of eminent domain that requires courts to scrutinize eco-
nomic claims is, moreover, likely to be most beneficial to those parties
that hold the financial resources necessary to marshal expert witnesses
and complicated data inherent in such challenges.243 This result would
be especially unwelcome, considering the perceived abuse of ordinary
citizens in losing their land to well-connected businesses through emi-
nent domain.2 " If economic justification were the touchstone, then
businesses and other institutions would be in a better position to win
complex cases than would individual homeowners.
A more compelling argument for a tighter law of eminent domain, I
suggest, is to preserve the personal integrity of the citizen's home and to
avoid the psychic and social damages associated with the loss of a home,
despite monetary compensation.245 Accordingly, I propose, the law
should focus not on the reasons for the government's decision to use its
power, but rather on the claims of those private citizens who serve as the
unwanted targets of eminent domain. To craft such a rule I suggest reli-
ance on the "representation reinforcement" theory of judicial review.
A. Representation Reinforcement and Political Participation
Under the theory of the late professor John Hart Ely, the interpreta-
tion of individual constitutional rights should not depend upon a delinea-
tion of certain "fundamental" substantive rights.246 Rather, rights are
better interpreted as circumstances in which law does not trust the
elected legislature to protect the interests of those who lack political
clout.247 Review should focus, Ely wrote, "only on questions of partici-
pation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under
attack.
248
243. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Competing and Complementary Rule Systems: Civil Procedure
and ADR: Procedure as Contract, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 615 n.83 (2005) (discussing the
advantages of the "repeat player" in any adversarial setting).
244. See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 219-22.
245. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13, at 946 (discussing the psychological costs of losing one's
property by eminent domain); Fennell, supra note 96, at 957 (discussing costs of loss of "auton-
omy").
246. See generally ELY, supra note 22.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 181. Ely's focus on process, as opposed to substantive rights, generated consider-
able criticism from various comers, from which substance is seen as still crucially important. See,
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The representation reinforcement approach avoids the crippling
faults of both of the traditional camps of constitutional interpretation.
The first method, which Ely called "clause-bound interpretivism," and
which others might call "textualism" or "original intent," calls for un-
earthing the supposed intention of the eighteenth and nineteenth century
drafters of the Constitution.249 But many constitutional rights, including
"freedom of speech,250 "due process,' 25' and "equal protection, 252 were
written with broad, amorphous phrases that seem to cry out for evolving
interpretations in different ages and under varying circumstances. 3
With all of these rights, Ely argued, both the history and textual phrasing
seem to point to a concern over the procedure of social, political, and
judicial actions.254 With free speech, for example, the concern is that all
persons are able to participate in the public debate, not that any particular
utterances need special protection.255 The right to due process mandates
deliberate and meticulous consideration in a wide variety of legal and
judicial proceedings, in order to ensure that certain persons are not
treated in a cursory or haphazard manner.25 6 And with equal protection,
the fear once again is that certain persons - especially African Americans
- would fail to receive an equal say in the development of laws and civic
opportunities.257
The traditional alternative to clause-bound interpretivism, on the
other hand, frees judges to create their own conceptions of what values
are "fundamental." Giving such power to judges, however, is inherently
undemocratic. As Ely pointed out, this judicial power allows courts to
override the decisions of the public's elected officials (or their bureau-
cratic delegates) and impose their own social, political, and moral judg-
258ments upon society. At some level, almost everyone agrees thatjudges should be constrained; one might agree with the outcomes of Roe
e.g., TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 44-50 (1999); Paul Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Nonnative Constitutional Schol-
arship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1092-93 (1981); Samuel Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy:
John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
547, 578 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064-65 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1980). I do not
seek to add to the debate over Ely's general theory, but rather to employ it in one context - eminent
domain.
249. See ELY, supra note 22, at 11.
250. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (proclaiming right to "freedom of speech").
251. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (controlling how both the national and state govern-
ments may deprive a person of life, life, or property).
252. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (describing the "equal protection" guarantee, which at its
genesis concerned the rights of African Americans). See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
309 (1880).
253. See ELY, supra note 22, at 11-13.
254. See id. at 13.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 14-22.
257. See id at 32-41.
258. See id at 43-48.
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v. Wade259 or Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council260 or both, but
few believe that courts should return to the days of Lochner v. New
York. 261 None of the proposed touchstones for "doing the right thing" -
natural law, neutral principles, tradition, or consensus - is able to rein in
judges from simply acting as super-legislatures, using their own values to
decide what is best for society.262
The solution to the dilemma, Ely concluded, is to view constitu-
tional rights as "policing the process of representation.' ' 63 Building from
the famous footnote four of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Carolene Products,26 this approach presumes that most deci-
sions of the political branches are reasonable ones - thus the doctrine of
judicial deference, which spans across all fields of law.265 Only when
laws do special harm to those minority groups who are likely to hold less
clout in the political and lawmaking process should courts intervene. 66
What the eighteenth-century framers, such as James Madison, were most
concerned about, and what modem judicial review should focus on, Ely
argued, is participation.267 Courts should not try to focus on "whether
this or that substantive value is unusually important or fundamental," he
wrote, "but rather on whether the opportunity to participate either in the
political processes ...or in the accommodation those processes have
reached, has been unduly constricted.'2 68 As shown by the groundbreak-
ing decisions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, Ely
argued that judges are uniquely qualified, by virtue of their distance from
day-to-day politics and long tenure, to think about whether the minority
has been hurt by a "malfunction" in the political process. 269 The goal of
judicial review, Ely therefore concluded, should be "unblocking stop-
pages in the democratic process ... [w]e cannot trust the ins [in the po-
litical process] to decide who stays out." 270 Courts should "protect those
who can't protect themselves politically," he concluded.271 "The whole
259. Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (describing constitutional right to abort one's fetus).
260. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that a land use regula-
tion is a compensable taking of private property if it prohibits "all economically productive or bene-
ficial use of the land").
261. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (stating government could not regulate
working hours because it violates an unenumerated right to contract).
262. See ELY, supra note 22, at 48-72.
263. Id. at 73.
264. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that courts
should protect "discrete and insular minorities").
265. See ELY, supra note 22, at 78. For leading cases on deference, see, e.g., Ewing v. Califor-
nia, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (confirming courts should defer to policy judgments); Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725, 740 (1983).
266. See Ely, supra note 22, at 79
267. See id. at 78-82.
268. ELY, supra note 22, at 77 (discussing the history of judicial review).
269. See id. (discussing the Warren court).
270. Id. at 117.
271. See id. at 152.
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point of the approach is to identify those groups in society to whose
needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in attend-
ing. 
27 2
Writing in the early 1980s, not far from the end of the civil rights
era, Ely naturally considered the quintessential poorly-represented mi-
nority group to be African Americans, and he focused on laws based on
prejudice against, or stereotype of, African Americans. 73 Nonetheless,
Ely recognized that courts should be protective of other groups, such as
aliens, who cannot vote. 74 An even larger minority group is "the poor,"
though Ely felt that the problems of the poor most often stemmed from
the government's failure to provide them with needed services - not
from affirmative steps to disadvantage them. 275 Using the example of the
death penalty, however, he argued that a punishment that "people like
us" need not worry about - meaning the majority of middle-class citizens
who hold some clout in the political process - is the quintessential kind
of legal decision in which "some nonpolitical check on excessive sever-
ity is needed.,
276
Despite the recognition that Ely's approach has received in acade-
mia, it has suffered from a shortcoming of many scholarly ideas - a fail-
ure to be explicitly recognized by the practitioners of law. While a num-
ber of courts have cited Ely's thoughts on various aspects of constitu-
tional law and interpretation, and while some courts have agreed with the
idea that laws concerning racial minorities deserve special scrutiny, few
courts have cited or relied on Ely's specific prescription - the approach
of representation reinforcement.277 Ely's theory has been useful as an
explanation for why protection of racial minorities has been such an im-
portant feature of American law, 278 but it has not done much to develop a
practical philosophy of judicial review for other categories of claims. In
the twenty-first century, fewer laws stereotype racial minorities. Accord-
ingly, it remains a challenge to apply Ely's theory to strengthen the
claims of other categories of persons who deserve to have their represen-
tation reinforced.
272. Id. at 151.
273. Seeid. at 155-57.
274. See id. at 161-62.
275. Seeid. at 161-62.
276. See id. at 173.
277. While a handful of federal or state courts have cited Ely's theory, they usually do so to
help support claims of well-recognized minority groups, such as racial minorities, immigrants, or
prisoners. See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 203 n.65 (D. Mass. 2004) (evaluating
prisoner rights case); State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 470 S.E.2d 162, 171 (W. Va. 1996) (discuss-
ing minority rights).
278. See, e.g., League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 858 (5th
Cir. 1993) (citing Ely for race discrimination claim).
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B. Representation Reinforcement and Eminent Domain
The dilemma of eminent domain, I suggest, is an excellent match
for representation reinforcement. Poorer citizens - owners of modest
homes, apartment dwellers, and small businesspersons - are quintessen-
tial "outs" in local government decision-making. 279  When government
considers whether to use eminent domain, we can easily understand why
local officials have "no apparent interest in attending" to the needs and
wishes of the poor. 280  The incentives noted by Tiebout's model lead
governments to discourage the participation of poorer citizens in favor of
more affluent persons.281 For governments that are concerned with im-
proving their tax bases, it simply is not economical to pay attention to the
needs or desires of the poor.282 Indeed, the usual ace-in-the-hole for poor
persons - their ability to vote in elections with the same clout as the rich
- may conceivably be lost with eminent domain, which enables govern-
ments to, quite literally, expel poor people from a locality and its voting
booths.28 3 If law is to grant property owners some sort of right not to
have their land taken through eminent domain, it makes sense to begin
with the category of persons who are the most likely and sympathetic
targets of abusive eminent domain.
Most academic critics, to date, have proposed greater scrutiny by
focusing on the end use of the land after the condemnation.28 4 Taking
their cue from the "public use" requirement, critics seek to tighten emi-
nent domain by asking courts to provide greater scrutiny in cases in
which the land is destined for private hands.285 Condemnation for a pub-
lic highway would be nearly always acceptable, no matter how dubious
the highway project is. 2 86 Meanwhile condemnation for a redevelopment
project, such as for an urban shopping complex, would be inherently
279. See ELY, supra note 22, at 20 (professing law should protect the "outs" from the tyranny
of the "ins").
280. Id. at 151. (arguing that identifying and protecting such groups should be the primary
responsibility of courts in asserting rights).
281. See Tiebout, supra note 120, at 418. (arguing that state governments may compete to
attract residents). Professor Gerald Frug has proposed that, in order to increase the clout of citizens
over their metropolitan area, they be permitted to vote in jurisdictions in which they do not reside.
Professor Frug suggests just such a solution. See Gerald Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U.
CH. L. Rrv. 253, 324-30 (1993).
282. See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 120.
283. See, e.g., Harris, Jr., supra note 4, at 12 (complaining of governmental efforts to discour-
age or remove African American residents).
284. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13 at 934-36.
285. See, e.g., id at 936-37 (contending that the standard should employ the law of land use
"exactions," which requires an assessment of the need for the governmental regulation); Jones, supra
note 19, at 302 (arguing for flipping the presumption against the government in private end use
cases).
286. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1971)
(setting aside a plan to build an interstate highway through Overton Park in Memphis,Tenn.); N.C.
Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 9 (1986) (suggesting that the construc-
tion of an expressway through an African American neighborhood would constitute a violation of
the residents' Title VII rights)
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more suspect.287 But, as I have endeavored to explain, a focus on the end
use may turn out to be an unsatisfactory solution for property owners.
From the perspective of the landowner, losing one's land for a suspect
highway is not any less unpleasant than losing one's land for a suspect
shopping center. The fact that the highway is public property is unlikely
to assuage the feelings of the landowner whose property is taken. A re-
quirement that the end use be governmental is unlikely to match those
cases in which losses by landowners arouse the greatest sympathy. 288 It
is unfairness to those who appear to have "lost" in the political process
that should be the focus of a tighter law of eminent domain.289
Moreover, a strict governmental title requirement is unlikely to
mesh well with the examples of eminent domain driven by undue private
influence.290 A highway, after all, may be just as susceptible as a shop-
ping complex to being spurred by abuse. Highway construction compa-
nies and those who own land near the exits, for example, may be just as
adept as shopping mall developers in twisting government to suit their
desires.29' Viewing the question from the other side, some private end-
uses, such as a low-cost housing development and shopping centers in
depressed inner city areas, may serve the public interest better than some
purely public end-uses, such as a highway built to serve yet another
sprawling upscale housing development or super-mall built on former
forest land. If a goal is to stop economically dubious projects, greater
scrutiny only of eminent domain destined for private ownership would
not stop the potential for abuse.
1. A Proposed New Requirement for Eminent Domain
I propose, by contrast, that a tighter law of eminent domain focus
not on the end use, but on the landowners whose property is taken or, for
lack of a better term, the "targets" of eminent domain. In particular, I
propose that law focus on those categories of cases in which we perceive
that it is most unfair for the owners or residents to lose their property,
especially those cases in which we suspect that residents have failed to
have their voices heard in the political process. Because eminent domain
comes with monetary compensation, the chief harm to the landowner
comes from the psychological and social injury, and the loss of personal
287. Brief of Petitioners at 9-11, Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2665 (2005) (arguing against
permitting eminent domain for the governmental purpose of economic development) (No. 04-108).
288. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 944-49 (discussing the psychological and economic losses
suffered by ousted landowners).
289. See infra Part VI.B. 1.
290. See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 218-24 (emphasizing the disparity in political
power between small landowners and large corporations in eminent domain cases for private rede-
velopment).
291. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the United
States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1192 (2004) (discussing the power of the highway lobby, writ-




autonomy, associated with condemnation.292 Being evicted from one's
home, by no fault of one's own, is likely to alienate one further from
one's government and community.293 This is especially true when the
locality is admittedly trying to replace certain housing stock - and per-
haps even categories of people - with others. The burdens of having to
leave the condemned residence and find another home is a cost that the
just compensation requirement may not address fully - and when a town
is trying to improve its tax base by eliminating low-cost (and low-taxed)
housing and encouraging high-cost (and high-taxed) housing, it is a tru-
ism that a poor household may find it difficult to obtain comparable
housing in the "upscaled" community.294 Having to move far from one's
home poses an array of problems, of course, including the potential diffi-
culties of a longer commute to work, the need for children to move
schools, and the loss of connections to the community, such as places of
worship, neighborhood friends, and social groups.295 For businesses
taken by eminent domain, there also may be consequential losses not
monetarily compensated for by eminent domain, such as the loss of
"goodwill" built up in the neighborhood.296 Nonetheless, considering the
significance of damages to the personal integrity associated with the loss
of a family's home, I propose that a stricter law of eminent domain focus
on condemnations of personal residences. In sum, the law should
tighten eminent domain to reinforce the representation of persons whose
integrity is damaged by the loss of a residence - whether it be a house,
apartment, or mobile home.
Which facts should lead a reviewing court to invoke representation
reinforcement? First, I propose that the traditional legal standards ap-
plied to suspect racial minorities be extended to eminent domain. The
doctrine of disparate impact2 97 began in employment discrimination law
and has since been extended to other realms of discrimination law.
298
Unjustified disparate impact is unlawful because it roots out cases of
hidden conscious discrimination, and it forces changes to policies that
may provide similar benefits to the actor with fewer adverse effects on
292. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 944-47 (discussing the psychological costs of condemnation
on small landowners); Fennell, supra note 96 (costs of loss of "autonomy").
293. See Gamett, supra note 13, at 945-47.
294. See Peterson, supra note 116, at A25 (explaining that one reason for the New London
condemnation is to encourage wealthier residents).
295. See articles cited supra note 292.
296. See, e.g., Alan T. Ackerman, Just Compensation for the Condemnation of Going Concern
Value, 64 MICH. BAR J. 1314, 1317 n.56 (1985) (discussing the "usual rule" that goodwill is not
compensable).
297. This doctrine requires that actions which have an adverse impact on racial minorities be
supported by bona fide justifications. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26,
436 (1971).
298. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26, 436 (establishing "disparate impact" in employment
discrimination cases); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 509-12 (2004) (applying "disparate impact"
analysis to discrimination against handicapped persons).
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the suspect groups. 299  Although the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis00 held that the federal constitution's equal protection command
prohibits intentional discrimination, not disparate impact, there is no
textual reason why it should be permitted under statutory law but disal-
lowed under the Fourteenth Amendment.3°' In any event, if law were to
apply to representation reinforcement to eminent domain, cases of dispa-
rate impact on suspect classes, most prominently racial minorities, are a
logical place to start.
30 2
Moreover, although federal equal protection law has not included
poor people within the suspect class, the poor are the quintessential cate-
gory of persons deserving of representation reinforcement.3 3 Poor peo-
ple merit protection for at least two compelling reasons. First, the poor
are likely to be disadvantaged in lobbying local governments and influ-
encing eminent domain decisions.30 4 Public choice theory reminds us that
policy decisions are often the result of one interest group prevailing over
others. 30 5  Second, under the Tiebout model of local governments, the
poor are the most likely targets of eminent domain, as a result of gov-
ernment efforts to maximize tax revenue and minimize expenditures.
30 6
An obstacle to representation reinforcement for the poor is, of
course, that it lacks an explicit textual basis in the United States Consti-
tution's Fifth Amendment 30 7 or in most state constitutions. How could
representation reinforcement be melded into eminent domain's "public
use" restriction? Ely's theory considers that when a group fails to re-
ceive adequate representation in the halls of government, courts should
299. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987) (setting forth justifications for finding discrimination
through disparate impact analysis).
300. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
301. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring equal protection under the laws) with Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2004) (proscribing discrimination "because of race" in renting or
selling real estate) and Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion "on the ground of race" for recipients of federal financial assistance).
302. Applying eminent domain law to protect racial minorities would harmonize with the
"environmental justice" movement, which seeks to protect racial minorities from receiving a dispro-
portionate share of the risks of environmental harms. Like eminent domain today, environmental
law did not consider the distributional effects of laws until the environmental justice movement
began in the 1980s. See generally EDWARD LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA
(2003) (tracing the history of the environmental justice movement); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING
IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990) (providing one of the original dis-
cussions of the environmental justice movement); Tara R. Kebodeaux & Danielle M. Brock, Envi-
ronmental Justice: A Choice Between Social Justice and Economic Development?, 28 S. U. L REV.
123 (2001) (discussing some of the contentious siting battles in Louisiana).
303. See supra Part VI.A.
304. See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 219-24.
305. Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 377, 392 (1997) (suggesting that under public choice theory, business groups may tend to
prevail in political struggles).
306. See generally Tiebout, supra note 114.




step in and ensure that all the "public" receives consideration. °8 Putting
this theory into action, eminent domain and its public-use requirement
could be interpreted as follows: Eminent domain would be impermissi-
ble if it both results in a private end-use and disproportionately harms
poor persons. Just as the disparate impact standard serves to pinpoint
otherwise-hard-to-detect forms of discrimination in employment, inject-
ing the public-use standard with a dose of representation reinforcement
would give some force to the judicial inquiry of whether an exercise of
eminent domain really does serve the public.30 9  Such a rule would be
more straightforward and easier to apply than having to balance the pur-
ported benefits of a particular development project, as others have pro-
posed.310 Government would be permitted to take land destined for pri-
vate hands, but only if the land does not include the residences of poor
citizens. Taking commercial land or taking more upscale residences
would be permissible. Finally, government could take the residences of
poor persons, but it could do so only when the public retains ownership.
How would such a standard affect government-fostered redevelop-
ment projects? I suspect that they would be hindered but not crippled.31'
Localities would still be encouraged to provide tax breaks and other in-
centives to attract new businesses;312 more often, however, private devel-
opers would have to buy or lease the land on the private market, without
help from eminent domain.3 13 Governments would still be able to con-
demn private property for important redevelopment projects, but they
would be required to do so in a manner that did not disproportionately
harm the poorer citizens of the community. Some of the most egregious
impositions of eminent domain on the least powerful members of the
community might be avoided without unduly hampering government
efforts to foster economic development. The "fit" between impermissi-
ble uses of eminent domain and the perceived abuses of governmental
308. See ELY, supra note 22, at 135-59.
309. When government takes the residences of poor persons and racial minorities, we have a
reason to fear that the eminent domain was motivated, at least in part, by undue influence from those
private parties who would benefit from the development, even if there is no proof of such undue
influence. Because of the inherent difficulty of proving such motivation in litigation, a legal rule can
avoid the likelihood of undue influence by requiring that government acts avoid the questionable
action. To avoid "false negatives" of hidden undue influence, we accept some "false positives" by
banning such government action altogether.
310. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13 (proposing greater scrutiny in public-use cases through a
parallel to the exactions test); Jones, supra note 19, at 286-87, 305-14 (proposing a flipping of the
public-use presumption that currently favors the government).
311. See Brief of Law Professors Robert Freilich et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 16-17, Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (arguing that local gov-
ernments would be crippled if prevented from using eminent domain for any and all redevelopment
plans).
312. See, e.g., KANTOR, supra note 15 (explaining that cities compete to attract businesses).
313. See ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR DURST, HOLDOUTS! (1984) (discussing the phenome-
non of landowners "holding out" against big development projects in New York City); DANIEL
OKRENT, GREAT FORTUNE 95-98 (2003) (discussing those who held out permanently against the
development of Rockefeller Center in midtown Manhattan, which was built anyway and became
arguably the most successful urban development project in American history).
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power would not be perfect, but would come as close possible under
practical law.
2. Other Applications of Representation Reinforcement
Another way in which the law could incorporate representation rein-
forcement would be to place more explicit lawmaking hurdles in the way
of eminent domain. Under the laws of most jurisdictions, local devel-
opment agencies are created by government but often act very independ-
ently of legislative control.314 These agencies hold the power to wield
eminent domain, typically with only a subsequent rubber-stamp approval
process from a legislative body. 315 The isolation of these agencies makes
them unusually susceptible to coercion and influence, especially by
wealthy developers and influential citizens.316 Development agencies
often act in ways that would make legislators, who are directly respon-
sive to the people at the ballot box, hesitate. This is especially true in
regard to using eminent domain to condemn homes.
A potential solution to the problem of development agencies is to
require that eminent domain be approved as regular legislation, not
through short-cut approvals by city councils, county commissioners, and
state legislatures.317 Given more public exposure than is usually pro-
vided in cursory administrative condemnations, legislative eminent do-
main would be subject to more open hearings and greater public scrutiny.
This is not to say that local legislators are not capable of being unduly
influenced or even bribed, but the hurdles that nearly all governments
impose on the adoption of new legislation provide some protection
against abuse and increase the chances that unwarranted exercises of
eminent domain may be exposed and stopped.318 Moreover, requiring
regular legislation also fits well with representation reinforcement.
Delegating decisions to administrative agencies makes the most sense
when the choice involves technical or scientific expertise.3 19 Such exper-
tise may be needed in figuring out what sort of development project, if
any, a locality may need, assessing its potential benefits, and deciding to
where to locate it. Less susceptible to agency expertise, however, are the
difficult questions whether the social and psychological costs of con-
314. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 974-75.
315. Eminent domain is often approved by local governmental legislative bodies through an
abbreviated process. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13, at 970-72.
316. See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 221-26 (discussing the role of political power
in eminent domain).
317. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 970-75 (discussing various "quick-take" procedures).
318. See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 231-32 (discussing the role of political power
in eminent domain).
319. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (deferring to an agency interpretation where that interpretation is reasonable); FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (deferring to the "'expert knowledge of




demnation are justified. Such balancing should necessitate a vote by the
elected officials, through the public and open forum of regular legisla-
tion.
Another way to incorporate representation reinforcement would be
to expand the government's constituency. As I have explained, one of
the chief impetuses to abusive eminent domain is competition among
localities to attract high-taxpayers and discourage low-taxpaying citi-
zens. 32  A way to dampen this unsavory competition is to require that
decisionmaking be made by a higher level of government.32' In a metro-
politan area, an inter-governmental umbrella authority could replace each
locality in making eminent domain decisions. An even bolder approach
would be to demand that state authorities approve all uses of the power
to condemn. With the decision made at a higher level of government, the
desire of town A to compete with town B would be harder to translate
into action.322 If a regional authority were to make the choice, the desires
of the representatives of town A would be countered, presumably, by
opposition from the representatives of town B and the possible indiffer-
ence of those from towns C and D. Although most Americans in the
twenty-first century are accustomed to thinking that all forms of competi-
tion are good, metropolitan and state-level decisionmaking would create
a useful "cartel" of government that would dampen Tiebout's model of
competition among localities. 323 With competition among close-by lo-
calities suppressed, the higher-level government would act in the best
interests of the wider geographic area - be it a metropolitan area or a
state - not just the best interests of one town. True, a bigger government
may still desire to attract upscale business centers and wealthy citizens.
Nonetheless, a higher-level authority is more likely to recognize that
using eminent domain to foster site-specific development may simply
move wealth around, from one locality to another. A higher-level gov-
ernment is more likely to be skeptical of the long-term economic advan-
tages of local plans to develop through eminent domain.
The advantages of higher level decisionmaking to the poor are, of
course, not limited to condemnation. For benefits such as public educa-
tion, welfare payments, and health care, local governments are more
likely to hesitate, knowing that generous services will attract those who
rely most heavily on government assistance, while the taxes needed for
such benefits will drive away the wealthy and mobile. Moving such de-
cisions to a higher level of government is likely to yield better results for
320. See Part I, supra.
321. See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 503-06 (arguing that governments compete to
discourage poor residents).
322. See id.
323. See generally Tiebout, supra note 114 (arguing that competing state governments act as a
"market" in which citizens may choose where to live).
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the poorer citizens of a community. 324 This effect is nothing new. What
is new, however, is characterizing the avoidance of eminent domain as a
benefit of good government decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
Eminent domain is close to unique among the workings of modem
government. From progressive taxation rates to subsidized public trans-
portation to government-assisted health care, today's public welfare
functions usually help redistribute wealth in favor of the less affluent.
Eminent domain is an exception. It is a public welfare function that is
likely to result in disproportionate harm to poorer citizens of the commu-
nity. This effect should disturb advocates for the less powerful, as well
as advocates for private property rights.
A property rights approach to reforming eminent domain is to limit
the power to those cases in which the government keeps title to the prop-
erty - for roads, schools, and fire stations - and not for any development
under private ownership. Such a rule would fit well with the text of the
constitutional "public use" requirement. But such a rule would also
hamstring the government's ability to foster useful urban development
projects. I suspect that most citizens see as worthwhile some category of
eminent domain in which property ends up in private hands - if not for a
new sports stadium to revive a depressed area of town, then perhaps to
assist a developer who is stymied by property "holdouts" in an effort to
bring stores and quality low-cost housing to a poor urban neighborhood
that has little of each. A governmental title rule would limit eminent
domain's potential for abuse, but at a cost, and that cost would be borne
disproportionately by poorer central cities. Other commentators have
suggested that courts should set aside eminent domain when it appears,
on balance, that the project wouldn't truly benefit the public. Such a test,
however, even if feasible for the courts, would play into the hands of
corporate developers and other wealthy landowners, who would be more
able to marshal the lawyers, experts, and financial data necessary to win
such a claim.
I propose that the rule of law focus on the identity of the targets of
eminent domain. It is the perceived unfairness toward these citizens,
after all, that gives rise to the call for a tighter law of eminent domain.
Because governments pay fair market value in compensation to land-
owners, law need not worry much about repeat-player developers or
most commercial landowners. Instead, the law should have sympathy for
homeowners and renters who are uprooted from their houses and apart-
ments. It should pay special scrutiny to cases in which most of the resi-
324. See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 503-06 (arguing that poor persons are less likely
to be able to shop for governments efficiently, and that governments compete to discourage poor
residents).
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dential victims are poor or are racial minorities. In these cases, the
courts would act to reinforce the representation of these citizens, who are
less likely to have their interests considered and their voices heard by
local government. The current United Supreme Court is, of course,
unlikely to explicitly adopt such a rule anytime soon. Nonetheless, emi-
nent domain could be crafted to prohibit governments from using emi-
nent domain to harm those persons who have faced the greatest obstacles
in achieving the American dream. Such a system would allow eminent
domain to play a role in helping, not hindering, the cause of social jus-
tice.

BLAINE'S NAME IN VAIN?: STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
SCHOOL CHOICE, AND CHARITABLE CHOICE
JILL GOLDENZIELf
ABSTRACT
This article explores the growing controversy over "no-funding pro-
visions, " state constitutional provisions that restrict state funding of reli-
gious institutions. These provisions, allegedly rooted in anti-Catholic
bigotry, may threaten state implementation of school choice programs
and faith-based initiatives involving public funding of religious social
service organizations. This article argues that these no-funding provi-
sions, which are commonly termed "Blaine Amendments," "Little
Blaines, " or "Baby Blaines," are often unrelated to the failed federal
Blaine Amendment, and do not always share the federal amendment's
infamous anti-Catholic history. In the first study of its type, this article
surveys the language and history of constitutional provisions prohibiting
funding of religious institutions in all fifty states, and details the constitu-
tional history and judicial interpretation of these provisions in eight rep-
resentative states: Ohio, Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, Colorado, Michi-
gan, Vermont, and Maine. This article concludes that the fates of school
vouchers and faith-based initiatives will not rest on the so-called "Blaine
Amendments," but on the ideological and jurisprudential tendencies of
state judiciaries. Debate over school choice and charitable choice
should therefore move from courtrooms to the political arena.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has just multiplied the controversy over original
intent in constitutional law by fifty. In 2002, the Supreme Court held
that the participation of religious schools in Cleveland's school voucher
program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris' did not violate the federal estab-
lishment clause.2 Yet two years later, the Supreme Court implicitly ap-
proved the use of state constitutional amendments to provide stronger
protection from religious establishment than that guaranteed by the fed-
eral constitution. 3  These "no-funding" provisions, which prohibit state
funding of religious institutions, exist in most state constitutions.4 State
courts may invoke these provisions to block school choice and charitable
choice programs, like the Cleveland voucher program, that involve pub-
lic funding of faith-based educational or social service organizations.
However, pro-voucher and pro-charitable choice activists argue that the
prejudicial, anti-Catholic history of these provisions renders them inva-
lid.5 Will state jurists apply original intent analysis, strict construction,
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643-44, 662-63.
3. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
4. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 263; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10,
art. II, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34, art. IX § 7; DEL.
CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. VII; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1;
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. 10 § 3; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6; KY. CONST. § 189; MASS.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (amended 1917, 1974); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, art.
XIII, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 66, art. 8, § 208; MO. CONST. art. I, § 7, art. IX, § 8; MONT. CONST.
art. X, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.M.
CONST. art. XII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA.
CONST. art. III, § 15, art. III, § 29; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3, art. VIII, § 16;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7, art. VII, § 5 (C); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4, art. X, § 9; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 19, art. III, § 36, art. VII, §
8.
5. See generally Brief for Historians and Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729 (stating that one
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or another form of interpretation to these provisions? And how will their
decisions affect the future of school choice and charitable choice in the
states?
These questions are currently fueling voucher debates across the
country. Spurred by the Court's ruling in Zelman, school choice advo-
cates have launched new political initiatives in states across the country.
In the past three years, Florida and Colorado, among others, have estab-
6lished new school choice programs. Congress recently approved the
first federal school voucher program for Washington, D.C.7 School
choice proponents successfully added referenda to the 2000 election bal-
lots in California and Michigan. 8  Although these proposals were de-
feated, 9 the solidification of Republican control in the 2004 elections has
increased the likelihood that other states will soon create voucher pro-
grams. In 2000 alone, "at least 21 states ... proposed voucher legisla-
tion. . . ,"0 A bitter voucher battle is currently underway in South Caro-
lina. I'
No-funding provisions are also likely to be at issue in litigation over
state involvement in "charitable choice" programs. The 1996 Welfare
Reform Act first introduced provisions, known informally as charitable
choice legislation, that allow faith-based organizations to participate in
new federal welfare programs. 12 Since then, charitable choice provisions
have been incorporated into several other pieces of federal legislation.
13
In 2001, President George W. Bush established the White House Office
of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to oversee efforts to encour-
age the participation of religious and community-based organizations in
argument in opposition of Washington's no-funding provision alleges that the provision is based on
anti-religious and, in particular, anti-Catholic, sentiment).
6. FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-56-101 to -110 (2004).
7. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. C, tit. III, 126-34 (2004)
(authorizing budget, including funds for District of Columbia school voucher program).
8. Ellen M. Halstead, Comment, After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, School Voucher Pro-
grams Can Exclude Religious Schools, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 147, 154 (2004). See generally The
Heritage Foundation, School Choice: California (April 2004), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Education/Schools/california.cfm; The Heritage Foundation, School Choice: Michigan (April 2004),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/Schools/michigan.cfin.
9. Halstead, supra note 8, at 154.
10. National Conference of State Legislatures, School Vouchers,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/voucher.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
11. See generally Bill Robinson, School Voucher Measure Criticized, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Oct. 8, 2004, at B 1 (discussing the battle over a movement in the South Carolina legislature to
give tax breaks to parents who send children to private or religious schools).
12. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a (West 2005) (permitting participation by faith-based organiza-
tions in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Welfare to Work programs). Since the
passage of this act, all subsequent legislative provisions permitting the participation of religious
organizations in federally-funded programs have become informally known as "charitable choice"
provisions.
13. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9920 (West 2005) (stating that religious organizations are in-
cluded as nongovernmental providers under the Community Services Block Grant Program); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300x-65 (West 2005); Charitable Choice Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 1991
(2001).
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the activities of all federal agencies. 14 Currently, twenty-eight governors
and the mayor of Washington, D.C. have established or are establishing
similar offices or liaisons to assist religious and community-based or-
ganizations in their respective states.' 5 Charitable choice programs have
met a great deal of opposition on both the federal and state levels.
16
The Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey17 has un-
earthed the no-funding provisions as a potential way to block both school
choice and charitable choice programs. In Davey, the state of Washing-
ton revoked a college student's merit-based "Promise Scholarship" after
he declared a major in Pastoral Ministries. 18 The state premised its revo-
cation of the scholarship on the state's no-funding provision, which pro-
hibits the use of state funds for religious education. 19 The Washington
Supreme Court had previously invoked its no-funding provision to pro-
hibit the use of state vocational training funds to support a blind man's
pastoral studies at a Christian college.2° While the district court granted
summary judgment for the state, the Ninth Circuit reversed in July 2002,
invigorating school choice proponents by invalidating the state law that
excludes theology students from the scholarship program.2'
In February 2004, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision in a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 22 The
Court held that state constitutions may extend greater religion-state sepa-
ration and greater guarantees of religious liberty to state citizens beyond
those afforded by the federal constitution. 3 The Court reasoned that the
state's interest in not funding theological instruction was based on a de-
sire to avoid establishment of religion, and not on hostility toward relig-
ion.24 Thus, denying the scholarship to theology students was permissi-
ble.
25
In amicus briefs in Davey and elsewhere, school choice proponents
have argued that the no-funding provisions are relics of anti-Catholic
14. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001).
15. The White House, Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: State Liaisons or
Offices for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/
fbci/contact.html#liaisons (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
16. See generally Jill Goldenziel, Administratively Quirky, Constitutionally Murky: The Bush
Faith-Based Initiative, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 359 (2004/2005).
17. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
18. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 2002).
19. Davey, 299 F.3d at 750.
20. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1119-20 (Wash. 1989).
21. Davey, 299 F.3d at 750, 760; see Institute for Justice, Ninth Circuit Ruling in Religious
Funding Case Could Remove "Blaine Amendment" Obstacle to School Choice (July 19, 2002),
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/locke_v_davey/7_19 02pr.html.
22. Locke, 540 U.S. at 718.
23. Locke, 540 U.S. at 719-22.
24. Id. at 721.
25. Id.
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bigotry, or "Blaine Amendments, 26 which violate the Free Exercise and
Equal Protection clauses and should be repealed. 27 The Washington pro-
vision and others like it, also known as "Little Blaines" or "Baby
Blaines," are nicknamed after a similar federal constitutional amendment
proposed by Congressman James G. Blaine in the late nineteenth cen-
tury.28 However, in a footnote, the Court stated that the provision in
dispute in Davey was not a Blaine Amendment, since Article I, Section
11 of the Washington Constitution originated in the Federal Enabling Act
of 1889, and not in an Anti-Catholic movement.29 Since "neither Davey
nor amici have established a credible connection between the [Federal]
Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11," the Court found that "the [Fed-
eral] Blaine Amendment's history is simply not before us."'30  The Su-
preme Court's treatment of the Federal Blaine Amendment's history in
Davey will make it harder for school choice and charitable choice propo-
nents to advance historical arguments against the Blaine Amendments in
lower courts.
However, the specter of Blaine still remains in those states whose
amendments have a more tangible connection to the history of the federal
Blaine Amendment. School choice and charitable choice activists have
launched initiatives and lawsuits specifically targeting these no-fumding
provisions.31 Many view these "no-funding provisions" as a bar to
school choice and charitable choice programs.32 Confirming these fears,
Florida's appellate court, sitting en banc, recently affirmed a lower
court's ruling that the state's school choice program is unconstitutional
because it conflicts with the state's no-funding provision.33 The case is
26. See, e.g., Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 22118852.
27. See, e.g., id; Robert William Gall, The Past Should not Shackle the Present. The Revival
of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L.
413, 436-37 (2003); Tony Mauro, Voucher Advocates Plan Next Push to High Court (Aug. 5,2002),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1024079086859 (discussing controversy over Blaine
Amendments as it relates to the voucher debate); Eric W. Treene, The Grand Finale is Just the Be-
ginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle Over Blaine Amendments, http://www.fed-
soc.org/pdf/FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
28. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 26.
29. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.
30. Id.
31. See generally The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments: What are
Blaine Amendments? (2003), http://www.blaineamendments.org/Intro/whatis.html (arguing that the
Blaine Amendments are anti-Catholic relics and should be repealed).
32. See, e.g., Gall, supra note 27, at 414, 431; Mauro, supra note 27; Holly Lebowitz Rossi,
State Constitutions Are Next Hurdles in Vouchers Fight (Aug. 8, 2002),
http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID-1413; Treene, supra note 27.
33. The court held:
For a court to interpret the no-aid provision as adding nothing [beyond that language
which is identical to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution] to article I, section 3
of the Florida Constitution would require that court to ignore the clear meaning of the
text of the provision and its formative history.
Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 343-44, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (en banc).
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currently on appeal before Florida's Supreme Court.3 4 School choice and
charitable choice supporters fear the impact of such a ruling on other
state programs,35 and supporters of school choice fear that other state and
federal courts will adopt a similar interpretation. 36 For this reason, the
so-called "Blaine Amendments" have been dubbed the "most prominent
weapon" of school choice opponents in the wake of Zelman.
37
However, the threat of the no-funding provisions to school choice
and charitable choice programs is overstated. The tainted past of the
Federal Blaine Amendment and its relevance to modem state jurispru-
dence is exaggerated. Only scant historical records and incomplete con-
stitutional convention journals document the enactment of these amend-
ments in the states, and the few available accounts reveal little evidence
of bigotry.38 Whatever anti-Catholic animus might have lain behind the
no-funding provisions at their inception has not yet been shown to influ-
ence current state jurisprudence. Also, rather than being an insurmount-
able obstacle to school choice and charitable choice legislation, the no-
funding provisions appear to be quite malleable in the hands of state ju-
rists. Several state supreme courts have upheld school choice programs
by reinterpreting their no-funding provisions or evading the implications
of their text altogether.39
This paper argues that the ambiguous history of the no-funding pro-
visions renders them helpful to neither side of the school choice and
charitable choice debates. Despite the potential implications of the his-
tory of the state no-funding provisions for political and legal battles over
school choice and charitable choice programs, no study yet compares the
legislative and legal history of the no-funding provisions in each individ-
ual state. Here, I begin this project by presenting a general discussion of
the current case law and scholarship on the no-funding provisions and
related provisions in all fifty states. I then focus on eight representative
states, detailing the legislative history, political context, and case law
pertinent to their no-funding provisions. After discussing the signifi-
cance of the interpretation of the no-funding provisions in the field of
state constitutional law, I conclude by elaborating on the implications of
34. See generally Voucher Ruling May Take Awhile, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 21, 2004, at 6B
(stating that the Florida Supreme Court has refused to expedite the appeal over Florida's voucher
law).
35. Linda Kleindienst, For Now, Students Can Use Vouchers; Gov. Jeb Bush's Appeal Lets
Kids Attend Religious Schools While the Issue is in Court, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2002, at A1;
Linda Kleindienst, Bush Appeals Ruling that Tossed Vouchers, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale,
Fla.), Aug. 7, 2002, at 6B.
36. Kleindienst, For Now, Students Can Use Vouchers; Gov. Jeb Bush's Appeal Lets Kids
Attend Religious Schools While the Issue is in Court at A1; Kleindienst, Bush Appeals Ruling that
Tossed Vouchers at 6B.
37. Gall, supra note 27, at 414.
38. See Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5.
39. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
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the state no-funding provisions for the debates over school choice and
charitable choice.
I. RELEVANT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Two primary types of state constitutional provisions present poten-
tial obstacles to school choice and charitable choice programs: no-
funding provisions and compelled support provisions. Many states have
both provisions.4 ° Scholars disagree over the precise meaning of what
constitutes a no-funding provision or a compelled support provision.41
Under the broadest reading, only three states have neither no-funding
provisions nor compelled support provisions: Louisiana, Maine, and
North Carolina.42 These provisions may exist as distinct constitutional
sections or as part of one religion-related section that includes a state's
free exercise and/or establishment clauses.
A. No-Funding Provisions: The So-Called "Blaine Amendments"
The first category of state constitutional provisions that may serve
as a bar to school choice and charitable choice programs explicitly pro-
hibits public funding of religious institutions.43 These provisions are
often called "Blaine Amendments," a name which stems from a similar,
federal constitutional amendment that Congressman James G. Blaine of
Maine proposed in 1876.44 The Blaine Amendment was drafted in the
wake of controversies over the public funding of sectarian education and
religious exercises in the public schools.45  Beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century, Catholic immigrants increasingly began to lobby for,
and receive, parochial school funding.46  Non-Catholics responded by
calling for legislation prohibiting public funding of "sectarian" schools.47
Two federal constitutional amendments to this end were introduced in
Congress in 1871 and 1872, but both bills failed.48 In an 1875 speech
before the convention of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee,
President Grant came out in support of such an amendment, encouraging
Americans to resolve that "not one dollar," appropriated for the support
of free schools "shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian
schools," and for religion to be left to "the family altar, the Church, and
40. Halstead, supra note 8, at 167, 171.
41. See id at 167.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 38
(1992).
45. Id. at 41-42; Steven K. Green, Blaming Blaine: Understanding the Blaine Amendment
and the No-Funding Principle, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 107 (2004). Green's two articles
present the most complete treatments of the history of the federal Blaine Amendment available. Cf
Noah Feldman, Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & POL. 65, 96 (2002).
46. Green, supra note 44, at 42-43.
47. Id. at 43. See generally Green, supra note 45.
48. Green, supra note 44, at 43-44.
20051
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
the private school, supported entirely by private contributions. 49
Grant's paean to the importance of "Keep[ing] the Church and State for-
ever separate" 50 was subsequently praised in newspapers, Protestant pub-
lications, and "free thought" journals alike.5'
Blaine, an ambitious politician with presidential aspirations,52
seized the opportunity to rally behind the President and unite the Repub-
lican Party. 3 He proposed a constitutional amendment that would fulfill
Grant's ideal, providing that:
[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious
sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided
between religious sects or denominations.
54
Then, as now, most religious schools were Catholic schools and Blaine's
"non-sectarianism" often, but not exclusively, served as a facade for his
followers' anti-Catholic sentiments.55 However, Blaine maintained that
he was not anti-Catholic, and no evidence suggests that he had any per-
sonal animosity toward Catholics.56 Blaine's mother was Catholic and
his daughters were educated in Catholic schools. 57  Publicly, Blaine
maintained that the amendment was merely meant to settle the "School
Question," the day's most heated political issue.58 Although the federal
Blaine Amendment failed narrowly in the Senate in 1876, 59 many states
subsequently adopted similar language in their constitutions, and such
provisions have been dubbed "Blaine Amendments."
B. Compelled Support Provisions
Besides no-funding provisions, many state constitutions have
"compelled support" provisions that may also be construed to prohibit
school choice and charitable choice programs. Compelled support provi-
sions provide that no citizen of a state will be compelled by the state to
49. Green, supra note 44, at 47-48 (quoting President Ulysses S. Grant, Speech before the
Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Sept. 30, 1875).
50. Green, supra note 44, at 48.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 49.
53. See id. at 48-53.
54. Green, supra note 44, at 53 n.96 (quoting President Ulysses S. Grant, Speech before the
Society of the Army of the Tennessee, Sept. 30, 1875).
55. For a thorough discussion of non-Sectarianism as more than anti-Catholicism, see gener-
ally Feldman, supra note 45, and Green, supra note 45.
56. Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 23 n.65.
57. Id.
58. Green, supra note 44, at 54; Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 23 n.65. Green
also notes that evidence substantiates Blaine's lack of personal animosity toward Catholics. Green,
supra note 44, at 54 n. 103.
59. Green, supra note 44, at 67.
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attend or support religious institutions. 60  The language of these provi-
sions originated in Virginia's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,
authored by Thomas Jefferson. 61 Arguing that civil authority should not
interfere with religion, the Bill proclaimed that "[n]o man shall be com-
pelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry
whatsoever .... , James Madison introduced the bill in the Virginia
legislature in January 1786, and with the support of a broad coalition of
Protestant sects, it passed. 63  Later, Virginia adopted a similar "com-
pelled support" provision in its state constitution, and several of the other
early state constitutions followed suit, including Pennsylvania and Ver-
mont.64 Today, twenty-nine states have compelled support provisions
65
modeled from Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom and
based on a shared distaste for the practices of taxation and coercion to
support an established church. 66 Like the no-funding provisions, at least
one state's compelled support provision has been used to prohibit a
school choice program.67
II. MODERN BLAINE DEBATES
In recent and pending actions, school choice proponents have
charged that the "Blaine Amendments" are relics of anti-Catholic bigotry
that states have continually used to discriminate against religious minori-
ties, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal First
Amendment. In support of their contention, they cite decisions in which
no-funding provisions have been used to block the equal participation of
religious educational institutions on par with similar secular institutions
in programs such as busing, scholarships, and textbook loans. 68 For ex-
ample, in the much-criticized Witters v. State Commission for the Blind69
decision, the Washington Supreme Court held that state support for a
blind man's theology education would violate the state's no-funding pro-
vision, even after the United States Supreme Court held that such aid
would not violate the Federal First Amendment.7 °
60. For example, the Virginia Constitution states:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or minis-
try whatsoever... or the people of any district within this Commonwealth, to levy on
themselves or others, any tax for the erection or repair of any house of public worship, or
for the support of any church or ministry.
VA CONST. art. I, § 16.
61. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73, 82, 85-86 (1989).
62. Id. at 82.
63. Id.
64. Halstead, supra note 8, at 170.
65. Richard D. Komer, School Choice: The State Constitutional Challenge, LIBERTY & L.
(Institute For Justice, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2001, at 4.
66. See Tarr, supra note 61, at 82, 85-86.
67. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 562 (Vt. 1999).
68. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Wash. 1989).
69. 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989).
70. Id. (on remand from Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986)); see also Institute for Justice, Ninth Circuit Ruling in Religious Funding Case Could Re-
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Currently, the Becket Fund's complaint in Pucket v. Rounds7'
charges that the South Dakota no-funding provision has been used to
exclude religious schools and children from numerous government bene-
fits, including textbook loans and school busing programs.72 Wherever
state courts hold that state constitutions provide stronger protections
against religion/state entanglement than the Federal Constitution, school
choice and charitable choice proponents argue that no-funding provisions
serve to discriminate against religious minorities. Bound by their preju-
dicial roots, these "Blaine Amendments" allegedly continue to promote
religious discrimination and should be repealed.
However, these arguments lack support. 73 First, many of the provi-
sions which activists term "Blaine Amendments" cannot justifiably be
associated with James G. Blaine and Reconstruction-era anti-Catholic
bigotry. A variety of circumstances spanning the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries surrounded the adoption of state constitutional provisions
restricting public funding of religious institutions.74 Yet activists seem to
apply the Blaine name and taint indiscriminately to rhetorically reinforce
their argument that all of these provisions have prejudicial origins.75 For
this reason, scholars disagree on the number of Blaine Amendments in
existence. For example, the pro-voucher Becket Fund and Institute for
Justice list thirty-seven states that have Blaine Amendments.76 However,
Kotterman v. Killian,77 an Arizona Supreme Court opinion upholding the
constitutionality of the state's school tax credits, mentions only twenty-
nine states that have amendments with the Blaine language.
78
Inclusive definitions encompass state amendments enacted under
circumstances quite different from those surrounding the debate over the
Federal Blaine Amendment. Many of these so-called "Blaine Amend-
ments" and related provisions were enacted before the Federal Blaine
Amendment debate began. Wisconsin's constitution, for example, con-
tains language nearly identical to the Federal Blaine Amendment, but it
was adopted in 1848. 79 Congress mandated similar provisions in the
move "Blaine Amendment" Obstacle to School Choice (July 19, 2002),
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/locke_v_davey/7_19_02pr.html (calling the Washington Blaine
Amendment "one of the most notorious and broadly construed" Blaine Amendments in the nation).
71. Complaint at 22, Pucket v. Rounds, No. 03-CV-5033, (D. S.D. Apr. 2003) (challenging
South Dakota's no-funding provision).
72. Id.
73. See generally Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5.
74. Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 7-17.
75. See Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REv. 117,
123 n.32 (2000) (citing the divergent conclusions of several law review articles of the number of
state constitutional provisions properly called "Blaine Amendments").
76. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments: States (2003),
http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.html.
77. 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
78. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.
79. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
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legislation enabling the statehood of North Dakota, s° South Dakota,"'
Montana, s2 Washington, Arizona, 4 New Mexico,8 5 Utah,86 Idaho, 7 and
Oklahoma,88 and were later ratified as part of the constitutions of those
states. 89 Michiganians, who refused to repeal their no-funding provision
in a 1970 voter proposition, were not affected by the same anti-Catholic
prejudice as Blaine and many of his supporters when reaffirming their
so-called "Blaine Amendment."9 Some states' provisions do not even
have language similar to the original Blaine Amendment, but are dubbed
"Blaine Amendments" because they prohibit public funding of religious
schools.91
States also may have unwittingly adopted no-funding provisions
when copying provisions from other states' constitutions. Borrowing
from other states' constitutions was common practice; a state often bor-
rowed from the constitution of states admitted to the Union just before it,
in hopes of expediting its own admission.92 Wisconsin's constitutional
provisions resemble those of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, and its
constitutional convention record, though incomplete, supports the idea
that it borrowed heavily from elsewhere. Wisconsin adopted its bill of
rights, including the provision against public funding of religious
schools, wholesale, without any recorded debate, on the first day of its
constitutional convention.93 States that chose to copy the provisions of
other state constitutions to expedite their admission to the Union cannot
be said to have copied any nascent anti-Catholicism in an "original"
state's provisions.
80. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, ch. 180 (1889) (enabling legislation for North Dakota,
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of
the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451,
458-59 (1988).
84. Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557, ch. 26 (1910) (enabling legislation for New Mexico
and Arizona).
85. See also ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO'S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 1946-1912 160-
67 (1968) (recounting why New Mexico drafted a constitution containing such a clause in probable
hopes of securing Union acceptance, even though it was so locally unpopular that it was viewed as
likely cause of the constitution's defeat by a vote of New Mexican citizens).
86. Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, part 4, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894) (enabling legislation for
Utah).
87. Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 8, 26 Stat. 215, 216 (1890) (enabling legislation for Idaho).
88. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267, 270 (1906) (enabling legislation for
Oklahoma).
89. Utter & Larson, supra note 83, at 458-69 (listing enabling acts requiring a Blaine-like
provision).
90. Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 551, 588-90 (2003).
91. See Heytens, supra note 75, at n.32.
92. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.
93. See Joseph A. Ranney, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, WIS. LAW., Sept. 1,
1992.
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Second, the historical record reveals little to support the argument
that all no-funding provisions were prejudicial in origin. Most state con-
stitutional conventions occurred in the nineteenth century, and records
were kept sparsely, if at all. Convention debates were not recorded ver-
batim, leaving it nearly impossible to determine the intent behind the
adoption of each provision. As historian Philip Hamburger notes, sup-
port of the separation of church and state in the mid-nineteenth century
became a secular, "American" principle, despite the nativist undertones
of the period's movement for religious liberty.94 One cannot know de-
finitively whether the no-funding provisions were passed for anti-
Catholic reasons, out of a desire to separate religion and state, or some
combination of these and other motives.
Third, despite the claims of opponents of the no-funding provisions,
the provisions have not engendered case law that prohibits school choice
and charitable choice. Judicial interpretation is hardly bound by the his-
torical context of a provision's enactment. The similar language of these
provisions does not necessarily signify that they were enacted for a simi-
lar legislative purpose, and certainly does not mean judges will interpret
them similarly in state courts. Even those provisions that closely mirror
the Federal Blaine Amendment have been treated quite differently in the
courts since their enactment. Indeed, some state jurists have lauded their
no-funding provisions for providing protection to religious freedom su-
perior to even the Federal Constitution. For example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has touted its no-funding provision as "a more complete
bar to any preference for, or discrimination against, any religious sect,
organization, or society than any other state in the Union," which is
hardly a discriminatory interpretation.95
III. COMPARING THE STATE No-FUNDING PROVISIONS
Scholars disagree over the definition of a Blaine Amendment. No
agreement exists as to whether Blaine Amendments are defined by their
textual similarity to the original Blaine Amendment, their restrictiveness
on funding to sectarian institutions, or their alleged anti-Catholic intent.96
Pursuant to Locke v. Davey,97 in which the Supreme Court noted that
Washington's provision was not connected to the Federal Blaine
Amendment because it was derived from the Federal Enabling Act, I
have conducted my own study of state constitutional provisions prohibit-
94. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 192 (2002).
95. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of School Dist. No. Eight of Edgerton, 44 N.W. 967, 977 (Wis. 1890)
(Cassoday, J., concurring) (praising Wisconsin's "Blaine Amendment," which was written before
existence of federal Blaine Amendment).
96. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (Ariz. 1999); See, e.g., Toby G. Heytens, School
Vouchers and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REv. 117 (2000); The Becket Fund for Religious Lib-
erty, Blaine Amendments, http://www.blaineamendments.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2005) (citing
different numbers of "Blaine Amendments").
.97. 540 U.S. 712, 723 n.7 (2004).
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ing funding to religious institutions. I have surveyed the language in-
volving funding to religious institutions in all fifty state constitutions to
determine which have similar language to the Blaine Amendment and to
differentiate those which were enacted before the 1875 introduction of
the Federal Blaine Amendment.
Approximately thirty-eight states have provisions restricting fund-
ing to religious schools or institutions. 98  Twenty-three of these states
enacted their no-funding provisions between the birth of the 1875 Fed-
eral Blaine Amendment and 1925, at the height of the debate over the
"schools question" in the United States.99 Of these twenty-three states,
eight derived their no-funding provisions directly from the federal ena-
bling acts that granted them statehood. 100 Eleven others re-ratified their
constitutions or amended the no-funding provisions after 1960, signify-
ing their approval of these provisions in a modem context. 10' While the
Federal Blaine Amendment was confined to restrictions of public fund-
ing of schools, twenty-one of the thirty-nine no-funding provisions re-
strict funding to all religious institutions or societies, or any funding that
will be used for a religious purpose. 0 2 Thus, the influence of the Federal
98. ALA. CONST. art. XIV § 263 (1901); ALASKA CONST. art. VII § 1 (1956); ARIZ. CONST. art.
IX, § 10, art. 11, § 12 (1910); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5 (1879); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34,
art. IX § 7 (1876); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1897); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1838); GA. CONST. art. I, §
1 I XIII (1877); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1959); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 (1890); ILL. CONST. art. 10
§ 3 (1870); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (1816); KAN. CONST. art. VI § 6 (C) (1859); KY. CONST. § 189
(1891); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII (1919); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1850); MNN. CONST. art. I, § 16
(1857), art. XIII, § 2 (1857); MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 66 (1890), art. 8, § 208 (1890); Mo. CONST. art. I,
§ 7 (1875), art. IX, § 8 (1875); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6 (1889); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11 (1875);
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10 (1880); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (1877); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (1911);
art. XII, § 4 (1911); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1846); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (1889); OHIO CONST.
art. VI, § 2 (1851); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. XI, § 5 (1907); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1857); PA.
CONST. art. III, § 15 (1874), art. III, § 29 (1874); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (1889); S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 3, art. VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1876), art. VII, § 5 (C) (1876); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4
(1895), art. X, § 9 (1895); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (1830); art. VIII, § 10 (1830); WASH. CONST. art.
1, § 11 (1889), art. IX, § 4 (1889); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1848); WYo. CONST. art. I, § 19, art. III, §
36, art. VII, § 8 (1890).
99. See sources cited supra note 98.
100. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, ch. 180 (1889) (enabling legislation for North Dakota,
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington); Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557, ch. 26 (1910) (ena-
bling legislation for New Mexico and Arizona); Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, part 4, 28 Stat.
107, 108 (1894) (enabling legislation for Utah); Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267,
270 (1906) (enabling legislation for Oklahoma). For additional discussions of Blaine amendments in
some of these states, see Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection
of Religious Freedom, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 299 (2003); Joseph P. Viteretti, Blaine 's Wake:
School Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
657 (1998).
101. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5 (re-adopted and amended 1974); FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 3 (re-adopted after full debate at Constitutional Convention of 1968); GA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (re-
ratified 1982); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16, art. XIII, § 2 (constitution generally revised 1972); MONT.
CONST. art. X, § 6 (constitution revised 1972); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § II (amended 1976); NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 10 (re-ratified 1938); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. XI, § 5 (amended 1978 to remove
discussion of segregation); PA. CONST. art. III, § 29 (amended 1933, 1937, 1963; renumbered 1967);
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1876), art. VII, § 5 (C) (amended 1989).
102. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5 (1879); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34, art. IX § 7
(1876); GA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1877); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1959); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5
(1890); MASS. CONST. art. XVIII (1919); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (1857), art. XIII, § 2 (1857); MiSS.
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Blaine Amendment on the fifty state constitutions is indirect and difficult
to trace.
In a comprehensive study of eight representative state Blaine
Amendments, I will show further that these provisions should have little
bearing on school choice and charitable choice debates. I will focus my
analysis on Ohio, Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, Colorado, Michigan,
Vermont, and Maine. I chose these representative states because of their
representative case law, representative types of (or lack of) no-funding
provisions, their geographic diversity,0 3 and the different historical cir-
cumstances surrounding the enactment of their constitutions. Taken to-
gether, the constitutional histories of these eight representative states will
illuminate the ambiguous significance of the no-funding provisions for
school choice and charitable choice debates throughout the country.
A. Basic No-Funding Language
Ohio, Wisconsin, and Arizona all have constitutional language simi-
lar to the Federal Blaine Amendment. Although these state constitutions
were enacted at different times, each state has a provision prohibiting any
"sect" from controlling public school funds, 104 or public funding from
aiding any "sectarian" school. 0 5 Yet the courts of these three states have
ignored both linguistic similarities and diverse histories of these provi-
sions and have construed their "no-funding" provisions in completely
different ways.
1. Ohio
Ohio enacted its no-funding provision in 1851, at the state's second
constitutional convention. 0 6  At the 1873-74 convention to revise the
Constitution of Ohio, a proposition was made to delete the line, "but no
religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or
control of, any part of the school funds of this state.' 1 7 This provision
CONST. art. IV, § 66 (1890), art. 8, § 208 (1890); MO. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1875), art. IX, § 8 (1875);
OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5, art. XI, § 5 (1907); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1857); PA. CONST. art. III, § 15
(1874), art. III, § 29 (1874); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3, art. VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1876),
art. VII, § 5 (C) (1876); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4 (1895), art. X, § 9 (1895); VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16;
art. VIII, § 16 (re-ratified 1971); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1848).
103. Because states in different regions came into being under very different historical circum-
stances, a better comparison of the history of state no-funding provisions comes from comparing
states in different regions. Moreover, states in similar regions admitted closely in time to one an-
other are more likely to have copied constitutional language from each other, so a comparison of no-
funding provisions in geographically diverse states ensures that similar language was adopted under
different circumstances.
104. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
105. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
106. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51.
107. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1873-74, VOL.
1,77.
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was presented to the convention as a "Catholic measure."'l08 However,
the words of at least one Catholic delegate reveal that the provision did
not receive uniform Catholic support:
So far as I know, [the amendment] was presented without the cogni-
zance, and urged without the indorsement of a single Catholic of this
Convention, other than its author. So far as it assumed to present the
wishes of any other Catholic here, I believe it was an assumption to-
tally unwarranted .... Trusting to my constituency as fair representa-
tives - and I represent as large a proportionate Catholic constituency
as any man on this floor - I do not believe even a minority in num-
bers of Catholics want such change, or any special privilege under
law or Constitution .... We need no special interposition of law or
Constitution in our favor .... That some of the Catholic clergy have
condemned the public schools, and insisted on Catholic schools for
the education of Catholic children, has no bearing on this issue. We
are asking no constitutional mandate to enforce their ideas .... 109
The Convention subsequently failed to adopt the amendment, leaving the
language of Article VI, Section 2 as it stands today.
Thus, the intent behind Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion appears unclear. The provision was both supported and contested by
Catholic and non-Catholic delegates at the 1873-74 constitutional con-
vention - at the same time that the question of public funding to religious
schools was becoming a federal issue. The alleged bigotry behind this
provision is uncertain.
Despite the prohibition on public funding to religious schools in the
Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a state school
voucher programs is permissible. 110 In Simmons-Harris v. Goff,"' the
Ohio Supreme Court was deeply influenced by federal constitutional
jurisprudence when interpreting its state constitution. 12  The court
avoided conflict between the program and the state's no-funding provi-
sion by adopting the federal Lemon test for determining whether the pro-
gram constituted the establishment of religion under both the First
Amendment, the religious freedom provisions of the Ohio Constitu-
tion,113 and the state no-funding provision, which dates to 1851.114 The
108. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITrUrIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1873-74, VOL.
2, pt. III, 2333.
109. Id. (quoting Delegate Jackson).
110. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ohio 1999).
111. 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
112. Id. at 203.
113. The Ohio Constitution states:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support
any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against his consent; and no pref-
erence shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with the
rights of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required, as a qualification
for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious
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court found the program constitutional under the United States Supreme
Court's Lemon test, but pointedly noted that it used the Lemon test be-
cause it is a "logical and reasonable method," not because the religion
clauses of the Ohio Constitution are coextensive with the federal religion
clauses. 115 The court explicitly "reserve[d] the right to adopt a different
constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether be-
cause the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other rele-
vant reason."'"16 One might speculate about what type of "relevant rea-
son" would cause the Ohio Supreme Court to deviate from federal con-
stitutional jurisprudence in its interpretation of the state constitution,
especially if public opinion had not been so much in favor of taking dras-
tic measures to fix the ailing Cleveland public schools.
In this context of federal influence, the Ohio Supreme Court spe-
cifically discussed the prohibition on the control of state school funds by
religious sects in Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.'" 7  The
court did not consider the history of this provision, perhaps because the
official journal of the state constitutional convention includes no discus-
sion related to its passage." 8 Instead, the court stressed the role of inde-
pendent choice in the Cleveland voucher program, noting that:
[N]o money flows directly from the state to a sectarian school and no
money can reach a sectarian school based solely on its efforts or the
efforts of the state. Sectarian schools receive money that originated
belief, but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths and affirmations. Re-
ligion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be
the duty of the General Assembly to pass suitable laws, to protect every religious de-
nomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship, and to en-
courage schools and the means of instruction.
OHIO CONST. art. 1, §7.
114. The Ohio Constitution's no-funding provision states:
The General Assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the
income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of
common schools throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever
have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.
OHIO CONST. art. VI, §2.
115. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 211. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the
Court established a three-pronged test for establishment of religion that was the Supreme Court's
standard in establishment clause cases for more than twenty-five years. Id. at 612-13. To pass the
Lemon test, a statute much have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vanced nor inhibited religion, and must not involve excessive entanglement between government
and religion. Id. Although Lemon has not been overruled, it has been modified and criticized in
recent Supreme Court cases, including Zelman. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668
(2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 212.
117. Id.
118. JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, convened
January 9, 1912; adjourned June 7, 1912; reconvened and adjourned without discussion August 26,
1912.
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in the School Voucher Program only as the result of independent de-
cisions of parents and students.1
19
Thus, the voucher program does not violate the state's no-funding
provision, since the sectarian schools do not have an "exclusive right to,
or control of' any part of Ohio's school funds, as forbidden by the state
constitution.120 The United States Supreme Court plurality relied on this
"independent choice" reasoning when later upholding the constitutional-
ity of the program in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.1
2'
Since the Supreme Court decided Zelman, the Ohio legislature has
established a Task Force on Nonprofit, Faith-Based and Other Organiza-
tions, 122 which created a Governor's Office of Faith-Based and Commu-
nity Initiatives. 123 The Office is currently involved in an initiative called
the Ohio Compassion Capital Project which grants funds to faith and
community-based organizations. 24 Yet this program may not be permis-
sible under the state constitution.' 
25
Although the Cleveland program is constitutional, the future of
school choice and charitable choice in Ohio remains unclear. Both the
United States Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court holdings in the
Simmons-Harris cases appear limited to the circumstances of the Cleve-
land voucher program. The Ohio Supreme Court even noted that a dif-
ferent school voucher program might damage the funding of public edu-
cation and "could be subject to a renewed constitutional challenge."'
126
This admission, along with the Ohio Supreme Court's explicit reserva-
tion of the right to depart from federal constitutional analysis, allow the
Ohio Supreme Court great flexibility in determining future no-funding
provision decisions. Simmons-Harris v. Goff presents an excellent ex-
ample of how experienced jurists selectively molded state constitutional
language for a specific, narrow purpose.
The Simmons-Harris v. Goff decision exemplifies two techniques
that state supreme courts have used to circumvent the no-funding provi-
sions. First, courts may hold state constitutional provisions to be coex-
tensive with Federal First Amendment standards, either generally or for
the purposes of a single case. 127 Courts may also narrowly interpret "ex-
clusive right to, or control of' funding so that programs which do not
119. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212. See also WILLIAM HERBER, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1913: THOROUGHLY ANNOTATED AND INDEXED.
120. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212.
121. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652-60.
122. H.B. 175, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001).
123. See The Governor's Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
http://www.fbciohio.gov (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
124. Id.
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involve direct funding of religious institutions by the state are deemed
constitutional. 128  Using these methods of analysis, courts can evaluate
school choice and charitable choice programs without considering either
the strict separationist interpretation of the no-funding provision or any
anti-Catholic bigotry in the history of the provision. Thus, courts may
tailor the language of the provision to the circumstances of the specific
voucher program. Under this method, the prejudicial and "threatening"
elements of the no-funding provision are rendered irrelevant, or at least
flexible.
2. Wisconsin
Wisconsin's prohibition of public funding of "religious societies, or
religious or theological seminaries," included in Article I, Section 18 of
the Wisconsin Constitution, 129 was framed long before the Federal Blaine
Amendment, and did not specifically prohibit the funding of religious
schools. 130  An 1846 draft constitution containing this provision failed
primarily due to disagreement over unrelated issues,1 31 and a second con-
stitution was successfully adopted in 1848.132 Unfortunately, the records
of both Wisconsin constitutional conventions leave much room for
speculation as to the original intent behind the state's constitutional pro-
visions. At both conventions, the no-funding provision was grouped as
part of a declaration of rights and adopted with no recorded discussion.
133
However, records of the debates surrounding Article I, Section 18 may
be incomplete. The reporter at the 1847-48 constitutional convention
admits that he often altered the language of the delegates, although he
128. Id. at 212.
129. The Wisconsin Constitution states:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of con-
science shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any
control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference
be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any
money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or
theological seminaries.
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18
130. Id.
131. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF WISCONSIN:
WITH A SKETCH OF THE DEBATES 8 (1848), microformed on LAC No. 13457 (Library of Am. Civi-
lization) (containing remarks of convention delegate Mr. Kilbourn concerning failures of previous
proposed constitution due to issues on the judiciary, banking, exemption, and property rights of
married women); See also STARK, infra note 174, at 3-4 (indicating that the 1846 constitution failed
at the polls due to three issues: the homestead exemption, the property rights of married women, and
restrictions on banking).
132. Id. at passirn
133. STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, THE CONVENTION OF 1846 (Milo M. Quaife,
ed., 1919); STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN, THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION (Milo
M. Quaife, ed., 1919); JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR TH4E STATE OF
WISCONSIN, supra note 131, at 51, 143 (indicating how the convention's Committee on General
Provisions drafted the declaration of rights and passed it unanimously before bringing it to the con-
vention floor).
[Vol. 83:1
BLAINE'S NAME IN VAIN?
claims this did not affect the substance of the debates. 134 At least four
delegates also asked for their remarks to be stricken from the record.
1 35
The reporter further warns that the convention did not decide to record its
proceedings until the "business of the convention was considerably ad-
vanced," and so the early debates "are not as full and complete as they
would have been."
136
While the history of these early debates may be particularly vague,
later discussion at the convention on related topics also reveals little con-
troversy or prejudice. The convention record shows no mention of relig-
ion whatsoever in a discussion of common schools and the school
fund. 137 The convention also overwhelmingly voted to forbid sectarian
instruction in public schools and universities immediately after such pro-
posals were made, with no discussion recorded. 38 Historians note that at
the time of the constitutional convention, Wisconsin already had a well-
established tradition of common schools with a universal non-sectarian
tradition, and did not have any parochial school system of note until well
after the constitution was ratified.139 Public education in Wisconsin had
already begun in 1845, and was offered statewide after its codification in
the 1848 constitution. 140  Historian Steven K. Green notes that despite
some tensions between Protestant, Catholic, and Lutheran immigrants,
no evidence exists that the Wisconsin constitution-makers were anti-
religious in drafting the no-funding provisions. 141
The best available insight into the meaning of Article I, Section 18
comes from the Wisconsin Supreme Court's first ruling on this provision
in 1890, just forty-two years after its enactment. In State ex rel. Weiss v.
District Board of School-District No. 8 of Edgarton,142 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court extended Article I, Section 18 to prohibit state funding of
religious activities in public schools and religious schools themselves .
43
134. H.A. TENNEY ET AL., Reporters' Preface to JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A
CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF WISCONSIN: WITH A SKETCH OF THE DEBATES (1848), micro-
filmed on LAC No. 13457 (Library of Am. Civilization).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE'STATE OF WISCONSIN,
supra note 131, at 321-24.
138. Id. at 336.
139. Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5, at 15; see also ALICE E. SMITH, 1 THE
HISTORY OF WISCONSIN 588-89 (1985); RICHARD N. CURRENT, 2 THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN
162-169 (1976); Brief Amicus Curiae of Historians and Law Scholars on Behalf of Petitioners at 27
n.41, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 21697729 ("placing the devel-
opment of the parochial school systems after the enactment of the 1848 constitution.") (citing Joseph
A. Ranney, "Absolute Common Ground": The Four Eras of Assimilation in Wisconsin Education
Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 791, 793-94, 796-98 (1998)).
140. The Wisconsin Mosaic, A Brief History of Education in Wisconsin (Apr. 17, 2000),
http://www.scils.rutgers.edu/-dalbello/FLVA/background/education.html; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
141. Steven K. Green, Blaming Blaine: Understanding the Blaine Amendment and the No-
Funding Principle, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 107, 127 (2004).
142. 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890).
143. Weiss, 44 N.W. at 980 (Conkley, J., concurring).
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The court held that the reading of the King James Bible in common
schools contravened Article I, Section 18, reasoning that bible-reading in
public schools was equivalent to public funds being funneled to religious
schools.' 44 The court held that Article I, Section 18 was adopted as a
protection against this and other encroachments on the religious freedom
of its inhabitants. 145 The court noted that Article I, Section 18 was
framed "with reference to attracting" a heterogeneous mix of settlers to
Wisconsin, including many Catholics and Jews. 146 In his majority opin-
ion, Justice Lyon remarks on what would later be known as his state's
"Blaine Amendment":
What more tempting inducement to cast their lot with us could have
been held out to [new settlers] than the assurance that, in addition to
the guaranties of the right of conscience and of worship in their own
way, the free district schools in which their children were to be, or
might be, educated, were absolute common ground, where the pupils
were equal, and where sectarian instruction, and with it sectarian in-
tolerance, under which they had smarted in the old country, could
never enter? Such were the circumstances surrounding the conven-
tion which framed the constitution. 
147
Thus, the earliest available judicial account of the drafting of Article I,
Section 18 reveals no prejudicial intentions. To the contrary, Wiscon-
sin's so-called "Blaine Amendment" apparently was meant to protect
religious freedom.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Article I,
Section 18 is distinct from the First Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. 148 However, the court has repeatedly applied Supreme Court analy-
sis pertinent to the religion clauses of the United States Constitution to
Article I, Section 18, blurring the distinctions between the religion provi-
sions of the two documents. 149 For example, in 1962, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court explicitly noted that its state establishment clause in Arti-
cle I, Section 18 might even be "less flexible" than the First Amend-
ment. 150 However, ten years later, the same court adopted federal consti-
tutional analysis in a challenge to a statute permitting the state to contract
with a church-affiliated university to provide dental education. 151 In its
Article I, Section 18 analysis, the court adopted the Supreme Court's
"primary effect" analysis, noting that the provision's benefits clause "is
144. Id.
145. Id. at 978.
146. Id. at 974.
147. Id.
148. E.g., State ex rel Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1962) [hereinafter
Reynolds]; State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Wis. 1996).
149. See Reynolds, 115 N.W.2d at 761.
150. Id. at 770.
151. See State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, 198 N.W.2d 650, 659 (Wis. 1972) [hereinafter
Nusbaum I].
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not to be read as requiring that some shadow of incidental benefit to a
church related institution brings a state grant or contract to purchase
within the prohibition of the section."' 52 The payments in the dental
education program should not be seen as payments "for the benefit of'
the religious institution, but as payments for the advancement of the den-
tal health of Wisconsin's citizens.'53 Thus, the court found the statute to
serve a "entirely secular and completely valid public purpose" despite the
church/state interaction.'
54
In 1974, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again applied Federal First
Amendment analysis to Article I, Section 18. 155 This time, the court up-
held a program allowing school boards to contract with sectarian institu-
tions to provide for the educational needs of handicapped children under
the state and federal constitutions.' 56 The court first analyzed the Federal
First Amendment challenge, applying the Lemon test, and determined
that the statute satisfied Lemon's requirement of having a primary effect
that neither advanced nor inhibited religion.' 57 The court then noted that
since the religion provisions of the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions
have similar purposes, the Wisconsin Constitution's further prohibition
of the use of state funds to support religious institutions simply encom-
passes the "primary effects" prong of the federal Lemon test.
58
In 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized the distinctness
of Article I, Section 18 from the First Amendment, but then applied fed-
eral constitutional analysis to interpret it.' 59 In State v. Miller,'60 the
court held that requiring Amish citizens to display red reflective tape on
their slow-moving vehicles, in violation of their religious beliefs, vio-
lated the right to freedom of conscience guaranteed by Article I, Section
18.161 The court explicitly based its holding on the guarantees embodied
in the state constitution alone, 162 and discussed at length the distinction
between Article I, Section 18 and the religion clauses of the First
Amendment. 63 The court held that its prior recognition that both clauses
"serve the same dual purpose," and its prior decisions to interpret Article
I, Section 18 "in light of United States Supreme Court Cases," "should
not be read as an abandonment of our long-standing recognition that the
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 655.
155. See State ex rel Warren v. Nusbaum, 219 N.W.2d 577, 577 (Wis. 1974) [hereinafter
Nusbaum II].
156. Id.
157. Id. at 582-84.
158. Id. at 585.
159. See Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 238.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 237.
162. Id. at 238.
163. Id. at 238-40.
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language of the two documents is not the same."' 64 The court concluded
that its "analysis of the freedom of conscience as guaranteed by the Wis-
consin Constitution is not constrained by the boundaries of protection the
United States Supreme Court has set for the federal provision. We hold
that our state constitution provides an independent basis on which to
decide this case."' 65 Despite this strong language, 166 the court applied the
United States Supreme Court's compelling interest/least restrictive alter-
native analysis for free conscience claims to the case, "see[ing] no need
to depart from this time-tested standard." 167 Thus, even when their dis-
tinctness has been painstakingly emphasized, the federal and Wisconsin
state religion clauses are intricately related.
In a celebrated 1998 case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again
blurred the relationship between the federal and state religion clauses.
68
In Jackson v. Benson,' 69 the Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association
and a group of students' parents brought suit under Article I, Section 18
to challenge a Milwaukee school voucher program that allows the par-
ticipation of religious schools. 70 The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
the program under the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions, and the
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari fueled speculation that
they would soon declare vouchers constitutional. To avoid a clash with
Article I, Section 18, the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the Wis-
consin Constitution's religion clauses as coextensive with the federal
religion clauses.' 7' Ignoring its holding two years earlier that the two
provisions are distinct, the court grounded its interpretation on its even
earlier statements that the religion clauses of the state and federal consti-
tutions serve the same dual purpose, and that Article I, Section 18 en-
compasses the primary effects test. 172 Since the Milwaukee voucher pro-
gram did not have the primary effect of advancing religion, it did not
violate Article I, Section 18.173 One commentator argues that the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Jackson construed Article I, Section 18 as co-
extensive with the federal religion clauses merely because the plaintiffs
erred by not asserting that the provisions are distinct. 7 4 The court may
have felt bound by a prior holding that it would use First Amendment
analysis to interpret Article I, Section 18 unless directed otherwise by the
plaintiff. 171
164. Id. at 239.
165. Id. at 239-40.
166. Id. at 239.
167. Id. at 241.
168. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 607.
171. ld. at 620.
172. Id.
173. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 608.
174. JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 67 (1997).
175. See Lange v. Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143, 148 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
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Although Wisconsin has not yet established a Faith-Based Initiative
liaison in its governor's office, the state has begun funding faith-based
social service programs pursuant to the federal charitable choice laws.
17 6
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. McCallum,'77 one of the few legal
challenges to the constitutionality of Bush's national Faith-Based Initia-
tive, involved a Wisconsin program. 178 Wisconsin funded Faith Works, a
faith-based, long-term alcohol and drug addiction treatment program.
179
The court held that the case did not reach the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the charitable choice law, and then upheld the funding of Faith
Works even though the program resulted in governmental indoctrination
of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 80 Relying on the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Mitchell v. Helms,'.' the court
held that the funding was constitutional because all offenders partici-
pated in the treatment program of their own free choice, and that the pro-
gram's safeguards ensured that they made true private choices. 182 The
plaintiff did not invoke Article I, § 18 of the Wisconsin constitution in its
suit. However, future challenges to similar grants from the governor's
discretionary fund to faith-based organizations might do better by invok-
ing the state constitution, which may be more flexible than the federal
religion clauses.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's treatment of Article I, Section 18
allows it to rely on federal constitutional jurisprudence while reserving
the right to construe the provision more strictly in the future. Jackson's
crafty wording does not overrule Weiss, Nusbaum I, Miller and other
cases insisting that Article I, Section 18 is distinct from and stronger than
the federal religion clauses. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted Article I, Section 18 in accordance with federal
constitutional standards, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's repeated insis-
tence that Article I, Section 18 is distinct from the First Amendment
leaves future school choice and charitable choice programs open to po-
tential legal challenge.
3. Arizona
Arizona's no-funding provisions were thrust into its constitution by
Congressional order. 83 The enabling act of 1899 which authorized the
176. Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 964 (W.D. Wis.
2002) (granting partial summary judgment); Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F.
Supp. 2d 905 (W.D.Wis. 2002), aff'd 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 881.
179. Id.
180. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 915, 920.
181. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
182. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 915.
183. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious estab-
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statehood of Arizona and New Mexico contained the proviso that both
nascent states must have constitutional language forbidding public fund-
ing to sectarian schools.18 4 Opponents of the Blaine Amendment claim
that the same anti-Catholic animus behind the federal Blaine Amendment
motivated this mandate to new states in the enabling acts. I8 5 However, a
recent study by historians prepared in an amicus brief to Locke v. Davey
found that no evidence of anti-Catholic bigotry lay behind a similar ena-
bling act for Washington State that same year, 186 and the Supreme Court
noted in a footnote that the history of the federal Blaine Amendment was
not relevant to consideration of Washington's similar provision. 18 7 In
general, the Arizona Constitution borrowed heavily from other states as
its legislature attempted to get the new state off to a swift start, and it is
likely that the no-funding provision was simply lifted without thought
from the Enabling Act. No evidence exists to show that the legislature
gave any more consideration to the issue of public funding to religious
schools than to any other issue. 88 The Arizona Supreme Court, recog-
nizing the difficulty of determining the intent of its constitutional fram-
ers, notes that no comprehensive history of the Arizona constitutional
convention exists.189 "The verbatim transcript of the 1910 constitutional
convention reveals little discussion on the convention floor about the
religion clauses."' 190 In general, when reading through the constitutional
convention proceedings, the court comments that "one is impressed by
the fact that major issues were often glossed over with no debate or dis-
cussion."' 9' Again, the truth about the impetus for the enactment of Ari-
zona's no-funding provision may be undiscoverable.
Arizona does not have a school voucher program, but it has offered
school choice since 1997 in the form of tax credits. 92 Parents who send
their children to private schools, including religious schools, receive tax
credits equal to the amounts of their tuition dollars up to five hundred
dollars.' 93 In 1999, a taxpayer group challenged this program under the
state's no-funding provisions. In Kotterman v. Killian,194 the Arizona
lishment."); ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10 ("No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made
in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation.").
184. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (enabling legislation for New Mexico and
Arizona).
185. See Brief Supporting Petitioners, supra note 5.
186. Id.
187. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7.
188. BRUCE BONNER MASON, REVISION OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY
(1961); JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1993);
MINUTES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA (1910).
189. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (Ariz. 1999) (quoting THOMAS E. SHERIDAN,
ARIZONA: A HISTORY 385 (1995)); MINUTES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA
(1910).
190. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 621.
191. Id. at 622.
192. Id. at 610.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 606.
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Supreme Court upheld the program, ruling that no evidence existed that
the framers of the Arizona constitution meant to prohibit tax credits of
this sort, based on their reading of plain meaning of the text of the Ari-
zona Constitution. 195 In doing so, the court effectively held the Arizona
state constitutional provisions coextensive with the federal First
Amendment, noting that no evidence existed of the intent of the Arizona
constitutional framers to exceed the requirement of the federal estab-
lishment clause. 196 The court felt bound by a duty to interpret the state
constitution in light of contemporary circumstances, including the state's
commitment to education and the Supreme Court's allowance of direct
aid programs involving school choice. 1
97
Finally, the majority addressed the state's no-funding provision.
Strangely, while the court was quick to reject the difficulty of discerning
the intent of the framers of the Arizona Constitution, it swiftly dismissed
the state's no-funding provisions as a "clear manifestation of religious
bigotry" and discounted their relevance for constitutional interpreta-
tion.' 98 The court noted that there is "no recorded history directly linking
the [federal Blaine] amendment with Arizona's constitutional conven-
tion." 199 Nevertheless, the court found itself "hard pressed to divorce the
amendment's language from the insidious discriminatory intent that
prompted it," and deemed the state no-funding provisions to have no
bearing on its decision in this case. 200  The same Arizona scholarship
program is currently being challenged in federal court pursuant to the
First Amendment.20 ' However, given the Arizona Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Kotterman and the Supreme Court's subsequent denial of certio-
rari, the program seems likely to stand. Arizona's faith-based initiative
programs, which include the establishment of a liaison in the governor's
office also appear constitutional under Kotterman's interpretation of the
no-funding provisions.20 2
Arizona's Supreme Court remains the most aggressive in its treat-
ment of its no-funding provisions. No other state has deemed its no-
funding provisions irrelevant because of its prejudicial past, without con-
sidering the particularities of the state provision's history. The United
States Supreme Court chose not to involve itself in the Arizona court's
interpretation of its own constitution, denying certiorari in the case.20 3
195. Id. at 623.





201. Winn v. Hibbs, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (remanded to the district court for further proceed-
ings).
202. See The White House, Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: State Liaisons or
Offices for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/
contact.html#1iaisons (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
203. See Kotterman v. Killian, 528 U.S. 921 (1999).
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The case is the most powerful ammunition in the arsenal of anti-Blaine
activists.
B. States with Strict No-Funding Provisions
States with strict no-funding provisions, such as Florida, Colorado,
and Michigan, include additional restrictions beyond the basic language
prohibiting funding to religious schools or institutions. These three state
constitutions contain provisions prohibiting any "political subdivision"
204
or "any county, city, town, township, school district, or other public cor-
poration.,'20 5 Michigan is the only state to have an additional constitu-
tional provision explicitly prohibiting school vouchers.0 6 However, state
courts will not necessarily rely on this stringent language when consider-
ing voucher and charitable choice programs.
1. Florida
Currently, Florida is a Blaine battleground, but the history of its no-
funding provision is quite benign. The legal battle over Florida's school
choice program is the most prominent example of the potential force of
no-funding provisions to block school choice programs.
Florida's no-fimding provision was originally enacted in 1838 with-
out any recorded debate.20 7 The original language survived constitutional
revisions in 1861, 1865, 1868, 1885, and 1968.208 A proposal to create a
204. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency
thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect,
or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.").
205. For example, the Colorado Constitution states:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or
other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund
or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any sectar-
ian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, univer-
sity or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or sectarian de-
nomination whatsoever, nor shall any grant or donation of land, money, or other personal
property, ever be made by the state, or any such public corporation to any church, or for
any sectarian purpose.
COLO. CONST. ART. IX, § 7.
206. Michigan's additional constitutional provision states:
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized,
by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indi-
rectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary,
elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deduc-
tions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be pro-
vided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment
of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruc-
tion is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students. The legislature may
provide for the transportation of students to and from any school.
MICH. CONST. art, VIII, § 2.
207. FLA. CONST. of 1838 art. I, § 3; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CONVENTION OF
DELEGATES TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE PEOPLE OF FLORIDA 2, 16 (St. Joseph, The "Times"
Office 1838).
208. FLA. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 3; FLA. CONST. of 1865 art. I, § 3; FLA. CONST. of 1868, § 4;
FLA. CONST. of 1885, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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stronger no-funding provision explicitly prohibiting funding to sectarian
schools failed at the 1885 Florida constitutional convention with no re-
corded debate. 20 9 Thus, Florida's provision appears designed to prohibit
funding of all religious institutions, not just religious schools.
Despite this strict language, Florida state courts have often permit-
ted state funding of religious institutions.210  Florida appellate courts
have approached issues of church-state entanglement using a type of
neutrality analysis, permitting state funds to benefit religion so long as
they have an incidental, but not a primary effect, of advancing religion. 1'
Accordingly, Florida appellate courts have held that a bible distribution
program in public schools is unconstitutional for advancing religion,21 2
but have upheld a county ordinance forbidding alcohol sales on Christ-
mas because it did not amount to tacit endorsement or establishment of
Christianity as an official religion.213 As recently as 2000, Florida appel-
late courts have upheld the constitutionality of statutes that provide indi-
rect benefits to sectarian institutions, such as penalty enhancements for
crimes committed near or involving places of worship.214
Florida courts have stirred controversy by invoking Article IX, Sec-
tion 1 to invalidate Florida's school choice program. The Florida Oppor-
tunity Scholarship Program "OSP" has been hotly contested since its
enactment on June 21, 1999.25 The following day, a coalition of parents,
citizens, and interest groups filed suit, alleging that the program violated
the Florida Constitution.21 6 The program was heavily supported by Gov-
217ernor Jeb Bush as part of his educational reform program, 1 and espe-
cially as education reform continued to be a pivotal issue in the 2002
Florida gubernatorial election.218 The program allows parents of children
in failing schools to transfer their children to higher-performing private
209. JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
FLORIDA 215-16 (N. M. Bowen, State Printers 1885). Mr. Sheats recommended the adoption of art.
IX, § 13, part of Ordinance No. 32:
No law shall be enacted authorizing the diversion or the lending of any county or district
school funds, or the appropriation of any part of the permanent or available school fund
to any other than school purposes; nor shall the same, or any part thereof, be appropriated
to or used for the support of any sectarian school.
Id.
210. See, e.g., Law Cleanup Time, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb. 4, 2003, at B4.
211. See, e.g., Todd v. State, 643 So. 2d 625, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
212. Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181, 184-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
213. Silver Rose Entm't Inc. v. Clay County, 646 So. 2d 246, 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
214. See Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 883-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding constitu-
tionality of statute enhancing penalties for controlled substance crimes committed near place of
worship); See also Todd, 643 So. 2d at 630 (upholding penalty enhancement for mischief involving
religious property).
215. See, e.g., Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
216. Id.
217. Kimberly Miller, State Reviewing Accreditation of Private Schools, PALM BEACH POST,
Dec. 1, 2002, at A34.
218. See Alisa LaPolt, Bush, McBride Spar Over Education, THE NEWS-PRESS, Oct. 7, 2002 at
Al.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
schools, including parochial schools. Most recipients use the scholar-
ship to attend religious schools, angering separationist groups.21 9
In Holmes v. Bush,220 The Florida Circuit Court granted summary
judgment holding that the OSP violates the state's no-funding provision,
Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution.221 The court reasoned
that the funds for the program come directly from the tax revenues of
Florida and its political subdivisions.222 Distribution of the scholarship
funds results in an equivalent reduction of public school funds, and thus
the depletion of the public treasury.223 Although the payments are made
224directly to parents, the parents are required to "restrictively endorse the
warrant to the private school, '225 which constitutes "indirect support"
forbidden by the state constitution.226 Here, the court notes that the
Alaska Supreme Court made a parallel holding on this issue.227 The court
distinguished the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Board of Edu-
cation v. Allen,228 which upheld a New York statute allowing the pur-
chase and loan of school books to parochial school students.229 Unlike
the program in Allen, the OSP was clearly intended to assist parochial
schools, since full tuition to parochial schools is paid under the OSP.
The court noted, however, that the intention of the legislature is always
debatable and is therefore not determinative when deciding the facial
constitutionality of any provision in Florida.230
While the court discounted the legislative purpose behind the OSP
program, it placed great weight on Florida's decision to keep its no-
funding provision when it revised its constitution in 1968.231 The Florida
Constitutional Revision Commission proposed eliminating the prohibi-
tion on governmental aid to religious institutions, but the Florida legisla-
ture acted "to strengthen the restriction and its applicability to 'indirect
219. Linda Kleindienst, For Now, Students Can Use Vouchers, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
Aug. 7, 2002 at Al.
220. Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079, at * 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002).
221. Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079, at * 1. The Florida Constitution states:
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing
the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or
agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of
any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2.
225. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(6)(b) (2002) (repealed 2003)).
226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Sheldon Jackson Coll. v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 132 (Alaska 1979) (discussed
infra)).
228. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 228 N.E.2d 791, 799 (N.Y. 1967) (upholding a NY





BLAINE'S NAME IN VAIN?
aid [to parochial schools].' 23 2 This demonstrated a clear intent of the
framers of the 1968 Florida Constitution to restrict state funding of reli-
gious schools. Thus, the Florida state appellate court struck down the
OSP as violative of Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida State Constitu-
tion: Florida's so-called "no-funding" provision.233 The Florida appellate
court, sitting en banc, recently upheld this decision, noting that the his-
tory of the federal Blaine Amendment was not relevant to the case.234
The Florida appellate court's ruling met with political outcry. The
OSP program had been heavily supported in the state legislature as part
of Governor Bush's educational reform package. 235 Governor Bush has
appealed the decision, and the state continues to award opportunity
scholarships pending disposition by the Florida Supreme Court. 2 36 Be-
cause the decision in Holmes v. Bush was released after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Zelman, pro-voucher activists fear that it
may serve as a signpost to other state courts about how courts should
interpret state no-funding provisions in the current establishment clause
climate.237 In Florida, politicians fear that the opinion will destroy other
state programs involving funding to religious institutions.2 38 Some pro-
school choice commentators and activists have assailed the Blaine
Amendment's prejudicial origins, hoping that the no-funding provision
itself will be struck down as unconstitutional, allowing the OSP to con-
239tinue.
The OSP's judicial fate may also bear on Florida's charitable choice
programs. Governor Jeb Bush has embraced his brother's faith-based
initiative, appointing a liaison to faith-based and community organiza-
tions in the governor's office. 240 Governor Bush has also issued an ex-
ecutive order establishing a twenty-five member Advisory Board to keep
him abreast of issues affecting faith and community-based social service
providers. 241 A Florida Supreme Court ruling upholding a strict reading
232. Id.
233. Id. In the lower court proceeding, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their challenge under
Article IX, Section 6 of the constitution, the claim that the OSP violated the provision that the state
school fund only be used for the support and maintenance of free public schools. See Bush, 767 So.
2d at 668.
234. Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 351 n.9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
235. See, e.g., Institute for Justice, Safeguarding Educational Freedom: Latest Legal Show-
down for School Choice Heads to Florida Supreme Court, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/florida/
backgrounder.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
236. See Kleindienst, supra note 219, at Al; See also Linda Kleindienst, Bush Appeals Ruling
that Tossed Vouchers, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2002 at B6.
237. See Kleindienst, supra note 219, at AI.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Law Cleanup Time, supra note 210, at B4.
240. Governor's Faith-Based and Community Advisory Board, http://www.volunteerflorida
foundation.org/about faithbased.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
241. Exec. Order No. 04-245 (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://dms.myflorida.com/dms/
content/download/3403/13438/file.
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of Florida's no-funding provision could endanger these programs, jeop-
ardizing social service provision to Florida's needy citizens.
No Florida Supreme Court precedent provides a controlling inter-
pretation of Article IX, Section 1, leaving the public to speculate on what
the court's decision will be. The Florida Supreme Court is known to
"lean[] left," which many believe will seal the demise of the OSP.
2 42
However, strong political and public support for the program may sway
the court's decision. Following the state's prior case law on Article IX,
Section 1, the Florida Supreme Court could easily uphold the constitu-
tionality of the OSP. 2 4 3 It would argue that the OSP has only an inciden-
tal effect of advancing religion and does not advance religion over non-
religion, and that the program is therefore permissible under the state
constitution. The court might also choose to uphold the program under
its longstanding presumption that challenges to legislative enactments
should always be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the law. 2"
According to the 1944 case Taylor v. Dorsey,245 the court should be lib-
eral in its constitutional interpretation, and the law should not be held
invalid unless it is clearly unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.24 6
The court might use the Taylor principle to construe the no-funding pro-
vision liberally, perhaps coextensively with the federal establishment
clause such that it would permit state funding to religious institutions
under the OSP.
However, it is not likely that the Florida Supreme Court will rely
only on this past analysis. First, most of these appellate cases relied on
the framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.247 While Lemon remained the salient federal doctrine of
establishment clause jurisprudence for more than twenty-five years, the
United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Agostini, Mitchell,
and Zelman have made its current relevance questionable at best.248 Fur-
thermore, the Florida appellate cases above do not explicitly address the
state's no-funding provision. In Holmes v. Bush, the issue had been
raised and briefed by the parties and was the deciding factor in the lower
court's opinion, so the Florida Supreme Court should address it. Alter-
natively, the court might strike down the OSP based on the Florida Con-
stitution's local control provision, recently invoked in a similar case be-
242. Law Cleanup Time, supra note 210, at B4.
243. Id.
244. See Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 881 (Fla. 1944) (en banc).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 317.
247. 403 U.S. 602, 640-42 (1971).
248. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810,
880-81 (2000); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670.
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fore the Colorado Supreme Court.24 9 The political preferences of the
court's members, or public opinion, will be the deciding factor.
2. Colorado
Like Florida, Colorado is currently a hotbed of school choice and
charitable choice activity. Colorado's no-funding provision has sparked
controversy since its inception.250 Hundreds of Catholic and non-
Catholic citizens of Colorado wrote to the Colorado Constitutional Con-
vention of 1875-76 weighing in on both sides of the issue of whether to
"withdraw from the control of the legislature the public school fund,",251
some noting that "free, non-sectarian common schools are essential.,
25 2
The convention noted that the "petitions for and against such division [of
the Public School Fund] contain nearly an equal number of names." 5 3 A
strict no-funding provision barring the legislature and any political sub-
division of the state from funding any sectarian institution was eventually
adopted.254 Some delegates reported that backlash against an aggressive
Catholic bishop, Monsignor Joseph Machebeuf, prompted the passing of
the o-fud~ roviion 255the no-funding provision. Allegedly, Monsignor Machebeuf threat-
ened to tell his constituency not to ratify the constitution unless the relig-
ion provisions contained language to his liking, fueling the other dele-
gates to pass a provision against his interests.256 No evidence exists of
more widespread anti-Catholic animus behind the no-funding provision.
The jurisprudential history of Article IX, Section 7 would not op-
pose school choice and charitable choice programs, despite the state's
restrictive Blaine language. The available state constitutional history
does not elaborate on the enactment of Article IX, Section 7.257 The
most comprehensive treatment of the provision in the state's case law is
in the Colorado Supreme Court case of People ex rel. Vollmar v.
Stanley2 58 in 1927. According to Stanley, the framers of the Colorado
constitution of 1875-76 did not intend for the term "sectarian" to be syn-
onymous with "religious.,, 259 Instead, they meant the common usage of
the term, which specifically referred to the various Christian sects.260
Thus, the state could freely sponsor a program that involved all religions
249. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers and Students, 92 P.3d 933, 937-38 (Colo.
2004) (see discussion infra).
250. COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 7 (Dale A. Oesterle & Richard
B. Collins eds., 2002).
251. PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLORADO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1875-76, 228 (1876).
See also id., 235-36, 261, 277-78, 295-96, 314, 351.
252. Id. at 277.
253. Id. at 311.
254. Id. at 360-62; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
255. COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 250, at 224.
256. Id. at 211.
257. Id.
258. 255 P. 610, 618 (Colo. 1927).
259. Stanley, 255 P. at 616.
260. Id.
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generally.261 Under Stanley's analysis, a voucher program involving all
religious schools generally would presumptively be constitutional. In
1953, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a school custodian's loaning
his services to a church did not violate the state no-funding provision,
262with little explanation of its reasoning. In 1982, the Supreme Court of
Colorado upheld the Colorado Student Incentive Grant Program, a higher
education tuition aid program that permitted assistance to students at-
tending religious schools.263 The court held that aid to an institution of
higher education will not have the primary effect of advancing religion
unless (1) it is so pervasively sectarian that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission, or (2) if the aid funds a
specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular set-
ting.264 The court thus noted that the program did not violate the state
no-funding provision, especially since it involved only higher education,
the aid flowed to the student and not the institution, and the aid went to
students from both public and private institutions.265 The decision heav-
ily draws on the Lemon test, and this could be grounds for distinguishing
this opinion.
Colorado's voucher program, the Colorado Opportunity Contract
Pilot Program, was passed by the state legislature on March 31, 2003.266
The vote was held among partisan lines, and many constituents did not
approve of the program.267 The goal of the program is "to help close the
achievement gap between high and low-performing students by provid-
ing a broader range of educational options for parents of high poverty,
low achieving students., 268 Under the program, a parent chooses a pri-
vate or sectarian school for his or her child to attend, and participating
school districts pay for education at those private schools.269  Citizen
groups filed suit against the voucher program, alleging the violation of
eight separate state constitutional provisions, including the no-funding
provision.270 However, the court never reached the no-funding argument,
instead invalidating the program based on the "local control" provision
of Article IX, Section 15, a provision found in only five other states.27 '
261. Id. at 618 (upholding a bible-reading program in public schools) (implicitly overruled by
Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 678 (Colo. 1982)).
262. Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Schmidt, 263 P.2d 581, 582 (Colo. 1953).
263. Am. United, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072, 1088 (Colo. 1982).
264. Am. United, 648 P.2d at 1079.
265. Id. at 1082.
266. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-56-101 (2003); see also John J. Sanko & Nancy Mitchell, School
Vouchers March Forward, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 20, 2003, at A4 (discussing passage of
voucher bill).
267. See Eric Hubler, Voters Not Sold on Lawmakers' Voucher Push, Poll Says, THE DENVER
POST, Feb. 14, 2003, at A 14; Nancy Mitchell, Union-Backed Poll Shows Voters Still Wary of Vouch-
ers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 14,2003, at A30.
268. Colorado Congress of Parents, Teachers and Students v. Owens, No. 03-CV-3734, 2003
WL 23870661, at *1 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter, Colorado Congress].
269. Colo. Congress, 2003 WL 23870661, at *1.
270. Id. at *2 (citing violation of COLO. CONST. Art. IX, §7, the state's no-funding provision).
271. The local control provision of the Colorado Constitution states:
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The court found that the program allowed local school boards no discre-
tion over how their money was spent to provide instruction for students
who live in the district, and they found no way to reconcile the constitu-
tional requirement of local control with the program's administration.272
Thus, the voucher program was found unconstitutional, and the rest of
the constitutional challenges to the program were rendered moot.
273
On June 28, 2004, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld this analysis
274and struck down the program based on the "local control" provision.
Although the Colorado Opportunity Scholarship program does not apply
to higher education, the court's analysis is otherwise directly applicable
to Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program and would bear toward
its constitutionality.
The local control provision would not affect the constitutionality of
Colorado's charitable choice programs. Governor Bill Owens has estab-
lished a liaison in his office to the faith and community-based organiza-
275tions. The Colorado Workforce, Faith and Community Works Initia-
tive, a state agency, has received a $1.3 million dollar grant from the
federal Compassion Capital Fund to improve relations with faith-based
and non-profit organizations.276 The status of these programs under the
state constitution has not yet been challenged.
3. Michigan
Michigan's no-funding provision is strictest and perhaps the least
ambiguous in the country. In addition to a general prohibition on state
funding of sectarian institutions, the Michigan provision specifically
excludes tuition voucher programs that assist with payment for nonpublic
schools, in an amendment that was ratified by a popular vote in 1 9 7 0 .
277
The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school districts of con-
venient size, in each of which shall be established a board of education, to consist of three
or more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall
have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 15. The five other state provisions are: FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (providing
local school boards "shall operate, control and supervise" district schools); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V
Par. I (vesting local boards with authority to "establish and maintain" district schools); KAN.
CONST. art. VI, § 5 (providing local public schools "shall be maintained, developed and operated by
locally elected boards"); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 8 (vesting "supervision and control of schools" in
local boards); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (vesting "supervision of schools" in local boards).
272. Colo. Congress, 2003 WL 23870661, at *12.
273. Id.
274. Owens, 92 P.3d at 944.
275. See The White House, Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: State Liaisons or
Offices for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/
contact.html#liaisons (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
276. Press Release, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment, Colorado Government to
Strengthen It's [sic] Partnerships with Faith-Based Community Organizations to Better Serve Cus-
tomers (July 2, 2002), available at http://www.coworkforce.com/News/fbco.asp.
277. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970).
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Michigan's prohibition of state funding to religious institutions has
deep roots. The original Michigan constitution of 1835, well before the
federal Blaine Amendment was created, provided that "No money will
be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies., 278 The
provision was enacted before the state had any significant number of
parochial schools and before the wave of Catholic immigration. 279 More
"traditional" Blaine language appeared in 1850 - still before the creation
of the federal Blaine Amendment - and again in 1908. That same lan-
guage was ratified when the entire constitution was amended in 1963.280
However, in 1970, the state legislature passed Public Act 100, which
allowed direct financial support by the state to eligible private schools.28'
A "Council Against Parochiaid" quickly organized to ensure that this
money would not flow to specific institutions instead of religious schools
in general.282 The Council succeeded in getting its propositions onto the
popular ballot, and the strengthened Blaine Amendment passed amid
much controversy. Called upon to clarify the meaning of the provision,
the Michigan Supreme Court held in 1971 that despite the "utter and
complete confusion" of the campaign, the voters had definitively rejected
parochiaid, or public aid to religious schools.
283
In 2000, Michigan voters overwhelmingly defeated a ballot proposi-
tion that would have approved a school voucher program and overruled
the state's no-funding provision.28 4 Since then, Republicans have over-
taken both houses of the state legislature, but Governor Jennifer Gran-
holm opposes school choice, so little political activity over vouchers is
occurring in the state.285 However, Governor Granholm has established a
liaison to faith and community-based organizations within her office and
is hosting an annual conference for these groups.286 Michigan boasts
little case law on its no-funding provision, perhaps because it has clari-
fied the intent of the provision, implicitly or explicitly, about every fifty
278. MICH. CONST. OF 1835, art. I. § 5 (repealed 1850).
279. Steven K. Green, Blaming Blaine: Understanding The Blaine Amendment and the No-
Funding Principle, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 107, 126 (2004).
280. SUSAN P. FINO, THE MICHIGAN STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 166 (1996).
281. MATTHEW J. BROUILLETTE, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, SCHOOL CHOICE
IN MICHIGAN: A PRIMER FOR FREEDOM IN EDUCATION 14 (1999),
http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=2027.
282. Id.
283. Traverse City Sch. Dist. v. Att'y Gen., 185 N.W.2d 9, 17 (Mich. 1971).
284. Albert Menendez & Edd Doerr, Americans for Religious Liberty, Article - School
Vouchers: Voters Say No, http://www.arlinc.org/articles/article-voterssayno.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2005); In 2000, Californians defeated Proposition 38, which would have created a public school
voucher program. Id. California also rejected a proposal that would have eliminated its provision
restricting funding to religious schools in the 1982 general election. The Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, Blaine Amendments: States (2003), http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states-files/
CA.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
285. Educationreport.org, Gubanatorial Candidate Profiles: Granholm, http://www.mackinac.
org/pubs/mer/article.asp?ID-4618 (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
286. The Official State Of Michigan Website, Granholm Administration to Host Faith-Based
Resource Symposium, Create Office of Community and Faith-Based Initiatives,
http://www.michigan.gov/som/0,1607,7-192-- 112680--,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
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years. However, Michigan boasts other constitutional provisions that
could block school choice and charitable choice programs. For example,
the Michigan constitution has a compelled support provision,287 which
prohibits the use of public funds to aid private schools "directly or indi-
rectly," whether or not the schools are sectarian. 288 A decision striking
down any Michigan school choice or charitable choice program might
rest on these constitutional provisions, and the courts would not need to
delve into Blaine's controversial history.
C. States Without No-Funding Provisions
States without no-funding provisions fall into two categories: those
with and without compelled support provisions. States with compelled
support provisions will find that their compelled support provisions are
the most formidable opponents to voucher programs in their state consti-
tutions, especially after the Vermont Chittenden2 89 case. For the states
with neither no-funding provisions nor compelled support provisions, the
lack of constitutional obstacles paves the way for public debate over
school choice programs.
1. Vermont
Vermont's Constitution today is nearly identical to the original en-
acted in 1777. It bears many similarities to other colonial constitutions,
and borrowed heavily from the original constitution of Pennsylvania.
290
Few cases were litigated under its Compelled Support clause until the
Chittenden case in 1999.291 The town of Chittenden had no high school,
so it paid tuition to public high schools or approved independent high
schools for the education of students in its school district. 9 2 When the
Chittenden school board modified its policy to allow for tuition reim-
bursement to sectarian schools, the Commissioner of Education termi-
nated state aid to the district, and the Chittenden school board brought
suit to declare its program constitutional.293 In its opinion, the Vermont
Supreme Court sought to understand the meaning of the Compelled Sup-
port clause by analyzing its plain language, its history, and its usage in
similar cases in other states.
The court commenced a thorough review of the influences on the
Vermont constitution, determining that the historical records of other
colonial constitutions in Pennsylvania and Virginia would have forbid-
den state aid to sectarian schools.294 The Vermont Supreme Court re-
287. MICH. CONST. Art. I, § 4.
288. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2, c. 2.
289. Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ. 738 A.2d 539, 542 (Vt. 1999).
290. See Chittenden Town, 738 A.2d at 556.
291. Id. at 547-49.
292. Id. at 542.
293. Id. at 543.
294. Id. at 556-59.
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viewed the Wisconsin court's decision in Jackson v. Benson295 and the
Ohio decision in Simmons-Harris v. Goff, carefully delineating the dif-
ferences between the Wisconsin and Vermont constitutions that necessi-
tated a different opinion.296 The Vermont Supreme Court specifically
refused to equate its state religion clauses with the federal religion
clauses, as the Ohio and Wisconsin courts had done in Simmons-Harris
and Jackson, because of Vermont's unique history and the historical re-
cord.297 Thus, the Vermont Supreme Court invalidated the Chittenden
Town tuition-reimbursement program based on the compelled-support
clause.298 Based on the Vermont Court's reasoning and insistence on
having an independent interpretation of the state constitution, this deci-
sion seems unlikely to change in light of the United States Supreme
Court's subsequent decision permitting vouchers in Zelman.
2. Maine
James G. Blaine's home state has no "Blaine Amendment" and no
compelled support provision. Despite this lack of restriction, the state
does not fund religious schools 299 and boasts little charitable choice ac-
tivity. Parochial schools may not participate in Maine's rural tuition-
reimbursement program. 300  Like Vermont, Maine permits those towns
which cannot support high schools to pay tuition for their pupils at other
approved area schools. 30 1 The exclusion of religious schools from this
"tuitioning" program has withstood challenge in both state and federal
court. In 1999, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the federal
free exercise clause did not prevent Maine from excluding religious
302 Ataschools from the tuitioning program, and that direct payments to reli-
gious schools would be impermissible under the Supreme Court's estab-
lishment clause jurisprudence. 0 3 Additionally, in Strout v. Albanese °4
the federal First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prohibition
against religious school participation in the program did not violate the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment because the grants could not
be given to the schools consistently with the establishment clause. 305 The
court noted that "there is no binding authority for the proposition that the
295. 578 N.W.2d 602, 632 (Wis. 1998).
296. Chittenden Town, 738 A.2d at 559-60.
297. Id. See also id at 566 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("It is preferable that our interpretation of
the Vermont Constitution be distinct and freestanding, and that the Court articulate the adequate and
independent state grounds for decisions when the Vermont Constitution is invoked.").
298. Id. at 564.
299. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 130-31 (Me. 1999).
300. Bagley, 728 A.2d at 130-3 1.
301. Id. at 130.
302. Id. at 136.
303. Id. at 147.
304. 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999).
305. Strout, 178 F.3d at 61.
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direct payment of tuition by the state to a private sectarian school is con-
stitutionally permissible."
30 6
In its first post-Zelman "counteroffensive" designed to strike down
barriers to school choice throughout the nation,3 °7 the Institute for Justice
recently filed another lawsuit challenging the exclusion of religious
schools from Maine's tuitioning program.308 However, Zelman is
unlikely to have changed either the state or federal court's analysis of the
Maine tuitioning program. The program in Zelman dealt with indirect
aid to religious schools, while the Maine program dealt with direct aid.
Indeed, the Court's recent decision in Locke v. Davey30 9 further supports
the Strout decision, since it finds no free exercise violation where the
establishment clause reaches.
D. Other States
Recent school choice litigation has also occurred in Pennsylvania
and Illinois. In Pennsylvania, a suburban Philadelphia school district
approved a tax benefit program for families who send their children to
private schools or public schools in other districts. 310 The teachers' un-
ion successfully challenged the program on state constitutional grounds,
with the state appellate court holding that the legislature did not intend,
expressly or impliedly, to permit the school district to create such a tax
credit program. 1 ' The state's no-funding provision did not factor into
the Pennsylvania court's decision in this case. The school district chose
"not to appeal [the] case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court." 312
In Illinois, the state's no-funding provision was at issue in a chal-
lenge to an Illinois state tax credit program.313 Under the program, en-
acted in 1999, parents could receive a 25% income tax credit for expen-
ditures related to sending their children to private schools, a credit of up
to $500 per family. 314 Keith Griffith and Terry Williams, a public school
teacher and a parent of children attending public school, respectively,
immediately challenged the program alleging that the program violated
the religious establishment provisions of the Illinois constitution, includ-
306. Id. at 60-61.
307. Institute for Justice, Vindicating the Supreme Court: Fighting for Parental Liberty by
Stopping Religious Discrimination, http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/maine2/backgrounder.html (last
visited Sept. 30, 2005).
308. Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2003 Me. Super. LEXIS 90 (2003).
309. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
310. Giacomucci v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 742 A.2d 1165, 1167 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
311. Giacomucci, 742 A.2d at 1167.
312. Institute for Justice, School Choice Cases: Southeast Delco, Pennsylvania School Choice,
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/pennsylvania/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
313. Griffith v. Bower, 747 N.E.2d 423,425 (I11. App. Ct. 2001).
314. Griffith, 747 N.E.2d at 425.
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ing the state's no-funding provision.31 5  The program was upheld on
summary judgment and certiorari was denied.
316
The Becket Fund, a non-profit law firm that seeks to protect "the
free expression of all religious traditions, 317 has recently filed lawsuits
challenging no-funding provisions in South Dakota and Massachusetts.
As mentioned above, Becket has filed a case in Pucket v. Rounds
318
charging that the South Dakota no-funding provision has been used to
exclude religious schools and children from numerous government bene-
fits, including textbook loans and school busing programs. 319 The suc-
cess of this case appears unlikely. South Dakota's no-funding provision
originated in the same enabling act as Washington's no-funding provi-
sion, so the South Dakota courts will likely follow Washington's strict
interpretation of its no-funding provision.
The strict Blaine state of Massachusetts also boasts a line of case
law that interprets its no-funding provision strictly and is quite restrictive
of school choice. 320 However, the Becket Fund recently filed litigation in
an attempt to pave the way for Massachusetts' first voucher program;32 a
group of parents wants to repeal a 1917 constitutional amendment that
currently bars referenda on the question of school choice. 322 The consti-
tutional provision forbids referenda on any law that relates to "religion,
religious practices, or religious institutions. 323 The Becket fund claims
that the anti-aid provision, like the federal Blaine Amendment, was
adopted as a result of anti-Catholic animus and asks for it to be struck
down under the free exercise and equal protection clauses.324 Although
the lawsuit itself has nothing to do with the state "Blaine Amendment,"
the Becket fund links the case to the Blaine Amendment discussion on its
websites and refers to it as a Blaine Amendment "forerunner. 3 25 The
315. Id. at 425.
316. Id. at 426-27.
317. Becket Fund Home Page, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php (last visited on Sept. 30,
2005).
318. The Becket Fund, Pucket v. Rounds, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/13.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., Bloom v. School Committee of Springfield, 379 N.E.2d 578, 579, 586 (Mass.
1978) (holding that a statute requiring school committees to loan textbooks to pupils attending
private schools, sectarian or nonsectarian, violates the state no-funding provision); Collins v. Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth, 556 N.E.2d 348, 348 (Mass. 1990) (upholding an article of the state
constitution excluding from the referendum process any law relating to religion, religious practices,
or religious institutions).
321. The Becket Fund, Wirzburger v. Galvin, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/6.
html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
322. Id.
323. Boyette v. Galvin, 311 F. Supp. 2d 237, 239 (D. Mass. 2004), on appeal sub nom Wirz-
burger v. Galvin, No. 04-1625 (1st Cir., filed May 19, 2004) (quoting MASS. CONST. amend, art. 48,
pt. 2, § 2).
324. The Becket Fund, Wirzburger v. Galvin, supra note 321.
325. Becket Fund Home Page, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php (last visited Sept. 30,
2005).
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Becket Fund's publicity of this case exemplifies broad use of the Blaine
name to tie other school choice cases to alleged religious bigotry.326
IV. ANALYSIS: A POTENT WEAPON?
No-funding provisions by themselves should not serve as the fore-
most obstacle to school choice and charitable choice programs through-
out the country. In the hands of a savvy court, even those no-funding
provisions with the strongest wording will not prevent such programs
from passing. As the examples above indicate, the history of the state
no-funding provisions is not dispositive of their final adjudication.
Sparse constitutional records and indecipherable legislative motives are
hardly a basis for a modem court to make a reasoned decision. No states
observe prohibitions on "sectarian" funding as black-letter law that re-
stricts all funding of religious institutions. What time's passage has not
turned to gray, judges' motivations may erase completely. State jurists
will be free to decide the fate of school choice and charitable choice pro-
grams based on their own political leanings. Whether judges decide to
uphold or strike down school choice and charitable choice programs,
they will have plenty of constitutional and jurisprudential ammunition
for doing so.
A. How Courts May Uphold School Choice and Charitable Choice Pro-
grams Despite the No-Funding Provisions
State jurists who want to uphold school choice and charitable choice
programs have several options for doing so before they must even reach
the state no-funding provisions. First, a jurist might root her argument in
the free exercise clause of the state or federal constitutions by arguing
that parents have the right to freely exercise their religious beliefs by
choosing to send their children to a religious school on equal terms with
a non-religious school. After Zelman and Davey, an open question re-
mains as to whether state or federal free exercise clauses would permit a
state to exclude religious schools from participating in a school choice
program. A circuit split exists on this question at the federal level. In
Peter v. Wedl,327 the Eighth Circuit held that the free exercise clause
barred a state from denying aid to disabled children attending religious
schools that they would receive if they attended non-religious private
schools.328 On nearly identical facts, the Ninth Circuit held the follow-
ing year that denying such aid did not constitute a free exercise viola-
326. See also The Heritage Foundation, School Choice: About the State Profiles,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/SchoolChoice/AboutStateProfiles.cfm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005) and Daniel McGroarty, N.Y. Bishops & the Blaine Truth, Milton & Rose D. Fried-
man Foundation, http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/news/2002-09-06.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2005).
327. 155 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
328. Peter, 155 F.3d at 997.
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tion.329 The Supreme Court temporarily let the question stand, denying
certiorari in 2000.330
Many states have attempted to strengthen their free exercise guaran-
tees beyond those of the federal free exercise provisions by passing state
versions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 331 after the
federal RFRA was struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores.332  States
passed RFRAs in response to what many viewed as a curtailing on free
exercise guarantees in the wake of Employment Div. v. Smith.333 Illi-
nois,334 Ohio,3 35 and other state courts also acted to bolster their free ex-
ercise guarantees since Smith. The Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly
rejected Smith and developed its own standard for evaluating whether
state laws adversely affect religion.336
State jurists who choose this way of justifying school voucher pro-
grams despite state no-funding provisions would couch their arguments
in terms of a recent trend among state supreme courts to use state consti-
tutions as a source of positive rights.337 Under this model, free exercise
is a positive right granted by state constitutions upon which neither state
anti-establishment provisions nor the federal establishment clause may
infringe. The state jurist would have to establish free exercise as a
paramount right that would supersede any rights guaranteed by the no-
funding provision.
A state court may also interpret the no-funding provisions to permit
school choice and charitable choice programs. Most commonly, courts
have declared the religion clauses of the state constitution coextensive
with the federal religion clauses. The Ohio, Wisconsin, and Arizona
courts have used this tactic.338
Courts can also interpret the no-funding provision narrowly so that
the school choice plan does not violate the no-funding provision. For
329. WJM ex rel. KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000).
330. WJM, 531 U.S. at 1010.
331. See, e.g., Illinois RFRA, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (2005).
332. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
333. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
334. Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961,
993-94 (N.D. Il. 2003).
335. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ohio 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 263.
336. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
337. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1156 (1999); Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are
Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993).
338. Other courts that have held their religion clauses to be coextensive with federal religion
clauses at various times include: Illinois (People v. Falbe, 727 N.E.2d 200, 207 (Ill. 2000) (estab-
lishment provisions same)); North Carolina (Appeal of Springmoor, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 177, 180 (N.C.
1998) (adopting law of both Religion Clauses)); Tennessee (State v. Medicine Bird Black Bear
White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 761 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (free exercise principles same)); and Lou-
isiana (Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 n.5 (W.D. La. 2001) (La. and
federal establishment clauses identical)).
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example, in Simmons-Harris v. Goff, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
the school choice plan does not violate the no-funding provision because
school funds would only reach sects through the "independent decisions
of parents and students. 339 Since only school choice programs involving
indirect aid are constitutional under Zelman, most future school choice
programs will likely involve indirect aid, and this analysis will be appli-
cable. State courts may also apply this rationale to uphold charitable
choice programs that involve indirect aid to religious organizations.
Finally, courts who wish to uphold school voucher programs may
declare the no-funding provision unconstitutional or irrelevant due to its
prejudicial origins, as the Arizona Supreme Court did in Kotterman.
Some activists cite two United States Supreme Court cases as providing
support for this approach. In Hunter v. Underwood,34 ° the Supreme
Court invalidated an Alabama criminal disenfranchisement statute, hold-
ing that it was racially motivated at its inception and continued to have a
racially disparate impact.341 Similarly, anti-Blaine activists might argue
that the no-funding provisions were motivated by anti-Catholic bigotry
and that they continue to have disparate impact on Catholic schools,
which still comprise most religious schools in the United States.
Some scholars also cite the more recent case of Romer v. Evans,
342
in which the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado ballot proposition
that invalidated a state constitutional amendment barring state actors
from granting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals protection and rights as a
class.343 The Court held that the statute had the discriminatory effect of
denying a class of people protection from discrimination, a clear viola-
tion of equal protection.344 However, to analogize the no-funding provi-
sion cases to Hunter and Romer, challengers would have to definitively
prove the anti-Catholic history of the no-funding provisions. Challengers
would also have to show that the no-funding provisions in each state
were directed against Catholics as a class, and not just religion in gen-
eral, and continue to have disproportionate impact against Catholics as a
class, and not just parochial schools. This task may not be possible given
the complex history of the Blaine provisions and their differential treat-
ment in the individual states. The Kotterman decision cites neither
Hunter nor Romer, and thus provides the least complicated option for
striking down no-funding provisions, although it is the least authorita-
tive.
339. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999).
340. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
341. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232-33.
342. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
343. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
344. Id.
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B. How Courts May Strike Down School Choice and Charitable Choice
Programs without Reaching the No-Funding Provisions
State jurists that wish to strike down school choice or charitable
choice programs still need not reach the no-funding provisions. State
courts have many other constitutional options that they can use to invali-
date school choice programs. The local control provision used by the
Colorado court to strike down the state's voucher program without reach-
ing its no-funding provision can be found in only six other states. How-
ever, the compelled support provision can be found in twenty-nine states
and presents a more powerful alternative for striking down school choice
programs. The Chittenden case in Vermont demonstrates how a Com-
pelled Support clause alone can invalidate a school choice program.
A state court might also claim that the state's anti-establishment
provisions are more expansive than the federal establishment clause and
thus do not permit school choice and charitable choice programs. While
such a use of state anti-establishment provisions would be bold and per-
haps unprecedented, nothing in Zelman forbids a state anti-establishment
provision from being stronger than the federal anti-establishment provi-
sion and therefore being used to strike down a voucher program, as long
as it does not violate the federal free exercise clause. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Locke v. Davey345 also gives state supreme courts tacit
permission to interpret their state constitutional provisions as stronger
than the federal establishment clause.346
CONCLUSION: DON'T BLAME BLAINE
Analyzing the history of eight so-called Blaine Amendments does
not reveal them to be legislatively enacted bigotry. Blaine Amendment
opponents have never explained how the no-funding provisions have
consistently been used in a prejudicial manner that is directly traceable to
their anti-Catholic roots. State no-funding provisions may or may not
have been passed because of anti-Catholic animosity on the part of some
or all voters. Courts in the past may or may not have interpreted their
no-funding provisions according to their own prejudicial motivations.
And all of this may or may not matter when no-funding provisions come
before politically active judges with an array of options for interpretation
at their fingertips. Moreover, Blaine Amendment opponents do not have
a compelling argument as to why state constitutions cannot protect sepa-
ration of religion and state more strictly than the federal constitution. As
state courts increasingly interpret state constitutional law to create and
enforce rights for state citizens, such an argument seems increasingly
345. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
346. Locke, 540 U.S. 712 at 718-19.
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difficult to make.34 7 Given the array of judicial options for circumvent-
ing, invalidating, or even ignoring state no-funding provisions, the fed-
eral Blaine Amendment simply cannot be blamed for halting school
choice in the states. The name of Blaine seems mainly used in vain.
Where history is indecisive, activists on both sides of the school
choice debate should bury the past and focus on the present. The true
legislative intent behind all state no-funding provisions cannot be un-
earthed by any amount of historical digging, and should not be rewritten
by partisan rhetoric. Debate over school choice belongs outside the
courts and in the public realm, where the competing values of freedom of
religion, freedom from religion, and superior education can manifest
themselves at the polls. Only then can we know the true legislative in-
tent behind the parochial school programs of today. We will also know
the popular view on whether freedom from religion is meant to trump the
value of saving failing schools, which can guide state courts in interpret-
ing their constitutional provisions. By keeping school choice out of the
courts and in the democratic arena, if school choice activists fail, they
cannot blame Blaine, but only themselves.
347. See Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 211 (2003).
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CORPORATIONS AND AUTONOMY THEORIES OF
CONTRACT: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW LEXMERCATORIA
NATHAN OMANt
ABSTRACT
One of the central problems of contracts jurisprudence is the con-
flict between autonomy theories of contract and efficiency theories of
contract. One approach to solving this conflict is to argue that in the
realm of contracts between corporations, autonomy theories have noth-
ing to say because corporations are not real people with whose auton-
omy we need to be concerned. While apparently powerful, this argument
ultimately fails because it implicitly assumes theories of the corporation
at odds with economic theories of law. Economics, in turn, offers a vi-
sion of the firm that is quite hospitable to autonomy theories of contract.
The failure of this argument suggests that a more fruitful avenue for rec-
onciling these competing approaches is to find a principled way of inte-
grating them into a single theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Many contracts scholars have long had an intuition that corporations
present a special problem for autonomy theories of contract law.' Most
of these theories implicitly or explicitly assume that contracting parties
are human beings rather than institutions. Hence, there seems something
suspect about applying such theories to corporations. Recently, scholars
have tried to use this intuition to solve some basic problems in the phi-
losophy of contract law. In this paper, I hope to demonstrate that this
approach will not work. First, I articulate the hitherto inchoate argu-
ments on which the intuition rests. Second, I demonstrate that despite
their initial plausibility, these arguments are flawed. Ultimately, the in-
jection of corporations into contract law theory throws up new versions
of some old problems, but corporations do not pose a unique or funda-
mental challenge to autonomy theories of contract.
The most recent use of corporations in the debate over contract the-
ory comes at a time when that theory is deeply divided. Contracts schol-
arship suffers from an embarrassment of theoretical riches. 2  Philoso-
phers,3 historians,4 and economists5 have all entered the conversation. A
few generations ago, discussion centered on questions of the extent to
1. For example, in discussing form contracts, Todd D. Rakoff has written:
Refusal to enforce a contract of adhesion, the courts say, trenches on freedom of contract.
Implicit in the argument is an equating of the drafting organization with a live individual.
For what gives value to uncoerced choice - the type of freedom that the courts have in
mind - is its connection to the human being, to his growth and development, his indi-
viduation, his fulfillment by doing .... To see a contract of adhesion as the extension
and fulfillment of the will of an individual entrepreneur, entitled to do business as he sees
fit, is incongruous.
Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1236
(1983). See also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY
FOR THE BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 61 (1986) (arguing that corporations do not have "original auton-
omy rights"); Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
733 n.63 (1931) (noting the "pernicious heritage" in contract law scholarship of treating organiza-
tions as though they were people); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J.
1417, 1464-71 (2004) (arguing that his promissory theory of contract cannot be applied to contracts
between corporations).
2. See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) (discuss-
ing contemporary theories of contract law); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004) (same);
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993) (same).
3. See, e.g., THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
4. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE (1991); DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
(1999).
5. See, e.g., THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)
(collecting essays on contract from an economic perspective).
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which contracts reflected the will of the parties or the rules of society
6
and the relative merits of achieving fairness or freedom.7 The debates
had the advantage of occurring in essentially the same language. 8 In
contrast, the contracts theorists of today find that it is difficult to talk
with each other even when discussing the same issues that exercised their
predecessors. While each approach operates with its own criteria for
successful theories, contracts scholars have not found a powerful and
widely accepted meta-theory that would allow them to adjudicate be-
tween the competing approaches. The search for such a meta-theory is
one of the major tasks of contemporary contracts scholarship.
One of the difficulties confronting a contracts theorist is the sprawl-
ing nature of contract law itself. Contracts have the potential to govern
everything from the sale of a cow by an individual farmer to disputes
over the acquisition of a multi-billion dollar oil company.9 One strategy
for dealing with the theoretical pluralism is to narrow the field of inquiry
to purely commercial transactions.'0 The claim is that whatever its limi-
tations elsewhere, in the realm of firm-to-firm contracts, economic
analysis should reign supreme." Thus, even if a unified theory of all
contracts is difficult, a unified theory of some significant subset of con-
tracts may be possible.
The success of this latest move-which I shall call the new lex mer-
catoria (law merchant)-rests on its ability to dismiss outright
non-economic theories as inapplicable. The claim is that autonomy theo-
ries are not useful in understanding contracts by corporations because
such theories assume that contracting parties are human beings. Ulti-
mately, this argument necessarily invokes a particular theory-or set of
theories-about the nature of corporations. These theories, however,
have been largely repudiated by contemporary economic analysis. Ironi-
cally, contemporary law and economics explicitly assumes a model of
the corporation that is particularly hospitable to the very theories that the
proponents of the new lex mercatoria hope to dismiss once and for all.
6. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933).
7. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1942).
8. For an idiosyncratic but influential account of this earlier discussion see Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (arguing that the
discussion of contract law represented a competition between individualistic and altruistic visions of
the law).
9. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 920 (Mich. 1887) (discussing a contract to
sell a cow named Rose); Texaco Inc. v. Penzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987) (discussing
a contract to sell the Getty Oil Company).
10. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S. Kraus &
Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contracts Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
11. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 544.
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The failure to banish autonomy theories from the new lex mercato-
ria illustrates the difficulty of reconciling autonomy and welfare theories
by dismissing one approach all together. Scholars interested in a coher-
ent theory of contracts would be better served by finding ways of inte-
grating the two approaches in some principled fashion.' 2  Hence, any
advantage of the new lex mercatoria must lie in its ability to make the
integration of autonomy and welfare theories into a single approach more
tractable.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some theoretical
background on the conflict between autonomy and efficiency theories of
contract and the attempts to reconcile them. In Part II, I provide a fully
developed version of the argument for dismissing autonomy theories
from the discussion of contracts between corporations. Part III examines
the various theories of the corporation inherent in that argument. In Part
IV, I argue that these theories of the corporation are inconsistent with
efficiency theories of contract and that the preferred conception of the
corporation among law and economics scholars-the nexus of contracts
theory--can be reconciled with autonomy theories. In Part V, I illustrate
the application of the nexus of contracts theory of the corporation to
autonomy-based arguments about contracts between corporations using
the example of contract interpretation. This article concludes with some
observations on attempts to reconcile autonomy and efficiency drawn
from the arguments over corporations and contracts.
I. THE PREDICAMENT OF CONTEMPORARY CONTRACT THEORY AND THE
NEW LEXMERCTORIA
A. Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency
Contemporary legal philosophy is essentially divided about the ba-
sis of contractual obligation. On one side are autonomy theorists who
claim that contracts represent a form of self-determination and ought to
be enforced as a way of respecting and increasing human freedom. On
the other side are efficiency theorists who argue that voluntary transac-
tions increase aggregate levels of social welfare and ought to be enforced
as a way of increasing wealth and utility.' 3 The autonomy theories are
12. For my own attempt to offer such an approach see Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in
Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1483 (2005).
13. There are of course theorists who seek to avoid this conflict by adopting a largely contex-
tual, atheoretical, and ad hoc approach to contract law. These theorists deny that contract law can or
should be understood to embody a consistent theory. It is enough that it provides pragmatic solu-
tions to the concrete problems that it finds itself faced with. See also Robert Hillman, The Crisis in
Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103 (1988) (arguing that a pragmatic model of contract
law displays the complexity of the theory). See generally HILLMAN, supra note 2. For example,
Jean Braucher has written, "I remain a skeptic about the need for and the wisdom of a unified field
theory of contract, particularly a one-dimensional one; a good gray compromise statement of com-
peting concerns will probably do." Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regula-
tory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 701 n. 14 (1990). For a discussion of the
conflict between theory and pragmatism in contract law scholarship see Oman, supra note 12, at
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deontological, while the efficiency theories are consequentialist, and
therein lies the problem. As one philosopher has observed:
As normative theories, economic contract theories would seem to be
logically incompatible with autonomy contract theories for the same
reason that consequentialist moral theories are logically incompatible
with deontological moral theories: The former claim that moral justi-
fication is solely a function of consequences, while the latter claim
that moral justification is logically independent of consequences. 14
Without some way of reconciling or adjudicating between these compet-
ing approaches, contract theory is deeply incoherent. So long as the
theories converge on the same conclusions, this is a logical but not a
practical problem. However, when the theories diverge 15 or when one
theory fails to generate any concrete answers to particular questions,
16
the absence of a unified approach presents real problems. 17 We are un-
able to specify or confidently justify the rules of contract law.' 8
There are two potential strategies for reconciling these differing
theories of contract law. The first approach is the "horizontal independ-
1483-84. In addition, James Gordley and others have argued for a neo-scholastic vision of contract
based on the idea of equality in exchange. James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547
(1995). See also James Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85 (2002).
14. Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical
Integration Strategy, in SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 420, 420 (Ernest Sosa &
Enrique Villanueva eds. 2001).
15. Compare, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 130-32 (4th ed. 1992)
(arguing against specific performance on economic grounds), with Randy Barnett, Contract Reme-
dies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986) (arguing in favor of a default rule of
specific performance based on an autonomy theory of contract). See generally TREBILCOCK, supra
note 2, at 242 ("On the various central normative issues pertaining to the concept of freedom of
contract, I have concluded that the claim of convergence between autonomy and welfare values is
much more tenuous than proponents of the private ordering paradigm have conventionally been
prepared to acknowledge.").
16. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989) (arguing that autonomy theories produce no determinate answer to the
question of what sorts of default rules the law of contract should include).
17. Peter Benson has observed:
Contemporary scholars often assume that the juxtaposition of a plurality of different
moral conceptions in an account of law is unproblematic. Indeed, they frequently judge it
to be desirable, because they think that the deployment of a multiplicity of conceptions
enables a theory to accommodate the richness and the complexity of the subject matter
under investigation. If, however, the invocation of different moral conceptions is to pro-
vide a coherent and stable account of the basis of contract, it is essential that these diverse
conceptions function as integrated parts of an articulated and therefore intelligible whole.
Otherwise, the plurality of conceptions will constitute only an unresolved chaos which
cannot explain anything, whether simple or complex.
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel
and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1085-86 (1989).
18. See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118,
118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("In common law jurisdictions at least, there is at present no generally
accepted theory or even family of theories of contract."); cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 543
("Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor a complete
normative theory, explaining what the law should be.").
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ence" strategy. 19 We can claim that autonomy approaches and efficiency
approaches are actually theories about different things. Since both pur-
port to be theories of contract law, this claim is puzzling. There are,
however, several different sorts of legal theories. A theory could justify
legal rules 20 or provide an explanation of a field of law.2 1 Alternatively,
a theory could aim simply at predicting actual case outcomes. 22 For ex-
ample, Jody Kraus claims that autonomy theories seek to explain the
doctrinal arguments of judges.23 In contrast, he argues, efficiency theo-
ries seek to explain the outcomes of particular cases irrespective of the
stated reasons of the judges.24  Hence the different theories are in fact
explaining different things.
The second approach is the "vertical integration" strategy.25  This
strategy "contemplate[s] . . . that both approaches may be combined as
logically distinct components of a unified theory., 26 They are reconciled
by arranging the two approaches hierarchically. There are two ways that
this can be done. First, one can show that autonomy is lexically superior
to efficiency or vice versa, so that the normative criteria are logically
distinct but one of them "trumps" the other. For example, I have argued
elsewhere that one should pursue efficiency so long as it does not con-
flict with autonomy. 27 When such conflicts arise, the demands of effi-
ciency must give way to the demands of autonomy.28 Alternatively,
19. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law: Groundwork for the Reconciliation
of Autonomy and Efficiency, I SOC. POL. & L. PHIL. 385, 390-422 (2002) ("Part II: Horizontal
Independence"). I borrow the terminology "horizontal independence" and "vertical integration" in
this section from Kraus. See also Kraus, Reconciling Efficiency and Autonomy, supra note 14.
20. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law, supra note 19, at 400-02.
21. Id. at 395-99. For the most elaborate attempt to date to provide such an internal interpre-
tation of contract law, see generally SMITH, supra note 2.
22. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law, supra note 19, at 400. By prediction, Kraus
seems to mean something like a theory that generates accurate forecasts of case outcomes without
necessarily providing a phenomenologically accurate account of legal reasoning or legal justifica-
tions. There are obvious parallels between this conception of explanation and Milton Friedman's
defense of unrealistic assumptions in economics. According to Friedman, the inaccuracy of the
assumptions is irrelevant so long as the predictions were empirically correct. See Ernest Nagel,
Assumptions in Economic Theory, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION 130, 130-38 (Alan
Ryan ed., 1973) (discussing Friedman's argument that unrealistic assumptions are valid in economic
theories if they produce accurate predictions). See generally ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 74-79 (1988) (discussing instrumentalism in economics). Analogously, Kraus
envisions theories that provide inaccurate descriptions of legal doctrine but correctly predict who
wins or loses the case.
23. See Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
URISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 689-90 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002).
24. Id.
25. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 422.
26. Id.
27. Oman, supra note 14, at 1499.
28. Id. at 1499-1506 (arguing for the lexical priority of liberty in contract law). Kraus sug-
gests that under a lexical ordering of competing theories the lexically prior theory can be thought of
as authorizing but not requiring the lexically subordinate theory. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 420-
22. As an example of this approach, he cites Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw 86 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). See id. at 437 n.6.
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Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell take the opposite position, claiming
that "parties need to be induced to perform their contracts when perform-
ance would be beneficial, but should not be encouraged to perform when
doing so would reduce their well-being." 29 The second "vertical integra-
tion" strategy is to argue that one approach is foundational while the
other is derivative. For example, Frank Buckley has argued that auton-
omy theories can actually be reduced to consequentialist theories. 3  Ac-
cording to Buckley, autonomy theories necessarily invoke the convention
of promising.31 Yet the desirability of the convention must be based on
consequentialist reasoning, because we cannot invoke a promise to abide
by the convention of promising without falling into circularity. 32 Hence,
autonomy is really an implication of consequentialism. As we shall see
shortly, one can also argue that efficiency is an implication of autonomy.
B. The New Lex Mercatoria
Recently, some commercial law scholars have sought to reconcile
the conflict by narrowing their focus from contracts in general to purely
commercial transactions. The idea that the law should make a distinction
between business obligations and other obligations has a long history.
Roman law created a special class of "innominate contracts" that allowed
certain kinds of business transactions, such as sales (emptio venditio) and
partnerships (societas), to be concluded without the formalities required
for other contracts.33  During the eleventh and twelfth centuries,
long-distance trade began to reemerge in western Europe, and with it
came the rise of the lex mercatoria to govern issues of sale, carriage, and
insurance.34 Nineteenth-century jurists sought to unite all voluntary ob-
ligations under a single rubric of contract,35 but today the law still makes
subtle and not-so-subtle distinctions between business contracts and
other contracts. In the United States, the entire law of sales has been cut
off from the common law and codified in Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The U.C.C. also has a set of special rules that apply
29. Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 156 (2002). See also
Richard Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (2002)
(discussing Kaplow and Shavell's Fairness Versus Welfare).
30. F.H. Buckley, Introduction to THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 (F.H.
Buckley, ed. 1999).
31. Id. at 4-5.
32. See id. at 5-6. Buckley's assertion that all autonomy theories of contract - what he calls
"right to contract" theories - can be dismissed by this kind of argument is a bit premature, since
there are autonomy theories of contract that do not invoke the convention of promising. Buckley's
failure to address non-promissory autonomy theories of contract is odd given the fact that Randy
Barnett had offered a more or less fully articulated version of such a theory long before Buckley's
essay appeared. See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
33. See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 171, 185 (1962).
34. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 333-34 (1983).
35. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). Gilmore's thesis has
been famously controversial on many fronts, not the least of which are his historical claims. See
James Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 452 (1975) (attacking some of Gilmore's more
extreme historical claims about the innovations of nineteenth-century theorists).
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only "between merchants., 36 According to some commercial law schol-
ars, the idea of a lex mercatoria can be used to attack the predicament of
contemporary contract theory.
Daniel Farber, for example, has implicitly built on this idea to offer
a vertical integration strategy, arguing that in the context of commercial
law an efficiency norm can be derived from a commitment to auton-
omy. 37 He invokes John Rawls's argument that the principles of justice
can be derived from what the parties in a hypothetical original position
would choose behind a veil of ignorance that keeps them from knowing
how they will personally fare under any particular set of principles.38
According to Farber, in the original position the parties would choose a
norm under which judges decided commercial law cases using effi-
ciency.39 Unlike earlier, more ambitious-and less persuasive--consent
arguments for efficiency, Farber limits his defense to the realm of com-
mercial law.40 In this limited context, he argues that risk aversion, dis-
tributive justice, and catastrophic reallocations of wealth are of limited
concern and are thus unlikely to upset consensus in the original posi-
tion.
Farber's argument seems to demonstrate that the task of reconciling
competing approaches to contract law becomes more tractable when the
discussion is narrowed to the context of commercial law. This turn to-
ward a new lex mercatoria can also be used to construct arguments
showing that autonomy and efficiency are "horizontally independent."
This approach offers a more radical solution to the problem of reconcil-
ing the competing approaches by suggesting that rather than being mis-
taken or derivative, autonomy theories are simply irrelevant for the vast
majority of contracts.
36. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-104(3) (defining "between merchants"); 2-201(2) (relaxing slightly
the requirements of the statute of frauds between merchants); 2-207(2) (stating that additional terms
accompanying an acceptance become part of the contract between merchants); 2-209(2) (stating that
limitations on oral alterations of written contracts between merchants must be countersigned if the
writing is a form); 2-605(l)(b) (specifying special repudiation rules for contracts between mer-
chants); 2-609(2) (stating that the reasonableness of the grounds for insecurity in contracts between
merchants is determined by commercial practice).
37. Farber, supra note 10, at 55-57.
38. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-30 (rev. ed. 1999) (setting forth the basic argu-
ment for "justice as fairness" based on the original position).
39. Farber, supra note 10, at 56-57.
40. Id. Compare RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 92-115 (1981) (offering a
consent based justification for the "wealth maximization" norm) with JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS,
MORALS, AND THE LAW 115-22 (1988) (criticizing Posner's argument) and RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237, 251-66 (1985) (offering a slightly different critique of Posner's argu-
ment). Posner himself has largely conceded defeat in this debate. See RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF LEGAL AND MORAL THEORY (1999).
41. Farber, supra note 10, at 73. He also argues that the efficiency norm should only be
pursued in commercial law when the lexically prior demands of justice generated by Rawls' theory
are satisfied. Id. at 74-75.
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II. THE ARTIFICIAL PERSONALITY ARGUMENT
A. Horizontal Independence and the New Lex Mercatoria
In a recent article, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott offer a "horizon-
tal independence" approach to the conflict between autonomy and effi-
ciency by combining the idea of the lex mercatoria and economics to
42offer a new theory of contract law. Their core claim is that contract law
should pursue no other goal than to maximize the joint gains from trans-
actions.43  All other considerations should be ignored.44  The hope that
economics can provide a master norm for contracts is not new.45 Indeed,
law and economics has had other approaches "on the run" for at least
fifteen years, if not longer.4  What is new is the basic strategy that
Schwartz and Scott adopt. Following Farber, they seek to strengthen the
case for the primacy of economic analysis by limiting it. Thus, they
claim their theory applies only to contracts between firms.47 In so doing
they explicitly hark back to the lex mercatoria,8
Limiting the theory to inter-firm contracts provides a unified theory
of contract law by summarily dismissing autonomy theories.49 Because
42. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10. Much of the rest of this paper focuses on the claim put
forward by Schwartz and Scott that autonomy theories of the corporation are inapplicable to con-
tracts between corporations, and the arguments implicit in that claim. In fairness to them, and their
fine article, I hasten to point out that the bulk of their piece is not directed at the issue of theoretical
pluralism, but rather at working out the implications of a single-minded allegiance to the efficiency
norm. Because my primary interest here is the issue of theoretical pluralism, rather than the specific
elaborations of autonomy and efficiency theories, I focus mainly on those parts of their article that
address the issue of pluralism. I am in no way claiming that that this piece is a response to the subtle
economic arguments that make up the bulk of their article.
43. Id. at 544.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 30, at 2 ("Not merely does law-and-economics scholarship
offer a compelling normative explanation for free contracting, but rival theories are unpersuasive.").
See also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 29, at 52-58 (arguing that welfare based theories of
contract are superior to alternatives based on promising or personal autonomy).
46. See Kraus, supra note 23, at 687 ("As in private law scholarship generally, economic
analysis is the dominant paradigm in contemporary contracts scholarship."). Although, dating such
things is always subjective, I would point to Richard Craswell's article attacking the inability of
autonomy theories to account for the default rules of contract law as the decisive turning point in
favor of economic analysis. See Craswell, supra note 16.
47. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 544. They do not foreclose the possibility, however,
that it may apply to other contracts as well. Id. For purpose of their theory, Schwartz and Scott
define a firm as: "(1)[A]n entity that is organized in corporate form and that has five or more em-
ployees, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or accounting
firm." Id. at 545.
48. They write, "[F]or centuries [commercial law] has drawn a distinction between mercantile
contracts and others. Modem scholars have not systematically pursued the normative implications
of this ancient distinction, however. We attempt to cure this neglect by setting out the theoretical
foundations of a law merchant for our time." Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
49. Limiting the theory to contracts between firms also makes the positive economic analysis
of contracting relationships more tractable. Many non-economists doubt that the rational actor
model of modem law and economics can provide an adequate epistemological framework for legal
theory. Behavioralists object to simple theories of utility maximization, pointing to evidence of
systematic cognitive biases that seem to falsify the basic assumptions of the rational actor model.
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); and Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endow-
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all of the agents in this realm are corporations, autonomy theories based
on a commitment to individual freedom are inapplicable. 50 "These an-
swers are ruled out ... because business firms that make commercial
contracts are artificial persons whose autonomy the state need not respect
on moral grounds, and whose morality is ordinarily required by positive
law.",51 If this move is justified, then Schwartz and Scott may have found
the holy grail of contemporary contracts scholarship: A unified theory of
contract law. As they point out, most interpersonal agreements and
firm-to-person agreements are not governed by the law of contracts.52
While human beings may make contracts, most of their voluntary rela-
tions are governed by employment law, real estate law, family law, or
consumer protection law.53 Thus, even if a theory of firm-to-firm con-
tracts is not a complete account of contract law, it would cover the lion's
share of contracts in the real world.
B. Autonomy Theories and the Corporation
Unfortunately, Schwartz and Scott do not provide any more details
about why the artificial nature of the corporate person vitiates autonomy
theories of firm-to-firm contracts. In the remainder of this section, I will
flesh out this argument, explicitly articulating the case for banishing
autonomy theories from the discussion of the new lex mercatoria. I shall
call this line of reasoning the Artificial Personality Argument. Because
they refer to this argument rather than explicitly developing it, what fol-
lows is not exposition but original analysis. Nevertheless, the Artificial
Personality Argument lies at the bottom of the common intuition that
autonomy theories cannot apply to contracts by corporations. While I
ultimately conclude that the Artificial Personality Argument is a failure,
in laying it out I try to make the strongest case possible for it, and in the
end I believe that it stands as a real challenge to autonomy theories rather
than as a straw man that can easily be brushed aside.
The Artificial Personality Argument is based on the philosophical
assumptions of contemporary autonomy theories.54  The works of
Charles Fried and Randy Barnett provide two of the more widely dis-
cussed examples of autonomy approaches and briefly sketching their
ment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002). Because firms,
however, are profit maximizing institutions rather than actual persons, one can argue that in the
limited context of corporate behavior, the critiques of the rational actor model, whatever their force
elsewhere, are quite weak. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 550-51. Schwartz and Scott ac-
knowledge that agency costs and cognitive biases may also distort firm behavior, causing them to
deviate from the predictions of a pure rational actor model. However, they are optimistic that com-
petition and corporate mortality largely weed out these problems. See id at 551 & n.18 (responding
to behavioral law and economics literature on corporate behavior).
50. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 556.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 544.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 556 n.25.
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theories will illuminate the Artificial Personality Argument.5 Both of
these theorists justify and explain contract law by arguing that it repre-
sents a commitment to the value of individual liberty.5 6 According to
Fried, the basis of contract is the enforcement of promises.57 He goes on
to argue that "[t]he obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in ar-
guments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust.
58
Individual autonomy, in turn, rests on what he calls the "liberal ideal."
59
According to Fried this is the principle that "whatever we accomplish
and however that accomplishment is judged, morality requires that we
respect the person and property of others, leaving them free to make their
lives as we are left free to make ours.,, 60  Fried's "liberal principle" es-
sentially restates the traditional distinction between the right and the
good. In liberal political philosophy, the right defines the sphere in
which people are free to pursue their own ends free of coercion. The
good represents the ideals and ends that people use their freedom to pur-
sue.6' According to Fried, promising provides us with a way of enlisting
the help of others in the pursuit of our vision of the good without violat-
ing their rights.62 At the same time, breaking a promise violates the "lib-
eral principle," treating the disappointed promisee as a mere means to the
promisor's ends. 63 For Fried, contract law is simply the legal instantia-
tion of this set of moral principles.
Fried's theory is open to a number of objections. Its focus on the
will of the promisor seems to commit it to subjective theories of contract
formation and interpretation, both of which have been rejected by the
common law and present practical problems. 64 In addition, contract as
promise commits the law to enforcing principles of personal morality,
55. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(1981); Barnett, supra note 32. Other examples are summarized in Peter Benson, Contracts, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
56. FRIED, supra note 55, at 2, and Barnett, supra note 32, at 306.
57. FRIED, supra note 55, at 2-4.
58. Id. at 16.
59. Id. at 7.
60. FRIED, supra note 55, at 7.
61. "[L]iberals ... draw a distinction between the 'right' and the 'good' - between a frame-
work of basic rights and liberties, and the conceptions of the good that people may choose to pursue
within the framework." Michael Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 3 (Michael
Sandel, ed. 1984). For further discussions of the distinction, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE §§ 5-6, 48, 68, 84 (rev. ed. Oxford University Press 1999) and BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8-19 (1980).
62. FRIED, supra note 55, at 8.
63. See FRIED, supra note 55, at 16-17 ("By virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and
respect, it is wrong to invoke that convention in order to make a promise, and then break it.").
64. See, e.g., Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) ("You
can't escape contractual obligation by signing with your fingers crossed behind your back, even if
that clearly shows your intent not to be bound."), Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Sisters of Char-
ity, 331 A.2d 313, 316 (Md. 1975) ("When language of a contract is clear, the true test of what is
meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the
position of the parties would have thought it meant."). See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 118-127, 137-139, 148-152, 503-505 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the role of the objec-
tive theory in the contemporary law of contracts).
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which apparently conflicts with the liberal principles that Fried in-
vokes.65 In response, Barnett has proposed an autonomy theory based on
the alienation of rights rather than the sanctity of promising.66 Barnett
begins his argument by invoking a version of Fried's "liberal principle":
The function of ... [a] theory based on individual rights is to define
the boundaries within which individuals may live, act, and pursue
happiness free of the forcible interference of others.
67
Barnett dispenses with Fried's complex gyrations around promising
and its autonomy-extending powers.68 Rather, he looks to how rights are
acquired and transferred. 69 While arguing that certain rights are inalien-
able,'( Barnett claims that most rights can be transferred by their holders
to others. 71 Within the liberal framework, consent becomes the touch-
stone for the transfer of rights precisely because rights are meant to de-
fine the sphere within which an individual is entitled to live her life free
of coercion.72 Contract law thus becomes the legal mechanism that fa-
cilitates and polices the consensual transfer of rights. Most contracts
involve a commitment to some future action. This temporal aspect poses
a potential embarrassment to Barnett's consent theory, which seems to
reduce contracting to conveyancing. It is also part of what makes the
promissory theory attractive. Promises are by definition commitments to
some future action. A consent theory of contract, however, has the same
advantage so long as one can conceptualize future performance as a kind
of alienable present entitlement.73
65. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 69. Furthermore, Smith writes:
The reason it is said to be illegitimate for the state to enforce promises qua promises is
that doing so is inconsistent with the 'harm principle.' This foundational principle of
modem liberalism... holds that it is illegitimate for the state to interfere with an individ-
ual's liberty unless that individual has harmed... another individual.
Id.; Randy Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1025
(1991) ("[A] moral theory of promising, standing alone, would have courts enforcing purely moral
commitments, which is tantamount to legislating virtue."). Schwartz and Scott seem to be implicitly
alluding to this point when they note that the morality of corporate behavior is already required by
the non-contract law. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 556. But see Thomas Scanlon, Promises
and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 86 (Peter Benson, ed. 2001) (rejecting the argu-
ment that enforcing promises is an illegitimate exercise morality enforcement).
66. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 271-74 (criticizing will theories of contract and promissory
theories of contract).
67. Barnett, supra note 32, at 291.
68. See generally id.
69. See generally id.
70. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTRACT LAW 70 (Randy E. Barnett, ed., 2d ed. 2001).
71. Barnett, supra note 32, at 293 ("The subjects of most rights transfer agreements are enti-
tlements that are indisputably alienable.").
72. See id. at 296-300 (discussing consent as the moral basis for the transfer of rights).
73. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 73 (1995). The
possibility of conceptualizing promises of future action as transfer of a presently existing entitlement
is perhaps the chief internal weakness of transfer theories like Bamett's. Stephen Smith has tren-
chantly summarized the argument, writing:
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Despite their important differences, these theories are both
grounded in the moral assumptions of liberal individualism. 74 Liberalism
takes the individual human being as the basic unit of moral calculus, and
then deduces moral theories from this basic assumption. Both promise
and consent theories see the autonomy of individuals as providing a
normative justification for the law of contracts. With these individualis-
tic assumptions clearly in view, we can understand the nature of the Arti-
ficial Personality Argument and the dismissal of autonomy theories from
the new lex mercatoria.
According to the Artificial Personality Argument, applying auton-
omy theories to corporate contracts is a category mistake. In justifying
respect for the autonomy of others, Immanuel Kant wrote:
Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an
end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by
this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether directed to him-
self or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time
as an end.
76
Kant's formulation makes explicit that respect for autonomy is tied
to the humanity of the rights-bearer.77 Liberals do not respect the auton-
omy of rocks precisely because rocks are not human beings. According
to the Artificial Personality Argument corporations are like rocks rather
The conceptual objection to transfer theories is that it is not possible for contracting par-
ties to do what such theories suppose they are doing when they make a contract. More
specifically, the objection is that the rights that transfer theories suppose are transferred
by contracts do not exist prior to the making of contracts .... I have the right to give or
not give you my watch next Thursday. But a contract in which I agree to deliver my
watch to you next Thursday cannot be regarded as transferring that liberty right to you.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 101.
74. The link between autonomy-based arguments for freedom of contract and liberalism has,
however, been questioned by some self-proclaimed liberal theorists. See, e.g., Dori Kimel, Neutral-
ity, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J. OF L. STUD. 473 (2001) (arguing that the
version of perfectionist liberalism articulated by Joseph Raz justifies significant restrictions on
contractual freedom). See also DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT (2003). Stephen Smith,
for example, links what he calls "rights-based theories" (autonomy theories in this article) with
liberal individualism, writing:
Rights-based theories of contract typically understand rights in the traditional 'Kantian'
sense. Rights, in this view, reflect the classically individualistic values .... [lit is ex-
pressed in the idea that the foundation of rights is individualist. These foundations are
typically regarded as either the protection of specifically individual interests (say an in-
terest in owning property or achieving personal autonomy), or, following Kant again, as
flowing from a particular conception of human agency. It would be inappropriate, in this
view, to explain our rights as grounded in, say, utilitarian considerations of general wel-
fare.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 141.
75. See, e.g., STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 14
(1992) ("The idea that society, and particularly its political arrangements, can be understood as... a
contract between individuals has been a major theme in the history of liberal thought.").
76. IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James W.
Ellington, trans. 1981) (1785).
77. Id.
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than people.78 Autonomy theories of contract cannot justify the contract
law applying to corporations precisely because such theories are deeply
grounded in respect for human beings as free definers of their own
lives.7 9 Corporations are not human beings and are not entitled to be
treated as ends rather than means. Morality does not require "leaving
them free to make their lives as we are left free to make ours." 80 To
paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist, the claim of the Artificial Personal-
ity Argument is that autonomy theories are concerned with "the liberty of
natural, not artificial persons." 8' Seen in these terms, the Artificial Per-
sonality Argument is a "horizontal independence" strategy that purports
to demonstrate that firm-to-firm contracts are a separate phenomenon
about which autonomy theories have nothing to say.
Once we explicitly state the Artificial Personality Argument, it be-
comes clear that it stands or falls based on one's theory of the corpora-
tion. If corporations really are fundamentally different than natural per-
sons, then concern for human autonomy tells us nothing about the law
governing their contracts. On the other hand, if the distinction between
natural persons and corporations can be collapsed, then autonomy theo-
ries can be used to understand firm-to-firm contract law and the basic
problem of theoretical pluralism remains. If the Artificial Personality
Argument fails, we must look elsewhere for a reconciliation. In the next
section, I turn to theories of the corporation that could support the Artifi-
cial Personality Argument.
III. ARTIFICIAL PERSONALITY THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION
The Artificial Personality Argument rests on the assumption that
corporations are not human beings. We must be wary of metaphors. It is
easy to speak of "soulless corporations" or "impersonal" firms, but if one
looks at the functioning of any corporation, what one sees are actual hu-
man beings. Even shell corporations that exist only as file folders and
tax shelters have their documents handled by digits attached to human
hands. The Wall Street Journal regularly reports on the contracts that
corporations have "signed" with one another, but it also mentions the
human beings that actually put pen to paper. 83 Thus, the Artificial Per-
sonality Argument cannot literally rely on the claim that corporate con-
tracts are not the acts of human beings. Rather, it must rest on some
78. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 556.
79. Cf Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1236 (1983).
80. Cf FRIED, supra note 55, at 7.
81. Cf First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting) (quoting Northwestern National Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)).
82. Cf LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 194 (2d ed. 1985).
83. See, e.g., James Bandler, Losing Focus: As Kodak Eyes Digital Future, A Big Partner
Starts to Fade, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2004 at A1 (discussing contracts signed by Walgreens, Kodak,
and Fuji), Healthcare Brief WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2004 at A10 (discussing contracts signed by
RiteAid, Corp.).
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concept of the corporation that explains why the activity of corporate
agents signing contracts is morally different than the activity of two
neighbors clinching a deal at a yard sale. The Artificial Personality Ar-
gument contends that autonomy theories of contract cannot apply to cor-
porate contracts because to do so would be nonsensical from the point of
view of the autonomy theories themselves. Thus in order to make the
Artificial Personality Argument coherent, we need some concept of the
corporation that renders the human activity of the corporation unworthy
of the kind of moral respect demanded by autonomy theories.
There are three basic theories about the nature of corporations: the
real theory, the concession theory, and the fiction theory. The real theory
claims that corporations are the legal expression of organic groups or
other supra-individual entities and should be understood as having a will
and an existence that cannot be reduced to the sum of their collective
parts.84 The concession theory claims that the corporation is a creation of
the state that exercises delegated authority to serve the purposes of the
government, even when that purpose is "private" business. The fiction
theory claims that the corporation is nothing more than a collection of
individuals and that the language of corporations is little more than a
useful shorthand referring to a complex set of individual rights and obli-
gations.86 None of these theories has ever completely dominated the law
of corporations, and one can find traces of each theory in the reported
cases. Hence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to match particular theo-
ries with different jurisdictions or different periods. Throughout history,
they have existed side by side in the law, taking on different names and
different nuances of meaning. 87 They have been combined and confused
with one another in various ways, but the basic claims demonstrate a
remarkable continuity.
In the remainder of this section, I shall argue that the Artificial Per-
sonality Argument can employ both the real and the concession theory.
In the next section, I will argue that the Artificial Personality Argument
cannot use the fiction theory, and that such a theory can be employed by
autonomy theories to understand the nature of corporate contracts.
A. The Real Theory of Corporations
Although the real theory of the corporation has almost disappeared
from discussions of corporate law, at one time it was an important posi-
84. See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1061, 1068 (1994).
85. Id. at 1069.
86. Id. at 1064.
87. See id. at 1064-65.
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tion in corporate jurisprudence.88 Writing at the end of the nineteenth
century, Ernst Freund summarized the position, stating:
Above the existence of the individual there is the existence of the
species, and the corporation is nothing but the legal expression of this
fact, which appears as a reality in the physical person, so the higher
will of the species is embodied in numerous and various forms of as-
sociation, and as a result we find, beside the individual, entities of a
higher order endowed with volition and acting capacity. And where
the law recognizes such embodied will as a person, we have a juristic
person or a corporation.8
9
There are two key ideas in this theory. The first is that the legal form of
the corporation recognizes an already existing community. One way in
which this concept manifests itself legally is through the doctrine of
"corporation by prescription." 90 At common law, a community-such as
a town-which operated as an entity for a long period of time could be-
come a legal person without a formal charter of incorporation. 9' The
second key idea is that corporate bodies are possessed of a collective will
that cannot be reduced to the individual wills of the members of the cor-
poration.
The real theory of the corporation received its most forceful state-
ment in German legal thought. Nineteenth-century German jurists were
eager to find authentically German legal traditions in contrast to the for-
eign influences of the Roman law.92 Otto Gierke became the proponent
of this approach in the context of corporate law.93 According to Gierke,
the indigenous, pre-Roman German law had a thick notion of corporate
existence, what Gierke called Genossenshaft.94  In contrast to the thin,
88. See MORTON HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 67
(2001) ("For almost forty years after 1890 American jurists, like their German French, and English
counterparts, were preoccupied with the theory of legal personality.").
89. ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 13 (Chicago, The Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1897).
90. One of the earliest recorded cases dealing with this doctrine was Lord Coke's opinion in
The Case of Sutton's Hospital, where he wrote that if "before time of memory foundation was made
.. foundation is taken for incorporation." 10 Coke's Rep. 23a, 33a (Kings Bench, 1612) reprinted
in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 347, 372 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
91. See, e.g., Town of Juliaetta v. Smith, 85 P. 923, 924 (Idaho 1906) (municipal corporation
may exist by prescription from long use even if the formalities of incorporation were not complied
with); Worley v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493, 496 (1882) ("The exercise of corporate powers over a place for
twenty years, with knowledge on the part of the public, is conclusive evidence ... of a corporation
by prescription."); Bassett v. Porter, 58 Mass. 487, 492-93 (1849) (stating that an entity of long
standing may be presumed to have a legal existence even if no record of incorporation exists). As
these cases - especially Bassett - show, corporations by prescription were frequently created by
recourse to the legal fiction that a charter had been granted at some point in the past but inadver-
tently lost.
92. See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 320-25 (1992) (dis-
cussing the work of nineteenth-century German jurists of the so-called "Historical School").
93. See OTrO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederick William Mait-
land trans., 1900) (Beacon Press 1958).
94. See id. at 37 ("It is a distinctive trait of medieval doctrine that within every human group
it decisively recognizes an aboriginal and active Right of the group taken as a Whole.").
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Roman theory that a corporation was nothing more than a legal fiction,
Gierke argued that historically German law recognized the organic exis-
tence of the group. 95 Corporations, he argued, are the legal manifestation
of communities possessed of a collective spirit.96 Hence, the acts of a
corporation are not the mere aggregation of the individual acts of its
members, but rather should be understood as being qualitatively differ-
ent. Gierke's treatise became influential in common law countries by
virtue of a translation by Frederick Maitland.97 Maitland and others ar-
gued that in numerous instances the common law acknowledged the real
existence of collectives and treated their actions as what they were-the
choices of organic groups, even when the groups were not formally in-
corporated. They took this as evidence that in practice the common law,
whatever the rhetoric of its judges and lawyers, contained elements of the
real theory.98
The real theory of the corporation is largely forgotten today, but
Meir Dan-Cohen has adopted a position very similar to it, albeit one
shorn on Gierke's Hegelianism.99  Dan-Cohen presents his theory
through a hypothetical. 100 Imagine a regular company with human man-
agers and employees who make widgets. 10' One day the managers de-
cide to mechanize the company's production completely. 0 2 All of the
employees are fired and replaced with widget-making machines. 10 3 This
move to automation proves so productive that the shareholders vote to
replace management with computers.' 4 The computers then decide to
alter the firm's capital structure, and the corporation purchases all of its
outstanding shares of stock in a buy back, leaving a fully functioning
corporation bereft of any human beings at all. 105  According to
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See HORWITZ, supra note 88, at 71-72 (discussing Maitland's influence on the debates
over corporate theory).
98. See Frederick William Maitland, Introduction to OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF
THE MIDDLE AGES vii (Frederick William Maitland trans., 1900) (Beacon Press 1958); Frederick
Pollock, Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?, 27 L.Q. REV. 219
(1911). The sorts of acknowledgments of organic group life pointed out by Maitland continue to
exist in American law. Id. Thus, American law routinely treats unincorporated associations as
persons, implicitly acknowledging according to Maitland's argument, the "real" status of these
groups. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8471(4) (2005) (defining "person" under the Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment Management System to include "unincorporated association"); 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(iv)
(2005) (defining "corporation" under the bankruptcy laws to include an "unincorporated company or
association"); 12 U.S.C. § 375b(9)(A)(i) (2005) (noting that an "association" or "unincorporated
organization" can violate Federal Reserve Board regulations); 15 U.S.C. §17 (2005) (noting that
"unincorporated associations" can be sued by major league baseball players for anti-trust violations).
99. See generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL
THEORY FOR THE BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 47-51 (1986).
100. Id. at 46.
101. Id.
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Dan-Cohen, "[t]he displacement of human management by computers
would ... have little effect on both the actual operations and the legal
status of [the corporation].' ' 6 The only thing that makes the hypotheti-
cal implausible is the demands it places on computer technology not on
legal theory.'0 7 The ease with which we can imagine fitting such a per-
sonless corporation into our existing laws suggests than corporations
should be treated as sui generis.
Regardless of whether one conceptualizes the real theory in the
terms of Gierke or Dan-Cohen, it fits the needs of the Artificial Personal-
ity Argument. Gierke's Genossenshafi may be entitled to some kind of
respect and autonomy, but such requirements cannot be specified using
contemporary autonomy theories. The liberalism upon which the auton-
omy theories rely is essentially individualistic. To borrow the words of
Gierke, in liberal thought there is "a drift, which makes for a theoretical
concentration of right and power in the highest and widest group on the
one hand and the individual man on the other, at the cost of all interme-
diate groups.' 0 8  Genossenshaft is thus outside the categories of liberal
theory. Dan-Cohen, as a contemporary of Barnett and Fried, is even
more explicit:
The negative answer to the question... [of] whether or not organiza-
tions can have original autonomy rights of their own . . . follows
simply and straightforwardly from combining the ethical individual-
ism of the paradigm of autonomy with our description of organiza-
tions [in the computerized company hypothetical].
0 9
Because corporations qua corporations can exist independent of any hu-
man members they cannot be endowed with rights based on notions of
human dignity. It does not follow from this that corporations are entitled
to no rights. Such rights, however, including presumably the right to
contract, 1 0 must be based on some sort of consequentialism. '
106. Id. at 48.
107. See id. Indeed, Dan-Cohen does not even believe that his hypothetical places unrealistic
demands on computer technology. Id
108. GIERKE, supra note 93, at 87.
109. DAN-CoHEN, supra note 99, at 61.
110. See id. at 98-102 (discussing contract remedies within the context of Dan-Cohen's the-
ory).
111. Id. at 80 ("[fIt is clear that as far as derivative rights are concerned the utilitarian is indif-
ferent whether the right bearing unit is an individual human being or a Personless Corporation.").
Not surprisingly, Dan-Cohen's version of the "real theory" is particularly hospitable to the Artificial
Personality Argument when it is employed by economic partisans like Schwartz and Scott. Id.
Indeed, he anticipates the basic approach of Schwartz and Scott, if not the details of their particular
economic arguments. Id. He mirrors the individual-individual, individual-organization, organiza-
tion-organization typology presented by Schwartz and Scott, and like them argues that in organiza-
tion-organization transactions in particular considerations of utility should dominate. See id. at 191.
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B. The Concession Theory of Corporations
In contrast to the marginal place of the real theory in Eng-
lish-speaking jurisprudence, 1 2 the concession theory flows naturally
from the history of Anglo-American corporate law and is a prominent
feature of much of the doctrinal discussion of that law.11 3  Stated suc-
cinctly, it claims that corporations are institutions that exercise authority
delegated to them by the state.' 
14
Some of the very first business corporations were the royal charter
companies of Elizabethan England.' 5 These corporations were created
by a special charter from the crown that gave them not only corporate
existence but also a monopoly over some aspect of commerce.1 1 6 The
Royal East India Company neatly illustrates the state-like functions of
these companies." 7 This corporation was responsible for the entire Eng-
lish conquest of the Indian subcontinent. 1 8 At the zenith of its power it
ruled the entire country and administered a "private" army of 260,000
troops, more than twice the size of the British Army of the time." 9 In-
deed, India--or some portion of it-was formally ruled by the East India
Company for over a century until 1858, when it turned the government
of the subcontinent over to the Crown.
120
Although less dramatic, the early history of America also illustrates
the quasi-public status of early corporations. The earliest corporations
operating in America were some of the colonies themselves. For exam-
ple, both Massachusetts and Virginia were self-governing corporations
created by the grant of a charter. 12 1 During the colonial period, there
were only a tiny handful of business corporations created by the colonial
legislatures, 22 and municipal corporations were only slightly more
112. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490-91 (1989) (describing the short life of the "real theory"
in American jurisprudence).
113. Id.
114. Id. ("Like government authorities, managers exercise their power by means of a rational-
ized system of control and administration like the government, the 'public' firm was a 'political'
entity.").
115. See generally W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries,
31 YALE L.J. 382 (1921) (discussing corporations law during the Elizabethan period).
116. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 21 (2003).
117. But see Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal Between Entre-
preneurs and Outside Investors, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=567941 (last




121. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2 n.3 (1999 & Supp. 2005) (noting that Virginia was incorporated in 1606 and
Massachusetts in 1629).
122. Simeon Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 449,
450 (1903) (listing the six corporate charters granted by colonies for businesses before the Revolu-
tion).
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common. 12 3  With independence, however, states began granting more
corporate charters, but they did so mainly to further quasi-public goals
such as the construction of bridges or canals and the charters frequently
granted monopolies. 124  The bulk of businesses continued to operate as
sole proprietorships, partnerships, or unincorporated joint-stock compa-
nies. 125  Although the first general incorporation statute was passed by
North Carolina in 1795,126 most corporations continued to be formed by
special acts of the legislature that gave to individual corporations specific
powers and rights.1
27
Although there was agitation to open up the corporate form during
the Jacksonian period, 28 it wasn't until after the Civil War that the cor-
poration became the dominant form of business organization in Amer-
ica. 129 The change came with general incorporation statutes that issued
charters to corporations for "any lawful purpose.' 130 Even those corpora-
tions, however, continued to be conceptualized as concessions from the
state. For example, in his first inaugural address as governor of New
Jersey, Woodrow Wilson reaffirmed that "[a] corporation exists, not of
natural right, but only by license of law, and the law ... is responsible
for what it creates." 131 Today, the language of delegated power contin-
ues to pervade the legal language surrounding corporations. 32 For ex-
123. Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1096 (1980) ("Prior to
the Revolution there were only about twenty incorporated cities in America.").
124. FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 188-89. "[P]eople in 1800 identified corporations with
franchise monopolies." Id. at 194.
125. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 190 ("Until ... the middle of the [nineteenth] century,
the corporation was by no means the dominant form of business organization."); Paul G. Mahoney,
Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REv. 873, 886-90
(2000) (chronicling the use of unincorporated joint-stock companies prior to the passage of general
incorporation statutes). See also FLETCHER, supra note 121, § 2 ("[M]ost of the business of the
period [early American history] being transacted by unincorporated joint stock companies more in
the nature of limited partnerships.").
126. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 295-96 (1998)
("In 1795, North Carolina adopted perhaps the first incorporation statute in the United States, grant-
ing canal builders the right of eminent domain under certain conditions and the power to 'sue and be
sued, plead and be impleaded, under the denomination of the canal company."').
127. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 188 ("In the early 19th century .. . the legislature
granted charters by statute, one by one."). In addition, Congress incorporated some businesses by
special statutes, perhaps most notably in the nineteenth century, the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany. See Act of July 1, 1862, 37 Cong. Ch. 120, July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489 (incorporating Union
Pacific).
128. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 194-95 (discussing Jacksonian agitation over corpora-
tions).
129. Id. at 511 ("By 1870 corporations had a commanding position in the economy.").
130. New York seems to have been the first state to adopt such a law in 1866. See 1866 N.Y.
Laws 1896.
131. Quoted in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 n.37 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
132. See, e.g., Allen v. Malvern Country Club, 746 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Ark. 1988) ("Corpora-
tions organized under the laws of this state are but creatures of the legislature"); Sahara Grotto &
Styx, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 261 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (stating that
corporations possess powers delegated to them by the statutes of their incorporation). The extent to
which this delegation language continues to have meaning in an age of general incorporation statutes
is illustrated by the fact that seemingly core aspects of government can be delegated to private cor-
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ample, the Supreme Court has argued that corporations are creations of
the state designed to confer special benefits on shareholders:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited li-
ability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation
and distribution of assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital
and to deploy their resources in ways that maximizing the return on
their shareholders' investments.
133
For liberal theory, the freedom of individuals is taken as a prima fa-
cie good, while the freedom of the state is viewed with great suspicion.
134
This suspicion is such that a libertarian theorist like Robert Nozick can
claim, "The fundamental question of political philosophy, one that pre-
cedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there
should be any state at all."'135 One can think of social contract theories
and other liberal justifications for the state as secular theodicies in which
the primal evil of social coercion must be justified. 136  Such coercion is
the antithesis of individual autonomy and something requiring special
explanation. 37 As I have already noted, autonomy theories of contract
rest implicitly or explicitly on some version of the liberal distinction be-
tween the right and the good. Individuals have rights, including the right
to contract, so that they can pursue their own visions of the good. 138 In
contrast, the state is not supposed to pursue a particular vision of the
good. 139  Rather, respect for individuals requires that the state remain
neutral as to their particular ideals, confining itself to the protection of
their rights, or pursuit of a limited conception of the good constrained by
the superior demands of individual rights.14
0
porations. See Owens v. Tri-County Turkey Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 21, 418 P.2d 674, 678
(Okla. 1966) (taxing power); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kueckelhan, 425 P.2d 669, 679 (Wash. 1967)
(law enforcement); Valero Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis, 926 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App. 1996)
(eminent domain).
133. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990).
134. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA ix (1974).
135. Id at4.
136. Cf JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST Bk. I. 11. 23-26 (1667), available at
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu-rbear/lost/pll .html ("what is low raise and support; [t]hat to the highth
of this great [a]rgument I may assert Eternal Providence, and justifie the wayes of God to men").
137. For a modem, and in some ways extreme, approach to the problem of justifying the "evil"
of collective coercion see NOZICK, supra note 134, at chs. 5-6 (presenting arguments in favor of a
state monopoly on most forms of protective violence).
138. See Joyce E. Taber, An Unanswered Question About Mandatory Arbitration: Should a
Mandatory Arbitration Clause Preclude The EEOC From Seeking Monetary Relief On An Em-
ployee 's Behalfln a Title VII Case?, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 281, 291 n.58 (2000).
139. Michael Mello, Adhering To Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall And The Dissent
Towards Death As a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 592, 683 n.624 (1995).
140. It should be noted that while the language of "rights" has a minimalist and libertarian
flavor to it some left-of-center theorists find off-putting. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 13, at 706
(referring to liberal theory's obsession with "dreaded 'crossings' of our 'boundaries"'). There are
liberal theories that justify a fairly expansive vision of wealth redistribution and the provision of
social services by the government. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 38, at 266 (arguing that social
inequalities should be arranged so as to benefit those who are least well off).
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We can now see why the concession theory of the corporation meets
the conceptual needs of the Artificial Personality Argument. If a corpo-
ration is an institution that exercises power delegated to it by the state,
then it does not make sense to justify the law governing its contracts with
the same theories that justify the contracts of individuals. On this view,
the actual human beings who sign the corporation's contracts and carry
out its affairs are analogous to government bureaucrats. They are human
beings, but their official actions are of a fundamentally different nature-
from the point of view of liberal political theory-from those engaged in
by private individuals. "Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted
or withheld is always a matter of state policy[,]' 141 Justice Brandeis
wrote. "If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end
which the state deems desirable."' 142 Under the concession theory it is
this link between corporations and the desires of the state that makes
autonomy theories inapplicable to firm-to-firm contracts.
IV. THE FICTION THEORY, THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS, AND
AUTONOMY
One of the striking things about the theories sketched in the preced-
ing section is how foreign they seem to most of contemporary corporate
law scholarship. For example, one scholar contends, "It has been over a
half-a-century since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic
stripe, took the concession theory seriously.', 143 While this is a bit of an
exaggeration,144 it is safe to say that neither the real nor the concession
theory represents a dominant approach in law and economics scholar-
ship. Rather the dominant approach has been a modem version of the
ancient fiction theory of the corporation.145 Building on an individualis-
tic framework for understanding legal entities that goes back at least to
the eleventh century, if not earlier, modem economists have conceptual-
ized the corporation as a "nexus of contracts."' 146 As I shall argue, this
concept of the firm cannot be used by the Artificial Personality Argu-
ment and is actually quite consistent with autonomy theories of contract.
A. The Fiction Theory of Corporations
The fiction theory of the corporation is one the oldest approaches to
corporate jurisprudence. It asserts that corporations are nothing more
141. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 545 (Brandeis, J, dissenting).
142. Id.
143. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 141 (2002).
144. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 151 (8th ed. 2000) ("[C]orporate law is constitutional law; that is, its dominant
function is to regulate the manner in which the corporate institution is constituted, to define the
relative rights and duties of those participating in the institution, and to delimit the powers of the
institution vis-a-vis the external world.").
145. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 143, at 199 ("The dominant model of the corporation in legal
scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory.").
146. See Michael J. Phillips, supra note 84, at 1071-72.
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than useful conceptual devices for understanding the relationships be-
tween individuals. 147 Under Roman law, the dominant form of business
organization, the societas, was conceptualized as a contract and lacked
most of the incidents of "corporateness."'' 48 During the eleventh century,
the jurisprudence of corporations took on a new urgency as the Catholic
Church came to be conceptualized legally as a set of interlocking corpo-
rations149 The medieval canonists, in turn, drew on the nominalist strand
of scholastic thought to define the corporation. As one four-
teenth-century jurist succinctly summarized the prevailing orthodoxy,
"All philosophers and canonists [believe] that the whole does not differ
really... from its parts."' 50 The medieval formulation of corporations as
"artificial persons" was to exert a powerful influence on corporate the-
ory, and centuries later the Supreme Court would use the same label.'
5
1
The medieval period also saw the rise of contractually created busi-
ness organizations that served many of the same functions as modem
business corporations. One of the primary functions of legal personality
and limited liability is what economists call "asset partitioning." For
example:
Consider a business (ignoring the organizational form) with a few
owners. The owners will have personal creditors and the business
will have business creditors. Each class of creditors needs to know
which assets are available to satisfy which debts. Can the personal
creditors seize business assets such as machines and inventory if the
owner's personal debts are unpaid? Can the business creditors seize
an owner's house or car if the business's debts are unpaid? It is criti-
cally important to a well-functioning system of organizational law
that the answers to these two questions be clear, and extremely useful
that the law offer multiple organizational forms that provide a varied
menu of answers to them.
1 52
Medieval lawyers solved these problems through a variety of contractual
mechanisms. Merchants could band together for a voyage, and purchase
a ship using a so-called "bottomary loan" (essentially a maritime mort-
gage). The ship would then become solely liable for the venture's liabili-
ties.1 53  Italian traders created a contractual entity for business pur-
poses-known as a commenda-that partitioned assets along similar
147. See id. at 1064-65.
148. NICHOLAS, supra note 33, at 185 ("Since Roman law had no concept of a corporation,
every joint commercial venture necessarily took the form of a societas ....").
149. See BERMAN, supra note 34, at 215-20 (discussing the constitutional role of corporate law
in the Papal Revolution of the eleventh century).
150. Id. at 607-08 n.48 (quoting the jurist Bartolus).
151. See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodworth, 17 U.S. 518, 605 (1819) (referring to
corporations as "artificial persons").
152. Mahoney, supra note 125, at 876.
153. See id. at 882-83 (discussing bottomary loans).
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lines. 154 During the Elizabethan period there were numerous joint stock
companies that lacked any formal charter. These companies were en-
tirely contractual and allowed investors to limit their liability to the ini-
tial investment and reap some pro rata share of the returns of the ven-
ture. 155 In the wake of the South Sea Bubble, parliament passed laws
against unchartered joint stock companies, but such companies continued
to operate despite the law until the middle of the nineteenth century. 56
Thus, even as the concession theory of the corporation was rising to the
position of legal orthodoxy in the mid-nineteenth century, there was a
commercial reality in which most of the indicia of corporateness were
being created almost entirely by contract.157 Less than a century later,
this earlier contractual account of the business corporation would be re-
discovered by economists.
158
B. The Nexus of Contracts Theory
The modem nexus of contract theory of the corporation traces its
origin to a 1937 article by Ronald Coase. 159 Coase was interested in un-
derstanding how the existence of the firm could be reconciled with what
he called "the main achievement of economic science," 160 namely the
insight that when resources are allocated using the decentralized process
of the market what results is not chaos but an orderly movement of goods
and services according to the price mechanism. If decentralized market
processes could effectively organize resources, why do "we find 'islands
of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps
of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk?"",16' Coase's answer to this
question was transaction costs. 62 Finding goods and services and nego-
tiating terms to spot contracts for every single business transaction is
expensive. These costs can be avoided through a single contract that
gives a central authority the right of direction. "The contract," according
to Coase, "is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which
may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entre-
preneur within certain limits."'
' 63
154. Id. at 880-81. See also MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 7-8 (discuss-
ing the Italian commenda).
155. Mahoney, supra note 125, at 883-84.
156. Id. at 887-89. See also MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 40 (discuss-
ing the Bubble Act of 1720).
157. Mahoney, supra note 125, at 886-92 (The Triumph of the Concession Theory).
158. See generally Bratton, supra note 112, 1513-17 (arguing that the nexus of contract theory
restates the older fiction theory of the corporation).
159. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937) available at
http://people.bu.edu/vaguirre/courses/bu332/naturefimn.pdf.
160. See id. at 394.
161. Id. at 387 (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (reprtd. & rev.
1948)).
162. Id. at 390.
163. Id.
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Later economists refined this model of the firm by pushing for an
even more individualistic, contractual approach. In 1972, Alchian and
Demsetz famously argued that Coase was mistaken to see managers as
exercising even circumscribed control, since employees' willingness to
follow direction was in every instance a matter of contractual choice.'
64
Four years later, Jensen and Meckling summarized what was to become
the conventional wisdom, writing that "[t]he private corporation or firm
is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus of contracting
relationships."'165 More recently, even the nexus of contracts approach
has come under attack as insufficiently contractual. 66  The hy-
per-contractual approach in effect completes the deconstruction of "con-
trol" and "ownership" that Coase began. In this theory, all the partici-
pants are "investors" contributing intellectual and reputational capital
(employees) or cash and other resources (equity and debt).1 67 Each set of
participants then "controls" the other participants through monitoring and
sanctions. For example:
Employers often ... evaluate and reward or penalize the employee's
behavior .... Less obviously, employees often exercise similar con-
trol. They grant the employer the power to set certain conditions of
employment, to evaluate their performance, and to decide on bonuses
and promotions, but then they evaluate the employer's performance
and penalize or reward the employer (for example, by quitting or ex-
erting less or more effort in the future).
168
In effect, these theorists simply dispense with the "nexus" in nexus of
contracts theory, leaving only a web of interlocking connected con-
tracts. 
69
For our purposes, particular solutions to the economic mystery of
the firm's existence are less important than the paradigm that these theo-
ries create for understanding the nature of corporations. Coase and his
progeny provide a way of conceptualizing the corporation as "a complex
set of explicit and implicit contracts.' 170  There are two aspects of this
approach that make it more hospitable to autonomy theories of contract
than either the real or concession theories. First, the contractual ap-
proach to the firm is essentially individualistic. Unlike the real theory, it
164. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972).
165. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
166. See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REv. 887 (2000).
167. See id. at 922-29.
168. See id. at 921.
169. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as a Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (2002) ("Although their [Gulati, Klien, and Zolt] new model remains contractarian in
nature, it lacks a critical feature of the standard contractarian account - namely, a nexus.").
170. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1416, 1418 (1989).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
does not rely on any communitarian notion of collective determination or
reified idea of the corporation independent of human constituents. 7 '
Indeed, it denies that a corporation is fundamentally different from any
other contractual endeavor. 172 Second, the contractual vision of the firm
conceptualizes it as arising out of private rather than government
choices. To be sure, nexus of contracts theorists acknowledge the exis-
tence of state promulgated corporate law, but they see these rules as pro-
viding contractual defaults in order to reduce transaction costs, rather
than as concessions of government power designed to serve the purposes
of the state. 173 Provisions of state corporate law that cannot be bargained
around are analyzed as mandatory contractual provisions analogous to
mandatory rules in contract law.
174
The nexus of contracts theory's insistence on the fictitious nature of
the corporation also explains how liberal autonomy theorists could ana-
lyze firm-to-firm contracts. A contract between two firms appears to be
a contract between two separate, non-human entities, but in reality in-
ter-firm contracts incompletely describe the underlying agreements of
actual human beings. The full terms of the agreement must be specified
using not only the explicit terms of the contract and the regular rules of
contract law, but also by the contracts-including the "contract" repre-
sented by corporate charters and management structures-which make
up the corporations that signed the agreement. Ultimately contracts be-
tween corporations are agreements between actual human beings. The
scope of the power of these human beings to "bind" other participants in
the corporate enterprise will be limited by the background rules of corpo-
rate law. However, the nexus-of-contracts theory teaches us that ulti-
mately these rules can be thought of in largely consensual terms. Corpo-
rate agents exercising their discretion become essentially analogous to
any other individual whose discretion and ability to bind others is limited
by pre-existing contracts. The presence of the corporation form works
no decisive shift in moral status. Thus, from the point of view of the
nexus of contract theory, the Artificial Personality Argument is unten-
able. It mistakes a useful shorthand- the corporation-for a decisive
difference where no such decisive difference exists. 175
171. See id. at 1418-20.
172. Id.
173. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principals For The Post-Contractarian
Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 565 (1996).
174. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) (setting forth general
requirements of contractual capacity); Id. § 14 (limitations on the enforceability of contracts by
infants); Id. § 15 (limitations on the enforceability of contracts by those with mental illnesses or
defects); Id. § 110 (listing of contracts covered by the Statute of Frauds); Id. § 178 (unenforceability
of agreements on public policy grounds); Id. § 189 (contracts in restraint of marriage); Id. § 356
(prohibition on penalty clauses).
175. One arguably decisive difference is the limited liability provided by the corporate form.
However, there is no reason that limited contractual liability cannot be created entirely by agree-
ment. Indeed limiting the pool of assets available to answer for a particular contract is routinely
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The nexus of contracts theory, thus, turns the table on efficiency
theorists who would invoke the Artificial Personality Argument. Just as
the Artificial Personality Argument claims one has nothing to say when
viewing firm-to-firm contracts through the lens of autonomy theories,
when one views the Artificial Personality Argument through the lens of
economics one finds that the conception of the corporation that the ar-
gument requires is not the one endorsed by contemporary law and eco-
nomics scholarship.
One might object that the nexus of contracts response to the Artifi-
cial Personality Argument rests on an equivocation. The term "contract"
in the nexus of contract theory 76 does not mean the same thing that
"contract" means in contract law and therefore the argument is falla-
cious. 177 This criticism can be met in the following way. Economics and
law clearly do not use the term "contract" in precisely the same way.
When economists speak of contracts they are generally using the term
broadly to include all voluntary transactions. 178 It can encompass every-
thing from simultaneous exchanges and informal deals to highly formal-
ized long-term written agreements. The important point is that the trans-
actions are consensual rather than required by government regulations or
some other external source of coercion. 79  In contrast, lawyers use the
term contract in a much more limited way. Thus, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) Contracts defines a contract as "a promise or set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty."' 80 Generally, a contract requires
the formalities of offer, acceptance, and consideration.' The juristic
done through devices such as non-recourse secured lending. Likewise, the liability shield provided
by the corporate form is routinely waived - at least for some businesses - through personal guaran-
tees offered for corporate debts. Tort liability, of course, presents a different case, but there is no
obvious reason why autonomy theories of contractual liability should be dramatically influenced by
the scope of tort liability.
176. Braucher, supra note 13, at 698-99.
177. Cf Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLuM. L.
REv. 1757, 1764 n.30 (1980) ("Economists tend to view contracts as relationships characterized by
reciprocal expectations and behavior .... ).
178. Id. ("Economists tend to view contracts as relationships characterized by reciprocal expec-
tations and behavior.").
179. Melvin Eisenberg summed up this point, writing:
In ordinary language, the term contract means an agreement. In law, the term means a
legally enforceable promise. Pretty clearly, however, the nexus-of-contracts conception
does not mean either that the corporation is a nexus of agreements or that it is a nexus of
legally enforceable promises. Instead, the conception means that the corporation is a
nexus of reciprocal arrangements.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (1999).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). See generally 1 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §1.1 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the legal definition of "contract").
181. See, e.g., Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Alaska 1997) ("The formation of a
valid contract requires an offer encompassing all essential terms, unequivocal acceptance by the
offeree, consideration, and an intent to be bound."). The law of contract, of course, abounds with
exceptions to these requirements and will enforce many agreements and promises that do not meet
them. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82(1) (1981) (promise to pay a debt
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and economic definitions of contract thus look quite different, and the
charge of equivocation seems correct. The problem with this line of rea-
soning is that the Artificial Personality Argument itself is an attack on
juristic categories. Insofar as the law is concerned, there is no difference
between the contracts entered into by a corporation and those entered
into by a natural person. 182 This is precisely the position that the Artifi-
cial Personality Argument rejects. Rather it insists that one must import
non-juristic distinctions between persons and corporations-namely the
distinction that says they are entitled to different sorts of moral respect-
into contract theory in order to understand the discontinuous nature of
contract.
Contracts between human beings and contracts between firms re-
quire differing theoretical approaches not because of any juristic distinc-
tion but because-all juristic categories aside-firms simply are not real
people. The argument thus stands or falls based on the non-juristic dis-
tinctions that it is making. If, however, the nexus of contracts approach
is accepted, then the activity of a firm can be understood in voluntaristic
and individualistic terms. This is precisely what the Artificial Personal-
ity Argument denies. In the end, the equivocation response rests on a
category mistake. It wrongly assumes that the Artificial Personality Ar-
gument is directed against a full-fledged set of juristic categories rather
than against the more primitive concepts of person, choice, and auton-
omy employed by philosophical defenders of contract.
C. The Failure of the Artificial Personality Argument
The ultimate validity of the Artificial Personality Argument rests on
which of the three competing theories of the corporation is "true." Cast
in these terms, evaluating the argument is a daunting task. From at least
the eleventh century to the present, debates have raged about the "true
nature" of corporations, and it seems unlikely that a definitive answer to
the question is going to emerge. However, it is important to remember
that the Artificial Personality Argument need not be thought of as a
free-standing claim about the nature of contracts and corporations.
Rather it is part of a larger attempt to understand the relationship be-
tween autonomy and efficiency theories of contract. Seen in this context,
the Artificial Personality Argument fails. Recall that the Artificial Per-
unrecoverable because of statute of limitations); Id. § 83 (promise to pay a debt discharged in bank-
ruptcy); Id. § 84(1) (a promise to perform a duty conditioned on an event that did not occur); Id. § 85
(promise to perform a voidable duty), Id. § 86 (promise for past or moral consideration); Id. § 87 (a
written option contract reciting consideration); Id. § 88 (a written guaranty reciting consideration);
Id. § 89 (fair and equitable modification of an existing contract); Id. § 90 (promissory estoppel)
(1982); U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) (firm offer rule).
182. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(26) (2003) ("'Party', as distinct from third-party, means a
person who has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement within the code."); Id. § 1-201(b)(27)
("'Person' includes an individual or organization"); Id. § 2-204(1) ("A contract for the sale of good
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract.").
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sonality Argument was offered as a horizontal independence strategy as
an attempt to reconcile autonomy and efficiency theories of contract by
showing that they apply to different sorts of things. Hence, the Artificial
Personality Argument can only demonstrate the horizontal independence
of these theories if it is consistent with the economic approach that it
seeks to defend. It is not. In assessing the Artificial Personality Argu-
ment we can thus move from daunting and loaded questions about the
"true" nature of things to more tractable questions about the consistency
of different pieces of a larger argument.
Modem economics of the sort invoked by efficiency theories of
contract is firmly committed to methodological individualism. 183 What
this means is that the individual is taken as the basic unit of social expla-
nation. 184 This methodological individualism, coupled with an assump-
tion of rationality and scarcity is what marks economics off from other
social sciences such as sociology or anthropology. The insistence on
rational individualism is more than a simple matter of policing discipli-
nary boundaries, however. It provides the basis for two important ambi-
tions of modem economics. The first ambition is that social scientific
theories be falsifiable. Most economists in theory aspire to the Pop-
perian model of science in which theories generate predications that can
then be falsified through observation. 185 The gradual accretion of theo-
ries that withstand repeated attempts at falsification, as well as the rejec-
tion of theories that fail this test, is supposed to lead to increased scien-
tific knowledge of human activity. The insistence on individual rational-
ity allows economists to produce theories from which predictions can be
rigorously and logically deduced. This deductive character makes the
theories potentially falsifiable and hence, on Popper's view, scientific.
The second ambition is theoretical unity. The rational actor model holds
out the promise that a single mode of explanation can account for all
interesting or important social phenomena. 186  Whatever the merits of
183. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 59 (3d ed. 1995)
(describing the basic assumptions of the rational actor model).
184. Some economists, particularly those who place their hopes in sociobiology or neurosci-
ence reject the individualistic reductionism of mainstream economics, arguing that the basic units of
social explanation are sub-individual, e.g., neuropathways, etc. See, e.g., Terrence R. Chorvat et al.,
Law & Neuroeconomics, (George Mason Law & Econ., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 04-07,
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=501063.
185. See Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY § 4.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2003), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/ ("Karl Popper's philosophy of science has been influen-
tial among economists."). Compare MAX BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS: OR How
ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN (1992) with TERRENCE HUTCHISON, ON THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE FORMALIST REVOLUTION (2000) (prominent defenses of a Popperian approach to econom-
ics); KARL POPPER, The Logic of the Social Sciences, in THE POSITIVIST DISPUTE IN GERMAN
SOCIOLOGY 87 (Teodor W. Adomo et al., eds. Glyn Adey & David Frisby trans., Harper & Row
Publishers 1976) (setting forth his own theory of social science).
186. See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE 15-16 (1932) (defining economics as the science which studies human behavior as a rela-
tionship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses). Robbins was an early and
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these ambitions, they demonstrate that methodological individualism is
not some secondary part of modem economics but rather is central to the
entire intellectual enterprise.
The rational actor of economics and the autonomous individual of
liberalism are slightly different people. One can be an economist without
being a liberal, and one can be a liberal without subscribing to the shib-
boleths of microeconomic theory. Both positions, however, share a hos-
tility to the collectivism of the real theory of corporations. For example,
the gravamen of liberal social contract theory is that the individual is
prior to the community, which must be justified in individualistic terms.
Likewise, economists have insisted that collective action must be under-
stood by reference to individual choices and incentives.18 7 Neither the-
ory is hospitable to Gierke's claims about collective wills and Gnossen-
shaft. The concession theory is less overtly inconsistent with economic
theory, but from an economic point of view it is ultimately question beg-
ging. Even if one accepted it as a historical account of the rise of the
corporation's legal personality, Coase and his progeny point out that one
is still left with the question of why economic activity is carried out by
firms at all. Answering that question in the individualistic terms of mod-
em economics leads inevitably toward the nexus of contract theory. In
short, efficiency theorists cannot invoke the Artificial Personality Argu-
ment to side step the competing claims of autonomy theorists without
simultaneously endorsing (if only implicitly) theories of the corporation
that are at odds with the basic assumptions of economics.
V. APPLYING AUTONOMY THEORIES TO THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS:
THE EXAMPLE OF INTERPRETATION
The arguments presented above show that one cannot dismiss
autonomy theories from firm-to-firm contracts on the basis of an a priori
claim about the nature of the corporation. The fiction theory-and in
particular the nexus-of-contracts theory-demonstrates that one needn't
assume that firm-to-firm contracts somehow belong to a different meta-
physical class from contracts between individuals that renders them
unamenable to autonomy theories. However, the a priori failure of the
Artificial Personality Argument does not necessarily mean that autonomy
theories have anything to offer to our understanding of firm-to-firm con-
tracts. Unless autonomy theories suggest results that differ from those
generated by the economic theories offered in their place, the failure of
influence advocate for an expansive view of economics. A more recent writer taking a similar
position is Richard Posner, who claims:
[E]conomics is the science of rational choice in a world - our world - in which resources
are limited in relation to human wants. The task of economics, so defined, is to explore
the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satis-
factions - what we shall call his 'self-interest.'
POSNER, supra note 15, at 3-4.
187. See, e.g., MACUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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the Artificial Personality Argument remains an essentially scholastic
point. The issue of contract interpretation offers an example of how
autonomy and efficiency theories sharply diverge when applied to firm-
to-firm contracts.
A. Hyper-Formalism and the Efficiency Norm
One must first understand the striking results that a consistent appli-
cation of the efficiency norm to contractual interpretation yields. Ac-
cording to the ingenious argument put forward by Schwartz and Scott, if
one's only goal is to maximize the joint gains from contracting, then one
ought to adopt a very hard version of the plain meaning rule.1 88 Rather
than looking to all of the circumstances surrounding a transaction and
evidence of the intention of the parties, one should interpret the words of
the contract as literally as possible. Going hand in hand with this posi-
tion is an equally hard-edged version of the parol evidence rule. 8 In
short, contractual interpretation should be simplified to a literal reading
of the language within the four comers of a written contract and nothing
more. This hyper-formalist approach rests on three inter-related con-
cepts: cost, risk, and diversification.
All things being equal, the efficiency norm suggests that low-cost
dispute resolution is to be preferred to high-cost dispute resolution. Hy-
per-formalism has the obvious advantage of cheap dispute resolution.
One can dispense with expensive and time-consuming fact-finding, with
the attendant army of disputes and arguments over the reliability and
interpretation of evidence. One simply reads the contract without refer-
ence to any divergence between that reading and the actual intent of the
parties.
The obvious objection to such an approach is that sometimes it will
produce "wrong" interpretations that vary significantly from anything
envisioned by the parties. One of the insights provided by Schwartz and
Scott is that stopping the analysis at this point is a mistake.' 90 The next
question should be whether the "mistakes" produced by hyper-formalism
are systematic. Do they consistently favor one group in a way that can
be predicted in advance? Schwartz and Scott conclude that they do
not.' 9 ' Accordingly, they argue that we should not care about the "mis-
188. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 569 ("Typical firms prefer courts to make interpreta-
tions on a narrow evidentiary base whose most significant component is the written contract.").
189. "Under [the parol evidence rule] when the parties to a contract embody their agreement in
writing and intend the writing to be the final expression of their agreement, the terms of the writing
may not be varied or contradicted by evidence of any prior written or oral agreement.... ." BLACK'S
LAW DICT"ONARY 1117 (6th ed. 1990).
190. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 575-76.
191. Id. at 575-76. Schwartz and Scott are careful not to overstate their case, acknowledging
that under some circumstances profit maximizing firms would not be indifferent to contract "misin-
terpretation." Id. at 576-77.
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takes" in the context of corporate contracts.192 A corporation is going to
have lots of contracts. Hence, it can expect to "win" about as often as it
"loses" under a regime of hyper-formalist contract interpretation. A
firm's contracts thus become analogous to a diversified stock portfolio.
1 93
The investor in such a stock portfolio should be risk-neutral as to any
particular stock, since diversification allows one to balance declining
stocks with advancing stocks. The only thing that matters is the aggre-
gate performance of the portfolio. Similarly, if our sole goal is to maxi-
mize the value of a firm, we should be indifferent to the "performance"
of any particular contract under a hyper-formalist interpretation regime.
So long as "winning" interpretations are as frequent as "losing" interpre-
tations, the risk of judicial "mistakes" is diversified away and the firm
realizes the full benefits of the cheaper resolution of contractual disputes.
The analogy to a stock portfolio also illustrates the stockholder cen-
tric nature of the efficiency argument for hyper-formalism. It ultimately
privileges the position of a diversified investor whose only goal is to
maximize the return on her investment. Such an investor would clearly
prefer the hyper-formalist interpretation regime. On the other hand,
managers and employees, for whom the corporation is not simply an
income stream, but also, a place where they spend much of their time and
lavish much of their energy, 194 quite possibility might prefer that their
plans and arrangements be carried out according to their intentions,
rather than falling victim to random-albeit evenly distributed-
misinterpretation by the courts. The question thus becomes why we
should adopt the perspective of such an investor. Schwartz and Scott
offer essentially two reasons for taking this position. The first is that
stockholders "own" the corporation and'are entitled by that "ownership"
to have the firm's contracts interpreted to maximize the value of their
investment. 195 The second is that employees of a corporation are re-
quired by law to maximize shareholder value. 1 96 Upon closer examina-
tion, however, the argument from ownership turns out to be circular and
the argument from the legal requirements of employees rests on an over-
simplification of corporate law.
As a legal matter, it is not true that shareholders "own" a corpora-
tion, and once the claim is unpacked it seems to be little more than a re-
statement of a conclusion. Legally speaking, shareholders are the resid-
ual claimants on the assets of a corporation and have the ability to exer-
192. See id. at 550-54.
193. This analogy is mine rather than Schwartz and Scott's.
194. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116 (noting that people live much of their
lives and work out much of their identity within the context of corporations).
195. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 550-51 ("A firm is direct by its owners, who often are
shareholders. Shareholders prefer their firms to maximize profits .... ").
196. Id. at 551 ("[T]he legal rules that attempt to deter bad manager behavior fall into the
domains of the criminal, corporate, and securities laws. Contract law should exploit this specializa-
tion by assuming that the agreements it regulates reflect the parties' maximizing choices.").
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cise some power through their voting over its management. Sharehold-
ers, however, lack many of the other crucial indicia of property owners.
For example, they do not have day-to-day control over a corporation or
its assets. 197 They do not have the right to exclude others from a corpora-
tion's property. By virtue of owning stock in the General Electric Com-
pany ("GE"), I do not have the power to throw someone out of a GE fac-
tory. Indeed, not only do stockholders lack the ability to exclude others
from corporate property, they themselves can be excluded from it. Were
I to trespass on GE's property, my ownership of GE stock would not
constitute a valid defense to a tort action against me. 198 One might still
assert that shareholders are the owners of the company in some important
normative sense. Whatever this sense, it is not one that we usually asso-
ciate with property. No one, to my knowledge, argues that shareholders
should be given all the incidents of control that would flow from treating
a corporation as their property. No one, for example, argues that GE
stockholders should be exempt from the law of trespass as it applies to
GE property. In short, the claim that stockholders own the corporation
amounts neither to the claim that they exercise full legal property rights
in a corporation nor to the claim that they should exercise such legal
rights in the corporation. Ultimately, it amounts to the claim that corpo-
rations ought to be run for the benefit of shareholders. Yet this is pre-
cisely the conclusion that that concept of ownership was invoked to sup-
port. Hence, introducing the concept of property into the discussion of
the shareholder's status neither accurately states the law nor materially
advances the normative discussion. In this context, it amounts to little
more than a restatement of the conclusion being argued for.' 99
It is far from clear that employees of a corporation are required by
law to run a corporation so as to maximize shareholder value. For start-
ers, dozens of states have passed laws explicitly allowing corporate man-
agers to consider the interests of corporate constituencies other than
shareholders, e.g., employees or members of the community in which a
197. Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440, 433 (App. Div. 1962) (holding that shareholders
cannot require management to follow particular business policies); Associated Grocers of Ala., Inc.
v. Willingham, 77 F. Supp. 990, 966 (N.D. Ala. 1948) (same), Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99
N.E. 138, 141 (N.Y. 1912) (same), Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cunninghame,
(1906) 2 Ch. 34 (U.K.) (same).
198. My status as a stockholder, however, would guarantee me access to corporate property for
the purposes of inspecting the books. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220 (2005). See also Susan B.
Hoffhagle & Jolyan A. Butler, Shareholders' Right to Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 4
CONN. L. REv. 707 (1972) (discussing the scope of shareholder's inspection rights).
199. William W. Bratton summarizes this point thus:
"Ownership" becomes as irrelevant a concept as "firm entity" [under the nexus of con-
tracts theory]. The "firm" is only a series of contracts covering inputs being joined so as
to become output. "Capital," and thus the traditional legal situs of ownership, devolves
into one of the many types of inputs.
Bratton, supra note 112, at 1499. Cf Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 164, at 781-83, 789 n.14
(owners contract for rights to anticipated residual rewards).
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corporation is located.200  The practical effect of these statutes has been
fairly minimal.20 ' However, their limited significance does not come
from a powerful, countervailing legal requirement that employees man-
age a corporation in the interests of the shareholders. Rather, it comes
from the fact that corporate managers are granted broad discretion in
how they manage corporations.
The courts have frequently declared that corporate managers are fi-
duciaries of the corporation.20 2 In practice, however, this fiduciary status
places few limits on managerial decision-making. It does create substan-
tial legal requirements with regard to the theft of corporate assets or op-
portunities, 20 3 but the business judgment rule provides a virtually im-
penetrable shield from legal oversight of ordinary business decisions.2
So long as a manager complies with the proper formalities and exercises
some basic modicum of care she is immune from legal attack and the
courts will not second guess her decisions. 20 5 Furthermore, although the
corporation may sue a manager for breach of fiduciary duty and a share-
holder may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, a share-
holder himself generally cannot sue misbehaving corporate managers for
most kinds of misbehavior.2 6
200. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e),
repealed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2005); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1602, -1702 (2005); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85
(2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d), (f), (g) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West
2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12- 210(4) (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2)
(2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 65 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2004);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2035(c) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-A:6-1(2), 6-14(4) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-
35(D) (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.59(E) (LexisNexis 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2005); PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 515- 16
(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2005); WIS. STAT. §
180.0827 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (2005) (enacted 1989).
201. See Robert Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156
(1993); Lawrence Mitchell, A Theoretical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992).
202. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), Pueblo Bancorp v. Lindoe,
Inc., 37 P.3d 492, 499 (Colo. App. 2001), In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 878 A.2d
975,999-1000 (2005).
203. See, e.g., Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985), Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71
(Minn. 1974), Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940), Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). See
also Victor Brudney & Robert Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV.
997 (1981).
204. The business judgment rule "immunizes management from liability in corporate transac-
tion[s] undertaken within both power of corporation and authority of management where there is
reasonable basis to indicate that transaction was made with due care and in good faith." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 200 (6th ed. 1990).
205. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d 805 (holding that Delaware law presumes that managers act
in good faith and in the best interests of the firm). Under Delaware law, even an explicit showing of
bad-faith or incompetence is not sufficient for legal interference with the business decisions so long
as a defendant can prove the "entire fairness" of the transaction. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
206. As the Delaware Chancery Court has explained:
A bill filed by stockholders in their derivative right . . . has two phases - one is the
equivalent of a suit to compel the corporation to sue, and the other is the suit by the cor-
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To be sure, one can find precatory language in judicial opinions to
the effect that corporations should be run in the interest of the sharehold-
ers, but the business judgment rule insures that such language has little if
any real impact on managerial decision making. In any case, there is
reason to believe that such language was never meant to enshrine the
shareholder primacy norm. The locus classicus for the shareholder pri-
macy norm is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,207 where the Michigan Supreme
Court stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself to the reduction of profits, or to the nondis-




When this dicta is viewed in context, however, it is clear that what is
involved is not a generalized duty by managers to maximize shareholder
value, but rather, a prohibition on the oppression of minority sharehold-
ers in the case of a closely held corporation. The case arose out a dispute
between Henry Ford and the Dodge brothers, who owned ten percent of
the stock in Ford Motor Company. 20 9 The Dodge brothers opposed
Henry Ford's management style and wished to set up their own car com-
pany to compete with Ford.210 Henry Ford wanted to forestall this by
denying capital to the Dodge brothers and forcing them out of the com-
pany.21' Accordingly, Henry Ford had the board of directors cease the
payment of stock dividends and then he himself resigned, went to Cali-
fornia, and announced that he would be setting up a new car company to
compete with Ford.21 2 All of these antics were ploys to depress the value
of the Dodge brother's Ford Motor Company stock and force them out.
2 13
Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled for the Dodge brothers
not because of some generalized duty to maximize share value, but
rather, because of the right of dissenting minority shareholders to be free
poration, asserted by the stockholders on its behalf, against those liable to it. The former
belongs to the complaining shareholders; the latter to the corporation. The complaining
stockholders are allowed in derivative bills to bring forward those two causes of action in
one suit.
Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A. 73, 76 (Del. Ch. 1939). Accord Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (I11.
1988) ("The derivative action really consists of two causes of action; one against the directors for
failing to sue; and the second based upon the right belonging to the corporation.").
207. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
208. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
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from unreasonable oppression. 214 The court pointedly did not issue an
injunction against plant expansions that the Dodge brothers believed
would be unprofitable, citing the business judgment rule.
215
B. Autonomy Theories and Interpretation
By and large, autonomy theories prescribe a different method of in-
terpreting contracts. If contract law is a matter of enforcing a particular
set of commitments that individuals make as a way of expanding their
liberty, then it follows that we must know what the individuals them-
selves committed to. Indeed, to the extent the "misinterpretation" of a
contract-that is an interpretation that varies from the intent of the par-
ties-leads to legal coercion, we are faced with the primal question of
liberal political theory, namely the justification of collective violence.
Autonomy theories of contract purport to answer this question in the
limited case of self-imposed or consensual legal obligations.2t 6 Once
contractual liability goes beyond such self-imposed obligations, how-
ever, it can no longer be justified by autonomy theories. These consid-
erations mean that autonomy theories of contract must take a broader
approach to contractual interpretation than the hyper-formalism sug-
gested by a single-minded devotion to the efficiency norm. This does
not mean that autonomy theories are committed to a wholly subjective
theory of interpretation. As Charles Fried has written:
It is a truism in the philosophy of language that in interpreting a per-
son's words we are not guessing at the hidden but determined content
of some list of meanings in the speaker's head. Rather our concerns
particularize render concrete, inchoate meanings.
2 17
Such an approach, however, does require an attention to context and in-
tention that would be foreclosed by a rule limiting inquiry into a con-
tract's meaning to a literal interpretation of the plain meaning of a signed
document.
Just as the nature and law of corporations does not provide any rea-
son for adopting the shareholder primacy norm implicit in the argument
of the new lex mercatoria, it also provides no reason for rejecting auton-
214. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 ("There should be no confusion... of the duties which Mr.
Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law
he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders.").
215. Id. (confessing that "judges are not business experts."). Dodge can be profitably con-
trasted with the well-known Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (I11. App. Ct. 1968) in which a
disgruntled shareholder argued that the refusal of the Chicago Cubs' management to install night
stadium lighting decreased profits. The court held that the board was not obligated to make profits
their sole goal and could appropriately consider factors such as the impact of their decisions on the
community and on the game of baseball as a whole. Id. at 180-82. See also ARTHUR R. PINTO &
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 19 (1999) (distinguishing Dodge from
Shlensky on the grounds that Dodge involved oppression of minority shareholders).
216. FRIED, supra note 55, at 16.
217. Id. at 60.
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omy theories. Armed with an understanding of the corporation as a
nexus of contracts, one can apply the broader notion of interpretation
inherent in autonomy theories to contracts between corporations. The
easiest way of illustrating this is through a thought experiment. Imagine
an entrepreneur who has a new idea around which he builds his business.
In order to advance his goals he enters into various contracts with indi-
viduals and companies. His decision to make these contracts is an exer-
cise of his liberty. To be sure, part of his motivation is profit. However,
this is by no means his sole motivation. People start businesses for many
reasons-such as the desire for independence or to be one's own boss-
that are not easily reducible to simple profits.21 8 Furthermore, liberal
philosophy's indifference to ends means that, properly speaking, our
entrepreneur's motives are irrelevant. What matters is whether his ac-
tions violate the liberal principle. Provided that they do not, the law
should further his autonomous choices by enforcing his contracts. Or, so
say the autonomy theories.21 9
As our entrepreneur's business grows, his contracts will become
more complex. He will develop relationships with employees, suppliers,
and creditors that will be governed by long-term agreements. No doubt,
these contracts will present knotty issues of interpretation. Language
may be vague and many assumptions will be left implicit. Nevertheless,
autonomy theories have a reasonably clear set of implications. We ought
to be willing to expend judicial resources and require that parties incur
costlier litigation in order to see to it that each contract, insofar as it is
possible to do so, is enforced to accord with the original intent of the
parties. In many cases, the ultimate purpose of the parties to these con-
tracts will be to maximize their wealth. According to autonomy theories,
however, this is not the primary concern of contract law.220 The reason is
that the law of contract represents state action compelling one party to a
lawsuit against his or her will. As such, it must stand the test of the lib-
eral principle, which requires that the state be indifferent to its citizens'
ends, focusing instead upon the protection and advancement of their lib-
erty. Hence, autonomy theories require that we inquire into the actual
intent and meaning of our entrepreneur's contracts.
Thus far, there is nothing in the nature of our entrepreneur's con-
tracts that would lead us to believe that they ought to be analyzed using
218. This point is hardly confined to the case of entrepreneurs. Most people make professional
and career decisions on the basis of a complex set of factors, of which monetary profit is but a single
- and often not the most important - part. Consider, for example, the fact that such talented lawyers
as Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz could surely make more money working on Wall Street or K
Street than they currently do at Yale Law School and the University of Virginia.
219. FRIED, supra note 55, at 7 ("But whatever we accomplish and however that accomplish-
ment is judged, morality requires that we respect the person and property of others, leaving them free
to make their lives as we are left free to make ours. This is the liberal ideal.").
220. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW
206, 224 (Peter Benson ed. 2001).
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some new set of theories. Now suppose that he faces the problem of
asset partitioning. 221 He wants to specify that certain assets under his
control will be available to answer for the debts of his business but other
assets should not be available to answer such debts. As we have seen
there are a variety of ways in which he might accomplish this. For ex-
ample, he could structure his debts as non-recourse loans secured by his
widget-making machine. As is common in such transactions, he might
enter into covenants that would limit his control over the widget-making
machine, agreeing, for example, that he will maintain it in good working
order and not sell it without first paying the debt.
Over time, the accretion of such contracts would do two things for
our entrepreneur. First, it would significantly limit his personal liability
for payment of "business" debts.222 Second, it would significantly limit
his former freedom to control "business" property without subjecting
himself to the risk of significant personal liability.223 Neither of these
changes, however, represents any fundamental change in the nature of
the contracts of the entrepreneur from the point of view of autonomy
theories. The limitations on personal liability are simply terms in par-
ticular contracts, representing the choices of autonomous individuals
pursuing their chosen ends. Likewise, the entrepreneur's loss of control
over particular assets does not mean that his liberty is no longer the
structuring normative principle of contract enforcement. It simply means
respect for that liberty requires honoring his choice to give up certain
freedoms and that he be subjected to liability for the violation of certain
self-imposed duties and obligations to others. Under autonomy theories,
224however, both of these propositions are true of any contract.
Now suppose that our entrepreneur decides to get around the asset-
partitioning problem in a different way. Rather than doing so by using
secured lending and other explicitly contractual devices, he chooses to
incorporate his business. This action will do three things. First, it will
limit his personal liability. Those assets that he assigns to the new corpo-
ration will now be answerable exclusively for corporate debts, and in the
absence of some further contract, his personal assets will be immune
from attachment by corporate creditors. Second, it will limit his control
over business assets. How much this control is limited will depend on
essentially two things. The first is the corporate law of the state in which
he incorporates the business. 25 Second, the terms of the corporate char-
221. See text accompanying notes 146 & 158.
222. See Lynn LoPucki, The End of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1, 14-19 (1997) (arguing that
secured lending allows debtors effectively to avoid or limit most of their liability).
223. For example, the non-recourse loan in the preceding paragraph might contain a covenant
not to sell the widget-making machine, the violation of which would subject our entrepreneur to full
personal liability for the loan.
224. FRIED, supra note 55, at 14, 16-17.
225. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 215, at 2 ("Every state has a corporate law statute that
provides the rules for the corporations incorporated in that state .... ").
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ter and bylaws will place further limits on his power.2 26 The third thing
that incorporation will allow our entrepreneur to do is raise money by
offering stock to others. Offering stock may further limit his control
over the business by subjecting him to obligations in addition to those
contained in the state law and the corporate charter, most notably federal
securities regulations.
By now, our entrepreneur will be hedged in by a variety of legal ob-
ligations. He is no longer the solo operator more or less free from legal
constraints that he was when he first began his business. However, all of
these new obligations are the result of voluntary actions by him and those
to whom he becomes obligated. Furthermore, there is a well-developed
body of law that defines the scope and meaning of those obligations, and
as we have seen, there is nothing in that body of law suggesting that he
has consented to a fundamental shift in how his business contracts should
be interpreted. To be sure, the laws of corporate governance and agency
now impact the legal effect of his contracts on behalf of the corporation,
but none of these bodies of law suggests that some new kind of contract
law applies to the contracts he enters into as part of his business. Nor do
they require that profit be the goal of his contracts.
One might object that even if autonomy theories can be applied to
relatively small and autocratically run corporations where contracts rep-
resent the will of a single manager with merely bounded power, they
cannot be applied to the contracts of more complex corporations. The
"decisions" of these larger corporations cannot be thought of as those of
a single individual. As Jensen and Meckling put it:
[T]he "behavior" of the firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the
outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the
trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but
we often make this error by thinking about organizations as if they
were persons with motivations and intentions.
227
One could argue that the idealized story of the entrepreneur presented
above obscures this fact. When we recognize that corporate behavior is
being dictated by complex market forces rather than individual decisions,
then autonomy theories ought to be jettisoned.
The problem with this objection is that ultimately it proves too
much. Every time a corporation makes a contract, it does so because
some actual individual has come to some decision as to how he or she
will exercise the discretion that belongs to her. Despite Dan-Cohen's
hypothetical, in our world it remains an irreducible fact that contracts by
corporations are always made by human beings. The legal scope of a
226. Id. at 11 ("The articles [of incorporation] may also contain other significant discretionary
provisions authorized by statute.").
227. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 165, at 311.
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corporate agent's discretion will be set by the law of corporations, which
as we have seen, does not commit her to an a priori duty to maximize
stockholder value. Nevertheless, as Jensen and Meckling rightly point
out, she will be subject to pressures created by the market-like forces
within the firm that will ultimately dictate many contractual terms.228
The question thus becomes whether the fact that the terms of the contract
are, in some sense, the outcome of a complex "market" renders the re-
sulting contract fundamentally different than other contracts in the way
posited by the Artificial Personality Argument. Once the question is
seen in these terms, its answer becomes straightforward. Virtually every
contract will contain terms that are determined by complex market trans-
actions. The most obvious example is the price term in a sales con-
tract.229 If one neighbor sells a used lawnmower to another neighbor, the
market in lawnmowers will largely control the price term. Absent ex-
traordinary circumstances, the seller cannot charge $10,000 for the
lawnmower because the buyer can easily purchase a new lawnmower at
Home Depot for considerably less money. A host of factors ranging
from the demand for lawnmowers in the local area to the price of steel on
international commodity markets, in turn, will determine the price at
Home Depot. If the mere fact that an implicit or explicit term in a con-
tract resulted from complex market transactions was sufficient to dismiss
autonomy theories of contract, virtually every contract would be beyond
the reach of such theories. Such a claim would be controversial to say
the least and is clearly beyond the scope of the Artificial Personality Ar-
gument.
The idealized story of our entrepreneur illustrates an important
point, namely that we ought not to be seduced by the language of entity
that surrounds our discussion of corporations. To be sure, it is extremely
useful to talk and think about corporations as separate entities in many
contexts. However,
The "personhood" of a corporation is a matter of convenience rather
than reality .... There are many actors, from production employees
to managers to equity investors to debt investors to holders of war-
ranty and tort claims against the firm. The arrangements among
these persons usually depend on contracts and on positive law, not on
corporate law or the status of the corporation as an entity. More of-
228. Id.
229. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 19 (5th ed. 2001)
("What [the] price and quantity [of goods] will be depends on the particular characteristics of supply
and demand. Variations of price and quantity over time depend on the ways in which supply and
demand respond to other economic variables, such as aggregate economic activity and labor costs,
which are themselves changing.").
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ten than not a reference to the corporation as an entity will hide the
essence of the transaction.
230
This is certainly true when corporate personality is invoked to explain
what corporate contracts are "really" about.
The actors involved in the idealized story of our entrepreneur-
customers, creditors, employees, stockholders and the entrepreneur him-
self-will all have different motives and goals in participating in the
business. From the point of view of the liberal philosophy embedded in
autonomy theories of contract, the point of the exercise is not to maxi-
mize the returns for a single group-stockholders---or even for all
groups, but rather, to facilitate the peaceful co-operation of individuals
pursuing disparate ends. Jules Coleman has written that the market can
be thought of as an essentially political institution that allows those with
widely differing conceptions of the good to nevertheless cooperate
peacefully with one another.231 The nexus-of-contracts theory teaches us
that the corporation is simply the market in another guise.232 In this
sense, the nexus-of-contracts theory makes the corporation into a much
weaker concept than is assumed by the Artificial Personality Argument.
As two of the nexus-of-contracts theory's most prominent proponents
have argued:
An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of the corpora-
tion removes from the field of interesting questions one that has
plagued many writers: What is the goal of the corporation? Is it
profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly defined? Is there
anything wrong with corporate charity? Should corporations try to
maximize profit over the long run or the short run? Our response to
such questions is: Who cares? If the New York Times is formed to
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be
allowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning consented,
and those who came later bought stock the price of which reflected
the corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective.
233
If corporations are enterprises defined by the emergent pattern of
individual agreements rather than some master norm of economic effi-
ciency, it does not mean that entrepreneurs and others should not be free
230. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991).
231. See JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 5 (1992) ("Markets are most attractive where
individuals have broadly divergent conceptions of the good ... "). According to Coleman, "The
market is a particularly appropriate form of rational organization under certain sets of empirical
circumstances, including heterogeneity of values, cultural diversity, geographic dispersion and the
like. In such communities markets contribute to social stability. That is their attraction to liberal
political theory." Id.
232. But cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 230, at 14 ("Just as there is no right amount
of paint in a car, there is no right relation among managers, investors, and other corporate partici-
pants. The relation must be worked out one firm at a time.").
233. Id. at 35-36.
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to opt into the regime of hyper-formalism advocated by Schwartz and
Scott. Nothing in the arguments offered above suggest that their basic
insight that hyperformalism increases the value of contracts taken to-
gether is incorrect. No doubt, the sole goal of some parties (perhaps
most parties) is to maximize the value of their contracts as a portfolio.
Autonomy theories have no objection to parties choosing such a hyper-
formalist regime either through integration clauses or-more effec-
tively-through arbitration agreements that move litigation over con-
tracts into private, hyperformalist forums. Indeed, there is empirical
evidence suggesting that parties who have a bundle of largely fungible
commodity contracts prefer precisely the kind of hyper-formalism advo-
cated by Schwartz and Scott and have created private forums accord-
ingly.234
All of this is unobjectionable to autonomy theories so long as it
represents the actual intent of the parties, rather than a one-size fits all
norm imposed by law. This stance necessarily commits autonomy theo-
ries to an inescapable first question when interpreting contracts: What is
the intent of the parties? Even when the intent is that other intentions be
ignored and that a written agreement be woodenly interpreted, autonomy
theories require that we first identify this intention. Such an inquiry will
inevitably impose costs that could be avoided by adopting the regime
envisioned by Schwartz and Scott. Although I have argued elsewhere for
the priority of liberty to welfare in contract law,235 I freely admit that
such increased costs may be a valid objection to autonomy theories. It
must be noted, however, that such objections have nothing whatsoever to
do with the nature of corporations. The argument applies equally well to
contracts between individuals, and as we have seen incorporation works
no legal or metaphysical transformation on the contracts negotiated be-
tween firms. Ultimately, the question must be fought out on the merits
of the respective theories themselves.
VI. A LESSON FOR CONTRACT THEORY
The demise of the Artificial Personality Argument illustrates one of
the key problems facing the "horizontal independence" strategy. Recall
that the horizontal independence strategy seeks to resolve the conflict
between autonomy theories and efficiency theories by demonstrating that
they are actually theories of different things. The Artificial Personality
Argument ultimately flounders on the fact that both the economics relied
on by the welfare theorists and the liberal political philosophy relied on
by the autonomy theorists are essentially individualistic. This commit-
234. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) (discussing contract interpre-
tation in merchant courts set up by commodity traders).
235. See Oman, supra note 12, at 1499-1503 (arguing for the priority, but not the exclusivity,
of autonomy theories on the basis of the philosophy of John Rawls).
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ment to individualism means that neither approach can consistently in-
voke some non-individualistic concept such as the corporation to side-
step any conflicts. To be sure, they use individualism in different ways,
but in the end, they are talking about the same things: actual human be-
ings. This convergence is precisely what the horizontal independence
strategy seeks to deny.
The ultimate convergence of both welfare and autonomy theories on
the individual comes from two forms of reductionism that are key to con-
temporary economics. First, economics in its positive form is reduction-
ist, focusing on the individual rational actor as the primary unit of social
explanation. Second, economics is normatively reductionist in that it
once again uses individuals as the primary unit of measurement. When
economists speak of efficiency or wealth maximization they are talking
in terms of social aggregates. What economists are aggregating, how-
ever, are the satisfactions of individuals. Hence, there is no sense in
which society is deemed to have or experience satisfaction independent
of the individuals who make it up. These two forms of reductionism are
what make economics such an attractive tool for policy analysis. The
rational actor model allows a policy analyst to predict the effects of par-
ticular policies by deducing how agents bent on satisfaction of their pref-
erences would behave in response. The same deductive model allows us
to make comparative judgments about the extent to which differing poli-
cies satisfy preferences. Both the positive and the normative judgments
focus our attention relentlessly on the individual, and it is at this point
that the conflict with autonomy theories becomes inevitable.
The vast majority of law and economics literature on contracts is
implicitly or explicitly normative.236 Economic theorists of contract law
do not regard efficiency as simply one potentially interesting equilibrium
point predicted by their positive model of contracting behavior. 7
Rather, they use it as criteria for judging the desirability of differing rules
of law.238 When coupled with the methodological individualism of eco-
236. See Kraus, supra note 23, at 694 ("Legal theory is both a normative and explanatory
enterprise. Most contemporary contract theories at least implicitly pursue both enterprises simulta-
neously.").
237. A. Mitchell Polinsky provides a representative example of the ease with which economic
theorists use the concept of efficiency as a normative criteria, invoking it as both a welfare maximiz-
ing principle and as an indicator of hypothetical consent:
Contract law can be viewed as filling in [the] "gaps" in the contract - attempting to re-
produce what the parties would have agreed to if they could have costlessly planned for
the event initially. Since the parties would have included contract terms that maximize
their joint benefits net their joint costs - both parties can thereby be made better off- this
approach is equivalent to designing contract law according to the efficiency criterion.
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICs 29 (3d ed. 2003).
238. See, e.g., Janet Kiholm Smith & Richard L. Smith, Contract Law, Mutual Mistake, and
Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 467 (1990); Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984);
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J. L. & ECON. 691 (1983);
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nomics, efficiency theories of contract will necessarily discuss the same
things as autonomy theories because while each theory conceptualizes
human individuality differently, both approaches are ultimately directed
at actual people. The conflict can only be resolved using the horizontal
independence strategy if one of the theories abandons its claim to being
normative.239 This happy solution is unlikely to work. Although auton-
omy theories might be conceptualized purely as interpretations of exist-
ing legal doctrines, the fact of the matter is that those who adopt auton-
omy theories almost universally tend to do so because they find the theo-
ries normatively attractive on the merits.240 Likewise, the convergence of
positive and normative individualism in economics means that few law
and economics scholars are going to give up their role as prescriptive
policy analysts. So long as efficiency theorists and autonomy theorists
both offer arguments for how contract law should be, a conflict remains
to be solved. The idea of a new lex mercatoria may play a role in such a
resolution, but if it does it will likely employ a vertical integration strat-
egy such as that put forth by Farber,241 rather than the horizontal inde-
pendence approach of the Artificial Personality Argument.
CONCLUSION
Despite the criticisms that I have made of attempts to establish effi-
ciency as a master norm for contract law, this article is not an exercise in
econophobia. I believe that economics offers important insights into the
law242 and that ultimately no theory of contract can afford not to incorpo-
rate the insights of law and economics. 2 43 Nor, despite the fact that I
have spent much of this article defending them, am I ultimately per-
suaded by autonomy theories of contract. Rather, I believe that contract
theory must find some principled integration of the two approaches.
Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible
Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 515 (1981); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11
BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and Theory of Efficient Breach,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); John H. Barton, The Economic Basis for Breach of Contract, I J.
LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972).
239. This, of course, is exactly the position that Jody Kraus tries to defend, arguing that law
and economic theory is a kind of behavioralist explanation of contract case outcomes. See Kraus,
supra note 23, at 689.
240. Stephen Smith has pointed out that:
Although the best known answers to the analytic question are prima facie open to both
utilitarian and rights-based justifications, in practice scholars who defend particular an-
swers to the analytic question also hold that, in the end, there is only one good justifica-
tion (the justification they defend) for the obligation they have identified.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 49.
241. See generally Farber, supra note 10 (arguing that in the context of commercial law an
efficiency standard can be derived from an autonomy norm).
242. Indeed, elsewhere I have offered a traditional law-and-economics analysis in defense of
the use of legislative history to construe statutes. See Nathan Oman, Statutory Interpretation in
Econotopia, 25 PACE L. REV. 49, 72-83 (2005).
243. See Oman, supra note 12, at 1504-06 (arguing that an adequate theory of contract must
incorporate economic arguments).
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Unfortunately, the Artificial Personality Argument cannot harmonize the
discordant voices of autonomy and welfare theories of contract. While it
appears superficially appealing to efficiency theorists, on closer exami-
nation the theories of the corporation that it requires in order to be coher-
ent cannot be reconciled with the methodological individualism of eco-
nomics. Armed with the nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation,
autonomy theorists can deploy arguments developed in other contexts to
account for firm-to-firm contracts. Obviously, the autonomy arguments
that I have discussed are deeply controversial and not without their
weaknesses. However, one need not be a partisan of such approaches to
appreciate the key insight of this paper: While the injection of the corpo-
ration into contract theory throws up new examples of old problems, it
does not pose any fundamentally new or unique issues for autonomy
theories. A new lex mercatoria may indeed hold the promise of reconcil-
ing the competing approaches to contract, but the promise does not lie in
the fact that autonomy theories can be summarily banished from its do-
main. Rather, the meta-theoretical advantage of a new lex mercatoria
must lie in its ability to make the principled integration of autonomy and
welfare theories into a single approach more tractable.
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United States statistical programs and practices are among the best
in the world. Lurking underneath this success, however, is a riddle-
given the potential for abuse and harm, why do Americans willingly hand
over their personal information to government data collection pro-
grams? In this article, we seek an answer to this riddle by examining the
evolution of United States legal and statistical programs, with a particu-
lar focus on the United States Census of Population. In so doing, we
explore the statistical programs, policies, regulations, and codes of eth-
ics that have evolved in the United States over the past two centuries.
We conclude that the willingness of individuals to disclose their personal
information is not linked to programs of legal coercion or to simple
cost/benefit analyses. Instead, we note that the intent of United States
statistical programs has been to increase the level of trust and confi-
dence that individuals have that their information will be kept strictly
confidential. Various legal frameworks and the promulgation of statisti-
cal society codes of ethics buttress our basic conclusion that trust is an
essential characteristic of a successful and efficient modern statistical
program. We conclude by noting some recent developments that may
threaten this trust program, including post 9/11 national security efforts,
the rise of new data-gathering and analysis technologies, and the in-
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creasing use of private data collectors for government statistical pro-
grams.
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INTRODUCTION
Statistics and United States government statistical programs are
stereotypically viewed as somewhat dull, otherwise benign. In the
United States, data collected by federal statistical agencies are used for
myriad purposes: from estimating unemployment and crime, to determin-
ing effectiveness of educational programs, to mapping traffic patterns.
Every year, hundreds of thousands of households voluntarily provide
information to government surveys.
Yet government data collection has its darker side. It has been
claimed that data from censuses and population registers were used in the
United States' forced internment of Japanese-Americans in World War
11,1 in Nazi Germany's rounding-up and execution of millions during the
Holocaust, 2 and in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.3 These are extreme
1. William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, After Pearl Harbor: The Proper Role of Population
Data Systems in Time of War 4-22 (Mar. 28, 2000) (unpublished draft manuscript),
http://www.uwm.edu/-margo/govstat/newpaa.pdf.
2. William Seltzer, Population statistics, the Holocaust and the Nuremberg Trials, 24
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 511,515-517 (1998).
3. ALISON DES FORGES, NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE To TELL THE
STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
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examples, but even well-meaning uses of data can potentially harm indi-
viduals. Innocent mishandling, misfiling, or misinterpreting of data can
have real consequences for the unfortunate souls whose lives or liveli-
hood may depend on how their information is used. The damage from
improper handling of private information is not confined solely to pecu-
niary or bodily harm-many citizens are just as concerned that govern-
ment data collection and use violates their privacy preferences. As a
result, individuals may view even ordinary data collection requests or
uses as embarrassing or particularly intrusive. Such attitudes may reduce
the willingness of individuals to engage in voluntary information disclo-
sures both today and in the future.
Elsewhere, we have argued that the United States is experiencing a
"third wave" 4 of increased privacy concern. Linked to technological
innovations and the concerted efforts of various interests groups to raise
awareness and alarm,5 this third privacy wave has heightened concerns
about information sharing in general. The rise in privacy concerns has
not left government statistical programs unaffected. Events surrounding
the 2000 Census reveal that the government's tenuous ability to rely on
voluntary information disclosures is intimately linked to perceptions of
confidentiality and secrecy. During the 2000 Presidential election, the
United States Census became a subject of political controversy. Then-
Governor George W. Bush, when asked about the census, declared that
he could "understand why people don't want to give that information
over to the government .... I'm not sure I would either. ... If people are
worried about government intruding in their lives, they should think
about it."'6 Candidate Bush was joined by other politicians and various
radio talk show hosts in urging Americans to protect their privacy by
refusing to answer questions they felt were too intrusive.7
A large-scale revolt against government data collection efforts in
general, and the census in particular, could spell disaster for numerous
programs. Indeed, then-Director of the Census Bureau, Kenneth Prewitt,
was deeply concerned that "[t]he census was compromised by those who
raised issues about privacy., 8 The political furor did not adversely affect
Genol-3-02.htm#P22_7285 (describing how population registers were used to identify Tutsis).
4. See Douglas J. Sylvester & Sharon Lohr, Counting on Confidentiality: Legal and Statisti-
cal Approaches to Federal Privacy Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT, 2005 WIsC. L. REV. (forth-
coming late 2005).
5. See Stephen A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create A Privacy Entitlement In Cyberspace,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2001).
6. Terence Samuel, The Job of Counting the Next 100 Million People is a Lot Harder This
Year, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Apr. 23, 2000, at A14.
7. Id.
8. Bill Hillburg, Response Rate 65% For Census Return Of Mail-In Forms Matches 1990
Nationwide, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, Apr. 20, 2000, at N3 (quoting Mr. Prewitt) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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overall response rates9 but raised the specter of a renewed backlash
against government data collection efforts. In short, the general view
that privacy needs to be protected is a potential source for individual
refusal to provide full and accurate information for future government
statistical projects.
Rising public concern over privacy and the dangers inherent in gov-
ernment uses of personal information collide with society's increasing
data requirements. The federal government provides a staggering array
of services that depend on submission of personal information for eligi-
bility and apportionment. National economic policy and forecasting are
equally affected by access to, and detailed analysis of, private informa-
tion. Government policies and services are so essential to the function-
ing of modem society that some now conclude that efficient government
based on access to data sets is a fundamental democratic right'l and is
essential to a well-functioning democracy. 1
9. Although the response rates for the 1990 and 2000 Censuses were essentially the same,
Prewitt did acknowledge at one point that "The long-form response rate is lagging behind the short
form by more than double the rate experienced in 1990." Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census
Director and Commerce Secretary Say Nation 'In Reach' of Major Civic Accomplishment (Apr. 11,
2000), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/census_2000/000581 .html. See
also Mike Johnson, Census Response Rate up in U.S. but Wisconsin gets Bumped to No. 2 as Rate
Drops from 77% to 75%, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 2000, at B1 (noting that "Prewitt said
that controversy affected the return rates for the long form.").
10. See Paul D. Reynolds, Privacy and Advances in Social and Policy Sciences: Balancing
Present Costs and Future Gains, 9 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 275, 310 (1993). According to Reynolds:
Citizens have a right to an efficient, effective, and just government. Given the current
complexity of major social problems, optimal government decisions are not possible
without more complete and detailed understanding of these social problems. This under-
standing will not be forthcoming without research access to large-scale data sets on indi-
viduals and organizations.
Id; See also New River Media Interview with Kenneth Prewitt, Director, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.pbs.org/finc/interviews/prewitt.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005) (quoting Kenneth
Prewitt, Director U.S. Census Bureau):
I would say that what I would call the nation's number system, good statistics, is critical
to democracy [and] effective governance: How in the world can you govern a compli-
cated industrial, advanced industrial economy or now our new knowledge economy with-
out decent information by those people who have to write the laws and administer the
laws and the programs?
Id.
As former Census Director Kenneth Prewitt has argued: "Information is two-way traffic in
a democracy. It is to help the government know what the people need, and it is to help the people
know if they are getting what they need, otherwise it is all anecdotes, and anecdotes are not good
enough as far as I'm concerned to run a serious democracy." Prewitt also argues that access to data
is essential to the basic workings and responsibilities of a democratic government. According to
Prewitt, "[tihe people who wrote the Constitution had in mind that this society could govern itself
better on the basis of quality information .... If we don't have information on reading scores, if we
don't have information on poverty rates, if we don't have information on health, if we don't
have information, broad-gauged information about what the government is doing, how in the world
do we punish them at election time?" Press Briefing, U.S. Census Bureau, Press Briefing -- April 19,
2000 Director Prewitt (Joined in Progress), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/4-19.html.
11. According to Steven L. Katz:
Transparency is a fundamental issue for democracy and differentiates totalitarian and
democratic societies. When information is not disclosed to the public, government has
failed to exercise the best means of maintaining public trust and dispelling distrust.
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Despite all these misgivings and potential harms, Americans have,
for most of the past century, been willing participants in government data
collection requests. The United States Census, for example, has enjoyed
relatively high compliance rates 12 and other surveys and data projects
have had similar success. 3 The question is why have Americans been
willing to provide information for the past 100 years and will the current
wave of privacy concern affect this willingness?
In this article, we explore the history of government data collection
practices to seek an answer to this riddle. This historical exegesis is not
limited merely to government practices-we also examine the evolution
of statistical societies and, in particular, the varying approaches to statis-
tical practice and ethics they adopt. As we will demonstrate here, the
compliance rates that government surveys and data projects currently
enjoy are not the result of an endemic preference by Americans to reveal
their data to government census officials or data collectors. Instead, the
history of United States statistical practice reveals a progression of gov-
ernment programs seeking to increase the voluntariness and accuracy of
disclosed data by augmenting the trust that individuals have in the gov-
ernment's willingness and ability to use data solely for their intended
purpose.
When government actually is conducted in secret or access to relevant information is de-
nied, then public support for and confidence in the resultant laws and policies is com-
promised.
Steven L. Katz, Transparency in the U.S.: Towards Worldwide Access to Government, THE
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC INQUIRY, Fall/Winter 2001, at 55, 57. See also ALAN CHARLES RAUL,
PRIVACY AND THE DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 22,
40 (2002) ("The first and likely most important benefit of open access to state records is that it facili-
tates representative government."); GEORGE T. DUNCAN, EXPLORING THE TENSION BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND THE SOCIAL BENEFIT OF GOVERNMENTAL DATABASES 7 (2004),
http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/archive/AccessGrid/documents/ExploringtheTension.pdf ("Broad
access to data supports democratic decision-making. Access to government statistical information
supports public policy formulation in areas ranging through demographics, crime, business regula-
tion and development, education, national defense, energy, environment, health, natural resources,
safety, and transportation.").
These widely shared ideals about the virtues of statistics for restraining authoritarian
tendencies within government resulted in a large number of statisticians decrying Attorney General
John Ashcroft's decision to "encourage[] federal agencies to reject requests for documents if there
was any legal basis to do so, promising that the Justice Department would defend them in court....
a stark reversal of the policy set eight years earlier... " Adam Clymer, Government Openness at
Issue as Bush Holds on to Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al.
12. The primary data collection for the 2000 Census was done by mailing out questionnaires
and requesting households to mail back the forms when completed. The final mail return rate, de-
fined to be the number of households returning the form by mail divided by the number of occupied
housing units in mailback areas, was 78% for the 2000 Census. For 1970, 1980, and 1990, the mail
return rates were 87%, 81%, and 75% respectively. HERBERT F. STACKHOUSE AND SARAH BRADY,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 MAIL RETURN RATES: FINAL REPORT 1, 13 (Census 2000
Evaluation A.7.b, 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/A.7.b.pdf.
13. Response rates are often higher for government surveys than for the Decennial Census.
For example, nonresponse rates for the U.S. National Crime Victimization Survey, the National
Health Interview Survey, and the Current Population Survey have all historically been below 10%.
ROBERT M. GROVES & MICK P. COUPER, NONRESPONSE IN HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SURVEYS 160-
61(1998).
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The history of government data collection practices reveals that, in
the earliest years of the country, efforts to enforce compliance through
legal coercion, 14 community policing and shaming, 5 and purely volun-
tary efforts 16 failed. In the face of a non-complying public, the federal
government began to adopt measures to ensure the strict confidentiality
of submitted data.' 7 As we show here, the concept of confidentiality,
although linked in part to an evolving sense of human dignity and enti-
tlement,1 8 was used mainly to encourage citizen compliance with data
collection requests.' 9 Indeed, the concept of confidentiality in law ap-
pears to have been little more than a tool for fostering trust between data
subjects and federal statistical agencies-a trust that submitted data
would only be used for the purposes for which it was originally submit-
ted.2°
Not surprisingly, statistical societies played an important role in fos-
tering respect for confidentiality. Voluntary codes of ethical conduct
stressed the utility of confidentiality in statistical practice, noting that it
increased compliance rates and promoted honest disclosure.2' By the
mid-twentieth century, government practice and statistical ethics enjoyed
a confluence of approaches-legally enforceable confidentiality pledges
coupled with statistical practices to protect individual identity-that re-
sulted in unprecedented compliance rates with disclosure requests. For
more than a century, the view that confidentiality protections enhance
response rates and accuracy has been largely correct and successful in
inducing compliance with data requests.
Throughout the twentieth century, the interplay of legally mandated
privacy and statistical methodology has created a system of statistical
programs that virtually assure individual confidentiality. The result, for
some, is to conclude that "[f]ederal statistics are not about individuals,
[and] therefore they are not about privacy., 22 Such assurances, although
widely correct, ignore recent developments in privacy attitudes that
threaten to undermine the perception and reality of data confidentiality.
As we discuss in more detail in another work, the concepts of confidenti-
ality and privacy are changing in the face of breathtaking new technolo-
gies and data analysis methods and may require reassessment in some
areas. 23 Just as important as these changes, however, are individuals'
14. See infra Part IA.
15. See infra Part IA.
16. See infra Part IA
17. See infra Part IA
18. See generally infra Part I.
19. See infra Part IA.
20. See infra Part 1B.
21. See infra Part LB.
22. Charles W. Holmes, Response To Long Census Form Below '90 Rate, PALM BEACH POST,
April 20, 2000, at 12A (quoting Prewitt).
23. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
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perceptions of the confidentiality of their data and whether promises of
non-disclosure given by the government over the past century remain
sacrosanct. To parallel a famous legal maxim, "it is not enough to assure
confidentiality, we must appear to assure individual confidentiality."
Recent government efforts to increase security in the years since the
events of September 11, 2001 ("9/11") undermine, at a minimum, this
appearance of confidentiality.24
Ultimately, security driven initiatives and actions, although perhaps
laudable for other reasons, may destroy the willingness of individuals to
consent to government data collection requests. Because the willingness
of individuals to provide full and accurate information is central to the
functioning and well-being of democratic government, a better under-
standing of the history of government statistical practice and the history
of statistical societies is, we believe, an important step for avoiding this
disastrous and potential future.
To these ends, the remainder of this article contains three parts.
Part I recounts the development and history of privacy in government
statistical practice. By focusing on legal and agency developments, we
reveal how high cost compliance regimes that sought to coerce citizen
compliance met with resistance and failure.
Part II reviews the rise of statistical societies and the changing na-
ture of their ethical codes of conduct. In this part, we analyze how such
societies, although deeply interested in the privacy and dignity of re-
spondents, quickly seized on confidentiality, and its trust promoting
qualities, as the key to increasing compliance and accuracy.
Part III builds on this historical exegesis, and compares and con-
trasts the privacy approaches of each discipline. Of particular interest is
the contrast between the state's understandable decision to define privacy
in terms of baseline individual rights, and statisticians' view that privacy
is a factor to be considered in a more robust cost-benefit analysis. This
part further notes the legal community's preference for providing post-
disclosure remedies and penalties in contrast to statistics' goal of reduc-
ing privacy risks by engaging in appropriate disclosure practices that
minimize privacy.
I. LAW AND PRIVACY
In this part, we document the rise of confidentiality, privacy, and in-
formed consent in three specific contexts: (A) confidentiality of United
States Census data; (B) the emergence of a "right to be let alone;" and
(C) the rise of "information privacy" and continued threats of secondary
uses. In so doing, we note how American jurisprudence has only re-
24. See id.
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cently concerned itself with questions of privacy. Indeed, the concept of
privacy is barely a century old and has been the subject of legal indiffer-
ence for much of that time. Despite the relative novelty of legally pro-
tected privacy rights, policymakers have long recognized tensions be-
tween society's need for data and individuals' fear of misuse. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these tensions often manifested
themselves in a mistrust of governmental purpose, particularly with re-
gard to participation in the United States Census of Population and the
Census of Manufactures. As the nineteenth and twentieth centuries pro-
gressed, however, government policies addressed these concerns by de-
veloping three distinct legal frameworks: (i) confidentiality of personal
information; (ii) regulatory pledges to avoid secondary unintended uses
of personal information without informed consent; and (iii) enacting
sanctions, if seldom used, to punish government agencies or agents that
breach confidentiality and informed consent requirements.
A. Privacy and the United States Census
The original United States Census, conducted in 1790, was consid-
ered by some to be inaccurate and poorly administered.25  Despite the
simplicity of the survey, consisting of a mere six questions,26 individual
compliance and disclosures were less complete than many had hoped.27
25. According to one commentator, "On every side loud complaints were heard, both of the
results of the census and the methods used. Lunt, infra note 37, at 73. See also HARVEY M.
CHOLDIN, LOOKING FOR THE LAST PERCENT: THE CONTROVERSY OVER CENSUS UNDERCOUNTS 42
(1994).
26. The 1790 Census asked respondents to disclose: (1) name of head of family, (2) number
of free white males over sixteen, (3) number of free white males under 16, (4) number of free white
females, (5) number of other free persons, and (6) number of slaves. MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE
AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 14 (1988). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, DECENNIAL CENSUS: OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL CENSUS ISSUES
8-9 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98103.pdf [hereinafter Decennial
Census]. Note that in 1790 no forms were provided to enumerators: the marshals submitted their
results in a form convenient for themselves, and this led to non-uniform reporting of results.
ANDERSON, supra.
27. Substantial disagreement continues to revolve around the claim that the 1790 Census
resulted in an undercount of U.S. citizens. Compare WRIGHT & HUNT, infra note 35, at 16-17 (not-
ing widespread belief that 1790 consensus resulted in a substantial undercount), The Special Com-
mittee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, The Undercount of the Census, 36 REC. ASS'N
BAR CITY N.Y. 24 (1981) and Lunt, infra note 37; with Frederick G. Bohme & David M. Pemberton,
Privacy and Confidentiality in the U.S. Censuses-A History 2 (1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author), Jeffrey S. Crampton, Comment, Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics: Dispelling Some
Myths Surrounding the United States Census, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 71, 71 (1990), and HYMAN
ALTERMAN, COUNTING PEOPLE: THE CENSUS IN HISTORY 205 (1969) ("Were the census results
really so inaccurate? Probably not.").
Whether the 1790 Census undercounted Americans in any substantial way or not, the
reasons why some chose not to participate in the census were varied. Some chose not to participate
in the census based on Biblical concerns. According to 2 Samuel 24, King David's stubborn insis-
tence on a census for conscription purposes resulted in a plague. See Bohme & Pemberton, infra note
44 (noting that in the first census and occasionally after that, some people opposed the census on
religious grounds.). Others feared the misuse of census data to impose government taxes. See
sources cited infra note 29. However, there is little evidence that any resistance to the census was
based on privacy concerns. See ALTERMAN, at 205; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS
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Although inaccuracies may have been caused by numerous factors, some
viewed individual unwillingness to participate out of fear of government
abuse of information as one cause.28 President Washington, for his part,
attributed the public's reticence to an "apprehension that [the census]
was intended as the foundation of a tax."
29
The fear of secondary uses, grounded in an abiding mistrust of gov-
ernmental purpose, 30 has been a long-standing obstacle to willing partici-
pation and disclosure in statistical studies.3' In the earliest years, United
States officials ignored the underlying problem of mistrust and, instead,
focused their efforts on coercing compliance. Congress adopted a simple
strategy for increasing compliance-substantial penalties were imposed
on individuals for failing to comply with census takers.32 No rules or
procedures were employed to ensure that data would be kept confidential
or otherwise used appropriately by the census takers or the government.33
This coercive system is illustrative of early federal statistical practice-a
general lack of concern for privacy or confidentiality and a view that
coercive tactics were the best way to assure citizen compliance.
The early census not only sought compliance and accuracy through
coercive fines, but it also employed a form of community policing. Be-
tween 1790 and 1840, census results were posted in "two of the most
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY: 1790 - 2002 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/conmono2.pdf [hereinafter Census Confidentiality]. For a
more general discussion of citizens' unwillingness to participate, see CHOLDIN, supra note 25, at 42
(noting that individuals refused to participate in the census on religious and other grounds).
28. See generally MARGO ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FEINBERG, THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST
AMERICAN CENSUS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE OF CENSUSTAKING: REPORT OF A
WORKSHOP, 11-12 (1999), http://lib.stat.cmu.edu/-fienberg/DonnerReports/FirstCensus.pdf.
29. Washington and others also believed that non-participation was motivated by various
concerns. See generally ALTERMAN, supra note 27, at 204-05. See also Davis, infra note 36, at 2
("[T]he problems of communication and travel . . . must have been a contributing factor [to the
undercount]. The suspicion that census data would be used in levying future taxes may also have
played a role in the reluctance of some citizens to cooperate.").
30. For a general discussion of the rise of American mistrust of government, see GARY
WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT (1999); Gary
Orren, Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST
GOVERNMENT 77, 81 (Joseph S. Nye et al., eds., 1997) (detailing the "mounting disillusionment"
since the 1950s).
31. The issue has been raised, most recently and forcefully, in Freedom of Information Act
requests for information gleaned from the census and other administrative surveys. See generally
Michael Hoefges, et al., Privacy Rights Versus FO1A Disclosure Policy: The "Uses And Effects"
Double Standard In Access To Personally-Identifiable Information In Government Records, 12 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS J. 1 (2003) (discussing the evolution of legal doctrine as it relates to derivative
uses of information taken from the U.S. Census); Jeffrey D. Zimmerman, United States Department
of State v. Ray: The Distorted Application of the Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption
to Repatriated Haitian Migrants, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 385 (1993).
32. In 1790, individuals who refused to participate in the census or cooperate with census-
takers could be fined $20. See ALTERMAN, supra note 27, at 195; DAN HALACY, CENSUS: 190
YEARS OF COUNTING AMERICA 33 (1980). Over time, these penalties were increased. Id at 144-45.
33. Penalties were imposed, however, for marshals or assistants who either failed to make
returns or falsified data. See Lunt, infra note 37, at 72 ("A penalty of $200 was prescribed .... ).
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public places" within each enumeration district.34  These acts imposed
duties on all marshals to publicly post all returns in order, ostensibly, to
provide individuals the opportunity to review their forms for accuracy.
Just as important, however, as a second chance at accuracy was the hope
that public posting would allow others in the community to note who
either failed to file a return or did so inaccurately or falsely.35 Through
public posting of returns, census regulators sought to shame non-
participants through public exposure and, ostensibly, to discover poten-
tial mistakes. 36 The zeal to garner complete and correct data drove these
early measures-not privacy or confidentiality grounded in any nascent
individual right.37
As the century progressed, and despite some initial success, the
government's compliance campaign ran into renewed opposition. By the
mid-nineteenth century, individual compliance was faltering and inaccu-
racies in the census were unacceptable.38 Blame was partly directed to
abuses of census data by various officials suspected of exposing survey
results for personal gain, curiosity, or respondent embarrassment. 39 Fur-
ther exacerbating privacy concerns was Congress' insistence that the
34. JASON G. GAUTHIER, MEASURING AMERICA: THE DECENNIAL CENSUSES FROM 1790 TO
2000 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/polO2marv-ptl.pdf. See e.g., Act of Mar. 1,
1790, 2 Stat. 101 (providing United States census standards). In addition to the public posting re-
quirements, enumerators were also, under penalty of law, required to file copies of all census sched-
ules with clerks of the district courts for acceptance and presentation to the grand jury. Id at 102. A
fine of $200 for assistants was imposed for such failures while the marshals were liable for $800 for
each violation. Id.
35. See CARROLL D. WRIGHT & WILLIAM C. HUNT, THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF THE
UNITED STATES CENSUS, S. DOC. No. 56-194, at 926-27 (1st Sess., 1900) (Census enumerators were
to "cause a correct copy, signed by himself, of the schedule, containing the number of inhabitants,
within his division, to be set up at two of the most public places within the same, there to remain for
the inspection of all concerned .... ).
36. Posting of census results not only served to stigmatize those who did not respond but also
allowed data respondents to conduct their own error checks-a result clearly envisioned by the
Census Act's authors. Timothy Pickering, the main author of the 1800 revisions to the original act,
believed that public posting of census results that identified individuals helped correct errors in the
census: "[It] appears to be that if any of the inhabitants discover errors in the enumerations, they may
be made known to the assistant; and the naming of the heads of families will render the detection of
errors practicable." Robert C. Davis, Confidentiality and the Census: 1790-1929,
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/appenc.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2005) (citing
TIMOTHY PICKERING, CIRCULAR TO MARSHALS, (April 30, 1800), in PICKERING PAPERS). See also
Census Confidentiality, supra note 27.
37. See generally Edward C. Lunt, History of the United States Census, I PUB. AM. STAT.
ASS'N 90 (1888). As stated in a more recent article:
If the framers of the U.S. Constitution thought that the census might be viewed as an in-
trusion on personal privacy or foresaw any need to keep census data confidential, their
misgivings were not evident when they approved Article 1, section 2, providing for a de-
cennial census.
Census Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 1. See also Davis, supra note 36 ("[T]hese requirements
involved disclosure, but apparently the confidentiality issue was not raised. Given the few facts
contained in the schedule, all of which were common knowledge locally, it is probable that most
citizens did not perceive the public posting of census results as an invasion of privacy.").
38. See Davis, supra note 36 (discussing discourse among the populace and government
following the act for the census of 1840).
39. See id (detailing the importance of confidentiality as matters of private life increasingly
became subjects of census questions).
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subject matter of the census increase beyond mere head-counting.4 ° Over
time, the limitations of the initial surveys were improved to provide fur-
ther information to government policymakers. 4' The increase in ques-
tions and the rise of individual mistrust of government uses of data led to
the first frameworks for assuring the confidentiality of census data. As a
result, by the mid-nineteenth century, various directives were issued or-
dering that census data be kept strictly confidential.42 Stopping short of
legal penalties against violators, the policy by 1850 was clear:
40. By 1850, the census not only included detailed questions involving manufacturing and
commerce (which had been included, off and on, in censuses as early as 1810) but detailed informa-
tion including:
The schedule for the free population would list every inhabitant by name, giving, in addi-
tion, sex, age, color, nativity, place of birth, marital status, literacy, real estate ownership,
and information as to whether the individual was deaf, dumb, blind, insane, idiotic, or a
pauper or convict. The slave schedule was less inclusive, but more detailed than ever be-
fore. A mortality schedule listed by name all who had died in the preceding year, with
personal and medical details included.
See Davis, supra note 36. As a result of the increase in reported data and their sensitivity, the re-
quirement of public posting was finally abrogated in 1850. See id.
41. Despite its practical limitation, the census was viewed, from its inception, as an invaluable
tool to "enable [Congress] to adapt the public measures to the particular circumstances of the com-
munity .... [And] to make proper a provision for the agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing
interests ...in due proportion." I ANNALS OF CONG. 1115 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwaclink.htmil (follow "Browse the Annals" hyperlink; then
follow "1st 1789-91" hyperlink; then follow "1st session" hyperlink listed under "House"; then enter
"1115" in the box).
42. As noted earlier, census instructions issued in conjunction with each taking of the Census
of the Population and, when it was administered, the Census of Manufactures had not, prior to the
mid-nineteenth century, included any provisions for the confidentiality of census data. Indeed, a
review of the 1820 instructions, for example, reveals that census-takers were more focused on the
legal obligation of individuals to provide census information (while noting the sensitivity of com-
mercial data). According to the 1820 instructions:
[Census takers] will be careful to observe an important distinction between the in-
quiries directly necessary to the enumeration, and those relating to manufactures;
they will see that.., each and every free person... is obliged to render.., a true
account.., upon a penalty of $20; but as the act lays no positive injunction upon
any individual to furnish information upon the situation of his property, or his pri-
vate concerns, the answers to all inquiries of that character must be altogether vol-
untary, and every one, to whom they are put or addressed, will be at liberty to de-
cline answering them at all.
John Quincy Adams, Instructions to Marshals-Census of 1820, reprinted in WRIGHT & HUNT,
supra note 35, at 136. The 1830 instructions included identical language regarding individuals'
requirement to provide legal assistance on the Census of the Population. See Martin Van Buren,
Instructions to Marshals-Census of 1830, reprinted in WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 140-41.
By 1840, however, issues of confidentiality had begun to creep into the instructions.
According to the 1840 instructions:
Objections, it has been suggested, may possibly arise on the part of some persons
to give the statistical information required by the act, upon the ground of disincli-
nation to expose their private affairs. Such, however, is not the intent, nor can be
the effect, of answering ingenuously the interrogatories. On the statistical tables no
name is inserted-the figures stand opposite no man's name; and therefore the ob-
jection can not apply. It is, moreover, inculcated upon the assistant that he consider
all communications made to him in the performance of this duty, relative to the
business of the people, as strictly confidential.
Instructions to Marshals-Census of 1840, reprinted in WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 145. As
we can see, by 1840 the census was already contemplating two modem notions of privacy and con-
fidentiality. First, that private information would be kept confidential through statistical methods (in
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[A]ll marshals and assistants are expected to consider the facts in-
trusted [sic] to them as if obtained exclusively for the use of the Gov-
ernment, and not to be used in any way to the gratification of curios-
ity, the exposure of any man's business or pursuits, or for the private
emolument of the marshals or assistants, who, while employed in this
service, act as the agents of the Government in the most confidential
capacity.
43
The primary concern for the confidentiality of information in 1850, how-
ever, was disclosing sensitive information about business or property, not
individual information. 44 Despite this admonition, disclosure of census
information was not criminalized until decades later.45 Public posting of
information, however, was soon abolished and, from 1850 on, census
records were considered "confidential" pursuant to administrative pol-
icy.
46
Over the next few decades, however, it appears that census agents
were failing to abide by this policy. In 1870, the Census Office was re-
quired, once again, to reiterate its policy that "No graver offense can be
committed by Assistant Marshals than to divulge information acquired in
the discharge of their duty. All disclosures should be treated as strictly
confidential .... The Department is determined to protect the citizen in
all his rights in the present Census. ' ' 7 One of the chief proponents of the
increased rules for confidentiality, Representative James A. Garfield,
summed up the concern that individuals were not properly protected
from secondary uses: "[t]he citizen is not adequately protected from the
danger, or rather the apprehension, that his private affairs, the secrets of
his family and his business, will be disclosed to his neighbors.
'A8
Still unwilling to criminalize improper disclosures, the Census Of-
fice escalated its attempts to ensure confidentiality by requiring newly
minted "census enumerators''9 to swear to maintain the confidentiality of
this early instance, merely insisting that names did not appear next to data) and, second, that those
charged with gathering the information would keep all data confidential.
43. The author of the circular was disturbed by the fact that:
Information has been received at this office that in some cases unnecessary exposure has
been made by the assistant marshals with reference to the business and pursuits, and other
facts relating to individuals, merely to gratify curiosity, or the facts applied to the private
use or pecuniary advantage of the assistant, to the injury of others. Such a use of the re-
turns was neither contemplated by the act itself nor justified by the intentions and designs
of those who enacted the law. No individual employed under sanction of the Government
to obtain these facts has a right to promulgate or expose them without authority.
WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 150 (quoting Thomas MacKennan, Circular to the United States
Marshals and Assistants (1850)).
44. See Bohme & Pemberton, supra note 27, at 5-6.
45. See Davis, supra note 36.
46. See id.
47. WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 156.
48. House Comm. on the Ninth Census, H.R. Rep. No. 41-3, at 49 (1870).
49. By legislative fiat, for the 1880 Census, local officials designated "census enumerators"
were selected to administer the surveys replacing United States Marshals in that regard. See Census
Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 7.
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all individually-identifiable census data.50  As these requirements were
still, apparently, insufficient and Congress finally criminalized disclo-
sures in 1890,5' further expanding the civil and criminal penalties over
the ensuing years: 2 What should be remembered, of course, is that for
all of these censuses, citizens could not legally protect their own privacy
by withholding information-legal sanctions continued to make non-
compliance a matter of criminal law, a policy that remains in place to this
day.
53
50. WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 937. See also Census Confidentiality, supra note 27,
at 8. The Instructions to Enumerators in the 1880 Census told enumerators "to use great courtesy and
consideration. A rude peremptory, or overbearing demeanor, would not only be a wrong to the
families visited, but would work an injury to the census by rendering the members of those families
less disposed to give information with fullness and exactness." GAUTHIER, supra note 34, at 18. The
1880 Census Instructions thus linked public trust with compliance and accuracy, noting that although
participation in the census was required by law, "[e]numerators will, however, do well not unneces-
sarily to obtrude the compulsory feature of the enumeration .... With the high degree of popular
intelligence here existing, the importance of statistical information is very generally appreciated; and
if the enumerator enters upon his work in a right spirit, he will generally meet with a favorable and
even cordial response." Id. at 18-19.
51. Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 319, § § 8, 13, 25 Stat. 760 (1889) (current version at 13 U.S.C. §
214 (2005) (imposing $5,000 fine on enumerators).
52. According to 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (2005):
(a) Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of Com-
merce or bureau or agency thereof, or local government census liaison, may, except as
provided in section 8 or 16 or chapter 10 of this title or section 210 of the Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998 or section 2(t) of the Census of Agriculture Act of 1997-
1. use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any purpose other
than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied; or
2. make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment or
individual under this title can be identified; or
3. permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Department or bu-
reau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.
53. Although these legal sanctions are rarely applied to nonrespondents, there is evidence that
a reminder that a response is required by law increases the rate of compliance to requests for data
from the census and other mandatory surveys. At the request of Congress (spurred in part by con-
cers about privacy), the Census Bureau tested the effect of different wordings in the letter request-
ing participation and on the envelope sent to persons selected to participate in the mandatory Ameri-
can Community Survey. Persons randomly selected to receive the "mandatory" reminder were sent a
letter saying:
Please take about 40 minutes of your time to assist your community greatly by complet-
ing and mailing back your copy of the American Community Survey, as required by law.
We are conducting this survey under the authority of Title 13, United States Code, sec-
tions 141-193, and 221. That same law protects your privacy. Section 9 requires us to
keep all information about you and your household strictly confidential. We may use this
information only for statistical purposes. In addition, Title 13 imposes severe criminal
sanctions if any U.S. Census Bureau employee violates those provisions. Title 13 also
imposes penalties for not responding to the American Community Survey.
DEBORAH H. GRIFFIN ET AL., MEETING 21 ST CENTURY DEMOGRAPHIC DATA NEEDS-
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY. REPORT 3: TESTING THE USE OF VOLUNTARY
METHODS 6, 18 app. 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/
Report03.pdf.
Other persons in the study-the "voluntary" group--were sent a letter saying: "The U.S.
Census Bureau chose your address, not you personally, as part of a randomly selected sample. The
Census Bureau is required by U.S. law to keep your answers confidential. Your participation in the
survey is important; however, you may decline to answer any or all questions." When the voluntary
survey was used, mail response rates dropped by more than twenty percentage points. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
These views were not couched in a rhetoric of individual rights. In-
stead, their motivations appear to have been grounded in a desire to in-
crease the accuracy and amount of data acquired. Accomplished by crea-
tion of a nascent trust regime, the actions of these early legislators to
force compliance slowly gave way to measures intended to induce
greater voluntary compliance through promises, pledges, and eventually
legal rules that punished those who breached such trust based measures.
These measures, combined with new technologies introduced in the
1890s, streamlined the census process and, at least in part, provided a
greater level of data security5 4 and further worked to build a trust-regime
around the taking, administration, and keeping of the census.
Interestingly, questions of industrial statistics seem to have spurred
greater acknowledgment of privacy concerns. First conducted in 1810,
the Census of Manufacturers (whether as separate form or additional
questions as part of the Census of Population) sought to gather informa-
tion on occupations, income, and other vital statistics necessary, as
President Martin Van Buren later noted, to "exhibit a full view of the
pursuits, industry, education and resources of the country... .,55 Despite
the statistical importance of this information, officials, including John
Quincy Adams, believed disclosure must be voluntary arguing that,
"some individuals will feel reluctant to give all the information desired..
S. ,56 Adams's view appears motivated by the nature of such informa-
tion-the view that some information was more sensitive than others-
an approach that, over time, would become a cornerstone of American
privacy law.
57
Despite paying some lip service to the idea that industrial statistics
were more sensitive and, therefore, deserving of greater privacy, most
objections followed a familiar pattern. Most clearly evinced an abiding
mistrust of the uses of the data, rather than a view that such information
was inherently private. Some critics objected to the census because the
information gathered might be used for other programs: "Is this federal
prying into the domestic economy of the people a precursor to direct
taxes? Is nothing to escape its inquisitors or its tax-gatherers? Is it worthy
of the dignity and high functions of the federal government to pursue
54. See JOEL SHURKIN, ENGINES OF THE MIND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER FROM
MAINFRAMES TO MICROPROCESSORS 78 (1996).
55. WRIGHT & HUNT, supra note 35, at 36.
56. Id. at 136 (quoting John Quincy Adams). A late nineteenth century writer noted that:
Much of the value of any census must come from the sympathetic co-operation [sic] of
the people examined; and in the first half of this century information was given much
more reluctantly than now. No penalty was attached in 1840 to a refusal to comply with
the requirements of the industrial investigation; and in some cases the people refused
point-blank to answer the inquiries of the census-taker.
Lunt, supra note 37, at 82.
57. See infra Part IC.
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such petty investigations? ' 58 Fears of prying, and a felt-right to avoid the
prying eyes of government and others, would soon launch the first
wave59 of legislated privacy.
In the end, the view that the United States Census could be adminis-
tered through coercion and force was a clear failure. As the century pro-
gressed, concepts of confidentiality and prohibitions on secondary uses
were gradually made part of the regulatory framework of conducting the
census. Over time, these initial pragmatic steps would become en-
sconced in law through the emerging right to privacy. In the end, how-
ever, the conduct of the United States Census has always reflected the
balance between disclosure and confidentiality. As the Supreme Court
noted in Baldrige v. Shapiro60 nearly 100 years after confidentiality was
first guaranteed for census participants: "Although Congress has broad
power to require individuals to submit responses, an accurate census
depends in large part on public cooperation. To stimulate that coopera-
tion Congress has provided assurances that information furnished ... by
individuals is to be treated as confidential.'
B. The Right to be Let Alone
As the United States government was cajoling the citizenry into full
and honest participation in censuses, others became increasingly con-
vinced that some information was inherently private. Individual privacy
was emerging as an important social and legal issue throughout the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century.62 The last two decades, in particular,
witnessed the development of new privacy-invasive technologies, such
as the portable camera, that gave rise to calls for the legal protection of
individual privacy.63
This nascent privacy movement was given its most articulate and
forceful support through the work of two jurists, Louis Brandeis and
58. See JAMES D. B. DEBOW, STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES: BEING A
COMPENDIUM OF THE SEVENTH CENSUS 12 (Richard E. Easterlin et al. eds., Gordon & Breach,
Science Publishers, Inc. 1970) (1854).
59. See infra Part lB.
60. 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
61. Baldridge, 455 U.S. at 354.
62. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335 (1992);
Thomas H. O'Connor, The Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS. L.Q. 101, 102
(1968); DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 113-249 (1972). Other areas of
law were expanding the zones of privacy beyond traditional notions of eavesdropping and home
entry prohibitions. For example, Congress passed a law in 1825 making it a crime for a post office
employee to open another's mail. See 42 U.S.C. § 1702 (1825), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1703
(2005).
63. Attribution for the coining the term "right to be let alone" is generally given to Judge
Cooley who, in his work years prior to that of Warren and Brandeis, made reference to the phrase,
"to be let alone," which he described as a right of personal immunity. See THOMAS M. COOLEY,
COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). See also DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881)
(holding that woman had "right to the privacy of her apartment" during childbirth that "the law
secures" against attempts by defendant to enter).
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Samuel D. Warren. 64 Upset at the erosion of personal privacy caused by
newspaper reporting 65 and photography, 66 these two lawyers penned
what is generally considered one of the "most influential law review arti-
cles of all."67 In this article they articulated what has become the basis of
much privacy law in the United States-the right "to be let alone. 6 8
Although Brandeis and Warren's ideal of privacy contained elements of
elitism and privilege, the basic notion that individuals possessed a right
to be let alone soon became law.
Within a decade, judicial opinions began to recognize a right to pri-
vacy,69 and legislation 70 and state constitutional7 1 approval soon fol-
lowed. By the mid-twentieth century, this initially academic right was
protected through four distinct torts:72 (i) false light;73 (ii) misappropria-
64. See Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMp. PROBS. 326 (1966).
65. According to Daniel Solove: "In the second latter half of the 19th century, newspapers
were the most rapidly growing type of media. Circulation of newspapers rose about 1000% from
1850 and 1890, from 100 newspapers with 800,000 readers in 1850 to 900 papers with over 8 mil-
lion readers by 1890." DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW 10 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--445181 (follow "Stanford Law School" hyper-
link to download pdf document).
66. The rise of portable, "instant" cameras was of great concern to Warren and Brandeis and,
as they argued, upset the prior balance of consent, trust, and contract that previously protected indi-
viduals against such intrusions:
While, for instance, the state of the photographic art was such that one's picture could
seldom be taken without his consciously "sitting" for the purpose, the law of contract or
of trust might afford the prudent man sufficient safeguards against the improper circula-
tion of his portrait; but since the latest advanced in photographic art have rendered it pos-
sible to take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate
to support the required protection.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193,211 (1890).
67. See Kalven, supra note 64, at 327.
68. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 195.
69. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (holding that use
of a photograph and name in an advertisement constituted an invasion of privacy). But see Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's
likeness in advertising without permission was not actionable under New York common law).
70. For example, in 1899, the California legislature amended its libel statute to include publi-
cation of a person in a newspaper or book, and other media, without consent. DON R. PEMBER,
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 64 (1972). See
also Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (N.Y. Civ. Rts §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1988)) (prohibiting the use of a person's name or likeness without consent when used
in advertisements or trade publications and passed in reaction to the Roberson decision cited supra
note 69).
71. The earliest mention of privacy-related rights in state constitutions may be found in the
original Washington and Arizona constitutions, adopted in the early 20th century. See WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law."); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (employing identical language as Washington). Admit-
tedly, these provisions only weakly relate to a concept of privacy as Warren and Brandeis intended.
It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that numerous states amended their constitutions to
include specific rights of privacy. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
72. Identification and naming of these torts is attributed to Prosser. See generally, William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
73. See Neil B. Hayes & Douglas J. Sylvester, The Law of Online Privacy, in BUSINESS LAW
& THE INTERNET § 15.20 (Michael B. Simon et al., eds. 2002):
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tion;74 (iii) public disclosure of private facts;75 and (iv) intrusion upon
seclusion.76
Each of these bases for protection, however, was largely inapplica-
ble against government data collection efforts. 77 On one hand were vari-
ous legally mandated data collection efforts, such as the census and tax
returns. On the other, torts do not protect information once disclosed,
providing little protection against secondary uses.78 Finally, government
bureaucracies increasingly made data disclosures by citizens nearly im-
possible to avoid, even where legal sanctions were inapplicable.
As the twentieth century progressed, individuals' increasing interac-
tion with government, through Social Security, driver's licenses, and
numerous other administrative iterations, led to an increasing amount of
personal data falling into the hands of government administrators.
79
These disclosures are voluntary in only the strictest sense of the word as
"[i]ndividuals cannot reasonably avoid many government transactions,
like getting a driver's license. 80 In addition to increasing government
collection practices, private data collection ventures multiplied including
the founding and proliferation of numerous commercial and personal
credit rating institutions.81 As the amount of data in governmental and
To prevail on a claim of false light, a plaintiff must generally prove a publication made
with actual malice that places the plaintiff in a false light and that is highly offensive to a
reasonable person.... [T]he false light tort requires a showing of actual malice or that
the defendant either "knowingly" or "recklessly" disseminated such false information.
74. Id. at § 15.21 ("To prevail on a misappropriation claim, a plaintiff must generally prove
that the defendant appropriated the defendant's name, likeness, or other image and used it for some
commercial gain or advantage.").
75. Id. at § 15.22 ("[T]he elements of a public disclosure claim are a public disclosure of
private facts that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
76. Id. at § 15.23 ("The elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion are (a) an intrusion
into an area in which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy and (b) that the intrusion is
highly offensive to the reasonable person.").
77. See, e.g., id at § 15.24.
78. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitu-
tion, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1176 (2002) ("One of the longstanding conceptions of privacy is that it
involves secrecy and is lost once information is disclosed.") [hereinafter Solove, Access].
79. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 605-18 (1977) available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report (noting how the
adoption of a national social security number was necessary to provide the means for government to
track social security benefits for individuals). See also Eric Grossman, Conceptualizing National
Identification: Informational Privacy Rights Protected, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1007, 1009-10
(1986).
80. Id.
81. Equifax, for example, was founded in 1899. Dun & Bradstreet and Moody's, two highly
influential commercial credit rating companies, were founded in the mid-nineteenth century and rose
to prominence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Jeffrey S. Adler, Capital and
Entrepreneurship in the Great West, 25 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 189, 194 (1994); RICHARD SYLLA, A
HISTORICAL PRIMER ON THE BUSINESS OF CREDIT RATINGS 2, 8 (2001),
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/HistoricalPrimer.pdf.
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private hands increased, new legal protections for privacy and informa-
tion control crept into the law.
8 2
C. Information Privacy
Tort-based privacy ultimately proved too limited to preserve both
the privacy of individual data and the trust and willingness of individuals
to provide that data. By the 1960s, the development of new data storage,
linking, and mining technologies greatly increased both the need for
more data and potential for abuse.8 3 In turn, individuals became increas-
ingly concerned about "the condition of not having undocumented per-
sonal information about oneself known by others."8 4 Public unease with
emergent capabilities was aggravated by numerous high-profile abuses of
government-held data. 85 These factors ultimately led to a second wave
of privacy law concerned, chiefly, with the protection of personal infor-
mation.
This second wave of privacy was largely sparked by journalistic and
academic writings detailing governmental data abuses and aggressive
surveillance by law enforcement in the 1970s.8 6 By the mid-I 970s, jour-
nalists and other commentators had uncovered and substantiated a cul-
ture of widespread lawlessness and surveillance by the FBI, CIA and
other governmental agencies.8 7 Revelations that successive administra-
tions had increased the surveillance budgets and activities of numerous
federal agencies, including illegal wiretaps of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
and other public figures,88 greatly increased fears of an imminent "Big
Brother." Fears of surveillance soon combined with fears about misuse
of collected data. As part of these larger surveillance efforts, it soon
became clear that government agencies were also combing through pub-
lic data files from the IRS and others.8 9 In addition, increasing attention
was being paid to the effect that financial credit data, controlled and dis-
82. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability
for Intrusion in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1044-54 (1995); Diane L. Zimmerman, Req-
uiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
291, 297 (1983).
83. William A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 287-88
(1983).
84. Id. at 269.
85. MORTON H. HALPERIN, ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 1-12 (1976); VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 229-51 (1964).
86. For one of the first and most influential writings giving rise to increased public attention
towards privacy concerns see PACKARD, supra note 85 (examining the rise of credit bureaus and
financial profiling); see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); JERRY ROSENBERG,
THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969); ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE
SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRIVACY (1972) (detailing rising public privacy
concerns using survey data); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
87. See, e.g., HALPERIN, supra note 85 at 1; ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:
COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 125-68 (1971).
88. See, e.g., WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 140-42 (1998).
89. See generally HALPERIN, supra note 85.
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seminated through various credit bureau companies, could have on nu-
merous areas of life.90
The United States' tentative steps towards stronger privacy laws
were deeply affected by events in Europe. Increasing controversy over
data-privacy programs in Europe, including disturbing revelations about
Nazi Germany's use of census data to locate and exterminate German
Jews, 91 led to an increased interest in constraining both government data-
collection and usage practices and, in particular, to a backlash against
comprehensive government databases.92 The fight in Europe against
national identity cards, censuses, and other statistical databases was
widely reported in the United States. Within the United States, the pri-
vacy debates spurred by the Watergate scandal and the Church privacy
hearings 93 were also reaching a fever pitch.
The result of these revelations was twofold. First, there was a sub-
stantial breakdown in trust between individuals and government data
collectors. Various polling data from the period demonstrate how pri-
vacy fears and mistrust blossomed in this period of government intru-
siveness. 94 These polls, first conducted in 1968 and then again in 1974-
78 asked whether individuals felt that "sometimes your sense of privacy
is being invaded or not-that people are trying to find out things that are
not any of their business." 95 Nearly two-thirds of those who responded
90. See PACKARD, supra note 85, at 168-82.
91. See generally J. ADAM TOOZE, STATISTICS AND THE GERMAN STATE, 1900-1945: THE
MAKING OF MODERN ECONOMIC KNOWLEDGE 36-37 (2001). Jutta Wietog documented changes in
the Census Act during the Third Reich: while the German Census Act of 1933 stated the obligation
to maintain secrecy and allowed the data to be used only for statistical purposes, the 1939 Census
Act "no longer mentioned the obligation to maintain secrecy" and permitted the data to be used
"only for the specialpurposes of the census. But these special purposes were not defined anywhere."
Jutta Wietog, German Official Statistics in the Third Reich With Respect to Population Statistics,
Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute (2003), available at http://www.isi-
2003.de/guest/3601 .pdfMltabObj=pcoabstract%26MIcolObj=uploadpaper%/o26MInamObj=id%26
MlvalObj=360 l%26MItypeObj=application/pdf (paper presented at the 54th Session of the Interna-
tional Statistical Institutes, Aug. 15, 2003). The 1939 Census asked specifically about Jewish ances-
try. Id.
92. See generally William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers: The Role
of Population Data Systems in Human Rights Abuses, 68 SOCIAL RESEARCH 481 (2001).
93. See Thomas S. Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United States:
Beyond the Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT
BALANCE 33, 34 (2003), available at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/opengov/ ("Only after
Watergate and Vietnam, when Congress finally investigated the intelligence agencies, did the
American public learn" of government data abuses and cover-ups). Reports prepared by the Church
Committee are available at Paul Wolf, Cointelpro, http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/
cointel.htm. See also Alice Robbin, The Loss Of Personal Privacy and Its Consequences for Social
Research, 28 J. OF GOV'T INFO. 493 (2001). According to Robbin:
During the 1970s, public anxiety was a catalyst for legislative hearings, the enactment of
federal and state statutes, and implementation of administrative policies, regulations, and
guidelines to safeguard privacy and create enforceable expectations of confidentiality for
personal information that was collected by government, financial institutions, and the so-
cial research community.
Id. at 494.
94. Robbin, supra note 93, at 495-97.
95. Harris Poll #1815 (Mar. 1968), cited in id. at 495.
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in 1968 did not feel that their privacy was being invaded.96 By 1974-78,
as the actions of government unfolded, the responses changed dramati-
cally, with 80% in 1974 and 98% in 1978 responding that they did feel
their privacy was under threat.
97
The United States scandals and European abuses also led to a judi-
cial and legislative backlash. During the 1960s and 1970s few, if any,
laws existed to curb government excesses. Wiretap surveillance, al-
though circumscribed in part by early statutes, 98 was largely unregulated
and, indeed, subject to the administration's view that "national security"
overrode other obligations to refrain from surveillance activities.99 As a
result, various judicial opinions and, finally, legislative enactments, were
promulgated to protect individuals against government intrusions via
wiretapping and other technologies. 100  In addition to these anti-
surveillance measures, various laws were proposed to protect data held
by federal agencies and private financial and medical entities.
Unlike most European countries, the United States did not enact a
comprehensive privacy regime, choosing instead to: (i) protect the pri-
vacy of data and records held by the federal government; and (ii) protect
privately held financial and medical data. Among the numerous regula-
tions and statutory enactments of this period are: (i) the Federal Privacy
Act of 1974 ("Privacy Act"); 01 (ii) the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA");'0 2 (iii) the Family Educational Right to Privacy Act
96. Robbin, supra note 93, at 495-96.
97. According to Robbin:
By the mid-1970s, however, the Watergate Affair and the Nixon Administration's highly
publicized wiretapping and surveillance activities radically altered Americans' assess-
ment of the importance of personal privacy. Between March 1974 and April 1978,
Americans became very concerned about privacy in their personal life, with between
90% and 97% in March 1974 (Harris Poll #7481) and June 1976 (Harris Poll #7684), re-
spectively, rating privacy as "very important" in their personal life. However, by April
1978 (Harris Poll #7804), the percentage of respondents who ranked privacy as "very
important" declined to 79%.
Id.
98. Federal Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1996) ("[N]o person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the exis-
tence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person."). The Supreme Court in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1957), restricted the scope
of § 605 to prohibit only the disclosure of tapped communications-not the wiretaps themselves.
99. See generally John Podesta & Peter Swire, Speaking Out About Wiretaps, WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 2002, at A23.
100. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (striking down Alabama statute that
attempted to force the NAACP to disclose its members' names); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967) (holding that wiretap of defendant's phone-booth telephone calls violated defen-
dant's "reasonable expectation of privacy"); Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2002) (generally referred to as the "Wiretapping Act", this enactment
greatly curtailed the ability of government to engage in wiretaps without warrants).
101. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2004)) [hereinafter Privacy Act].
102. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002), amended by Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendment of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-23 1, 110 Stat. 3048 to 3054 [hereinafter
FOIA].
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("FERPA");' °3 (iv) the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"); 1°4 and (v)
regulations governing social security, employment, education, health,
and other records. 05 These enactments, although substantially improv-
ing the privacy and confidentiality of federally controlled and other sen-
sitive data, did not achieve all that privacy advocates had hoped. Instead,
these measures sought to retain the balance between access and privacy
set up during prior regimes by emphasizing trust-promoting measures
that penalized post-collection disclosures and set out guidelines for ap-
propriate data disclosures. The privacy regime set up at the end of the
second privacy wave focused on three main goals: (i) assuring individu-
als that government-held data would not be used for secondary purposes
without permission; (ii) securing privacy as an individual right to be
overcome only by showings of substantial countervailing need; and (iii)
providing a check on unrestrained government by opening up databases
and practices to public scrutiny. 10 6 These three goals, as well as the lim-
103. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2002); 34 CFR §
99 (2004) [hereinafter FERPA].
104. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-81x (2004) [hereinafter FCRA].
105. For example, regulations governing the disclosure of personal information by the Internal
Revenue Service echo those of the more general Privacy Act-although not enacted until 1976-
including provisions regarding the publication of statistical studies. "No publication or other disclo-
sure of statistics or other information required or authorized [by various provisions] shall in any
manner permit the statistics, study, or any information so published, furnished, or otherwise dis-
closed to be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.
I.R.C. § 6108(c) (2004). See also I.R.C. § 6103 (2005) (making tax returns and information confi-
dential and prohibiting disclosures without specific Congressional authorization); I.R.C. § 7431
(2004) (creating a civil remedy for unauthorized disclosures). See also Allan Karnes & Roger
Lively, Striking Back at the IRS: Using Internal Revenue Code Provisions to Redress Unauthorized
Disclosures of Tax Returns or Return Information, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 924 (1993).
The Social Security Administration is similarly obligated to maintain confidentiality of
records in its possession. See Social Security Act § 1106 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2004)).
The Census Bureau is also subject to legislation mandating the confidentiality of survey
data. See 13 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (2005) (census data must be kept confidential). See also McNichols v.
Klutznick, 644 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981) (census data not subject to ordinary discovery in suit
challenging apportionments).
Not all administrative agencies have always operated under similar confidentiality restric-
tions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, for instance, was never legally required to keep information
confidential although, as a matter of agency practice and policy it is so required. See Confidential
Nature of BLS Records, COMMR'S ORDER 3-93, §7(a) (Dep't of Labor Aug. 18, 1993) ("[D]ata
collected .. .under a pledge of confidentiality shall be treated in a manner that will ensure that
individually identifiable data will be used only for statistical purposes and will be accessible only to
authorized persons."). See also George T. Duncan & Stephen F. Roehrig, Mediating the Tension
between Information Privacy and Information Access: The Role of Digital Government, in PUBLIC
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 94, 99 (G. David Garson, ed., 2003) (noting that BLS is not legally
obligated to secure the confidentiality of individually identifiable data).
106. See generally Ronald Backes, Freedom, Information, Security, 10 SETON HALL CONST.
L.. 927, 936 (2000) ("The FOIA rests upon a foundation of open government and the need in a
democratic society for public disclosure of information concerning government operations.");
Heather E. Kilgore, Signed, Sealed, Protected: Solutions To Agency Handling Of Confidential Busi-
ness Information In Informal Rulemaking, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 519 (2004); Department of Justice,
Office of Information and Privacy, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE (2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foi-act.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005) (providing an extensive overview
of the FOIA including its history and judicial treatment).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ited nature of legal protection, can be seen in the overarching structure of
the major privacy laws of the period.1
0 7
The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, sought to control the "impact
of computer data banks on individual privacy"'1 8 but limited its reach to
federally controlled data banks.'09 Intended, as Marc Rotenberg has
claimed, to "set out a comprehensive regime limiting the collection, use
and dissemination of personal information held by government agen-
cies,"110 the Act placed a number of administrative burdens on the collec-
tion, analysis, and sharing of data by federal agencies. Among these
burdens were requirements that agencies make it possible for individuals
to: (i) determine what data or records have been collected or otherwise
held by affected agencies;"'. (ii) prohibit or restrict the ability of agencies
to use data for purposes other than those for which it was originally col-
leted;112 (iii) gain access to, copy, and amend or correct, any data held by
affected agencies;" 3 (iv) be assured that federally-held data is secure,
current, and used solely for lawful purpose;' 1 4 and (v) pursue civil penal-
ties against agencies or individuals that violate these rules. 115 Despite
these various empowerments, the privacy of collected data was still sub-
ject to a number of exceptions and limitations-the most significant of
which is a provision allowing agencies to disclose information for "rou-
tine uses" that are "compatible" with the reasons for original collec-
tion.116
Partly intended to combat unrestrained government surveillance by
granting individuals the right to view any federally controlled records
about them, the Privacy Act also sought to grant individuals control over
their records. 117 Its provisions were based, in large part, on a Code of
Fair Information Practices ("FIP") put forth by the then-Department of
107. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy: (What Larry
Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (2001).
108. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE & COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY
ACT OF 1974, S. 3418 (Public Law 93-579), at 300 (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter PRIVACY ACT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
109. The official legislative history declared the Act a "landmark achievement in securing for
each citizen .. .the right of privacy with respect to confidential information held by the Federal
Government." Id. at v.
110. Rotenberg, supra note 107, at 39.





116. § 552a(a)(7); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
117. Privacy Act, supra note 101.
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Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973.118 Among the various ap-
proaches outlined in the FIP are:
1) A prohibition against the keeping or creation of secret databases;
2) The principle that individuals must have the means and ability to
access and, if necessary, correct their data and records;
3) A prohibition on the disclosure or use of collected data without
explicit informed consent by respondents as to such disclosures or
uses;
4) A requirement that all data collectors, analyzers, and handlers take
steps to ensure the security and accuracy of all data. 1
19
According to the Privacy Act, no federal agency may "disclose any
record [about an individual] ... except pursuant to a written request by,
or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains." 120 As many have noted, "the Privacy Act begins from a pre-
sumption of personal control over government-held data and vests indi-
viduals with the power to waive privacy in such data at their own discre-
55121tion.
Placing control in the hands of the individual to whom the informa-
tion pertains accomplishes a number of goals. First, it grounds the Pri-
vacy Act's provisions in an individual right to personal privacy (rather
than a mere factor in an overall cost-benefit analysis). Second, it ensures
that individuals have the power to inspect government records and prac-
tices-promoting accountability and democracy. Finally, it assures indi-
viduals that their data, once voluntarily disclosed for one purpose, will
not be used for another or shown to a third party without explicit consent.
This framework, clearly intended to restore confidence in the confi-
dentiality of personal records, was also balanced by a keen understanding
of the importance of data sharing.122 The data sharing provisions are
motivated, in part, to promote open government. In particular, the Pri-
vacy Act and its confidentiality and privacy guarantees are subject to
numerous exceptions, including conforming to requests for data under
the Freedom of Information Act.123 In addition to this important goal, the
118. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, Sec.
V (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/c5.htm.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2004).
120. § 552a(b).
121. RAUL, supra note 11, at 24.
122. Id. ("Congress ... recognized that the proper policy for government-held personal infor-
mation consists of a delicate balance between privacy and access.").
123. The Privacy Act, despite its broad support of personal control over data nevertheless
included numerous exceptions intending to seek a delicate balance between privacy and access
including:
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Privacy Act also contains an explicit nod to statisticians' concerns as
noted in the Privacy Act's relationship to the Federal Reports Act, 12 4 a
statute that dictates the circumstances under which data can be shared
between federal agencies.
The Privacy Act was enacted after the FOIA and is subject to
FOIA's rules mandating public access to government-held records.
12 5
Incorporating the above-mentioned principle that open government fos-
ters democratic governance in an era of feared tyranny, the FOIA em-
powers "any person" to request "records" maintained by federal agen-
cies.1 26 At first blush, this principle seems antithetical to the pro-privacy
regime of the Privacy Act and others. After all, the data requested by
"any person" include, quite possibly, individually identifiable data that
the affected individual would rather keep silent.
To avoid gutting the privacy framework based on individual con-
trol, trust, and access, FOIA contained two specific privacy promoting
1. To the agency's own officers or employees;
2. Pursuant to an FOIA request;
3. For routine agency uses provided such uses are disclosed to the public;
4. The Bureau of Census for purposes of carrying out the census or other official sur-
veys;
5. To statisticians and researchers solely for statistical research or reporting provided
such records do not identify individuals;
6. To a US jurisdiction for law enforcement purposes;
7. To Congress;
8. Pursuant to a court order;
9. To a Consumer Reporting Agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(1-12)(2004).
124. For an overview of the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3511 (1942)
[hereinafter FRA], see John V. N. Philip, The Paperwork Reduction Act in United Steelworkers of
America v. Pendergrass: Undue Restriction and Unrealized Potential, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 922-
23 (1989). Although recently overhauled by the e-Government Act of 2002, the FRA governed the
sharing of information between federal agencies on four conditions:
1. If the information is in the form of statistical totals or summaries;
2. If the information was not collected under a confidentiality guarantee;
3. If the persons supplying the information consent to its transfer; or
4. If the receiving agency has mandatory authority to collect such data.
FRA, supra. Later amendments to the FRA required federal agencies to submit request for further
data gathering to the Comptroller General who must approve the proposed surveys-to avoid dupli-
cation. See generally Federal Records Act, 44 USC § 3101 (1950) (establishing the framework for
records management programs in Federal Agencies). One of the more important enactments requir-
ing the publication of reports and statistical data to be publicly disclosed. See The Brooks Act, Pub.
L. No. 89-306, 92 Stat. 2541, Pub. L. No. 95-595, 31 U.S.C. § 68a (2004). According to this Act, the
Department of the Treasury must render overall Government financial reports to the President, the
Congress and the public, Under this Act, each agency must furnish the Secretary of the Treasury
with reports and information relating to the agency's financial condition and operations as the Secre-
tary may require for effective performance. The Secretary's responsibilities include the system of
central accounting and financial reporting for the Government. The Brooks Act, Pub. L. No. 89-306,
Pub. L. No. 92-582, 40 U.S.C.§ 901 et seq. See also Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)). Under this Act, Congress requires that government agencies submit all proposed information
gathering, included in proposed regulations, to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
approval.
125. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(2), (f) (2005)
126. § 552(a)(3)(A).
20051 THE SECURITY OF OUR SECRETS
rules: (i) "personnel and medical files and similar files... which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy";' 27 and (ii)
"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . ..
which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy,"' 28 were exempt from disclosure. Statisticians,
in particular, viewed the initial exceptions to FOIA requests as narrow-
merely imposing the need to balance the privacy of individuals against
the proposed public goods (including transparency, efficiency, and tai-
lored rulemaking). 129 However, the consequence of embedding privacy
into the framework of individual, and occasionally constitutional, rights
led to an increasing tendency of judges and regulators to privilege the
right of the individual to his privacy over that of the countervailing pub-
lic goods arising out of forced disclosure. 30
Through the 1960s and 1970s, various statutes were enacted that
imposed some level of responsibility on data collectors to protect the
confidentiality of data in their possession. FCRA, 131 for example, passed
in 1970, regulates the collection and use of personal information by con-
sumer credit reporting agencies ("CRAs").13 2  Burdens are placed on
CRAs to protect consumer credit data13 by, at least in part, 134 only pro-
127. § 552(b)(6).
128. § 552(b)(7)(C).
129. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, infra note 155. President Johnson, in
signing FOIA into law, declared:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy works
best when the people have all the information that the security of the Nation permits. No
one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed
without injury to the public interest.
Lyndon B. Johnson, 2 PUB. PAPERS 841 (1967), (quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 104-795, at 8 (1996)),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3451).
130. See Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 477-78 (1995) (noting courts' preference to value individual privacy over
data access and open government); Hoefges et al., supra note 31, at 16-17 (noting same).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005).
132. A "consumer reporting agency" is generally defined as any entity that regularly engages
in the creation and dissemination of consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1a(O.
133. Credit data are generally included as part of a general "consumer report." A consumer
report is defined as a report touching on an individual's creditworthiness, credit standing, credit
capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living. 15 U.S.C. §
1681 a(d).
134. The FCRA imposes a number of affirmative obligations on CRAs. In particular, CRAs are
required to implement "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" in all reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). In addition to this overarching obligation are a number of specific directions:
1. CRAs, or parties acting on consumer reports, must inform individuals of any adverse
actions taken as a result of information contained within a consumer report.
2. CRAs must ensure that consumer reports do not contain obsolete data.
3. When an individual disputes information contained in a consumer report, the CRA
must delete that information if it cannot confirm the information's accuracy within 30
days.
4. CRAs must delete any obsolete or incorrect data as soon as possible after discovery
or notice.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e.
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viding such information for "permissible purposes,"' 35 including strict
penalties for disclosures considered impermissible.' 
36
FERPA was passed in reaction to the "the growing evidence of the
abuse of student records across the nation."' 3 7 FERPA, like other regula-
tions of the period, favored an individual rights model of privacy protec-
tion and imposed liability against data collectors for impermissible re-
leases of private data.' 38  FERPA specifically granted students the sole
right to access educational records for inspection and review'39 and for-
bade educational institutions from releasing such records without explicit
permission 40 subject to numerous exceptions.' 4' As with other laws,
these new exceptions assured respondents that such data, once disclosed,
would only be used for statistical purposes and would not be disclosed to
any third parties for any purpose. 142 As we will explain, this strong pri-
vacy regime was not to outlast the security jangles following 9/11.143
All of these laws, and the various regulations governing control of
information in individual agencies, not only sought to promote individual
privacy rights, but also worked to reassure individuals that data in gov-
ernment hands for statistical purposes would not be used for secondary,
non-statistical, purposes such as tax or other law enforcement. Various
commentators have noted how "[m]ost individuals agree to provide per-
sonal information to ... governments because the benefits [outweigh] the
price of diminished privacy."'144 However, "[t]he cornerstone of that
agreement... is the individual's assumption that the information will not
be used for purposes other than those for which it was collected."'
' 45
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
136. The FCRA includes robust civil and criminal penalties against violators. It authorizes
private lawsuits and provides for the recovery of economic and, in some cases, punitive damages as
well as costs and fees. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n - 1681o. Criminal penalties are also available for those who
fraudulently obtain consumer reports from CRAs or for officers of CRAs for intentional unauthor-
ized disclosures of consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681q - 1681r. Finally, the FCRA contains a two-
year statute of limitations that requires actions to be brought "2 years after the date of discovery by
the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability." 15 U.S.C § 168 lp(l). Most courts
have held that the statute of limitations under the FCRA runs from the date of the violation by the
CRA. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989); Houghton v. Ins.
Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F.2d 322, 324 (3d Cir. 1986); Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 961
(l1th Cir. 1985).
137. 121 CONG. REC. 13,990 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Buckley before the Legislative Confer-
ence of the National Congress of Parents & Teachers, Mar. 12, 1975).
138. According to the sponsors of the Act, "[tihe purpose of the Act is two-fold - to assure
parents of students . . . access to their education records and to protect such individuals' rights to
privacy by limiting the transferability of their records without their consent." 120 CONG. REC.
39,862 (1974) (Joint Statement in Explanation of Buckley/Pell Amendment, Dec. 13, 1974).




143. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
144. Carol R. Williams, Note: A Proposal for Protecting Privacy During the Information Age,
I 1 ALASKA L. REV. 119,134-35 (1994).
145. Id. at 134-35.
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Law enforcement activities of the 1960s and 1970s raised fears that
statistical and individually identifiable data in government hands for ad-
ministrative or research purposes could quite easily be co-opted for en-
forcement purposes.146 The Privacy Act's, FERPA's, FCRA's, and other
laws' prohibitions on secondary uses were intended to counteract these
fears and restore confidence in the benign and beneficial nature of gov-
ernment purpose. In some cases, courts have imposed a "secondary use"
element to determine whether disclosure requests under FOIA are too
intrusive of individual privacy rights. 147 As we shall see, the fear of sec-
ondary uses rekindled following 9/11 is driven not only by renewed
dread of government malfeasance but also by a pervasive sense of pri-
vacy erosion caused by private-sector data collection efforts.
48
The lack of a comprehensive privacy law governing the collection
and dissemination of personal information by the private sector forced
the courts to consider the extent to which privacy was protected by the
Constitution. Privacy advocates, generally frustrated at the lack of a
comprehensive "right to information privacy" sought recognition of the
right in United States courts. 149 Despite these efforts, the courts have yet
to explicitly recognize such a right-but they have come pretty close. In
1977, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute requiring the report-
ing of certain medical prescriptions. Rejecting a lawsuit by physicians
and patients that the statute violated their right to privacy, the Supreme
Court concluded that an individual's right to privacy, with "roots in the
Constitution," was implicated, but found that the statute sufficiently pro-
tected that right.'5 ' In a later decision, the Court held that "both the
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the
individual's control of information concerning his or her person."'
' 52
Many other cases have continued to expand and clarify this "right to in-
formation privacy," but none have held it applicable to data once dis-
closed.
153
146. Cf United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 751-52 (1989) (example of feared conduct).
147. Hoefges et al., supra note 31, at 25 (noting that "the Court seemed to suggest that secon-
dary effects of disclosure were relevant" to determining the level of intrusion into personal privacy
by allowing disclosure) (referring to Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982)).
148. Cristi Allen, Trust in Government, DECISION ANALYST, June 13, 2001,
http://www.decisionanalyst.com/publdata/2001/Attitudes.asp (showing the declining trust in the
federal government, particularly information collecting agencies).
149. Appellee's Brief at 15-20, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL
181401.
150. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
151. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
152. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 764.
153. See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160, 165-66 (2004)
(holding that because family did not disclose the materials, the right of privacy was still intact);
United States Dep't. of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 177-78 (1993) (implicitly assuming that no
right of privacy attaches to data once disclosed).
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In the end, at the close of the second privacy wave, legislation and
judicial decisions had gone far in restoring trust between respondents and
federal data collectors by focusing on two main principles: (i) individual
control over the use of and access to their data records; and (ii) legally
mandated requirements that data collectors control access to data. Rather
than focusing on the comprehensive privacy protections that many de-
sired, the legislative response sought no more than to restore a balance
between access and privacy through a legal regime that focused on trust
and accountability. As President Ford noted in 1976:
I do not favor establishing a separate Commission or Board bureauc-
racy empowered to define privacy in its own terms and to second
guess citizens and agencies. I vastly prefer an approach which makes
Federal agencies fully and publicly accountable for legally mandated
privacy protections and which gives the individual adequate legal
remedies to enforce what he deems to be his own best privacy inter-
ests. 
154
Although not the comprehensive approach that many desired, it appears
that the balance sought by the limited reach of the Privacy Act, the
FOIA, and similar statutes was largely successful in increasing voluntary
compliance with federal statistical surveys and studies.
III. PRIVACY IN STATISTICAL PRACTICE
The above discussion on the rise of privacy in American law paral-
lels the development of statistical society codes of conduct. In particular,
this section notes how statistical societies and practice, despite a different
emphasis on the importance of individual privacy, have long been con-
cerned with privacy, both as an individual right and as a source of trust
enhancement in statistical agencies. As in the legal arena, statistical con-
cepts of privacy and confidentiality developed in concert with contempo-
rary technological and political changes, and we argue that much of the
present day confidentiality ethos in statistics responds to issues from the
first two waves of privacy concern.
As the Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality for the
American Statistics Association noted in 1977:
Efficiency in terms of cost, accuracy, timeliness, and convenience
through use of existing records and limited transfer of records among
designated agencies for purposes agreed to by the affected agencies
should be balanced against any added risks to privacy that such trans-
fers may entail. Demands for collection of particular items of infor-
154. PRIVACY ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 108, at 956.
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mation should always be subject to the check of the expected social
benefit-to-cost ratio.155
At the same time as the government is seeking to protect individual
privacy, it is requiring both private industry and public agencies to col-
lect ever increasing amounts of data. 156  In addition to these concerns,
there is an increasing pressure for efficiency, both economic and legal.
157
Economic efficiency requires agencies to share data they collect-it is
deeply wasteful, obviously, to require the same data to be collected twice
for legitimate government programs. Yet, as we have seen, law's at-
tempts to fulfill the promise of individual liberty and sensitivity result in
a general prohibition against secondary uses in the absence of explicit
prior consent without sufficient regard for the potential value of such
uses and the minimal (or potentially minimalized) danger to privacy.
15 8
Much of the preceding material has focused on a history of the con-
cept of privacy in law with some reference to statistical approaches; in
law the conception of privacy as a right, and in statistics the idea of a
necessary balance between the responsibilities of confidentiality to the
respondent and data access to the public. In this section we note that,
statistical societies were founded with the goal of bringing the benefits of
statistical analysis to society.' 59 Many of those benefits depend on hav-
ing summary statistics, or even portions of data collected, available to the
citizenry. As James Madison argued, the census should "embrace some
other objects besides the bare enumeration of the inhabitants" in order to
provide legislators with more information for benefiting the country.160
155. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality, 31 AM. STATISTICIAN 2,
59-78, 60 (1977) [hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
156. Stephen E. Feinberg & Leon C.R.J. Willenborg, Introduction to the Special Issue: Disclo-
sure Limitation Methods for Protecting the Confidentialtiy of Statistical Data, 14 J. OFF. STAT. 337,
337-39 (1998).
157. Ivan Fellegi has argued that trust is an essential component of statistical agencies' success
in serving these larger social goals:
[Tihe less trust there is in a society (whether this is based on the assumption of doubtful
integrity or suspected incompetence), the more there is a need for an objective and visibly
unbiased mechanism to resolve real or potential conflicts in the design of government
programs, and to provide information on the basis of which their performance can be as-
sessed once they are implemented. Official statistics, if their provider is truly trusted, can
often serve in such a capacity.
Ivan P. Fellegi, Official Statistics-Pressures and Challenges ISI President's Invited Lecture, 2003,
72 INT'L STAT. REV. 139, 141 (2004).
158. See generally Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, Statistical Policy Working
Paper 2, Report on Statistical Disclosure and Disclosure-Avoidance Techniques 1 (May 1978),
available at http://www.fcsm.gov/working-papers/sw2.html.
159. See infra Part liA.
160. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1115 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwaclink.html (follow "Browse the Annals" hyperlink; then
follow "1st 1789-91" hyperlink; then follow "1st session" hyperlink listed under "House"; then enter
"1115" in the box). Madison's views, however, were not necessarily shared by others at the time. In
a letter to Thomas Jefferson on Feb. 14, 1790, Madison wrote:
A Bill for taking a census has passed the House of Representatives, and is with the Sen-
ate. It contained a schedule for ascertaining the component classes of the Society, a kind
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In 1940, the centenary of the establishment of American Statistical
Association ("ASA"), Halbert Dunn wrote that access to official statistics
is fundamental to democracy itself:
At the birth of this nation about a century and a half ago, the fore-
most thought in the mind of its people was the maintenance of per-
sonal freedom for which the citizen had struggled and for which he
had been willing to die. In recent years, however, a number of fac-
tors have tended to undermine this freedom. The more important of
these are: Concentration in relatively few hands of the agencies
which disseminate information to the public, advancement in the
knowledge of how to control human behavior by the use of psychol-
ogy, and the extremely rapid growth of totalitarian ideology. How
many persons appreciate the importance of the census method and its
resultant statistical information in the maintenance of the democratic
principles to which the country is dedicated?
161
Dunn argued that census data should be readily available, and that
scope, timeliness and availability of census data, "linked to the citizen's
right and willingness to question, will prove a bulwark of strength to our
democracy throughout the next century." 162 In this view, the collection
and analysis of data is not merely an ancillary component of governance.
Rather, the collection of valid statistical data is seen as central and indis-
pensable, not only for good governance, but for any kind of effective
governance. "The government cannot fulfill its regulatory mission
unless those who are subject to the regulations provide regulators with
truthful and relevant information that will enable them to monitor the
activities of the regulated entities for compliance."'' 63 As a result, and as
hinted at in the prior discussions, statisticians and policymakers with
statistical inclinations have long viewed privacy as a necessary compo-
nent of statistical practice if for no other reason than that it promotes
voluntary, truthful, and comprehensive disclosures.
Statisticians have long been aware of the importance of protecting
persons who participate in statistical studies. Although data have been
used for millennia, statistics as a profession is very young with many
dating its origins as a mature and distinct discipline no earlier than
of information extremely requisite to the Legislator, and much wanted for the science of
Political Economy. A repetition of it every ten years would hereafter afford a most curi-
ous and instructive assemblage of facts. It was thrown out by the Senate as a waste of
trouble and supplying materials for idle people to make a book.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 14, 1790), in I THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 654
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
161. Halbert L. Dunn, Census-Past and Future, 35 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 242, 242 (1940).
162. Id. at 250.
163. BeVier, supra note 130, at 456 (emphasis added).
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1900.164 Although late in maturing, statistical study, as discussed in the
prior section, has been a subject of governmental interest since the
Founding.
A. The Origins of Statistical Societies
From early in this country's history, scientific associations in the
United States were concerned about official statistics. For example, in
1800, the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences requested Congress
to expand the census and:
[B]egged leave to request their honors to direct by law that the next
census of the inhabitants of the United States might comprehend
much more exactly analyses of the population with respect to age,
might indicate the number of persons not born in the United States,
the number of persons in each leading occupation, the number of
married persons, of widows, and so on. 165
From the outset, the ASA was closely connected with the gathering and
dissemination of official government statistics. On several occasions in
the nineteenth century, the Association petitioned Congress about De-
cennial Census issues or provided advice about the scope and conduct of
the census. 166
The development of statistical study in the United States paralleled
that in Britain, and an examination of the evolution of privacy notions in
both countries is instructive. The Statistical Society of London (now
called the Royal Statistical Society) was established in 1834, and the
ASA followed suit in 1839.167 The prospectus of the Statistical Society
of London stated its purpose to "procure, arrange and publish facts calcu-
lated to illustrate the condition and prospects of society."'' 68 According
to the first constitution of the ASA, the goal of the new society was "to
collect, preserve and diffuse statistical information in the different de-
partments of human knowledge."' 69 The Journal of the Statistical Soci-
ety of London started in 1838 and morphed into the Journal of the Royal
164. STEPHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS: THE MEASUREMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY BEFORE 1900 1 (1986).
165. Lunt, supra note 37, at 75.
166. See R.L. Mason et al., A Brief History of the American Statistical Association, 1839-1989,
44 Am. STATISTICIAN 68, 69 (1990).
167. Id. at 68 (noting that following the precedent in England, it was originally called the
American Statistical Society, but a regrettable acronym prompted a quick name change to "the
American Statistical Association" in 1840).
168. Athelstane Baines, The History and Development of Statistics in Great Britain and Ire-
land, in THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS, THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS IN MANY COUNTRIES
365, 385 (John Koren ed., 1918).
169. John Koren, The American Statistical Association, in THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS, THEIR
DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS IN MANY COUNTRIES 3, 3 (John Koren ed., Burt Franklin, 1918).
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Statistical Society in 1887. Publications of the American Statistical As-
sociation commenced in 1888.
Not surprisingly, since the concept of individual privacy was not
found in other arenas, it is not found to be of paramount concern in the
early history of the statistical societies. Many of the scholarly papers in
the early volumes of the Journal of the Statistical Society of London and
the Publications of the American Statistical Association consisted of
tabulations of agricultural statistics and descriptions relating to statistics
of conditions of laborers, children, trade, manufactures, and other topics.
Many of the authors express the exuberance of a child with a new toy
when noting the possible uses of statistics to help society. The first arti-
cle in the Journal of the Statistical Society of London stated how "every
subject relating to mankind itself, forms a part of Statistics.
'' 70
Until the close of the nineteenth century, statistical practice, like
law, remained relatively unconcerned with privacy. Promoters of statis-
tics such as Florence Nightingale were more concerned with document-
ing the sanitary conditions of hospitals and needless deaths of injured
soldiers in the Crimean War than with protecting their privacy. She
wrote: "I stand at the altar of the murdered men, and while I live, I fight
their cause" and her main weapon was statistical tables and graphs.' 7'
Given these goals, privacy was not of great concern.
B. Confidentiality and Privacy in Statistical Literature
The earliest mention of confidentiality protection found in the pub-
lications of the Royal Statistical Society or ASA related to protecting the
reputations of medical practitioners.172 Benjamin Phillips, surgeon to the
Mary-le-bone Infirmary, wrote that he did not publish the names of the
doctors performing amputations "because there is great difference in the
results, which might easily be explained to the satisfaction of medical
men; but which, in non-professional minds, might readily raise a preju-
dice against the practice of individuals; on which account I have pre-
ferred suppressing the names in the memoir."' 73  As with the United
States Census, the earliest concern about privacy in the statistical asso-
170. Introduction to I J. STAT. SoC'Y LONDON 1, 2 (1839). Many of the articles in the early
issues of the Proceedings begin with a statement of the potential usefulness of statistics for solving a
discipline's problems. See, e.g., Arthur Saunders Thomson, A Statistical Enquiry on Fever, I J.
STAT. SOC'Y LONDON 278, 278 (1838) ("There is no science in which statistical investigation is
more necessary than in medicine; and there are few to which it has hitherto been less applied."). A
common theme of the early articles is the insufficiency of available data, and that better data could
solve the problems of poverty, trade imbalances, public health, and most other societal issues.
171. Edwin W. Kopf, Florence Nightingale as Statistician, 15 PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT.
ASS'N 388, 390 (1916). Florence Nightingale was elected to be the first female member of the Royal
Statistical Society in 1858. Id. at 394.
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ciations was related to commercial and professional interests, not as a
matter of individual dignity or liberty.
The use of the word "privacy" with respect to a right of an individ-
ual occurs much later in the statistical literature and not, at first, in the
United States. One of the earliest discussions of privacy, as the word is
currently understood, was written in 1900 regarding the British Census
and its privacy implications:
The usual conception [of the census] seems to be that a rather seedy
stranger drops a curiously complicated paper (which has to be read at
various angles) containing certain foolish, certain other impertinent,
and other again unintelligible and futile questions concerning one's
maid servant and the stranger that happens to be within one's gates,
and that the said paper is called for the next morning, your inmost
family details unsympathetically perused, probably with the remark
that your declaration of occupation indicates that you do not know
your own business. The one drop of comfort lies in the assurance
that if you find that your wife's age has become the common prop-
erty of your court or alley, you are at liberty to complain of a breach
of official confidence, which, however, is not in England, I believe,
punishable by law.
174
By 1900, in the United States, breaches of confidentiality of census
data and concepts of private information had been introduced into the
law. Soon thereafter, the first explicit mention of privacy in ASA publi-
cations was written in 1908, by Kate Holladay Claghorn. 175 In her arti-
cle, Claghorn expressed concern that "among the host of newcomers into
the statistical field with a fresh idea for a statistical investigation for
every day of the year, it seems as if the preoccupation with each succes-
sive new scheme prevents any critical examination of those already
brought to completion."'' 76 She mentioned the possible harm to the fami-
lies who were being studied in the statistical investigation:
These inquiries are in the main carried on, not merely from pure sci-
entific interest, but for some purpose of social betterment; and it is
not so very long ago that persons with such purposes were warned
over and over again by their guides and advisers of the dangers of in-
vading the privacy of the home and the necessity of keeping strictly
within the limits of confidence, kindness, and personal relation in the
174. J.A. Baines, On Census Taking and Its Limitations, 63 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y 41, 42-43
(1900).
175. Kate Holladay Claghorn, The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Social Work, I 1 PUBL'NS
AM. STAT. ASS'N 150, 164 (1908).
176. Id. at 151.
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work of investigation, which was to be tolerated only in so far as it
was a necessary means for securing the benefit of the family itself.
177
Claghorn balanced the harms of "invading the privacy of the home"
with the benefits to society and insisted that the data collection should
lead to benefits for the specific families being studied.178  Following
Claghom's article, the statistical literature more frequently mentions
privacy of persons who are subjects of statistical investigations and the
importance of keeping their information confidential. 179 By the 1930s, it
is largely taken for granted in statistical literature that the confidentiality
of respondents must be protected. This increasing emphasis on confiden-
tiality in the statistical literature paralleled the changes in the Census
Acts-the 1880 Census Act required enumerators to swear an oath that
they would not disclose information to anyone except their supervi-
sors. 180 The Director of the Census, however, could disclose information
relating to individuals, and in 1917, the Director supplied transcripts of
information to draft boards.' 8' By 1930, however, "the agency began
interpreting confidentiality much more strictly."'
8 2
During the 1940s and 1950s, some statisticians anticipated concerns
that were to be more fully voiced during the second wave of concern
about privacy. Stuart Rice stressed that:
[D]ata supplied to an agency of government for statistical purposes
should not be allowed, through disclosure, to cause individual hard-
ship or disadvantage. It should not be used to support legal action
against the respondent in the courts. It should not fall into the hands
177. Id. at 164.
178. See id. at 164-65.
179. See, e.g., F. Stuart Chapin, The Budgets of Smith College Girls, 15 PUBL'NS AM. STAT.
ASS'N 149, 149 (1916) (outlining the procedures for keeping the data confidential). Chapin noted:
The accounts were strictly confidential. Personal privacy was guaranteed by the follow-
ing plan of administration: the student presidents of every college house distributed the
books in September, and each month reminded the students of their share in the investi-
gation; at the end of the month each student tore off the completed sheet and turned it in;
since each account book and every one of its sheets bore the same number, the final as-
sembling of the nine sheets of any one book was not a difficult matter. The stub, with its
monthly totals, was retained by the student.
Id. at 149
Similarly, respondents to a survey on household expenditure were told:
All information given will be treated as strictly confidential. Particulars respecting indi-
vidual households will not be published or disclosed in any way. You are not asked to
give your name or address anywhere on the form. Your Association will know that you
are filling in a form, but it will not see it when completed; the Civil Service Statistical &
Research Bureau will see the details on the form, but it will not know who has filled these
in.
Philip Massey, The Expenditure of 1,360 British Middle-Class Households in 1938-39, 105 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 159, 162 (1942).
180. Census Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 8.
181. Decennial Census, supra note 26, at 36.
182. Census Confidentiality, supra note 27, at 13.
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of business competitors who would find therein a competitive advan-
tage.1
83
Rice added, however, that concern about disclosure of information
should not become an "unreasoned fetish"'184 that prevented federal sta-
tistical agencies from sharing information with each other. Morton
Kramer was typical among statisticians in the late 1960s in voicing more
contemporary concerns about privacy due to increased technology:
The collection of such data has created concerns on the part of indi-
vidual citizens and members of various groups. .. who believe col-
lection of such data invades the citizen's rights to privacy. These
concerns are aggravated further by fears generated by the spectre of
computers bringing together pieces of information from various offi-
cial records for a given individual and of the possible use of such in-
formation to the detriment of the individual citizen.
185
During the 1970s, reflecting the increased concern about privacy in
all arenas, statistical journal articles, books, and panels concerning confi-
dentiality proliferated. Survey respondents' right to have their data pro-
tected from disclosure was not questioned. The literature still held that
statistical analyses benefit society, but acknowledged the costs, material
and psychological, to respondents. 86  Ivan Fellegi, currently the chief
statistician of Canada, suggested methods and media for data dissemina-
tion that would minimize disclosure risk.
187
Although individual statisticians wrote about the need for protecting
confidentiality of respondents in the professional journals, the statistical
associations did not make formal statements supporting principles of
privacy and confidentiality until after legal changes were introduced.
They did, however, often serve in an advisory capacity to federal agen-
cies on matters of confidentiality. The ASA instituted a Commission on
Statistical Standards in 1949 to develop ethical guidelines for statisti-
cians. The American Statistician published several papers in 1952 on
professional ethics. 188 In these papers, exactly one mention is made of
183. Stuart A. Rice, Problems of Coordinating the United States Statistical System, 49 J. AM.
STAT. Ass'N 438,443-44 (1954).
184. Id. at 444 (italics removed from original).
185. Morton Kramer, Statistics of Mental Disorders in the United States: Current Status, Some
Urgent Needs and Suggested Solutions, 132 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIES A (GENERAL) 353, 392
(1969).
186. See A. Ross Eckler, Statisticians and Shoemakers ("Who is Worse Shod than the
Shoemaker's Wife, " From Heywood's Proverbs), 65 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 9, 17 (1970) (discussing the
psychological costs).
187. Ivan P. Fellegi, On the Question of Statistical Confidentiality, 67 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 7,
15-17 (1972). Another interesting article in this respect is Lester R. Frankel, Statistics and People-
The Statistician's Responsibilities, 71 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 9, 12-13 (1976) (devoting large part of
ASA presidential address to confidentiality issues).
188. See Andrew T. Court, Standards of Statistical Conduct in Business and Government, AM.
STATIsTcIIAN, Feb. 1952, at 6, 6; Morris H. Hansen, Statistical Standards and the Census, AM.
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confidentiality: "If source material is furnished him [the statistician] on
condition that the respondent should not be specifically identified, he
preserves this anonymity."' 89  In 1951, the ASA created an Advisory
Committee on Statistical Policy which dealt with issues of confidentiality
of individual returns.' 90 Jean Gibbons detailed the subsequent history of
ethical codes by the ASA, noting that due to lack of general support, the
issue of a code of ethics "apparently lost its momentum."'
' 91
The issue of a professional code of ethics was revived in the 1980s,
and this time confidentiality concerns played a prominent role. 92 This
led to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee of Professional Ethics
(now a permanent committee) and the 1989 ASA Ethical Guidelines for
Statistical Practice. These guidelines were revised in the 1990s in part to
reflect increasing concerns about confidentiality.' 93
In response to the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in
1966 and the Privacy Act of 1974, the ASA established the Ad Hoc
Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality in 1975.194 The committee
distinguished between administrative and statistical data: the former are
collected "for the purpose of taking action on or controlling actions of an
individual person or other entity,"' 95 while the latter are used only for
calculating statistics such as averages or correlations. 196 "The very es-
sence of statistical analysis is that the identity of individual units of
which it is composed is immaterial. Individuals should not be identifi-
able in the output of a statistical system.', 197 The Committee generally
approved the provisions in the Privacy Act' 98 and emphasized the impor-
tance of the legal protections assuring confidentiality: "Agencies should
not make unqualified promises of confidentiality unless supported by a
legal shield that confers upon the records in their custody unbreachable
protection against disclosure."' 99 In an interesting parallel with modern-
STATISTICIAN, Feb. 1952, at 7, 7-10 (1952); Theodore H. Brown, The Statistician and His Con-
science, AM. STATISTICIAN, Feb. 1952, at 14, 14-18 (1952). These articles were largely concerned
with the statistician's responsibility to produce honest and accurate statistics, to detail limitations of
studies, and to resist pressure from outside forces to obtain desired results.
189. William W. K. Freeman, Discussion of "The Statistician and His Conscience", AM.
STATISTICIAN, Feb. 1952, at 18, 20.
190. See Rice, supra note 183, at 446.
191. Jean D. Gibbons, A Question of Ethics, AM. STATISTICIAN, Apr. 1973, at 72, 75.
192. See Jonas H. Ellenberg, Ethical Guidelines for Statistical Practice: A Historical Perspec-
tive, 37 AM. STATISTICIAN 1, 2-3 (1983).
193. AM. STATISTICAL Ass'N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR STATISTICAL PRACTICE (1999),
http://www.amstat.org/profession/index.cfm (follow "Ethical Guidelines for Statistical Practice"
hyperlink) [hereinafter ASA GUIDELINES].
194. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 155, at 59. Statisticians also took part in the
debate leading up to the Privacy Act. Id.
195. Id. at 60.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 60-61.
198. Id. at 73. The committee noted, though, that "We find little evidence that federal statistical
agencies have been other than scrupulous about these matters." id.
199. Id.
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day concerns about possible uses of government data for law enforce-
ment,2 °° the committee appeared to be concerned, not that the federal
statistical agencies might voluntarily disclose information, but that they
might be compelled to release information by the courts or through an
executive order.20'
Similar developments occurred in Britain, with one major differ-
ence. In 1971, the Royal Statistical Society was asked by the Privy
Council to nominate representatives to a committee discussing confiden-
tiality of the census.20 2 The Society addressed issues of confidentiality in
its 1977 report to the Data Protection Committee.20 3 In contrast to the
results of ASA deliberations in the United States, the Society preferred to
have the Authority provide a code of conduct for protection of data rather
than legal sanctions:
It is not thought that the Authority needs powers to enforce the use of
such a code of conduct.... [T]he publicity it would give to an infor-
mation system which departed seriously from the code of conduct
would, in our view, be sanction enough to bring serious abuse to an
end, and in any case, the complainant could ultimately have recourse
to the courts.2°
One of the provisions of the Royal Statistical Society report with salient
implications for the post-9/11 world is that national security systems
should have no exemption from requirements of confidentiality.20 5
Concern about privacy and confidentiality in the statistical literature
has largely followed the same waves as found in the legal arena. Corre-
sponding to the current popular concerns about online data gathering and
data sharing, the statistical literature has seen a resurgence of articles and
books about methods for protecting the data of persons participating in
medical studies and surveys. In the third wave of the statistical literature
on confidentiality, much emphasis has been placed on possible statistical
solutions for protecting data from undesired disclosure20 6 as well as
greater risks to data from new computer technology, increased availabil-
ity of databases, 207 and increasingly sophisticated methods for matching
200. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
201. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee; supra note 155, at 69-70 (discussing St. Regis Paper
Co. v. U.S., 368 U.S. 208, 217-20 (1961) (holding that confidentiality considerations do not protect
the subpoena of economic census reports in the hands of a private company)).
202. See generally P.G. Moore, Security of the Census of Population, 136 J. ROYAL STAT.
SOC'Y: SERIEs A (GENERAL) 583 (1973) (discussing the results of the committee).
203. Evidence from the Royal Statistical Society to the Data Protection Committee, 140 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIES A (GENERAL) 210 (1977).
204. Id. at 215.
205. Id. at 216.
206. See generally CHANCE, Summer 2004 (entire volume devoted to confidentiality issues).
207. For just one example, PublicRecordFinder.com provides links to thousands of databases
worldwide, and allows searches by name, address, telephone, social security number, or other pieces
of information. One can access records that include information about current and previous ad-
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data records.2 °8 The ASA continues to take a leading role in promoting
the discussion of privacy issues relating to statistics through the Commit-
tee on Privacy and Confidentiality and places many resources on its web-
site.20 9 Recent writings by statisticians on confidentiality, and various
methods that have been proposed for protecting confidentiality of re-
spondents' information, are discussed elsewhere.
21 0
C. Confidentiality and Statistical Codes of Ethics
The statistical societies, and the statistical literature in general, care-
fully distinguish between privacy and confidentiality. Privacy is gener-
ally viewed in the more traditional legal sense of "the right to be let
alone. 211 Statisticians typically do not view this as the issue most rele-
vant to statistical practice. Some have concluded that "the individual
who wants [to be left alone seeks to invoke] his absolute privacy [and] is
[therefore] unwilling to participate in voluntary statistical inquiries or to
provide data about his personal situation ....,,212
The more common variation on privacy articulated by statisticians
is "confidentiality." Confidentiality is closely associated with informa-
tion privacy as used by the law and, specifically, with the concern for
secondary uses. As one author put it, "[t]he concern about privacy...
centers around the question of making such information available to oth-
ers, possibly unknown to the respondent, without his or her consent,
thereby increasing the knowledge of the 'others' about him., 213 Another
author was even clearer:
Confidentiality is specifically the quality or state of being confiden-
tial (private or secret), i.e., not freely disclosed .... Hence, the confi-
dentiality of information relates to the trust of the provider of the in-
formation that the information will not be inappropriately dissemi-
nated or used in identifiable form to hurt him.
214
The more important distinction between most legal uses of privacy
and the statistics profession's use of the term confidentiality is the source
dresses, birthday, roommates, property, marriage, divorce, legal judgments, bankruptcies, criminal
history, and more. PublicRecordFinder.com Home Page, http://www.publicrecordfinder.com (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
208. See generally supra note 206.
209. American Statistical Association Privacy, Confidentiality, and Data Security web site,
http://www.amstat.org/comm/cmtepc/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
210. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
211. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
212. Joseph W. Duncan, Confidentiality and the Future of the US. Statistical System, 30 AM.
STATISTICIAN 54, 55 (1976).
213. Fellegi, supra note 187, at 7-8.
214. Duncan, supra note 212, at 55-56. See also CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, AND DATA
ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES (P. Doyle et al. eds.,
2001).
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of the default rule in statistics society's various policies.21 5 The codes of
ethics of the major statistical societies emphasize protecting the confi-
dentiality of data given by persons and businesses participating in statis-
tical studies but consistently note the limitations imposed on attempts at
"complete" confidentiality. Some excerpts from various codes of stan-
dards and ethics follow.
* "Protect the privacy and confidentiality of research subjects and
data concerning them, whether obtained directly from the subjects,
from other persons, or from administrative records. Anticipate secon-
dary and indirect uses of the data when obtaining approvals from re-
search subjects; obtain approvals appropriate for peer review and for
independent replication of analyses."
2 16
e "Be aware of legal limitations on privacy and confidentiality as-
surances. Do not, for example, imply protection of privacy and con-
fidentiality from legal processes of discovery unless explicitly au-
thorized to do so."
2 17
* "Fellows shall in their professional practice have regard to basic
human rights and shall avoid any actions that adversely affect such
rights. Enquiries involving human subjects should, as far as practi-
cable, be based on the freely given informed consent of subjects. The
identities of subjects should be kept confidential unless consent for
disclosure is explicitly obtained."
2 18
* "Statistical inquiries involving the active participation of human
subjects should be based as far as practicable on their freely given in-
formed consent."
2 19
* "Statistical data are unconcerned with individual identities. They
are collected to answer questions such as 'how many?' or 'what pro-
portion?', not 'who?'. The identities and records of co-operating (or
non-cooperating) subjects should therefore be kept confidential,
whether or not confidentiality has been explicitly pledged.'2
2
1
215. "The OECD defined a set of privacy principles more than 20 years ago that struck a
balance between the need for the free flow of information and the fundamental human right to pri-
vacy." PAUL ASHLEY ET AL., FROM PRIVACY PROMISES TO PRIVACY MANAGEMENT 1,
http://www.semper.org/sirene/publ/AsSP-02.PrivacyAsNewParadigm-preproceedings.pdf (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
216. ASA GUIDELINES, supra note 193.
217. Id.
218. THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY CODE OF CONDUCT 1 (1993), http://www.rss.org.uk
(follow "Professional Membership" hyperlink; then follow "Code of Conduct" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
219. INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE DECLARATION ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, cl.
4.2 (1985), http:/isi.cbs.nl/ethics.htm [hereinafter ISI DECLARATION].
220. Id. cl. 4.5.
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9 "Statisticians should take appropriate measures to prevent their
data from being published or otherwise released in a form that would
allow any subject's identity to be disclosed or inferred.",
221
* "Avoid disclosure or authorization to disclose, for personal gain or
benefit to a third party, confidential information acquired in the
course of professional practice without the prior written permission
of the employer or client, or as directed by a court of law."
' 222
As evidenced by the codes of ethics of the statistical societies, it is
widely held that an ethical statistician protects the confidentiality of the
data provided by subjects in medical studies and by respondents to sur-
veys. At the same time, these guidelines also emphasize the importance
of making data available so that results can be confirmed by independent
investigators and society can benefit from the information.
e "Promote sharing of (nonproprietary) data and methods. As ap-
propriate, make suitably documented data available for replicate
analyses, metadata studies, and other suitable research by qualified
investigators.
' 223
* "Governmental policy decisions regarding public health, criminal
justice, social equity, education, the environment, the siting of critical
facilities, and other matters depend in part on sound statistics."
'224
* "Statistical inquiry is predicated on the belief that greater access to
well-grounded information is beneficial to society. The fact that sta-
tistical information can be misconstrued or misused, or that its impact
can be different on different groups, is not in itself a convincing ar-
gument against its collection and dissemination.
225
* "There can be no absolute safeguards against breaches of confi-
dentiality, that is the disclosure of identified or identifiable data in
contravention of an implicit or explicit obligation to the source.
Many methods exist for lessening the likelihood of such breaches, the
most common and potentially secure of which is anonymity.
' 226
These stated principles reveal a different approach to privacy than
found in law. A review of legislative and judicial approaches to privacy
221. Id. cl. 4.6.
222. STATISTICAL SOCIETY OF CANADA CODE OF ETHICAL STATISTICAL PRACTICE (Draft,
Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.ssc.ca/main/about/codee.html. The Statistical Society of Canada has
perhaps the weakest confidentiality protections of those considered here. Their guidelines, and those
of the Royal Statistical Society, permit court-ordered disclosure. The ethical guidelines of the ASA
and International Statistical Institute do not specify exceptions to confidentiality principles when
directed by a court of law.
223. ASA GUIDELINES, supra note 193, Part IIF.
224. Id. See also infra, Part lB.
225. ISI DECLARATION, supra note 219, cl. 1. 1.
226. Id. cl. 4.6.
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reveals law's tendency to view privacy as an intrinsic individual right-
as a floor for determining permissibility of exchange and intervention.
227
The law makes privacy the starting point for determining permissibility
of statistical practices, thereby elevating it to a position of preference in
the hierarchy of determining what releases are or are not permissible. In
early days of statistics, often a similar "absolute" conception of confiden-
tiality was taken, and "confidentiality was always thought about in terms
of the protection of individual and establishment data and not the release
of data .... In modem statistical usage, however, confidentiality is
often thought of in terms of how to implement confidentiality protections
in practice while maintaining usability of the data.229
The various ethical codes of statistical societies differ on the degree
of protection that should be afforded to respondents, however. The ASA
and the Royal Statistical Society both still emphasize that individual data
collected under a pledge of confidentiality should not be disclosed, but
their codes of ethics do not address the problem that confidentiality may
be violated in spite of the utmost efforts of statisticians. The Interna-
tional Statistical Institute guidelines perhaps best reflect recent thinking,
through the statement cited above, that "no absolute safeguards" are pos-
sible.23° With the advent of new computational and statistical methodol-
ogy that may be used to combine data sources and possibly identify indi-
viduals, it may be time to update the ethical guidelines to address the
new information landscape.
IV. THE LESSONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Legal Lessons
By the end of the 1970s, legal approaches to privacy had generally
settled into a series of broad, if at times inconsistent, principles and regu-
lations intended to strike the balance between privacy and access, trust
and security. As discussed above, the law moved from a pro-disclosure
regime to a newer framework intended to promote the trustworthiness of
government institutions while protecting individuals from bad actors,
poor management, and unintended consequences.
Despite the widespread view that privacy is a right fundamental to
American democracy, it has not, as discussed above, enjoyed long-
standing legal protection.231 Privacy's legal novelty is further compli-
227. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
228. Stephen E. Fienberg & Aleksandra B. Slavkovic, Making the Release of Confidential
Data from Multi-Way Tables Count, CHANCE, Summer 2004, at 5, 5.
229. See id.
230. ISI DECLARATION, supra note 219, cl 4.6.
231. Cf. JUDITH WAGER DECEW, PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 9
(1997) ("In the United States, formal legal protection for privacy has developed only during the last
hundred years.").
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cated by the approach law has taken to the subject. As demonstrated by
the above, the law has taken a piecemeal approach to privacy protection,
shielding individuals and their information in certain circumstances, but
not in others, and prohibiting some practices while promoting others.
Given the multitude of privacy-invocations in American law, it is should
not be surprising that the term itself has been employed in numerous
ways.
In legal circles, privacy is often used as a general term encompass-
ing different and often contradictory values. Some of the more famous
iterations protect an individual's: (i) right of free action, equality, or
autonomy; 232 (ii) physical space (both in ownership and access);2 33 (iii)
freedom of thought and secrecy; 234 (iv) anonymity and seclusion; 235 and
(v) "control over information., 236 It is this last sub-category that encom-
232. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Richard A. Epstein, Decon-
structing Privacy: And Putting It Back Together Again, in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1, 9 (Ellen
Frankel et al., eds., 2000) [hereinafter PRIVACY] (noting "the simple observation that the prohibition
against eavesdropping and similar forms of behavior satisfies the condition of formal equality" of
individuals); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Ingrid Schulp-
bach Martin, The Right to Stay in the Closet: Information Disclosures by Government Officials, 32
SETON HALL L. REV. 407 (2002) (analyzing informational privacy in the context of individual dig-
nity and autonomy); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737 (1989) (grounding
privacy in individual autonomy); ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY (1995) (providing a current review of United States privacy approaches and noting their
relationship to concepts of liberty and autonomy).
233. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (privacy offers protection of home
against "warrantless entry."); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1990) (overnight guest has
privacy interest in owner's home); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (privacy
extends to papers in private desk drawers). See also Stephen Daren Blevit, A Tale of Two Amend-
ments: Property Rights and Takings in the Context of Environmental Surveillance, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 885 (1995); David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wire-
less Communication, 8 COMM. L. POL'Y 1 (2003) (privacy rights are intimately entwined with rights
to physical space); Note, Privacy, Technology, and the California "Anti-Paparazzi" Statute, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1367 (1999).
234. See, e.g., KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 181-190 (1988); SISSELA BOK,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1983); Charles Fried, Perfect Free-
dom, Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L REV. 717 (1998) (discussing the problematic founding of privacy in
issues of freedom of thought and conscience); Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After Septem-
ber 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2002) (discussing the relationship between privacy and secrecy);
Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITr. L. REV. 579 (1986). See also Sandra
L. Macklin, Students' Rights in Indiana: Wrongful Distribution of Student Records and Potential
Remedies, 74 IND. L. J. 1321, 1322 (1999). Macklin notes the many ways that individuals approach
privacy, including her view that
Different people interpret the term 'privacy' differently. For some, it simply refers to 'the
right to be left alone,' while for others it may have a more complex association, such as
'the right' to an abortion. Still for others, it may mean the right to be secure in the soli-
tude of one's own home, free from governmental intrusions.
Id
235. See H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality of
Persons, in PRIVACY supra note 232, at 120-26; Warren & Brandeis., supra note 66; Paul
Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 663, 710 (2004)
("[A]dvances in information technology will unreasonably erode the privacy and anonymity to
which American citizens are entitled"). See also Phillip Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG.,
Autumn 1976, at 7, 8 (characterizing three facets of privacy, broadly characterized as anonymity,
secrecy, and autonomy) (quoted in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977)).
236. Numerous authors have written on this subject. See, e.g., Lloyd Weinreb, The Right to
Privacy, in PRIVACY, supra note 232, at 25, 34 ("When people speak of a right to privacy, they
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passes most of the principles and laws that affect statistical practice and
forms the core of our attention here.
As we have noted above, the second wave of privacy regulation at-
tempted to restore the trust individuals had in government prior to vari-
ous high-profile abuses. In so doing, the laws and judicial decisions that
sought to restore balance to the privacy/access dichotomy and promote
trust in government institutions did so by: (i) grounding privacy in the
rights of individuals to control the original collection and the subsequent
use of most data; (ii) promoting open government wherever possible by
empowering individuals to access records and, in some cases, take action
to correct errors or otherwise hold agencies accountable; (iii) penalizing
agencies and individuals who broke the trust set up by legal frameworks
by, among other actions, prohibiting certain secondary uses; and (iv)
although not discussed above, creating a clear legal distinction between
individually-identifiable data and purely statistical data-imposing
greater legal obligations and administrative burdens on the collection,
use, and dissemination of the former while providing for a far more per-
missive regime for the latter.
1. Privacy Founded in Individual Liberty and Autonomy
The law's emphasis on privacy as a legal, perhaps constitutionally-
based,237 right has important implications for its regulation. In particular,
privacy's categorization as an individual right often works to tip the
scales in its favor when faced with competing requests for disclosure. A
review of legislative and judicial frameworks reveals, as noted above, a
number of different uses of the term "privacy" based on the nature of the
intrusion, the status of the affected individual and the individual or entity
seeking to so intrude, or the kind of information or access requested.
Yet, despite these numerous contexts and differences, legal approaches
to privacy up through the 1970s indicate the law's preference to ap-
proach privacy as an individual right to be protected against intrusions-
whether by other individuals, private industry, or government.
mostly have in mind informational privacy, a person's control over others' acquisition and distribu-
tion of information about himself."); Parent, supra note 83; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Pri-
vacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1151-52 (2002) (arguing that individualized conceptions of privacy
direct approaches to resolving privacy tensions in the Information Age).
237. The most famous, and controversial, attempt to ground privacy in the Constitution is Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Amy Peikoff, No Corn On This Cobb: Why Reductionists
Should Be All Ears For Pavesich, 42 BRANDEIS L. J. 751, 753 (2004) ("Most recently, the Supreme
Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, [539 U.S. 558 (2003)] 'embrace[d] the [Constitutional] right-to-privacy
line of cases that began with its birth control decision in 1965 and culminated 30 years ago in the
abortion decision, Roe v. Wade."'); Anne C. Hydom, Does the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Protect Forced Disclosure of Sexual Orientation?, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237, 238 (2003)
(noting that the right to privacy is never explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution, but
the Supreme Court has rooted it in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1392 (1992).
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Conceiving of privacy as an individual right results in legal deci-
sions and frameworks that view privacy as the default rule for determina-
tions of the permissibility of data access issues. As a result of this de-
fault rule, laws and legal decision-making place burdens on data-
collectors rather than users and subjects. Indeed, as discussed earlier,
most federal laws place burdens on agencies and other data collectors to
demonstrate that the need for the data outweighs the individual's right to
privacy. The FOIA, although ostensibly neutral or, perhaps even disclo-
sure friendly, has nevertheless been increasingly interpreted as favoring
privacy.238 As several commentators have noted, the FOIA framework,
protecting as it does the privacy of individuals against unwanted access,
has two consequences: (i) courts have, over time, interpreted the individ-
ual interest in privacy in such a way that it must be substantially out-
weighed by the right of public access; 239 and (ii) the strengthening of
individual rights-based privacy has allowed some agencies to use privacy
as a "shield" to prevent otherwise appropriate disclosures.24 °
As many have noted, "the instrumental function that privacy advo-
cates believe a right to informational privacy serves is to support the
freedom of self-definition .... This freedom in turn enhances individual
autonomy ... ,241 Perhaps the clearest indications we have of law's
preference to place privacy in the context of an individual autonomy
right is in the explicit adoption of FIP frameworks in the Privacy Act and
FRCA.242 This framework, as noted earlier, seeks to provide to individu-
als the maximum amount of control over disclosure of their information.
Protecting privacy by focusing on issues of control, disclosure, and ac-
cess is consistent with a conception of privacy as central to protecting
"liberty" 243 and "autonomy ' 244 interests.
238. Hoefges et al., supra note 31, at 26.
239. Id. at 15. ("[S]ince FOIA was passed, the Supreme Court [has] created a framework for
balancing public access and personal privacy interests in disputes over the release of government-
held information .... These cases remain controversial, and commentators have accused the Court
of judicially legislating a balancing scheme that strongly favors individual privacy over public ac-
cess despite evidence of congressional legislative intent to the contrary.").
240. BeVier, supra note 130, at 485. ("[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted [the FOIA] so as
to enhance agencies' ability to invoke them as shields to repel requests that records containing per-
sonally identifiable information about individuals be released."). See also Hoefges et al., supra note
31, at 24. ("[Supreme Court] opinions have made a profound impact on constricting the boundaries
of disclosure under FOIA in privacy cases, and have gone a long way toward skewing the ... bal-
ancing test in a manner that favored withholding over disclosure.").
241. BeVier, supra note 130, at 468.
242. See id. at 468-69, 478-79.
243. See citations in supra note 232. See also Peikoff, supra note 237, at 787; Tamara F.
Kushnir, It's My Body, It's My Choice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act Of2003, 35 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 1117, 1130 (2004) ("[T]he right of a woman to choose to have an abortion is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the right to privacy."); Eileen Fry-Bowers, Controversy And Conse-
quence In California: Choosing Between Children And The Constitution, 25 WHITrIER L. REv. 889,
900-01 (2004) ("[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court held that an offender had a protectible liberty
interest in his privacy and reputation .... ")
244. See BeVier, supra note 130, at 468-69. See also Nonnie Shivers, Firing "Immoral" Pub-
lic Employees: If Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Protects Employee Privacy
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Interestingly, in the desire to privilege individual rights above those
of the public goods derived from open access, the privacy regimes
erected by the adoption of FIP in the Privacy Act are, ironically, quite
burdensome on individuals.245 For the notice, access, and consent provi-
sions to fulfill their promise of promoting individual liberty and auton-
omy, the individuals so served must be aware of their rights, understand
the nature of the threats posed by releasing their data and, ultimately, be
willing to enforce the rights given.246 To make matters worse, many of
the notice and consent provisions inherent in the FIP and the Privacy
Act, as well as the individual rights model in its entirety, require a spe-
cific knowledge of how to read and periodically search the Federal Reg-
ister because that is where such notices are published.247 Finally, even
where individuals undertake all these responsibilities, their remedies are
greatly limited.248 Government, on the other hand, can quite afford the
few suits that may be brought. In the end, government holds all the
cards--often rendering the individual rights model ineffective as well as
inefficient.
Without passing judgment on this view of privacy, it is worth noting
here for three reasons: (i) it may result in poor exchanges between public
goods and individual autonomy; 249 (ii) it places significant burdens on
Rights, Then Why Can't We?, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 621, 641 (2004) ("Privacy has also been
said to include 'an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity."').
245. See generally, Solove, Access, supra note 78, at 1172 (noting that it is "[flrequently ... up
to the individual to take significant steps to protect privacy [and] ... [i]n many instances, individuals
are never even given notice or an opportunity to assert a privacy interest when records containing
their personal information are disclosed.").
246. Most federal privacy statutes rely on individual enforcement for violations. However,
numerous privacy advocacy groups have been successful in upholding individuals' privacy rights.
See Hetcher, supra note 5.
247. For example, the recent passage of the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical
Efficiency Act ("CIPSEA"), as it relates to the FOIA, does require that any data exchanges between
federal agencies must be publicly disclosed to provide sufficient notice to individuals to object to
such disclosures-however, the notices are printed in the Federal Register-hardly a place where
most people are likely to notice. See 44 U.S.C. § 3504(c)(6) (2004). FOIA requires a wide variety of
public disclosures of agency data and reports, including publication of proposed rules and decisions,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(I)(A)-(E) & a(2) (2004), and also all records received and held including a rea-
sonable descriptions of their content, id § 552(a)(3)(A) (2004). It is this last disclosure requirement
that generates much of the FOIA litigation in federal courts.
248. In many cases, individuals are not able to recover damages (FERPA) or otherwise engage
in lawsuits against individual agencies for improper disclosures (IRS). But see 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. II 1996); 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (2000) supra Part IIC (stating civil damages for unauthorized
inspection or disclosure of returns and return information must be prosecuted by injured individu-
als); see also Sandra L. Macklin, Students'Rights in Indiana, 74 IND. L.J. 1321, 1326 (1999). Mack-
lin notes:
There was, however, some question about whether FERPA's purpose is to address indi-
vidual records violations or only to prevent systematic violations. The law on its face
does not answer this question, but every court which has addressed the issue has said that
FERPA protects against systematic violations only. While no court has ruled that FERPA
allows a private cause of action, many courts have said that the Buckley Amendment cre-
ates a privacy interest under § 1983.
Id. (ciations omitted).
249. As other have noted, the move toward individual informational privacy deeply affected
statistical practice, although as Robbin seems to imply, not for the worse:
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individuals to enforce their rights;250 (iii) it marginalizes statistical ethics
and practices that favor a more explicit cost-benefit analysis that bal-
ances individual privacy against public goods without privileging either;
and (iv) it does not protect against later government actions that seek to
disrupt traditional barriers against secondary uses because data once col-
lected under a pledge of confidentiality may later lose that status. We
take up most of these issues in another paper that looks at legal changes
following 9/11.251
2. Commitment to Open Government
Closely linked to the argument that privacy is associated with per-
sonal autonomy and liberty, a second characteristic of the second wave
privacy frameworks is a commitment to open government. Evincing
general mistrust or fear of unrestricted government-and appropriately
so given the historical context in which these laws were enacted-this
commitment to open government requires federal agencies to disclose
records they may have, 252 honor public record requests by the public,
253
and obtain individual consent prior to data collection or use for any new
data requests. 4
In contrast to the general free-rein provided to private sector efforts,
this approach conveys "a principled commitment to limited government
powers .... ,,255 As referenced throughout this paper, data access, open
government, and restrictions on data collection and analysis by govern-
ment agencies are often seen as checks against unrestricted and potential
256tyrannical governance. FIP, and the 1973 Report by the Department of
Health, discussed previously, are examples of this approach and, as oth-
ers have concluded, "[t]he lasting legacy of the report and its Code of
Fair Information Practices is the need to protect privacy, at least in part,
The social research community had historically enjoyed a special relationship with gov-
ernment, one that permitted researchers extraordinary access to administrative and statis-
tical records based on their potential contribution for solving social problems .... The
privileged access of the social research community to government information was, how-
ever, irrevocably altered by the mid- 1 970s, as a result of a series of court cases and state
government intrusions into private lives that clarified the failure of existing laws to pro-
tect informational privacy.
Robbin, supra note 93, at 502.
250. See generally BeVier, supra note 130, at 480 (describing the excessive and almost unreal-
istic burden of enforcement placed on individuals).
251. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
252. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2004) (Privacy Act provides that "[n]o agency shall disclose
any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person,
or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the
individual to whom the record pertains .... ).
253. See, e.g., FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2004).
254. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(2004).
255. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119,127 (2004).
256. See also Katz, supra note 11, at 57.
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as one powerful mechanism for leveling the playing field in a game
where participants have unequal starting positions. 257
Courts have also explicitly acknowledged that access to records
held in government databases-even where such records implicate some
privacy interest-is essential to upholding open government. In 1978,
for example, the Supreme Court, in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc.,258 noted that: "It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents ....
American decisions generally do not condition enforcement of this right
on a proprietary interest in the document or upon a need for it as evi-
dence in a lawsuit., 259 The reason, according to the Court, for such open
access is predicated on the principle that citizens must "keep a watchful
eye on the workings of public agencies .... , 2 6 0
As already noted, however, the commitment to open government is
in some tension with a principled commitment to individual privacy
rights grounded in autonomy: "The difficulty is that as the ambit of pri-
vacy law expands, the amount of information available to the public di-
minishes, thus blocking access to potentially valuable information that
the electorate may need to make informed decisions about self-rule."
26'
3. Focus on Post-Disclosure Penalty Schemes
A further feature of the legal regime arising out of the first and sec-
ond privacy waves was the application of legal penalties against data
collectors for data disclosure and misuse.262 In so doing, however, this
approach penalizes the gatherer and gatekeeper of data-punishing those
who do not adequately protect data while, generally, avoiding penalties
against those who misuse data.263 For example, FCRA imposes penalties
against CRAs that allow data to be released to third parties for improper
uses.264 It does not specifically penalize those who make improper re-
257. Nissenbaum, supra note 255, at 128.
258. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
259. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597.
260. Id. at 598 (citation omitted).
261. Martin E. Halstuck, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes, 11 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS
71, 73 (2000).
262. For example, census employees who disclose restricted data are subject to criminal li-
abilty. See 13 U.S.C. § 214 (2004) (imposing $5000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both). See
also 13 U.S.C. § 9 (a)(2004) (limiting data disclosure by census employees).
263. For example, recent passage of HIPAA imposes liability against health care institutions
that do not adequately secure data while remaining silent on the penalties to be imposed against
individuals that link data improperly protected or disclosed. See Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 101, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-87) (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1) (2005) (HIPAA's privacy
rule require covered entities to "make reasonable efforts to limit [use or disclosure of] protected
health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclo-
sure, or request."). See also Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records And HIPAA: Is It Too Late To
Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1506 (2002).
264. See FCRA, supra note 104, § 1681(b).
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quests or who otherwise engage in secondary uses of data-although
these individuals and entities may be liable under 
other laws.265
In keeping with this general preference for focusing civil and crimi-
nal penalties against those who either refuse or fail to protect the confi-
dentiality of statistical data, federal agencies are often liable for security
failures and other data releases that do not comport with federal regula-
tions. The focus on disclosure-related penalties does, of course, make a
good deal of sense by placing burdens on collectors to secure data and
control their releases. That said, these frameworks tend to avoid trickier
questions about the uses of data-failing to differentiate between differ-
ent data uses and merely declaring that all disclosures are improper
without consent or regulatory approval.266 For obvious reasons, this fo-
cus may result in either substantial inefficiencies by foreclosing benefi-
cial secondary uses that do not threaten privacy or requiring substantial
security-investments that far outweigh the intrusive nature of the poten-
tial disclosure, or, conversely, allowing for disclosures that may comport
with earlier permissions or regulatory provisions that are injurious to
individual privacy.
4. Differentiated Rules for Types of Statistical Data
Related to the idea that individuals have a right to keep their secrets,
another approach applied to legal privacy frameworks is differentiation
based on the nature of the information disclosed.267 This approach has
two different branches: (i) a differentiated privacy approach for sensitive
versus innocuous data;268 and (ii) a differentiated approach for individu-
ally identifiable data versus anonymous data.269
265. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, for example, imposes liability on individu-
als that access federal computers and cause harm. Electronics Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-3127 (1994); See generally Julie J. McMurray, Privacy In The Information Age:
The Need For Clarity In The ECPA, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (2000); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
of 1986 (CFAA), Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986). The 1986 Act was the first to
include the specific anti-hacking provision under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2002).
266. 13 U.S.C. § 9 regulates privacy of information collected in the census. Section 9 requires
information gathered by the Bureau be kept confidential and be used exclusively for statistical pur-
poses. The statute provides penalties for employees who willfully disclose such information ille-
gally. Section 9(a) expressly restricts the Census Bureau from: (1) using the information for any
purpose other than statistics, (2) making any publication allowing any individual to be identified or
(3) permitting any unauthorized person to examine the census reports.
267. See generally FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 80-100 (1997) (detail-
ing the differentiation of privacy protections based on the nature of the information in question).
268. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) (setting out privacy protec-
tions for financial data); Health Insurance Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.;
26 U.S.C.; 29 U.S.C.; 42 U.S.C.) (setting standards for the privacy and security of individually
identifiable medical data).
269. Bradburn and Straf distinguish between information about individuals and statistical data,
which they define as "a representation of information that does not identify any individual." Norman
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Based on societal standards of sensitivity, certain kinds of informa-
tion are granted higher levels of privacy protection than others. In the
1960s and 1970s, for example, congressional committees and public in-
terest groups urged the federal government to enact privacy legislation to
protect sensitive data such as financial or medical information. 270 In ad-
dition, following the experience of the Holocaust, the importance of
keeping census data confidential quickly became more than just a matter
of trust and voluntary compliance. In making judgments about what
kinds of information to protect, federal law did not approach privacy
from the perspective of the individual, but rather, seemed attuned to a
general "sense" of societal approval for privacy for these data but not
others. As others have noted, this approach captures the widely held
view that "the degree of sensitivity of information [is a] key factor in
determining whether a privacy violation has occurred or not."2 7' Regard-
less of the underlying mechanism, the fact remains that legal responses
have privileged these distinctions.
A second differentiation regime is the law's approach to individu-
ally identifiable data versus data that cannot be used to identify individu-
als, here termed anonymous data. Put simply, federal law and regula-
tions place significant restrictions on data considered to be individually
identifiable-including requirements of informed consent for collection
and disclosure, as well as contractual obligations to ensure confidential-
ity on disclosees. Anonymized data, on the other hand, may be generally
released between statistical agencies and, in many cases, to the general
public, without fear of legal repudiations. This all makes perfect sense
insofar as the risks to privacy are minimized where the individual cannot
be identified.272
However, the concept of "anonymized data"--data incapable of be-
ing manipulated to identify individuals-is far more slippery than com-
monly believed. We are not urging regulators to abandon privacy re-
quirements, nor are we suggesting that a regime of strict liability for dis-
closures that, despite reasonable efforts, result in individual identifica-
tion, become the standards for statistical regulation. Indeed, enactment
of either of these regimes would be a disaster either for the trust that in-
dividuals have in government data or, conversely, would eradicate nearly
all the substantial value derived from data analysis and sharing. That
M. Bradburn & Miron L. Straf, Information and Statistical Data: A Distinction With a Difference.
19 J. OFF. STAT. 321, 322 (2003).
270. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Disclosure of Nonpublic Personal Information, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2000); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Adminis-
trative Simplification, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d, -1 to -8 (Supp. V 1999); Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, Protection of Subscriber Privacy, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
271. Nissenbaum, supra note 255, at 128.
272. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between disclosure risks and the potential
utility of such disclosures, see George T. Duncan & S. Lynne Stokes, Disclosure Risk vs. Data
Utility: The R-U Confidentiality Map as Applied to Topcoding, CHANCE, Summer 2004, at 16.
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said, it is important that, as we come to understand the approach that law
takes, and the choices it makes in enacting one form of privacy regula-
tion or another, the nature of "reasonable efforts" and "anonymous data"
or "data incapable of being individually identified" be taken into consid-
eration in the standards enacted. As we argue elsewhere 273 the current
privacy regime would be greatly served by explicitly recognizing the
right of statistical agencies to focus more on potential uses of data and,
importantly, to use statistical norms to define "individually identifiable"
or "anonymized" data rather than focusing purely on common-sense,
intuition, or market-based notions of reasonable efforts.
B. Confidentiality and Statistical Practice
As seen above, statistical societies' approaches emphasize balanc-
ing the public goods inherent in statistical study with maintaining confi-
dentiality of the data. In so doing, they explicitly acknowledge that in
some cases it may be impossible to keep data completely confidential
and simultaneously useful for society.274 Our history has also revealed
that for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, statistical socie-
ties and their codes of ethics appear to be somewhat behind the law and
public opinion in calling for confidentiality and privacy. Whereas legal
commentators and policymakers began to call for confidentiality and
privacy by the mid-nineteenth century, and entrenched certain privacy
rights into the law by the early twentieth, statistical societies did not
seem to have been as concerned with privacy and confidentiality until the
twentieth century and, indeed, did not seem to have made it of paramount
concern to statistical praxis. Paradoxically, during the last half of the
twentieth century they became a strong advocate for confidentiality of
gathered data.
In this subsection, we discuss these two related emphases of statisti-
cal practice: (i) the balance between data confidentiality and utility; and
(ii) the evolution of statistical societies from organizations committed to
improving the accuracy of statistics to societies also dedicated to prom-
ulgating and implementing ethical standards for modem statistical prac-
tice.
1. Balancing Data Confidentiality and Utility
Many statisticians have called for balancing the disparate demands
for data and confidentiality. Henry Wynn, 1976 president of the Royal
Statistical Society, wrote:
273. Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
274. See ISI DECLARATION, supra note 219, cl. 4.6.
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The importance of getting the balance right between the protection of
an individual's privacy and society's right to open government can-
not be overemphasized .... The increase in the use of computers is
seen as a threat to personal privacy, and it is natural that the Govern-
ment should seek to legislate to protect that privacy.275
Wynn called for caution in going too far to protect privacy: "I certainly
believe that individuals should be protected from misuse of information
on them. However, there is a danger that the balance could be upset and
shift away from protection of the individual and shift towards protection
of data in some more global sense. 27 6 Tore Dalenius took the view that
the Swedish Data Act, in its concerns about confidentiality, curtailed
research too much.277 Dalenius wrote that he did not share the view "that
those responsible for producing statistics are also responsible for ensur-
ing that it is impossible to infer information about individuals from pub-
lished data, if 'impossible' is to be understood literally: the condition
expressed by 'impossible' is too strong. ,278
It is vital that statisticians understand the law's preference to use
"privacy" when it means "confidentiality" and, more importantly, its use
of individual privacy as a right to be overcome upon a showing of strong
public need. The balance between public goods and this right is one that
statisticians should not, and perhaps cannot, take for granted in legal
developments. As this paper has discussed, the evolution of information
privacy law has been increasingly marked by this elevation of individual
privacy. Although spurred on mainly by private industry data collection
practices, it is entirely possible, and in the case of the European Union's
approach a reality, that reactions to private industry data collection and
usage practices can have great negative effect on public service statistical
work.
Official statistics are, in essence, a matter of trust. Politicians, busi-
nesses, and citizens must be able to have confidence that statistics pro-
vided by the federal statistical agencies are accurate and independent of
political pressure. The United Nations Fundamental Principles of Offi-
cial Statistics state:
Bearing in mind that the essential trust of the public in official statis-
tical information depends to a large extent on respect for the funda-
mental values and principles which are the basis of any society which
seeks to understand itself and to respect the rights of its members....
To retain trust in official statistics, the statistical agencies need to de-
275. Henry P. Wynn, Freedom of Statistical Information, 141 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIEs A
(GENERAL) 1, 2 (1978).
276. Id. at 3.
277. See Tore Dalenius, Data Protection Legislation in Sweden: A Statistician's Perspective,
142 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y: SERIEs A (GENERAL) 285, 292 (1979).
278. Id. at 297.
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cide according to strictly professional considerations, including sci-
entific principles and professional ethics, on the methods and proce-
dures for the collection, processing, storage and presentation of sta-
tistical data.279
In order to produce accurate statistics, statistical agencies must also
preserve the trust of the public that data they provide will not be used to
harm them. We have seen how the notion of harm from statistics has
expanded from the early ideas about harm accruing from lack of infor-
mation, to possible harm from revealing business data, to the current
embracing of an individual right to control his or her information through
informed consent and assurances of confidentiality. The United States
Census Bureau, anticipating and responding to concerns about privacy,
has increased efforts to assure the public of the confidentiality of its data
collection.28°
Before 9/11, there was every indication that these assurances were
largely working. The 1999-2000 Surveys of Privacy Attitudes concluded
that between 1996 and 2000 there was increased distrust of data sharing
but no increase in distrust of the Census Bureau's confidentiality assur-
ances; an indicator of general privacy concerns in fact declined signifi-
cantly between 1999 and 2000.281 That said, only 25% of people sur-
veyed answered that they are sure that the Census Bureau protects confi-
dentiality of names and addresses, and only 17% said that other govern-
ment agencies cannot get names and addresses of census respondents.282
There is evidence that general publicity about privacy and confidentiality
issues increases concerns about confidentiality of data collected by the
government. 283  At the same time, paradoxically, the public has ex-
pressed willingness for law enforcement agencies to have greater access
to information about individuals.284 The paradox might be explained by
279. UNITED NATIONS, STATISTICS DIVISION, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF OFFICIAL
STATISTICS (adopted 1994), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/statorg/FP-English.htm.
280. The Census Bureau's efforts to assure respondents that their data will be kept confidential
have increased in recent years. A brochure on privacy states that "The Census Bureau Has an Un-
broken Record of Protecting the Public's Privacy[,]" relating incidents when the Secret Service or
other agencies attempted to obtain individuals' census information and were denied. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS2000: THE CENSUS BUREAU GOES ALL OUT TO PROTECT YOUR
PRIVACY 2 (1999), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d3238c.pdf [hereinafter Census Goes All
Out]. It emphasizes that "[t]he Census Bureau's dedication to confidentiality plays an important role
in everything that it does-including hiring, training, planning procedures and reporting." Id. at I.
281. ELEANOR SINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT ON THE 1999-2000 SURVEYS OF PRIVACY
ATrITUDES 4 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/SPAN-SPA.pdf.
282. Id at 25.
283. Elizabeth A. Martin, Privacy Concerns and the Census Long Form: Some Evidence from
Census 2000, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL
ASSOCIATION (2001), available at http://www.amstat.org/sections/SRMS/Proceedings/
y200l/Proceed/00466.pdf. See also ELEANOR SINGER, CENSUS 2000 TESTING, EXPERIMENTATION,
AND EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC REPORT NO. 1, TR-I, PRIVACY RESEARCH IN CENSUS 2000 4-7
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/TR- I.pdf.
284. See, e.g., Gary Langer, Poll: Americans Believe Stopping Terror is More Important than
Privacy (2004), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/terror poll020610.html ("Seventy-
nine percent say it's more important right now to investigate terrorism, even if that means intruding
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a hypothesis that people are very protective of their own information
(their right to privacy) while wanting the government to have access to
others' data if they think that will lead to greater public safety. Never-
theless, the conflicting desires in the post-9/11 age to have greater pri-
vacy and greater security simultaneously necessitates a revised approach
to confidentiality of privately collected and government data.285
2. Statistical Accuracy and Ethics
One conclusion that can be drawn from the history we have pro-
vided is that statistical societies appear to have lagged behind both public
opinion and law in the call for greater confidentiality and privacy. The
clearest explanation for this appears to be that the statistical profession
rose in the early nineteenth century and took as its first challenge to cor-
rect the perceived deficiencies of prior censuses and other forms of data
collection. Faced with the deficiencies of these early censuses, espe-
cially that of 1840,286 statisticians formed societies in part to urge for
better practice in the conduct and review of the census.
Statisticians were particularly outraged at the use of the 1840 Cen-
sus to support pro-slavery arguments of high "Negro insanity. 287 Un-
able to correct the deficiencies and repugnance of these questions, statis-
ticians founded the ASA to, in part, lobby for a more appropriate 1850
Census.288 Faced with these kinds of disputes, it is hardly surprising that
on personal privacy. Just 18 percent say it's more important not to intrude on privacy, even if that
limits counterterrorism efforts."); Dalia Sussman, Poll. Vast Majority of Americans Say War on
Terror Isn't War on Them (2004), http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/
libertiespoll021001.html ("This continues a string of poll results in which most Americans have not
seen the government's anti-terrorism efforts as damaging their rights.").
285. An issue we take up with greater detail in another paper. See Sylvester & Lohr, supra note
4.
286. See Davis, supra note 36.
287. Albert Deutsch, The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840) and Its Use as Pro-Slavery
Propaganda, 15 BULL. HIST. MED. 469, 478-80 (1944). Sadly, Deutsch points out that the eugenic
and deficient bases for the claims of high levels of "Negro insanity" among free versus slaves, were
still prevalent into the mid twentieth century. According to Deutsch:
The flagrant, socially harmful errors of the 1840 census continued to be spread abroad
under the sanction of Congress. The errors repeatedly found their way into lay and pro-
fessional journals. In 1851 the American Journal ofInsanity--now the official organ of
the American Psychiatric Association, under the more recent title, American Journal of
Psychiatry-reprinted without comment a newspaper article, which stated: 'It is obvious,
from the following schedule (taken from the 1840 census), that there is an awful preva-
lence of idiocy and insanity among the free blacks over the whites, and especially over
the slaves.'
Id. at 478. The "findings" of the 1840 Census that free-blacks held a much higher insanity rate was
used in making the pro-slavery arguments that freed blacks were worse off than slaves. Id. at pas-
sim.
288. According to Davis:
Among the many voices raised, the most significant was that of the American Statistical
Association. Founded in 1839, the new organization was an active critic of the official
statistics on Negro insanity, data already being cited in the national controversy over
slavery. As the result of its futile struggle to get corrections made in the Census of 1840,
the Association became committed to the fight for a better census in 1850.
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early statistical societies had more pressing concerns about federal statis-
tical practice than confidentiality or privacy.
Indeed, for most of the nineteenth century, statisticians and statisti-
cal societies were inclined to focus their attention far more on improving
the accuracy and amount of gathered data than they were on the confi-
dentiality or privacy of individuals or their data. As already noted, early
statistical publications and statements consisted mainly of long tables,
analysis of data, and the basic conclusion that, to paraphrase, "if only we
could get more data we could really solve problem x."289 A widespread
view that statistics could cure numerous societal ills is found throughout
the earliest discussions of the profession. 290 Thus, writings of the period
focused more on reforming the practice of statistics, 291 urging greater
scientific method,292 or otherwise proposing reforms to increase statisti-
cal usefulness.293
Those associated with the census were also prone to waxing elo-
quently about the value of statistical analysis. In a speech given to the
ASA, Robert Porter, superintendent of the 1890 Census, defended the
Davis, supra note 36. See also Francis A. Walker, Remarks of President Walker at Washington, 5
PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 179, 183-84 (1897) (discussing Dr. Edward Jarvis' founding of the ASA
and his work "in connection with the ... statistics of the unfortunate classes, particularly the in-
sane.").
289. See Report ofAd Hoc Committee, supra note 155 and accompanying text.
290. Given the nascent nature of statistical societies, it is interesting to look at the writings
from other countries including Great Britain. For example, in an early address by an official of the
British Association (Economic Science and Statistics), it is declared that "There is scarcely a moral
art [that statistics] should not be able to take cognizance." Nassau W. Senior, Opening Address of
Nassau W. Senior, Esq., as President of Section F (Economic Science and Statistics), at the Meeting
of the British Association, at Oxford, 28th June, 1860, 23 J. STAT. SOC'Y LONDON 357, 361 (1860).
In a later address, another English statistician urged his fellows to:
[E]xtend the science which this Society was founded to promote. Statistics... is... in its
essence the science of politics without party colouring; it embraces all the affaires in
which governments, municipalities, local boards, and vestries are concerned. From this
bare announcement its transcendent importance is evident.
William Fan, Inaugural Address Delivered at the Society's Rooms, 12, St. James Square, London,
on Tuesday, 21st November, 1871 34 J. STAT. Soc'Y LOND. 409,409 (1871).
American statisticians, although writing later than their British counterparts, appear
equally enthused about the possibilities of statistical analysis for solving society's ills. Most writings
from the period initially remark on the American appetite for statistical society. See, e.g., Walker,
supra note 288, at 179 (For "the American people... the interest in facts and data of an authoritative
character is greater than anywhere else in the world .. "); Charles F. Pidgin, How to Make Statis-
tics Popular, 2 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 107, 107 (1890) (noting a letter from a distinguished statisti-
cian, that the United States "is hungry for information; everything of a statistical character, or even
of a statistical appearance, is taken up with an eagerness that is almost pathetic."); Henry C. Adams,
Statistics and Economics, an Outline of Statistical Science, with Especial Reference to the Use of
Statistics in Political Economy and Social Science, 1 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 216, 217 (1889) (book
review) ("In this country ... the popular demand for statistical information is constantly forcing the
government to undertake new lines of inquiry.").
291. See RICHMOND MAYO-SMITH, STATISTICS AND ECONOMICS: AN OUTLINE OF SCIENCE,
WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE USE OF STATISTICS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE (Guggenheimer, Weil & Co 1888).
292. See Farr, supra note 290, at 409.
293. See generally Walker, supra note 288 (urging statisticians to be more upfront about the
value of the statistics they collect).
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accuracy and methodology of government statistical practice.294 He was
especially proud of the new electronic tabulating machines (Hollerith)
which, he argued, for the first time enabled tabulation of statistics in any
manner imaginable. 295 He was particularly taken with the view that,
through technology and statistical analysis:
A card which means nothing to the uninitiated is converted into a
pauper or a criminal, whose sin and suffering are as palpable as if the
man himself were bodily present in the room. The groups into which
they are cast are like the divisions of an army from the corps to the
battalion. Under the mysterious influence of the electric current run-
ning through the machine, they organize themselves, as though pos-
sessed of volition, into these groups and sub-groups, with a precision
superior to that shown in any movement of disciplined troops at the
word of military command. I can compare this current to nothing
less intelligent and powerful than the voice of the archangel, which, it
is said, will call the dead to life and summon every human soul to
face his final doom.
29 6
Faced with such enthusiasm it is easy to see why the potential negatives
of statistical practice faded into the background. Indeed, Porter's com-
ments demonstrate how little the concept of confidentiality had changed
since 1810. At one point, Porter discussed how some had urged the 1890
Census to inquire into private economic matters, including mortgage
values.2 97 According to Porter, "[t]he amount of irritation which would
have been aroused ... cannot be estimated. The enumeration of the peo-
ple would have been endangered., 298 As in 1810, statisticians continued
to be concerned about the sensitivity of commercial data solely because
of the detrimental effect such inquiries may have on general data collec-
tion efforts.
Despite these early views about the infallibility or promise of statis-
tics, some tentative efforts at reform were undertaken. Such efforts,
however, focused more on reforming the science and administration of
statistical practice and did not, with rare exceptions, focus on the poten-
tial harms to privacy and confidentiality that would form the core of
more modem discussions. During the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury, for example, the ASA lobbied for a permanent office of the Census
Bureau,299 with the hope that this reform would reduce the inconsisten-
294. See Robert P. Porter, The Eleventh Census, 2 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 321, 322-24 (1891).
295. Id. at 330.
296. Id. at 339 (quoting "Mr. Wines").
297. Id. at 352-60.
298. Id. at 355.
299. American Statistical Association, Permanent Census Office, 7 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1,
1-3 (1901). Numerous other writings demonstrate that statisticians favored establishment of a per-
manent statistical bureau. Some were in favor of a government office and others for private institu-
tions. See Roland P. Falkner, Proposed Statistical Legislation, 3 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 69, 69-74
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
cies among statistics collected by different government agencies-a re-
form finally made real in 1902 with establishment of the permanent Cen-
sus Bureau. In his presidential address to the ASA in 1908, Carroll
Wright commented on the newly formed Census Bureau and focused on
the ethical obligation of the statistician to "tell the story of our present
state" that will "endure through all time., 30 0 The focus was, obviously,
to expand the power of statistics -there was no mention of regard for
the confidentiality or privacy of its subjects.
Concurrent publications continued to stress the importance of statis-
tical study for curing society's ills. The preponderance of articles pub-
lished in the first decades of the twentieth century continued to focus on
the inaccuracies and limitations of current statistics-urging for contin-
ued increases in available data and better methodologies to solve prob-
lems.301 Many early articles were devoted to social problems such as
poverty or family desertion, discussions with obvious confidentiality and
privacy implications, but the thrust of these writings was the need to
quantify and classify the problem more accurately-with little attention
paid to the privacy of the study's subjects.
For example, a 1907 article studying disadvantaged children in New
York was concerned with documenting child health problems and, in so
doing, required families under study to list their children's names.302 The
authors of the study did not view this as an intrusion into family privacy
and indeed seemed incredulous that "[m]any families were surprised that
their children's names should... [be] given ... [and] refused to answer
questions as to their living conditions. 30 3 Prominent statisticians also
continued to urge for greater and greater data collection. S.N.D. North,
for example, favored a census conducted every five years since "It has
come to be understood that among the first duties ... of a government to
the people whose welfare is in its keeping is their sanitary and hygienic
protection; and this duty cannot be effectively performed without the
intensive knowledge of the people which only a census affords. ' 3°
(1892) (favoring government census office); Pidgin, supra note 290, at 114 ("There should also be a
Central Statistical Bureau of the United States... organized on a private commercial basis.").
Falkner's article also includes mention of an interesting provision of the proposed statisti-
cal legislation he examined. He notes that the legislation sought to adopt a new method of inducing
compliance with a proposed census on property ownership and debt. According to Falkner, the
legislation included a "curious feature... a provision for the publication of the names of all persons
who refuse to answer the questions." Falkner, supra at 74.
300. Carroll D. Wright, Address of Carroll D. Wright, President of the American Statistical
Association, at its Annual Meeting in Boston, Jan. 17, 1908, 11 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1, 15
(1908).
301. See, e.g., Bradburn & Straf, supra note 269, at 321-25.
302. New York Committee on Physical Welfare of School Children, Physical Welfare of
School Children: An Examination of the Home Conditions of 1,400 New York School Children
Found by School Physicians to Have Physical Defects, 10 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 271 (1907).
303. Id. at 278.
304. S.N.D. North, Uniformity and Co-Operation in the Census Methods of the Republics of
the American Continent, 11 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 295, 298 (1908).
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Kate Holladay Claghorn, who, as mentioned earlier, was one of the
first persons to express concern for individual privacy in the statistical
literature, was also one of the first to express skepticism about the om-
nipotence of statistics.3 °5 Chiefly concerned with the living conditions
facing immigrants in New York, she was a proponent of statistics but
favored focusing on individual conditions in addition to aggregates.3 °6
As a result, she was suspicious of claims that statistics alone could im-
prove society or individual living conditions.3 °7 While registrar of re-
cords in the Tenement House of New York, Claghorn wrote an article,
The Limitations of Statistics,3" 8 in which she critiqued the prevailing
view that more careful collection of data could improve, for example,
government efficiency and effectiveness.30 9 Such views, according to
Claghorn, promised too much from statistical method and reflected "the
present rage for putting every conceivable thing in the shape of 'statis-
tics' and beginning every enterprise of any sort whatever with a long and
elaborate and costly research . ,,310
As statistical societies grew and statistical practice matured, the en-
thusiasm and hope that surrounded the discipline became tempered. The
limitations of statistics were reflected in many of these same writings-
with early twentieth century authors, while still hopeful of statistics'
promise, urging their peers to make statistics more popular,31 more eas-
ily understandable,31 2 or presented to the general public with more realis-
tic assessments about their accuracy or usefulness.3 13 In the end, it is not
surprising that statisticians did not view privacy or confidentiality as
essential concerns of statistical practice. It was not until the discipline
had, itself, matured and settled into political and scientific life that ques-
tions of effects and unintended harms crept into the discussion. What-
ever the beginnings of confidentiality and privacy in statistics, these so-
cieties and their practitioners have now become strong advocates for
increasing confidentiality and privacy protections in statistical practice.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have explored the history and practice of confi-
dentiality in data collection in the United States. By no means compre-
hensive, this review has nevertheless shed light on a number of important
305. See Kate Holladay Claghom, The Limitations of Statistics, 11 PUBL. AM. STAT. ASS'N 97,
97-98 (1908) (book review).
306. See generally Kate Holladay Claghorn, Immigration in its Relation to Pauperism, 24
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 187 (1904) (discussing relevant conditions facing an entire
population of immigrants and also highlighting individuals in the population).
307. See Claghorn, supra note 175, at 165-66.
308. Claghorn, supra note 305, at 97.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 101.
311. See Pidgin, supra note 290, at 115.
312. See Walker, supra note 288, at 180-81.
313. Id. at 185-86.
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policy and practical considerations for the future of government statisti-
cal programs. As we have discussed, initial government programs that
relied on voluntary data disclosures were met with high levels of indi-
vidual suspicion. Initial legislative responses that focused on public dis-
closures or criminal penalties in order to increase compliance were
largely unsuccessful precisely because they failed to address the underly-
ing problem-mistrust of governmental purpose.
Recent events have stirred currents of mistrust. In particular, pas-
sage of the so-called USA PATRIOT Act ("The Patriot Act") and its
provisions for abrogating the confidentiality of federally-held statistical
data may erode trust in statistical agencies. In another paper, we have
examined the role that The Patriot Act has played in eroding citizens'
trust in government.315 Numerous commentators and pollsters have also
chronicled the rise of mistrust among the American citizenr. 3 6  The
314. The full name of the act is the "United and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter "Patriot Act"]. The impact of the Patriot Act on statistical confidential-
ity is an issue we take up in greater detail in Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
315. Sylvester & Lohr, supra note 4.
316. A recent poll conducted by the Ponemon Institute, a private industry pollster, declared that
"the general public holds a relatively low or negative impression of various federal government
organizations that are presented in our survey." Thomas Claburn, Report: People Don't Trust Gov-
ernment To Protect Privacy, INFO. WEEK (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.informationweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 17700220 (quoting a survey of more than 6,300 Americans sponsored
by Carnegie Mellon University's CIO Institute). According to this survey, only 22% of Americans
felt favorably toward the Justice Department's treatment of individual privacy. Id. In addition, "Sub-
jects cited loss of civil liberties (64%), surveillance into personal life (63%), and monitoring of e-
mail and web activities (47%) as having the biggest impact on their privacy perceptions." Id.
According to one source, the level of individuals having "no trust" in government is
sharply on the increase even after 9/11. Press Release, Decision Analyst, Inc., Surprising Number of
Americans Say They Have No Trust In U.S. Government, Government Agencies, Survey Shows
(June 13, 2001), http://www.decisionanalyst.com/publ data/2001/Attitudes.asp (detailing that one in
seven Americans claim to have "no trust" in government). Other polls have shown that, despite some
rise in trust in matters of national security, high levels of distrust continue for issues of domestic
importance. See Gary Langer, Water's Edge Greater Trust in Government Limited to National
Security, Jan. 15, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/poll0I120115.html. In
addition, there is some poll evidence indicating rising distrust among younger Americans. Carl
Weiser, Survey: Young People Losing Trust in Government, Jan. 16, 2004, http://www.usatoday.
com/news/politicselections/nation/2004-01-16-youngvoters-gnsx.htm. See also John Samples,
Americans Don't Trust Big Government on Home Front, Says ABC Poll, Jan. 31, 2002,
http://www.cato.org/dailys/01-31-02.html; Garry Langer, Trust in Government . . . to do What?,
PUB. PERSP. July/Aug. 2002, at 7, passim; Robert J. Blendon et al., Changing Attitudes in America,
in WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT, 205, 206-07 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al, eds. 1997). But
see The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, Trust in Government Index 1948-
2002, http://www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a 5.htm (using proprietary index score, the
NES survey ranked trust in government as 27 in 1980, 29 in 1990, 34 in 1998, 36 in 2000, and 43 in
2002). The data is not entirely clear. Many surveys continue to show spikes of trust in government
following 9/11. For example, the National Election Studies group that seeks to poll individuals about
general attitudes toward government, including trust, have concluded that overall trust in govern-
ment is rising. The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, Trust the Federal Gov-
ernment 1958-2002, http://www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a-l.htm (indicating a large
recent increase in the percentage of people who trust the government "most of the time."). However,
it is not clear that these surveys account for differential areas of trust-where some may trust in
national security but not other areas. Other writers also indicate increased trust in government post-
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exact effect this rise in mistrust has or may have on government statisti-
cal programs is uncertain; however, the United States Census Bureau is
certainly aware of increased public concern about privacy and is trying to
preemptively reassure the public that information is kept completely con-
fidential and is never given to law enforcement agencies.1 7
In this article, we have related the evolution of the concept of pri-
vacy in law and the parallel concept of confidentiality in statistical prac-
tice. Current laws and codes of ethics reflect the times and mores during
which they were developed. Law has evolved to view privacy as a right;
all statistical codes of ethics now strongly assert that confidentiality of
respondents' information must be maintained.
We have seen, however, that confidentiality was not a prominent
feature of statistical codes of ethics until after the second wave of privacy
concern during the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, despite the nascent
computer technology, accessing confidential information or matching
records required a great deal of exertion: many records, for example,
could only be found by poring over files in a courthouse basement. The
ethical codes of statistical societies still reflect to some extent the as-
sumption that confidentiality will be breached primarily by deliberate
releases of information.
In light of recent events, this assumption is questionable. The data
company ChoicePoint, which performs data mining and manipulation on
19 billion data records for clients, was recently found to have sold data
on 145,000 people to a con artist.31 8 Mr. Oluwatosin paid for all of the
records and ordered them in small batches so as not to alert ChoicePoint
security systems.319 In March 2005, it was announced that criminals
used stolen passwords to obtain information on 32,000 persons in a data-
base owned by LexisNexis. 320 There are likely many other examples in
which unauthorized individuals have obtained confidential data but
where the perpetrators have not been caught. It is even possible, al-
though the Census Bureau maintains that it has a perfect record of main-
9/11. Virginia A. Chanley, Trust in Government in the Aftermath of 9/l 1: Determinants and Conse-
quences, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 469,471-73, 479 (2002).
317. The Census Bureau recently announced the appointment of its first Chief Privacy Officer,
and the launching of a new Data Stewardship Web Page. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Cen-
sus Bureau Names Gerald W. Gates as First Chief Privacy Officer (Mar. 1, 2005),
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/miscellaneous/004060.html. One of
the headings on the new web page is "Partnership and Trust": it is emphasized that "We honor
privacy, protect confidentiality, share our expertise globally, and conduct our work openly."
http://www.census.gov (follow "Data Protection & Privacy Policy " hyperlink; then follow "Partner-
ship and Trust" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
318. Greg Fulton et al., Are Your Secrets Safe? TIME, Mar. 7, 2005, at 46-47.
319. Id.
320. Ellen Simon, Data Broker Says Personal Records of 32,000 Vulnerable, EAST VALLEY
TRIB., Mar. 10, 2005, at B3, available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/technology/0503/12/tech-
113016.htm.
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taining confidentiality,32' that individuals have been identified by persons
who just have never been caught.
Much of the concern about privately collected data is also transfer-
able to data collected by the federal government. As Senator Patrick
Leahy stated regarding databanks collected by private entities:
The temptation will be more and more-especially in a polarized so-
ciety and a society where there is a fear, whether it's the Red Scare in
the fifties or terrorism in this century-to use those databanks.... At
some point it doesn't matter if they're private or public, at some point
they will be used by the government to determine who is a good
American and who is a bad American. Not determined through
prosecution, trial, but based on what came up on someone's computer
322screen.
In the end, we believe that a better understanding between lawyers
and statisticians about the tensions that arise between what is legal, what
is trust-enhancing, and what is statistically possible, provides an avenue
for both better legislative and statistical practice. We further posit that
legal regimes would be greatly improved if increased collaboration with
statisticians was included as an aspect of any new regulation about data
access and protection. Finally, we believe that federal statistical practice
should be subject to legal frameworks that more consciously approve of
statistical association codes of ethics for aiding in determinations con-
ceming appropriate data releases and anonymization techniques. At the
same time, we believe that there must be a legal shield protecting data
given under a pledge of confidentiality from being used to harm individ-
ual respondents.32 3
321. See Census Bureau Goes All Out, supra note 280 at 2. But see Bohme & Pemberton,
supra note 27, at 8. Bohme and Pemberton detail numerous possible breaches in confidentiality and
privacy at the Census Bureau. According to Bohmne and Pemberton, "Census confidentiality--or
perhaps the maintenance of privacy-left something to be desired in 1910." Id. The authors go on to
detail how "the Census Bureau ... permitted the public unrestricted access to the census records
from 1790 through 1880" and only restricted access to the later censuses because of difficulties in
binding and displaying the volumes. Id. at 9. During World War I, the Census Bureau provided
information to the "Department of Justice, local draft boards, and individuals.., in connection with
cases where the individuals had been arrested for draft evasion." Id. As they discuss, in 1917, the
Solicitor General, when asked about the propriety of using census data to aid in the draft, concluded:
[T]he Director of the Census might, in the exercise of his discretion, furnish to the offi-
cials in charge of the execution of the Selective Service Law, information in regard to the
names and ages of individuals, as it did not appear that any person would be harmed by
the furnishing of such information for the purpose for which it was desired.
Id. (citing Letter of E.R. Magie, Acting Solicitor, to the Secretary of Commerce (Jan. 15, 1920)).
Such breaches of confidentiality, although apparently legal, were also employed to aid in deportation
proceedings. Id. at 9-10. Of interest is the fact that strict confidentiality was given to economic data
as it had traditionally been since 1810. Id. at 2.
322. ROBERT O'HARROW, JR., No PLACE TO HIDE 33 (2005) (quoting Leahy on Dec 10, 2003).
323. For a fuller discussion of these conclusions and recommendations see Sylvester & Lohr,
supra note 4.
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Technological advances and sociological changes ultimately compel
rethinking some of the ethical underpinnings of modem statistical prac-
tice. Medical ethics guidelines developed during the early-to-mid twen-
tieth century have had to be updated and modified to adapt to genome-
based research and other scientific innovations. We are at a similar point
with the statistical codes of ethics. It is important to see that they devel-
oped in response to the particular technological and popular concerns of
the 1970s. To stay relevant, the ethical codes now need to be updated to
deal with today's problems, and statistical societies need to continue
encouraging scientific work on confidentiality protection. In this en-
deavor, statisticians can benefit from a better understanding of the con-
cepts of privacy codified in law.
It was not widely noted at the time, but 1890 marked a turning point
in the conception of legal and statistical privacy. As we have demon-
strated, after 1890 legal and statistical disciplines implemented changes
that both responded to and spurred new notions of individual privacy and
human dignity. It is widely known that the advent of new technologies
and the increase of urbanization compelled much of the legal change we
note. Statisticians, however, were equally affected by new technologies
at the end of the nineteenth century. In particular, 1890 saw the intro-
duction of the Hollerith machines used to tabulate data in the United
States Census.324 Although primitive by today's standards, the Hollerith
machines inaugurated the computer age of information processing-
greatly increasing the efficiency and potential of government data analy-
sis. Of course, these same potentials carried with them the spectre of
increased dangers to privacy and confidentiality. As technology
changed, so statistical societies, as in law, sought to arrange their affairs
to deal with the new potentials and threats. We believe that the United
States is at a similar point in its history-where technology creates both
potentials and dangers for statistical practice and individual privacy. In
this new era of unprecedented access to information about individuals
and unprecedented need for reliable data about society, we must be wary
of clinging to tried and true methods without deeper analysis. We must
be prepared to consider new policies, practices, codes, and regulations to
seek the best solutions to the problems we face. Ultimately, we believe
this cannot be done by either discipline in isolation from the other.
324. See Joel Shurkin, ENGINES OF THE MIND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER FROM
MAINFRAMES TO MICROPROCESSORS 78 (1996).
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ROPER V. SIMMONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
There is a gap between the United States and the much of the world
on the issue of capital punishment.' Legal systems across the globe have
employed the death penalty since the beginnings of civilization, 2 and
colonial America inherited the practice from its British forefathers.3
Formerly, these multinational origins fostered concurrence on the ethi-
cality of capital punishment. Hence, when the framers of the United
States Constitution crafted the Eighth Amendment's 4 ban on "cruel and
unusual punishments," the death penalty fell outside of the Amendment's
ambit as capital punishment was deemed morally acceptable by both
American society and international standards.5 However, in the last few
decades, this common path has split.6 A global movement has emerged
that rejects capital punishment, compelling much of the world to abolish
its use.7 The United States has not embraced this movement as fully; and
the United States Supreme Court's slow abrogation of death penalty laws
under the Eighth Amendment has not matched the enthusiasm of its in-
ternational brethren.8  Consequently, a significant disparity has arisen
between the United States and the international community.9 This dis-
parity has played a volatile role in Supreme Court deliberations as the
Court has struggled to define what part, if any, international law should
have in the Court's decisions regarding capital punishment.
Recently, in Roper v. Simmons,'0 the United States Supreme Court
abolished the juvenile death penalty." The United States' use of the
1. See William A. Schabas, International Law and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, in
BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 178, 210 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
2. Jeffery M. Banks, Student Article, In Re Stanford: Do Evolving Standards of Decency
Under Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Render Capital Punishment Inapposite for Juvenile Of-
fenders?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 327, 338 (2003).
3. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1085, 1092 (2002).
4. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
5. Koh, supra note 3, at 1091-92.
6. See Franklin E. Zimring, Postscript: The Peculiar Present of American Capital Punish-
ment, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 212, 213 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
7. Koh, supra note 3, at 1093-95. The recent swell of international opinion against capital
punishment flows from an "international human rights movement" triggered by the horrors of the
Holocaust and World War II. Id. at 1092-93. This movement has realized abolition throughout
Europe and much of the world. See id. at 1094-95. Currently, a total of 120 countries have abol-
ished the death penalty in law or practice. Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death
Penalty, http://www.amnesty.org (follow "Campaigns" hyperlink; then follow "The Death Penalty"
hyperlink; then follow "Facts and Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Facts and Figures on the Death
Penalty" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Amnesty International Facts & Figures].
8. Dana L. Bogie, Note, Life or Death? The Death Penalty in the United States and the New
Republic of South Africa, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 229, 245 (1996).
9. Schabas, supra note 1, at 196.
10. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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juvenile death penalty emphasized its isolation from the international
community. The juvenile death penalty has been roundly condemned by
the international community; and before Roper, the United States re-
mained one of only seven countries in the world that continued the prac-
tice. 12 Thus, the Court's decision in Roper was made in the presence of
an unavoidable tension between the United States and the world commu-
nity. 13 In Roper, the Court not only acknowledged this tension but did so
with a discussion of international law more extensive than any previous
majority opinion regarding capital punishment.' 4  Therefore, Roper's
significance extends beyond the fact it abolished the juvenile death pen-
alty; Roper also marks a growing appreciation within the Court for the
validity of international law.
This comment will explore the history of international law in Eighth
Amendment analyses, its use in Roper, and the ramifications Roper's use
of international law could have for future Court decisions. Part I of this
comment will explain the history of international law within Eighth
Amendment analyses. Part II will review the cases that led up to Roper.
Part III will discuss the Roper decision itself. Part IV will examine the
Court's use of international law in Roper and argue why it was appropri-
ate. Part V will analyze the effect international law might have on the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part VI will consider
the implications Roper has for the use of international law in future Court
decisions.
I. THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSES
The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.' 15 The Eighth Amendment's omission of precisely what "cruel
and unusual punishments" it forbids has obliged judges to more specifi-
cally define its parameters. 16 Through the Court's gradual refinement of
the Eighth Amendment's criterions, it has established that to satisfy the
Amendment a punishment must be deemed unacceptable by society's
11. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
12. Id. at 1198-99.
13. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 196 (stating that in 1999 the Sub-commission on the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights adopted a resolution that condemned the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by those under eighteen; this resolution specifically referred to
the United States).
14. The majority's discussion of international law in Roper uses 1,183 words, see Roper, 125
S. Ct. at 1198-1200. The only other majority opinions that come close to having such a long discus-
sion of international law are Trop v. Dulles at 153 words, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100,
102-03 (1958), and Stanford v. Kentucky at 151 words, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369
n. 1 (1989) (word counts include footnotes).
15. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
16. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (noting that the Constitution's
Framers delegated the task of defining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment to future
generations ofjudges).
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"evolving standards of decency." 17  The Court has consulted interna-
tional law to determine where this "standard of decency" rests, and occa-
sionally placed foreign sources of law alongside other indicia within a
"national consensus." 18
A. Evolving Standards of Decency and International Law
For eighty years, the Supreme Court looked backwards to try and
attune its assessment of what was cruel and unusual with societal stan-
dards existing at the time of the Eighth Amendment's adoption.' 9 The
Court's antiquated perception limited the Amendment's power to prohib-
iting only "inhuman and barbarous" tortures such as beheading, quarter-
ing, and crucifixion. 20 Then, in Weems v. United States,2' the Court de-
clared that what is cruel and unusual should not be bound to archaic and
"obsolete" ideas.2 2 Weems established that what is cruel and unusual is
not necessarily measured by a static standard, but rather can be altered by
the public's shifting opinions of what is "humane justice. 23 This notion
that what is cruel and unusual is perpetually changing was ensconced
into Supreme Court jurisprudence by Trop v. Dulles.2 4
In Trop, the Court considered whether a statute that stripped the Pe-
titioner of his United States citizenship as punishment for wartime deser-
tion constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment. 25 Here, the Court rea-
soned that the Constitution's vitality was intertwined with society's con-
temporary attitudes.26 Accordingly, what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment must be gauged by "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. 27 Moreover, this standard does
not necessarily spring solely from American conceptions of "decency. 2 8
The Court concluded that the impugned law was unconstitutional after
noting that statelessness is "a condition deplored in the international
community of democracies," evidenced by a survey of eighty-four na-
tions of whom only two "imposed denationalization as a penalty for de-
sertion."29 The Court's acknowledgement of international norms estab-
17. Richard Heisler, The Kids Are Alright: Roper v. Simmons and the Juvenile Death Penalty
After Atkins v. Virginia, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 25, 31-32 (2004).
18. See Coker v Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 n.21 (2002).
19. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1972).
20. Furman, 408 U.S. at 264-65 (citing to Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878); In re
Kemmler 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890)).
21. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
22. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
23. Id. Weems also set down another new test to guide Eighth Amendment analysis called the
"proportionality test." Under the proportionality test a punishment must be proportional to the crime
committed, or it is cruel and unusual. See id. at 367.
24. Heisler, supra note 17, at 32. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
25. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87, 99.
26. Id. at 100-01, 103.
27. Id. at 101.
28. See id. at 102-03.
29. Id.
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lished that an analysis of "standards of decency" is not limited to domes-
tic indicia but can include foreign sources as well.
The idea that a punishment's "cruelty" must be judged in light of
evolving standards of decency has guided the Court since Trop.30 How-
ever, in death penalty decisions arising between Trop and Roper v. Sim-
mons,31 the Court has only intermittently sprinkled international law into
this evolving standard of decency, often as little more than an after-
thought.32 Hence, until recently, international law's overall effect on
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been minimal.
B. The National Consensus and International Law
After Trop, the Court aggregated various tests of society's "stan-
dards of decency" into a "national consensus., 33 National and state leg-
islative activity is the foremost indicator of a national consensus. 4
However, the Court has considered other factors in determining the na-
tional consensus, and it is there that the Court has sometimes placed in-
ternational law.35
II. THE CASES LEADING UP To ROPER V. SIMMONS36
After World War II, societies in the United States and around the
world began to seriously question the efficacy and morality of the death
penalty. 37 In the United States, this movement raised doubts about the
death penalty that resulted in a seemingly mercurial standard of decency.
This standard urged the Court to abolish the death penalty in Furman v.
Georgia, 38 but then compelled the Court to uphold the death penalty
only four years later in Gregg v. Georgia.39 Since Gregg, the Court has
30. See Heisler, supra note 17, at 30-32.
31. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
32. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830-31 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 n.10 (1977).
33. See Heisler, supra note 17, at 32-33.
34. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. This national consensus is central to the Court's interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment; however, the Court has repeatedly stated that it retains the right to dis-
agree with modem indicia if they do not comport with the underlying principles of the Eighth
Amendment. See id. at 1185; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; Coker, 433 U.S. at
597.
35. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.l0. In the national consensus
the Court has also included (1) the frequency with which a punishment has been used within the
States that permit it, see Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-93; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; (2) the official opin-
ions of professional organizations, see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; (3) the attitudes of various
religious communities, id.; and, (4) public opinion polls, id.
36. 125 S. Ct. 1183.
37. See Koh, supra note 3, at 1093-94.
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ("The progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the infliction
of death demonstrate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment...
Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
39. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ("[lI]t is now evident that a large proportion of American society
continues to regard [the death penalty] as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction." Id. at
179.).
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discerned a stabilization of the United States' standards of decency that
reflects a crawling trend against capital punishment. Accordingly, the
Court has moved with stuttering momentum to abolish the death penalty
among various classes of criminals.40
Meanwhile, the international community has consistently outpaced
the United States in abolishing death penalty practices, 4 1 and the conse-
quential alienation of the United States42 has stirred controversy within
the Court.43  Hence, the Court has vacillated as to whether the interna-
tional community's stance is relevant: the Court has alternately cited
international law as an affirmation of the Court's decisions, 44 overtly
dismissed international law as an inappropriate element within Eighth
Amendment analyses, 45 or ignored international law altogether. 46  The
Court's inconsistent application has frustrated the potential of interna-
tional law to become a significant and reliable factor in Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Four of the Court's decisions since Gregg bear par-
ticular significance to Roper and reflect the Court's shifting attitudes
towards international law.
A. Thompson v. Oklahoma
Fifteen year-old petitioner William Wayne Thompson first brought
the question of the juvenile death penalty's constitutionality to the Court
in Thompson v. Oklahoma.47 Thompson was a convicted murderer who
had been sentenced to die.48 In Thompson, the Court found that eighteen
States' bans on executions for juveniles under sixteen, and the scarcity of
such executions during the twentieth century reflected a national consen-
40. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded violates
the Eighth Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the execu-
tion of offenders fifteen years-old and younger violates the Eighth Amendment); Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding that capital punishment of the criminally insane vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding that capital
punishment for felony-murder criminals violates the Eighth Amendment); Coker, 433 U.S. at 600
(holding that capital punishment for rape is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
41. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 210.
42. Zimring, supra note 6, at 215.
43. The controversy within the Court over the United States' estrangement from the world in
its death penalty practices dates as far back as Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), when
Justice Goldberg objected to the Court's denial of certiorari to hear the case of a Petitioner sentenced
to death for rape. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889. Here, Justice Goldberg stated: "I would grant certiorari
in this case .... [i]n light of the trend both in this country and throughout the world against punish-
ing rape by death." Id. And the controversy has manifested as recently as 2002 when the Court
denied a stay to a seventeen year-old Petitioner sentenced to death in Patterson v. Texas. Patterson
v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984 (2002). Justice Stevens' dissent in Patterson echoes Justice Goldberg:
"Given the apparent consensus that exists among the States and in the international community
against the execution of a capital sentence imposed on a juvenile offender, I think it would be appro-
priate for the Court to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity." Patterson, 536 U.S. at 984 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
44. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
45. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n. 1 (1989).
46. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
47. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23.
48. Id.
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sus that objected to capital punishment of those fifteen and younger.4 9
The Court affirmed this conclusion by recognizing it was "consistent
with the views that have been expressed ... by other nations that share
our Anglo-American heritage., 50 Thompson abolished the death penalty
for juveniles fifteen and younger, but its limited ruling did not encom-
pass the execution of sixteen and seventeen year-olds; thus, the question
lingered if Thompson would soon impel the Court to strike down this
practice as well. 51
B. Stanford v. Kentucky
The Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of capital punishment for
sixteen and seventeen-year olds a year later in Stanford v. Kentucky.
52
Here, the Court found no indications that the practice offended evolving
standards of decency.53 Fifteen states had explicitly banned the practice,
but this was not sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus that it was
immoral.54 Further, the Court explicitly dismissed the notion that inter-
national law had any bearing on its evolving standards of decency analy-
sis.
5
C. Penry v. Lynaugh56 and Atkins v. Virginia
The same day it decided Stanford, the Court addressed whether
capital punishment for the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual in
Penry v. Lynaugh.57 Like Thompson, the Court found no national con-
sensus objecting to the practice and ruled it did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.58 In Penry, the Court's discussion of the Eighth Amend-
ment did not mention international law.
Twelve years later, the Court reexamined the practice of executing
the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia.59 Now, the Court held that
evolving standards of decency did oppose executing the mentally re-
tarded. 60 Eighteen states had banned capital punishment for the mentally
retarded since Penry, signifying a new national consensus. 61 Moreover,
the Court rejected Stanford's notion that international law was irrelevant
and armored its national consensus with the posture of the world com-
munity who "overwhelmingly disapproved" of executing mentally re-
49. See id. at 826-29, 832-33.
50. Id. at 830.
51. See id. at 838.
52. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
53. Id. at 377.
54. Id. at 370-73.
55. Id. at 370 n.1.
56. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
57. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
58. Id.
59. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
60. Id. at 316.
61. Id. at 314-15.
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tarded offenders.6 2 Hence, the Court declared the execution of the men-
tally retarded to be "cruel and unusual. 63 The Court's acknowledgment
of international law in Atkins foreshadowed the approach it would take in
Roper.
III. ROPER V. SIMMONS64
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court reversed Stanford v. Kentucky.6 5
The Court found capital punishment for sixteen and seventeen year-old
offenders unconstitutional and thereby abolished the juvenile death pen-
alty. 66 This reversal, sixteen years after Stanford, was compelled by re-
cent legislative enactments 67 and international law 68 from which the
Court ascertained a new crest of modern decency.
A. Case History
Christopher Simmons was a seventeen year-old living in Missouri
when, with two friends, he formulated a plan to rob and murder a se-
lected victim.69 On the morning of September 9, 1993, Simmons and an
accomplice broke into the home of forty-six-year old Shirley Crook. °
The two youths undressed Crook, bound her hands, and taped her eyes
and mouth closed v.7 Crook was forced into her own mini-van, which the
youths drove to a railroad trestle that crossed a river; there the youths
placed a towel over Crook's head, hogtied her with cord, pushed her into
the river, and left.72 Later that day, fishermen found Crook's corpse. 3
B. Procedural History
Simmons was arrested and confessed to killing Crook; a trial court
found him guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.74
Simmons appealed his sentence to the Missouri Supreme Court, and the
Court was compelled to reconsider his case by Atkins v. Virginia' S7 cri-
76 oteria. In view of Atkins, the Court concluded that evolving standards of
decency had shifted since Stanford; the new national consensus con-
demned the execution of juveniles.77 This consensus was demonstrated
62. Id. at 316 n.21.
63. Id. at 316.
64. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
65. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
66. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197-98.
67. See id. at 1192-94.
68. See id. at 1198-99.
69. Id. at 1187.
70. Heisler, supra note 17, at 44-45.
71. Id. at45.
72. Id. at 45-46.
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id.
75. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
76. Heisler, supra note 17, at 47-48.
77. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 409 (Mo. 2003).
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by recent legislation among states banning the juvenile death penalty and
the fact that international opinion crushingly opposed the practice.
78
Accordingly, the Court declared the juvenile death penalty a violation of
the Eighth Amendment and commuted Simmons' death sentence to life
imprisonment without parole. 79  The Attorney General of Missouri ap-
pealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court.80  The Court
granted certiorari in January, 2005.1
C. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme
Court's ruling and declared that modem standards of decency reject the
juvenile death penalty.82  The Court's conclusion hinged on the fact that
thirty states had abolished the juvenile death penalty.8 3 Also, as in At-
kins, the Court bolstered its conclusion with a discussion of international
law. 4 The Court noted that juvenile execution is prohibited by Article
Thirty-Seven of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child8 5 and the practice defies the "overwhelming weight of internationalopinion.,86 Of particular importance was the experience of the United
Kingdom: the Constitution's Framers modeled the Eighth Amendment
after a provision in the United Kingdom's English Declaration of Rights;
however, the United Kingdom had abolished the juvenile death penalty
within its own borders fifty-seven years before Roper.8 7 The Court fur-
78. Heisler, supra note 17, at 52-53.
79. State ex rel. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413.
80. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198, 1200.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1200. The Court's independent proportionality review was also important to its
decision in Roper. In its proportionality analysis, the Court found that juveniles' impulsive natures,
undeveloped identities, and their inability to escape negative influences make them less likely than
adults to posses an "irretrievably depraved character" incapable of reform. Id. at 1195-96. Facing
this fact, the Court concluded that juveniles' circumstances result in a diminished level of moral
culpability that was exceedingly likely to be disproportionate to the punishment of death. Id. Also, a
juvenile's inherently volatile character minimized the probability of the death penalty's deterrence.
Id. at 1196. In light of this proportionality analyses, the Court concluded that "a line must be drawn,
and those under eighteen were ineligible for capital punishment." Id at 1197-98.
83. Id. at 1192-93. To reach this conclusion the Court discarded Stanford's assumption that a
national consensus was comprised only of the eighteen States that had explicitly rejected the death
penalty for juveniles. See id at 1193. Now, the Court included the twelve states that had abolished
the death penalty altogether. This approach deduced that thirty states opposed the juvenile death
penalty. Id. at 1193. However, of these States, only five had explicitly abolished the juvenile death
penalty since Stanford. Id. The Court conceded these five States did not mark an overt change in
the national consensus, but nevertheless found their abolition compelling because, "[i]t is not so
much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."
Id. (citing to Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
84. See id at 1198-99.
85. Id. at 1199. The Court also noted that Article Thirty-Seven of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by every country in the world except the United
States and Somalia. Id. (citing to Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r025.htm).
86. Id. at 1199-1200.
87. Id. ("The Amendment was modeled on a parallel provision in the English Declaration of
Rights of 1689, which provided: '[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required nor excessive Fines
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ther observed that the United States remained one of only seven coun-
tries that had executed juveniles since 1990, accompanied in its practice
by Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and China.88 The length and depth of the Court's discussion of
international law surpasses any previous Eighth Amendment case.8 9
D. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, took issue with the majority's con-
tentions that a national consensus rejected the juvenile death penalty and
that juries were unqualified to deliver such a sentence. 90 However, Jus-
tice O'Connor did reaffirm the jurisprudence behind the majority's ac-
knowledgment of international opinion, stating that the Eighth Amend-
ment's "special character" justified the Court's use of international law.91
2. Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent, was less generous than Justice O'Connor. Jus-
tice Scalia belittled the methods the majority used to arrive at a national
consensus. 92 He furthermore cast off the majority's acknowledgement of
international opinion and declared, "The premise ... that American law
should conform to the laws ... of the world ought to be rejected out of
hand., 93 Nor did Justice Scalia approve of the majority's recognition of
the United Kingdom's laws, warning that "if we took the Court's direc-
tive seriously," the Court might engage in absurdities such as curtailing a
defendant's right to a jury trial because, like juvenile capital punishment,
that too has been diminished in the United Kingdom.
94
IV. THE COURT'S USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ROPER V. SIMMONS
9 5
Justice Scalia's biting criticism of the majority's use of international
law fails in two respects: first, it ignores the Court's venerated history of
recognizing international law in its decisions; second, it overlooks the
invaluable insight international law can provide in Eighth Amendment
analyses.
imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted."') (citing to English Declaration of Rights,
1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2, § 10 (Eng.)).
88. Id. at 1199.
89. See id. at 1197-98.
90. Id. at 1207-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1215-16.
92. Id. at 1217-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1226.
94. Id. at 1228.
95. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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A. The Tradition of International Law in Eighth Amendment Analyses
In fortifying Roper v. Simmons' evolving standards of decency
analysis with the principles of the international community, the majority
was following a long established tradition of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. The Court has appreciated the validity of international law in
rulings as far back as Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 96 in which the
Court declared that if possible a court must never construe law of the
United States in violation of "the law of nations. 97 Chief Justice Mar-
shall supported McCulloch v. Maryland's98 landmark ruling with the
weight of international opinion.99 Marshall further declared in The Ne-
reide'00 that lacking domestic statutory guidance the Court was "bound
by the law[s] of [other] nation[s]."'' And in The Paquete Habana,10 2 the
Court announced that "international law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice.,
103
Underlying the Court's recognition of international law are the legal
foundations the United States shares with other countries and the com-
mon realities they confront.1 4 Fundamental to the Bill of Rights, the
United States Constitution, and United States common law are ideas bor-
rowed from foreign legislatures, judiciaries, and intellectuals.'0 5 At the
country's inception, the ubiquitous nature of customary laws, like lex
mercatoria,10 6 precluded United States courts from distinguishing be-
tween international and domestic law; inevitably they often weaved in-
96. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
97. See The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
98. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
99. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405 ("If any one proposition could command the uni-
versal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government of the Union, though
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action.").
100. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
101. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 423.
102. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
103. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
104. See generally Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
265 (2003) (discussing how international law and foreign sources can assist interpretations of the
United States Constitution by providing empirical data, insight from parallel rules, and a source of
community standards).
105. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199 (stating that the Eighth Amendment was modeled after a
provision of the English Declaration of Rights); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 109-13 (2d ed. 1985) (1973) (explaining how the United States' common law was
strongly influenced by English common law); PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 20 (Penguin Books 2000) (1999) (implying that James Madison's construction of the U.S.
Constitution was influenced by the governments of ancient Greece, the Swiss Confederation of
independent cantons, and the United Provinces of the Netherlands); BERNARD SCHWARTZ &
ROBERTO L. CORRADA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 65 (5th ed., Aspen Publishers, Inc.
2001) (1923) (stating that British intellectual John Locke's ideas about legislative delegation of
power heavily influenced the framers of the U.S. Constitution); Lord Gordon Slynn, The Develop-
ment of Human Rights in the United Kingdom, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 477, 478-79 (2005)
(stating that the English Magna Carta created the foundation for the U.S. concept of due process of
law).
106. Lex mercatoria is "transnational common law." Jean R. Sternlight & Judith Resnik,
Foreword, Competing and Complementary Rule Systems: Civil Procedure and ADR., 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV 481,485 (2005).
[Vol. 83:1
2005] ROPER V. SIMMONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 219
ternational law into their rulings. 10 7  Therefore, although each country
matures in a way that reflects its unique circumstances, the United States
legal system is anchored by many of the same legal concepts that sustain
other societies. 10 8 Furthermore, as the United States and other civilized
countries have progressed along their respective paths, they have been
thrust into common realities by shared technologies, universal religions,
transnational cultural movements, and converging military conflicts.'
0 9
The Court has acknowledged the relevance of these familiar situations,
consulted the international community for insight, and found its guidance
particularly helpful with constitutional notions that implicitly suggest
review within a societal context such as "due process of law" and "cruel
and unusual punishment."110
107. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 45
(2004).
108. See id. at 45-46. Justice Scalia has argued that this fact does not justify the Court's use of
international law. See Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997). Justice Scalia con-
tends that while foreign sources influenced many of the concepts embedded within the United States
Constitution, the system of government created under the Constitution is inimitable and inherently
incompatible with foreign laws and experiences. See id. ("We think such comparative analysis
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the
task of writing one."). Scalia is correct that the United States enjoys a unique society and system of
governance; however, he does not explain why the Court cannot consult international law for guid-
ance while keeping the United States' unique qualities in view. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Nor does Scalia explain why the Court cannot learn from foreign experiences that
parallel the United States', but dismiss foreign experiences that are incompatible with the United
States'. See id. ("We are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there
may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own. But their
experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a
common legal problem.").
109. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. See Koh, supra note 107, at 46. Some commentators argue that this "societal context"
actually makes international law irrelevant as an interpretive tool in Eighth Amendment cases. See
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57,
59-60 (2004). These commentators cite the "international countermajoritarian difficulty" and con-
tend that foreign sources are inappropriate to understanding the Eighth Amendment within a societal
context because Eighth Amendment analysis hinges on a majoritarian paradigm-the national con-
sensus. Id. This argument posits that by allowing international opinions into the national consensus,
the Supreme Court is allowing foreign opinions to filter into what is intended to be an assessment of
strictly domestic indicia of public opinion. Id. The "international countermajoritarian difficulty"
argument fails in that it balances on the false perception that determining a "national consensus" is
the sole factor in Eight Amendment analyses; and accordingly, an Eighth Amendment analysis is a
simple majoritarian tally. The Court's emphasis on the "national consensus" in Eighth Amendment
decisions implies that the national consensus is a substantial factor in the Court's considerations.
However, the Court has explicitly stated that its "own judgment 'is brought to bear' on whether the
conclusions of the national consensus accord with Eighth Amendment principles; thus, in effect, the
national consensus must be approved by the Court. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002)
(citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)). See also Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1185; Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). Therefore, Eighth Amendment interpretation does not hinge on a
majoritarian paradigm; rather, Eighth Amendment application is ultimately controlled by the Court's
own assessments of evolving standards of decency; these assessments have embraced the relevancy
of international law since Trop. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958). Cf Koh, supra note
107, at 55 ("[T]his argument ["the international countermajoritarian difficulty"] assumes that the job
of judges construing the Constitution is to give expression to majoritarian impulses, when their long
settled role ... has been to apply enduring principles of law to evolving circumstance without regard
to the will of shifting democratic majorities.").
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International opinion first emerged as an applicable factor in Eighth
Amendment interpretation in Trop v. Dulles, where the Court looked to
the "civilized nations of the world" to advise its appraisal of evolving
standards of decency."' The Court echoed this practice in Coker v.
Georgia, Enmund v. Florida, and Thompson v. Oklahoma."2 But in
Stanford v. Kentucky," 3 the Court eschewed the notion that international
opinion was significant in Eighth Amendment analyses.1 14  Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority stated, "We emphasize that it is the
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the con-
tention . . . that the sentencing practices of other countries are rele-
vant."'115 So, for over a decade, international opinion disappeared from
the Court's considerations of the Eighth Amendment. Then, in Atkins v.
Virginia, the Court reclaimed its prerogative to consult international
opinion and recognized the world community's "overwhelming disap-
proval" of executing mentally retarded offenders. 16  Thus, Justice
Scalia's disallowance of international law in Roper collapses in the face
of precedent: the Court has acknowledged the benefit of using foreign
authorities in constitutional interpretation since its beginnings and has
employed international law within Eighth Amendment analyses as far
back as Trop'" and as recently as Atkins. "8
B. Why Roper's Consideration of International Law Makes Sense
Tradition itself does not imbue a rule with vitality; a relevant rule
must retain efficacy in a contemporary application; therefore, it is worth
putting aside precedent to consider the reasoning behind Roper's dis-
sent."19 In his dissent, Justice Scalia declared that the "premise ... that
American law should conform to the laws. . . of the world ought to be
rejected out of hand."'' 20 This statement mirrors his dissent in Thompson:
"The views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through
the Constitution."' 2' Justice Scalia is correct that imposing the views of
other nations upon the United States through the power of the Supreme
Court would be a dangerous undertaking. 22 The Constitution and the
Eighth Amendment were established to guide American society; accord-
111. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03.
112. 487 U.S. 815, 830-31(1988).
113. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
114. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n. 1 (1989).
115. Id.
116. Atkins, 536U.S. at316n.21.
117. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03).
118. Atkins, 536U.S. at316n.21.
119. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is...
revolting if the grounds upon which [a law]... was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.").
120. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1225-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ingly, flexible concepts like evolving standards of decency take their
cues from the American people. 12 3 If these concepts were infiltrated and
modeled after an international opinion incongruent with America's own
beliefs Justice Scalia would indeed be admonishing a significant threat to
the United States' autonomy. However, Justice Scalia's contention that
the Roper decision is a vehicle to inflict international law on the United
States legal system shrugs off the majority's actual use of international
opinion. 124  Roper's ruling is not the result of international coercion;
rather, only after it conducted its own evolving standards and proportion-
ality analyses, did the majority consult the world community.125 More-
over, the majority realized it has an obligation to consider international
law when interpreting "cruel and unusual punishment," an expression
whose use predates the United States' 26 and whose fundamental nature
has long been reflected by the values of "the civilized nations of the
world.' l2 7 Absurd as a Court might be that "[imposes] the views of other
nations ... upon Americans through the Constitution,"'' 28 equally absurd
would be a Court that eschews the legal acumen of foreign countries, but
also pretends to thoroughly understand a concept whose modem applica-
tion is informed by international notions of civility.
29
Justice Scalia was further troubled by the majority's statement that
the United Kingdom's ban on the juvenile death penalty "bears particular
relevance here."' 30  Justice Scalia pointed out that the United Kingdom
has different laws than the United States regulating jury trials, thus, "If
we took the Court's directive seriously, we would also . . . curtail our
right to jury trial in criminal cases.' 3' Here, Justice Scalia assumes the
majority's rationale, if followed to its logical end, prescribes the haphaz-
ard incorporation of international law into United States jurisprudence.
32
123. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
124. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (noting that world opinion is not controlling in its decision).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1199 (stating that the Eighth Amendment was modeled after a provision in the
English Declaration of Rights enacted in 1689).
127. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03.
128. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a
Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, Address, in 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 383, 387
(1994). Justice Blackmun stated:
Refusing to consider international practice in construing the Eighth Amendment is con-
venient for a Court that wishes to avoid conflict between the death penalty and the Con-
stitution. But it is not consistent with this Court's established construction of the Eighth
Amendment. If the substance of the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the 'evolving stan-
dards of decency' of the civilized world, there can be no justification for limited judicial
inquiry to the opinions of the United States. Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, no
less than that of treaties and statutes, should be informed by a decent respect for the
global opinions of mankind.
Id.
130. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1227-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1228.
132. See id.
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Justice Scalia ignores the majority's actual use of international law. 133 By
acknowledging international law, the majority did not advocate that the
Court indiscriminately embrace -legal concepts because they are favored
by the international community any more than Justice Scalia, by his dis-
missal of international law, was contending that the Court indiscrimi-
nately reject legal concepts because they are favored by the international
community. 134 Instead, the majority recognized that if an overwhelming
number of countries with whom the United States shares basic mores
disavow a particular practice, their rejections give rise to question
whether that practice comports with America's own standards of de-
cency. 35 Likewise, if the United States finds itself upholding a practice
that is endorsed only by nations whose values are glaringly dissimilar to
its own, that too is a reason to question whether that practice abides by
American standards of decency. 1
36
The issue of juvenile execution provided the majority with an ideal
context to apply this reasoning. Not only did countries with whom the
United States shares historic ties "overwhelmingly disapprove" of the
juvenile death penalty, the United States' only international counterparts
in the practice - Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo, and China - are nations that hold many
fundamental values strikingly different than the United States'. 137 This
conspicuous association called into question whether the juvenile death
penalty accorded with America's own moral principles. 138 Therefore, the
majority soundly reasoned that it was compelled to find "confirmation"
from members of the international community with whom the United
States does share like values, not only to advise its own assessment of
modem standards of decency, but to emphasize the universality of the
fundamental rights that underlie America's convictions of justice and
sustain its dignity. 1
39
133. Id. at 1198.
134. See id. at 1198-99. See also Koh, supra note 107, at 56. Koh notes that:
What this claim misunderstands is that those who advocate the use of international and
foreign sources in U.S. constitutional interpretation are not urging U.S. courts to defer
automatically to some kind of global 'nose count.' Instead, they are suggesting that prac-
tices of other mature democracies-not those that lag behind developmentally-constitute
the most relevant evidence of what Eight Amendment jurisprudence calls the 'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'
Id.
135. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1199-1200.
138. See Koh, supra note 107, at 51-52.
139. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200 ("It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride
in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage
of freedom.").
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V. THE EFFECT OF ROPER V. SIMMONS140 ON EIGHTH AMENDMENT JU-
RISPRUDENCE
The Court's discussion of international law in Roper v. Simmons en-
tails the lengthiest and most comprehensive discussion of international
law ever to issue from the Court's majority in an Eighth Amendment
decision. 141 This fact suggests that the reemergence of international law
in Atkins v. Virginia142 was not a fluke: international law is again a factor
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. If the Court carries this trend for-
ward and regularly employs international law within its "evolving stan-
dards of decency" analyses, international law may prove to be of increas-
ing consequence in the Court's assessments of what is cruel and unusual.
Eventually, Roper's most resounding after-effects could manifest in
future cases challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment.
143
Abolitionists who seek to persuade the Court that the death penalty is
"cruel and unusual" have invoked international law as a source of per-
suasive precedent, 144 and Roper demonstrates that international law can
be an effective tool towards this end. However, the potential of interna-
tional law to effectuate judicial abolition is tempered by two factors.
First, the potency of international law has increased within Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, but it is still secondary to the Court's domes-
tic national consensus. Given the popularity of capital punishment in the
United States, a contemporary national consensus would likely reflect
domestic approval for the death penalty. 45 Second, a notable number of
140. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
141. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-1200.
142. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
143. Symposium, Death Penalty and International Law, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305,
308 (2004).
144. See Koh, supra note 3, at 1129 ("The evidence strongly suggests that we do not currently
pay decent respect to the opinions of humankind in our administration of the death penalty. For that
reason, the death penalty should, in time, be declared in violation of the Eighth Amendment");
Geoffery Sawyer, Comment, The Death Penalty Is Dead Wrong: Jus Cogens Norms and the Evolv-
ing Standard of Decency, 22 PENN ST. INT'L REV. 459, 459-60 (2004)( "As more of the world looks
upon the death penalty as unfair, or cruel and unusual, or as torture, arguably, a jus cogens norm
prohibiting the death penalty has developed in international law, and will ultimately be the vehicle
by which the death penalty will be abolished worldwide.").
145. This projected national consensus is based on the following facts: (1) currently thirty-eight
states employ the death penalty; (2) fifty-nine prisoners were executed in the United States in 2004;
(3) approximately 3,400 prisoners are currently sentenced to death, Amnesty International Facts &
Figures, supra note 7; (4) A May, 2005 Gallup poll indicated seventy-four percent of Americans
approved of the death penalty for offenders convicted of murder-this reflects an eight percent in-
crease since 2000, Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' Views of Death Penalty More Positive This Year,
GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, May 19, 2005, LEXIS, Gallup Poll News Service (on file with au-
thor); (5) there have been notable state death penalty reforms and state moratoriums in recent years,
see Death Penalty Information Center, Changes in Death Penalty Laws Around the U.S.: 2000-2005,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=236&scid=40 (last visited Sept. 23, 2005) (listing
changes in several states' death penalty policy and statutes). However, these facts alone are not
likely to demonstrate the "consistency of direction of... change" the Court requires to determine
that a national consensus disapproves of the death penalty, see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
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countries reject capital punishment, 46 but this is not on balance with the
world's "overwhelming" disapproval of the juvenile death penalty in
Roper.147 International sentiment seems to be culminating against the
death penalty, and could eventually reach the point of "overwhelming"
rejection. 48 But as it stands, world opinion on capital punishment does
not carry the same weight as with the juvenile death penalty issue, and its
effect would be nugatory. Nor has abolition of the death penalty become
so common that it is clearly an international norm, orjus cogens, under
which it could be argued that the United States' retention of the death
penalty violates international law. 149 Thus, international law will likely
effect future Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and could ultimately
prove a useful instrument for abolitionists; but Roper does not suggest
that the current influence of international law alone can impel the Court
to abolish capital punishment.
VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A GROWING TREND
The significance of the majority's acknowledgement of interna-
tional law in Roper v. Simmons 50 reverberates beyond the Eighth
Amendment; Roper also represents the Court's growing acceptance of
international law as a source of persuasive authority in its general ap-
proach to Constitutional interpretations. This controversial trend may be
slowed by opponents in the Court and the United States Congress, but
neither of these obstacles seems capable of stopping this trend altogether.
A. The Trend Towards Acknowledging International Law in the Court
1. The Rise of Transnationalist Jurisprudence
Until roughly fifty years ago, the United States judiciary was virtu-
ally the only legal system in the international community that undertook
judicial review. 151 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court looked
inward for precedent. 52  Then, the global reconfigurations of the post
World War II era created numerous constitutional courts that took no-
tions of jurisprudence from the United States, among other sources, and
146. 120 countries have abolished the death penalty in law or practice, and seventy-six coun-
tries retain the death penalty. Amnesty International Facts & Figures, supra note 7.
147. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199.
148. The international trend against the death penalty is evidenced by the fact that over fifty
countries have abolished the practice since 1985. Amnesty International Facts & Figures, supra note
7.
149. Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35
GEO. J. INT'L L. 547, 555-56 (2004). But see Sawyer, supra note 144, at 470 (arguing that although
the number of countries that have explicitly banned the death penalty do not establish a jus cogens
norm, a jus cogens norm can be found in an "amalgamation of various non-derogable rights" present
in "treaties and positive law sources" and "from that mixture make the conclusion that a jus cogens
norm has been established prohibiting the death penalty internationally.").
150. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
151. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks, in 14 GERMANY AND
ITS BASIC LAW 411,411-12 (Paul Kirchof& Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
152. Id. at 412.
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rendered them into their own laws.153 Over time, these courts produced a
reserve of precedent and judicial contemplations that, until recently, has
been largely ignored by the United States Supreme Court.154 However, a
rising "transnationalist jurisprudence" movement within the Court has
recently begun to utilize these foreign precedents as well as other sources
of foreign jurisprudence.' 55 This movement invites international law into
Court jurisprudence because: (1) it finds international law useful as a
correlative canon of jurisprudence to advise the Court's own estimations
of constitutional standards; 156 and (2) it regards the acknowledgment of
international law as a means of maintaining international comity.
57
Roper is the latest in a procession of Court decisions indicating that the
ideals of transnationalist jurisprudence are becoming increasingly ac-
cepted by the Court.
Roper's recognition of international law sprang from the Court's
acknowledgment of the world community's "overwhelming disapproval"
of executing mentally retarded offenders in Atkins v. Virginia.'5 8 Also, in
2003, international law played a role in two other notable Supreme Court
cases: Grutter v. Bollinger'59 and Lawrence v. Texas. 6  In Grutter, the
Court considered the constitutionality of affirmative action.' 6' Justice
Ginsburg, concurring, cited to the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in her explanation of
the constitutional standards for race-conscious programs.' 62 Similarly, in
Lawrence, the Court struck down Texas's sodomy law after recognizing
that "the right the petitioners [sought] ... [had] been accepted as an in-
tegral part of human freedom in many other countries.' 6 3  Lawrence
furthermore marked the first time the Court's majority cited to a Euro-
153. Id. See also Martha F. Davis, Don't 'Gag' U.S. Courts, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 2004, at 19,
19 col. 2 ("The Supreme Court of Canada, the supreme courts of India, Israel and South Africa, the
European Court of Justice and many other high courts have strong traditions of looking to U.S.
precedents as they shape their own domestic law."), available at 8123104 Nat'l L. J. 19, (Col. 2)
(Westlaw).
154. Rehnquist, supra note 151, at 412.
155. Id. Though Chief Justice Rehnquist showed little use for international law in recent Court
decisions he foresaw its rise in 1989, stating, "The United States courts, and legal scholarship in our
country generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and decisions of other
countries. But I predict that with so many thriving constitutional courts in the world... that ap-
proach will be changed in the near future." Id
156. Koh, supra note 107, at 56.
157. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) ("Comity is not a vague political concern favoring interna-
tional cooperation when it is in our interest to do so ... When there is a conflict, a court should seek
a reasonable accommodation ... that considers ... the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly
functioning international regime.").
158. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002)).
159. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
160. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
161. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311.
162. Id. at 344 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
163. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
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pean Court of Human Rights case. 164 The Court recently revealed that its
enthusiasm for transnationalist jurisprudence is limited when it dismissed
certiorari in Medellin v. Drake,165a case that raised important issues re-
garding international comity. 166 Yet Roper's acknowledgment of inter-
national law, taken in conjunction with the Court's use of international
law in Atkins, Grutter, and Lawrence signals that, overall, the Court's
appreciation for transnationalist jurisprudence is ripening.
2. Nationalist Jurisprudence
Railing against the Supreme Court's recognition of international
law are the Court's proponents of "nationalist jurisprudence": Justices
Scalia and Thomas.167 Nationalist jurisprudence recognizes the role anti-
quated international influences played in forming the United States legal
system, 168 but views modern United States society as an exceptional
paradigm incompatible with foreign experiences and international law.
169
This ideology regards the Court's consultation of international law as the
infliction of foreign principles upon Americans, 170 and it further rejects
the notion that the Court should consider international comity as a basis
for its decisions. 171 Instead, nationalist jurisprudence insists that domes-
tic authorities are the Court's only legitimate sources of judicial revela-
tion. 172  However, the influence of nationalist jurisprudence has floun-
dered recently and it seems unable to curtail the transnationalist jurispru-
dence trend.
164. See Koh, supra note 107, at 50.
165. 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005).
166. Medellin raises the issue of what the United States legal system's obligation is to Peti-
tioner Medellin and other convicted foreign nationals in light of an International Court of Justice
decision declaring that the United States' conviction of Medellin without consular access violates the
Vienna Convention. See 125 S. Ct. at 2089-90 (discussing Avena and other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31)). In Medellin, the Court's dismissal of certiorari was predi-
cated on the presumption that Medellin's case would be retried in a Texas court, where it would
emerge "unencumbered" of procedural issues and allow the Supreme Court to review the issues
raised by the International Court of Justice. Id. at 2090 n. 1. Thus, transnationalist jurisprudence may
yet play a role in deciding the issues of Medellin.
167. Koh, supra note 107, at 52.
168. The admiration proponents of nationalist jurisprudence hold for international sources that
pre-date the United States is demonstrated by Justice Scalia's dissent in the recent Hamdi v. Rums-
feld decision in which Justice Scalia quotes at length eighteenth century British jurist William Black-
stone to establish the background of "due process." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2661
(2004).
169. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.1 1(1997).
170. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.11 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Law-
rence, 538 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'[T]his Court... should not impose foreign moods,
fads, or fashions on Americans."') (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring))).
171. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769-70 (1993) (stating that interna-
tional comity is not a bar against using Sherman Act jurisdiction over a foreign claim).
172. Koh, supra note 107, at 52.
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3. Chief Justice Roberts and the Departure of Justice O'Connor
Following the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Senate has ap-
proved John Roberts, Jr. as the new Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court. 73  Chief Justice Rehnquist opposed transnationalist ju-
risprudence while he served on the bench.174 Chief Justice Roberts has
similarly disparaged the Court's use of international law as a "misuse of
precedent,"'175 indicating that he, like his predecessor, rejects transnation-
alist jurisprudence. Also, Justice O'Connor has announced her intention
to retire subsequent to the confirmation of her successor. 176  Justice
O'Connor generally accepted the use of international law in Court deci-
sions, 177 so confirmation of a "nationalist" Justice to replace her could
soften the impact of international law in future Court rulings. Yet, even
in this scenario, there will remain five justices who either promote or
accept the Court's use of international law making it unlikely that the
Court will dismiss international law from its jurisprudence any time
soon. 178
B. Legislation Opposing the Court's Use of International Law
The amplified status of international law within the Court has of-
fended some members of Congress, who have in turn proposed legisla-
tion to restrain its use. This backlash was sparked by the Court's recogni-
tion of international law in Lawrence179 and further compounded by the
Roper decision. Congressman Bob Goodlatte made a statement the day
after the Court decided Roper that exemplifies the discontent of those in
Congress who oppose transnationalist jurisprudence: "The opinions of
foreign governments have no place in interpreting the original meaning
of the Constitution, and it is high time that these justices be reminded
that their duty is to interpret the Constitution, not to impose the will of
173. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Elizabeth Bumiller, Senate Confirms Roberts as 17th Chief Jus-
tice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
174. Koh, supra note 107, at 52 n.62.
175. Confirmation Hearing of John Roberts, Jr., 109th Congress (Sept. 13, 2005) (responding
to a question from Sen. Kyl), available at 2005 WL 2214702.
176. President Bush recently nominated Harriet E. Miers to replace Justice O'Connor, but, as
this article went to press, Ms. Miers withdrew. It remains to be seen who replaces Justice O'Connor.
177. See id. at 52 n.67.
178. Justices Breyer and Ginsberg are the Court's two most enthusiastic champions of transna-
tionalist jurisprudence. Id. at 52. Justices Stevens and Souter are also "regular members of this
camp." Id. at 52 n.67. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy has recently demonstrated an increasing accep-
tance of transnationalist jurisprudence, id., underscored by his lengthy acknowledgement of interna-
tional law in Roper. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-99. These five judges make up a majority on the
Court who accept the use of international law in Court decisions.
179. H.R. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) ("Whereas the Supreme Court has recently relied on the
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions ... in Lawrence v. Texas ... inappropri-
ate judicial reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements threatens the sovereignty of the
United States.").
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foreign entities on the people of the United States."'' 80 Congress' dissat-
isfaction with Roper gave rise to two pieces of proposed legislation: (1)
the Reaffirmation of American Independence Act,18' an act intended to
express the outrage of Congress; and (2) the Constitution Restoration
Act, l1 2 an act structured to halt the Court's use of international law.
1. The Reaffirmation of American Independence Act
The Reaffirmation of American Independence Act, popularly
known as "The Feeney Resolution," was originally introduced into Con-
gress in 2004 by Congressman Tom Feeney; 8 3 there the Act was passed
out of committee and debated on the House floor. 184 The Act resolves
"to [express] the sense of the House of Representatives" that "judicial
determinations should not be based in whole or in part on judgments,
laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions. ' 8 5 Two weeks after
Roper, Feeney re-introduced this Act into Congress; it is currently in
committee. 186 If passed, the Reaffirmation of American Independence
Act notifies the Court of Congress's grievances; but its declaration is not
binding and cannot oblige the Court to limit itself to domestic sources.'
87
A more ambitious threat to the Court's use of international law arises
from The Constitution Restoration Act.
188
2. The Constitution Restoration Act
The Constitution Restoration Act is proposed legislation that forbids
"a court of the United States ... to rely upon any constitution, law, ad-
ministrative rule, Executive order, directive, [or] judicial decision ... of
any foreign state or international organization or agency.' ' 189 The penalty
for violating the Act is considerable: a judge employing one of the
aforementioned "foreign" resources in her decision has committed an
impeachable offense. 190 However, the likelihood of this Act finding req-
uisite support for passage into law remains uncertain' 9' and if it is en-
acted, the Act will probably not survive judicial review.
192
180. Hadar Harris, "We Are the World" -Or Are We? The United States' Conflicting Views
On the Use of International Law and Foreign Legal Decisions, 12 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5, 7
(2005).
181. H.R. 568, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/feeney/downloads/
reaffres.pdf.
182. S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005).
183. H.R. 568, supra note 181
184. Harris, supra note 180, at 7-8.
185. H.R. 568, supra note 181
186. The act was reintroduced as H.R. Res. 97. 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/feeney/reaffirmation.htm.
187. Davis, supra note 153
188. Harris, supra note 180, at 8.
189. S. 520, supra note 182
190. Id.
191. Congress Moves to Restrict Court Rulings on God, VT. GUARDIAN, May 18, 2005,
http://www.vermontguardian.com/dailies/0904/0518.shtml (stating that the Constitution Restoration
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Ultimately, these acts alone do not present a significant threat to the
transnationalist movement. Still Congress has the capacity to complicate
the Court's use of international law: the presence of the aforementioned
acts, combined with Congress' public criticisms of the Court and its
power to impeach a sitting justice,193 could create a political environment
hostile to international law that will cause Justices to hesitate before turn-
ing to foreign sources.1 94 This intimidation would be unlikely to coerce
Justices away from international law completely, but it could decelerate
the transnationalist jurisprudence movement.
Yet none of the forces aligned against this movement are likely to
substantially undermine the Court's growing appreciation for foreign
sources, and it is probable that international law will play an increasing
role in Court rulings. Specifically, this trend could be significant in the
forthcoming case of Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New
England,195 set for oral argument before the Court in November, 2005.196
Ayotte deals with the Constitutionality of New Hampshire's Parental
Notification Prior to Abortion Act and has raised references to interna-
tional law and foreign sources in support of the Petitioner's argument.,
97
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court's lengthy acknowledgment of foreign sources in
Roper v. Simmons1 98 manifests a reemergence of international law within
the "evolving standards of decency" analysis that may effect the Court's
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment with greater potency than in the
past.199 This blossoming recognition of international law does not stem
from the Court's enthusiasm to impress foreign beliefs on American citi-
zens, but rather from its understanding that the views of all humanity are
relevant when deciding what is cruel and unusual.200  Furthermore,
Act is sponsored by twenty-eight members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Sen-
ate).
192. Harris, supra note 180, at 8.
193. For a discussion of Congress' power to impeach a sitting justice see David R. Fine, Opin-
ion, No Politics in Third Branch, NAT'L L.J. Dec. 26, 2004, at 30 col. 2 available at 12/6/2004 NLJ
30, (Col. 1) (Westlaw).
194. See Davis, supra note 153.
195. 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005).
196. The Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.gov (follow "Oral
Aguments" hyperlink; then follow "Argument Calendars" hyperlink"; then follow "Session Begin-
ning November 28, 2005" hyperlink).
197. See Brief of University Faculty for Life as Amici Curae in Support of Petitioner, Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL
1912326, at *1 ("[R]esort to international law regarding abortion provides little guidance for this
Court. To the extent such guidance does exist, it supports the right of parents to be involved in the
care and treatment of their daughters, and thus supports the petitioner in this case."); Brief of the
Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, and John M. Thorp, Jr., M.D. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005) (No. 04-1144), 2005 WL1902074, at *9 (citing studies
done in Finland an England to support Petitioner's argument).
198. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
199. See Symposium, supra note 143, at 308.
200. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198.
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Roper, taken in light of other recent decisions by the Court, signals the
Court's rising awareness of the cogency of international law and its ap-
plication beyond the Eighth Amendment. Staring down this trend are the
Court's proponents of nationalist jurisprudence and dissatisfied members
of Congress. However, despite the opposition of these groups, interna-
tional law will likely continue to weigh into the Court's Constitutional
interpretations, and could be significant to forthcoming Court cases.
Stephen Arvin*
* Stephen Arvin is a J.D. Candidate 2007 at the University of Denver Sturm College of
Law. The author would like to thank his family for their support and Professor Paula Rhodes, Asso-
ciate Professor of Law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, for her input.
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SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON: A PRETEXT OF VICTORY FOR
EMPLOYEES
INTRODUCTION
Age discrimination plagues many older workers in America today.'
Recent studies reveal that while companies purport to value older em-
ployees, they often discriminate against older workers in their hiring,
2training, and employment practices. In 2004, workers submitted 17,837
age discrimination charges to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), which represented a 26% increase from 1999.3 Fur-
thermore, in a 2005 survey of working Americans, 20% reported over-
hearing age-biased comments in their workplace.4
Age discrimination causes unnecessary loss in productivity and de-
pletion of social insurance, unemployment, and welfare programs.5 As
Lyndon B. Johnson so eloquently stated in urging Congress to adopt leg-
islation to prohibit age.discrimination, "in economic terms, [arbitrary age
discrimination] is a serious - and senseless loss to a nation on the move.
But the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice of happiness and well-being,
which joblessness imposes on these citizens and their families."6
Striving to protect older workers from age discrimination in the
workplace, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where it's Been,
Where it is Today, Where it's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 670-72 (1997).
2. Id.
3. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA) CHARGES: FY 1992-FY 2004 (2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.
html (does not reflect settlements, withdrawals, or other administrative closures); cf Eglit, supra
note 1, at 669 n.230 (recognizing that the significant numbers of age discrimination charges filed
with the EEOC may or may not indicate prevalence of age bias in employment today. The EEOC
dismisses a large number of these claims. However, many dismissed claims might have merit but
the EEOC chooses not to pursue them due to lack of resources). See generally Gary Minda, Oppor-
tunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version of Age and Pension Discrimination in
Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 513-14 (1997) (arguing that current popular employment
practice of downsizing vulnerable late-career employees who cannot easily transfer skills to other
potential employers should be considered illegal age discrimination).
4. Hubert B. Herring, There's No Shortage of Intolerance in the Workplace, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2005, § 3 (Business), at 2 (citing 2005 phone survey conducted by Novations/J. Howard &
Associates of 623 randomly selected working Americans).
5. See BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 4, 34 (2003); see also Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (2004) (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 18
(1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT] (report of the Secretary of Labor to Congress under section 715
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)).
6. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 7 (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson, in PUB. PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, Book 1, 32, 37 (1968)). See generally Eglit, supra note 1, at 670-72 (age stereo-
types may affect managerial decisions and result in negative consequences for older employees such
as lowered motivation, career stagnation, and eventual career obsolescence).
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(ADEA).7 For decades, courts interpreted the ADEA equivalently to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) which prohibits dis-
crimination based on race, sex, religion, color, and national origin.
8
Courts reasoned that because Congress enacted both statutes to combat
discrimination, and used the same prohibitory language in both statutes,
the statutes should be similarly construed. 9
Therefore, like Title VII plaintiffs, older workers were initially able
to utilize two different avenues to combat age discrimination under the
ADEA: disparate treatment and disparate impact.10 However, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,II some circuits
began to reject disparate impact claims under the ADEA. 12 Finally, in
Smith v. City of Jackson, 13 the Court resolved the circuits' split and held
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.14
Part I of this Comment presents a background of the applicable leg-
islation and case law preceding Smith. Part II summarizes the Smith de-
cision. Part III provides a critical analysis of Smith, including the unfor-
tunate but likely ramifications of this case. This Comment will argue
that the Court's affirmation of a disparate impact theory of recovery un-
der the ADEA is only an ostensible victory for older workers. In actual-
ity, the Court's narrow construction of employer liability, by its interpre-
tation of employer defenses and its redistribution of burdens of proof,
threatens the viability of disparate impact claims altogether. In addition,
the Court's restrictive interpretation of disparate impact claims under the
ADEA jeopardizes the main purpose of the ADEA: to protect older
workers from arbitrary age discrimination.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA arose out of a 1965 report (Wirtz Report), requested by
Congress and compiled by the Secretary of Labor regarding age dis-
crimination.' 5 The Wirtz Report discussed different types of age-based
discrimination and the extent of each type.16 The Secretary of Labor
7. Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate
the "Reasonable Factors Other than Age" Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 1399, 1400 (2004).
8. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1542-43 (2005).
9. J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1402.
10. See Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Ap-
plying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 625, 632-33
(1996). See generally discussion infra Part 1B (providing explanation of disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment claims).
11. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
12. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543.
13. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
14. Id. at 1537.
15. Id. at 1540.
16. Gold, supra note 5, at 6-8.
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found that discrimination based on dislike or intolerance of older indi-
viduals was not a significant problem. 17  Conversely, arbitrary age dis-
crimination based on mistaken assumptions about the effect of age on
ability was a serious issue.18 Finally, the Wirtz Report explained that age
discrimination sometimes stems from institutional arrangements which
needlessly restrict the employment of older workers.' 9 For example, a
hiring policy requiring a high school diploma might unnecessarily elimi-
nate an older applicant with years of work experience that would be con-
sidered equivalent to a high school education.2°
The Secretary of Labor also reported on the deleterious economic
effects of age discrimination. 2 1 The Secretary stressed that denying older
workers employment opportunities wastes valuable human resources.22
Specifically, rough calculations showed that, at that time, the Nation's
economy was losing billions of dollars per year due to lost productivity
from individuals forced to retire involuntarily.23 Additionally, the Wirtz
Report noted that the high unemployment rate of older workers and the
resulting drain on unemployment insurance programs were serious eco-
nomic problems.24
Congress responded to the Wirtz Report findings by passing the
ADEA in 1967.25 The ADEA applies to persons over the age of forty
and makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employ-
ees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's age.
26
However, the ADEA provides four exceptions to employers' liability:
(1) where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business (BFOQ);
or (2) where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age (RFOA); (3) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority
system not intended to evade the purposes of this chapter ... or...
17. Id. at 6-7 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5).
18. Id. at 6-8.
19. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005) (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note
5, at 15).
20. Id. at 1541 n.5 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 21).
21. See Gold, supra note 5, at 8 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 18).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1540.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2004).
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employee benefit plan; (4) to discharge or otherwise discipline an in-
dividual for good cause.
27
B. Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Claims
Two distinct theories of recovery exist in discrimination law.28 The
first, disparate treatment, refers to an employer's action against an indi-
vidual because of the individual's protected characteristic and requires
discriminatory intent. 29 The second, disparate impact, refers to an em-
ployer's practice or policy which is facially neutral and involves no dis-
criminatory intent, but disproportionately affects a protected class of
employees.30 Disparate treatment claims are cognizable under both Title
VII and the ADEA, 31 and the Court interpreted Title VII to cover dispa-
rate impact claims.3 But, until the recent decision of Smith, the Court
had not addressed whether a disparate impact theory is available under
the ADEA.3 3
C. Disparate Impact Claims Under Title VII
Generally, courts follow judicial interpretation of Title VII to inter-
pret ADEA disparate impact claims. 34  Therefore, to provide a back-
ground of ADEA disparate impact claims, this Section summarizes the
progression of the disparate impact theory of recovery under Title VII.
The Supreme Court initially articulated the disparate impact theory in a
Title VII case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,35 and then refined the theory
in another Title VII case, Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio.36 Finally, in
response to the Court's decision in Wards Cove, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, codifying disparate impact claims under Title
VII.
7
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Griggs, decided four years after the enactment of the ADEA, was
the first case in which the Court expressly recognized disparate impact
claims under Title VII.38 In Griggs, an employer allegedly discriminated
27. § 623(O(1)-(3).
28. Brett Ira Johnson, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a Rep-
resentative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the ADEA from Title VII Regard-
ing Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 303, 304-06 (2000).
29. Id. at 305.
30. Id. at 306.
31. Id. at 305.
32. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541.
33. Id. at 1539.
34. See James C. Bailey, Age Discrimination Models of Proof After Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 9 ELDER L.J. 175, 179 (2001).
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
36. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
37. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
38. Jennifer J. Clemons & Richard A. Bales, ADEA Disparate Impact in the Sixth Circuit, 27
OnoN.U. L. REv. 1, 8 (2000).
[Vol. 83:1
2005] SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON 235
against African American employees by requiring a high school diploma
and a passing grade on a standardized test as a condition of hire or trans-
fer.39 Although the Court accepted that the employer had no intent to
discriminate, the Court held that because the requirements were not cor-
related with job performance, disqualified African Americans at a higher
rate than whites, and perpetuated the employer's historical preferential
hiring of whites, the employer was nevertheless liable. 40 The Court ex-
plained that good faith (or lack of intent to discriminate) "does not re-
deem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability." '
Furthermore, the Griggs Court introduced the concept of "business
necessity" as the touchstone and limiting principle of the disparate im-
pact doctrine. The Court stated that if an employer cannot show that its
challenged employment practice is related to job performance (or a busi-
ness necessity), then it is prohibited under Title VII.
43
2. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
After the monumental decision in Griggs, a significant amount of
case law followed which struggled with the disparate impact doctrine,
the business necessity defense, and the burdens of proof for plaintiffs and
defendants in disparate impact cases. 44 The Supreme Court endeavored
to resolve these issues in its Wards Cove decision.45
In Wards Cove, salmon cannery workers brought suit against their
former employer under Title VII alleging that its hiring and promotion
policies adversely affected non-white employees and constituted racial
discrimination.46 The Court held that the plaintiff must identify specific
employment practices responsible for creating the alleged disparate im-
pact.47 Then, the employer may produce evidence of a business justifica-
tion (rather than business necessity) for the employment practices.48 But,
the plaintiff may still prevail by showing that the employer could have
used an alternative practice with less discriminatory effects.49
The Court held that the burden of persuasion remains at all times
with the plaintiff.50 This holding conflicted with the Court's own (and
39. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-28.
40. Id. at 430-33.
41. Id. at 432.
42. Id. at 431.
43. Id.
44. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 630.
45. See id.
46. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48.
47. Id. at 659.
48. See id
49. See id. at 660-6 1.
50. Id. at 659.
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other federal courts') procedural treatment of the business necessity de-
fense as an affirmative defense with the burden of persuasion on the de-
fendant.5' Furthermore, the Court noted that an employer need not pro-
duce evidence that the challenged practice is "essential" or "indispensa-
ble" to the employer's business for it to qualify as a business justification
(as opposed to business necessity).: Finally, the Court implied that, in
order for the plaintiff to prevail upon showing of an alternative practice
with less discriminatory impact, employers needed to have been aware of
the alternative practice and rejected it.
53
3. Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Court's narrow construction of employer liability in Wards
Cove sparked considerable criticism from Congress and led to the
amendment of Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 amend-
ments).54 The 1991 amendments codified and clarified disparate impact
claims under Title VII,55 and restored the plaintiff and defendant burdens
articulated in Griggs.6 First, the 1991 amendments allowed a plaintiff to
allege that an employer's decision-making process (as a whole) causes a
disparate impact if the plaintiffs could not isolate specific employment
practices.57 Second, the 1991 amendments incorporated the business
necessity defense from Griggs rather than the more lenient business justi-
fication test from Wards Cove.58 Third, the 1991 amendments stated that
the employer retained the burden of proof and persuasion to establish the
business necessity defense. 59 Notably, the 1991 amendments to Title VII
did not include any amendment to the ADEA nor mention age discrimi-
nation,6° which is a frequently cited fact in the debate about the scope of
ADEA disparate impact claims.6'
D. Disparate Impact Claims Under the ADEA
After the Court announced the disparate impact theory as a method
for proving discrimination under Title VII in Griggs, courts consistently
recognized disparate impact claims under the ADEA.62 Similarly, courts
51. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 668-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 659 (majority opinion).
53. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 631.
54. See id.
55. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
56. See Robert A. Robertson, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Congress Provides Guidelines for
Title VII Disparate Impact Cases, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 47-48 (1992) (citing 137
CONG. REC. S15273 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (2005).
58. See § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i); Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 631 (citing Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3 (codified in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981)).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2005).
60. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
61. See id. at 1544-45. See also infra Section IVB (discussing the effect of Wards Cove on
ADEA disparate impact claims).
62. See Smith. 125 S. Ct. at 1543.
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applied the 1991 amendments of Title VII to the ADEA, including the
business necessity defense and the shifting burdens of proof.63 However,
after the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,64 the
circuits split over whether the ADEA covered disparate impact claims.65
1. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff, age 62, alleged he was fired to pre-
vent his pension from vesting and brought suit for age discrimination
under the ADEA. 66 The Court held that because the employer's motiva-
tion for termination was the employee's years of service, not his age, the
employee failed to state a claim of disparate treatment under the
67ADEA. The Court explained that disparate treatment "captures the
essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the very
essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because
the employer believes that productivity and competence decline with old
age. ' 68 The Court reasoned that when an employer's decision is based
on factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate stereotypes disap-
pears.69
In dicta, the Court expressly stated it was not deciding whether dis-
parate impact claims are recognized under the ADEA.70  However, a
concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy mentioned the ADEA may not
cover disparate impact claims.71
2. Turmoil Created by Hazen Paper
Despite the Court's unambiguous statement in Hazen Paper that its
decision did not address disparate impact claims under the ADEA, many
circuits interpreted Hazen Paper as precluding disparate impact claims
under the ADEA.72 Yet, other circuits continued to recognize disparate
impact claims under the ADEA73 and some circuits remained undecided
on the issue.74
Circuits which continued to recognize disparate impact claims
stressed the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII and pointed to
the express language in Hazen Paper, stating that the Court was not de-
63. See LINDEMANN & KADuE, supra note 5, at 427-28.
64. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
65. See B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 316.
66. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 606-07.
67. Id. at 610-12.
68. Id. at 610.
69. Id. at 611.
70. Id. at 610.
71. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996).
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1999).
74. See, e.g., Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998) (stat-
ing in dicta that this court is unsure as to whether disparate impact theory is cognizable under the
ADEA after Hazen Paper).
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ciding on the issue of disparate impact claims. 75 For example, in Smith v.
Xerox Corp. ,76 the Second Circuit, citing Griggs, held that disparate im-
pact claims targeting employment practices which are "fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation" are recognized under the ADEA.77 Xerox
involved fifteen former employees who alleged disparate impact and
disparate treatment discrimination claims under the ADEA after being
laid off during a reduction in force (RIF).78 Although the employees did
not provide sufficient evidence that the RIF process adversely affected
older employees, as compared to other employees,79 the court clearly
stated that the Second Circuit recognized disparate impact claims despite
the Hazen Paper holding and other circuits' decisions to reject such
claims.8°
In contrast, circuits rejecting such claims argued that the holding in
Hazen Paper, allowing employers to rely on factors correlated with age,
precluded disparate impact claims.8 Furthermore those circuits con-
cluded that the statutory language, the legislative history, and Congress's
1991 amendments to Title VII all pointed to the differences between the
ADEA and Title VII and Congress's intention to prohibit disparate im-
pact claims under the ADEA.82
For example, the Tenth Circuit held that disparate impact claims are
not cognizable under the ADEA in Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc.8 3 In
Ellis, two flight attendants alleged that the airline's height and weight
requirements adversely affected older workers and, therefore, constituted
age discrimination under a disparate impact theory.84 The court recog-
nized that Hazen Paper left the question of disparate impact under the
ADEA open.85 However, the court's own interpretation of the text, legis-
lative history, and congressional intent of the ADEA combined with the
Court's language in Hazen Paper, supported its decision not to recognize
disparate impact claims. 86 Thus, because the circuits were split over the
recognition of ADEA disparate impact claims, the issue was ripe for
resolution by the Supreme Court. In Smith, the Court granted certiorari
to decide this issue.
87
75. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (1999).
76. 196 F.3d 358, 358 (1999).
77. Smith, 196 F.3d at 364.
78. Id. at 363.
79. Id. at 368-69.
80. Id. at 367 n.6.
81. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 636.
82. See id. at 636-49.
83. 73 F.3d 999, 1009-10 (1 0th Cir. 1996).
84. See id. at 1005-06.
85. Id. at 1007.
86. See id. at 1006-09.
87. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1540.
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II. SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON
88
A. Facts
On October 1, 1998, the City of Jackson, Mississippi (City) updated
its wage structure to institute pay increases for all employees.89 The City
implemented the new wage structure to ensure that entry-level salaries of
police department employees were competitive with the average market
wage for similar positions in the region.90 Specifically, the plan revision
identified five distinct positions and a wage range for each position based
on a survey of analogous positions in similar Southeastern communi-
ties. 91 The City divided each wage range into a series of steps and as-
signed each employee to a step which was the lowest step to give the
individual at least a two percent raise.92
While most officers occupied the three lowest positions which con-
tained both officers under and over forty, the few officers in the two
highest positions were all over forty. 93 The officers in the highest posi-
tions received raises which, while larger in dollar amount, were propor-
tionately smaller compared with the raises granted to the younger offi-
cers. 94 Statistical evidence showed 66.2% of officers under forty re-
ceived raises of more than 10%, compared to only 45.3% of those over
forty.95 Also, the average percentage increase for officers with less than




A group of police officers filed suit against the City under the
ADEA in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
alleging: (1) the City deliberately discriminated against them because of
their age (disparate treatment); and (2) the older officers were adversely
affected by the wage plan (disparate impact).97 The District Court
granted summary judgment to the City on both claims, and the officers
appealed.98 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the
disparate treatment claim, allowing petitioners to proceed with discovery
regarding intent.99 However, the majority affirmed the dismissal of the
disparate impact claim, holding that disparate impact claims are not cog-
88. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
89. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1545.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1545-46.
95. Id. at 1546.
96. Id.
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nizable under the ADEA. l00 The majority noted, though, that the alleged
facts would have entitled the petitioners to relief under a disparate impact
theory if such a theory had been available.'0 l The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the ADEA authorizes disparate
impact claims. 102
C. Majority/ Plurality
In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined in con-
currence by Justice Scalia, the Court concluded that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the ADEA.10 3 However, the Court held that
the petitioners failed to present sufficient facts to support their disparate
impact claim. 104
The plurality considered the text and legislative history of the
ADEA to support the conclusion that the ADEA authorizes disparate
impact claims. 0 5 The plurality also utilized the Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins'0 6 decision, the reasonable factor other than age (RFOA) provision,
and the agency interpretation of the ADEA in its reasoning. 0 7 In addi-
tion to finding that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims, the
plurality clarified the scope of employer liability in ADEA disparate im-
pact cases, and identified the proper test for the RFOA defense, 
0 8
In examining the text of the ADEA, the plurality highlighted §
623(a)(2) of the ADEA, which prohibits employers' actions that "deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... age."' 1 9 The
plurality noted that the language of § 623(a)(2) is identical to that of §
703(a)(2) of Title VII with the exception of the word "age" rather than
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 10 The plurality relied on
the presumption that because these two provisions are equivalent, Con-
gress intended the language to have the same meaning in both statutes;' 1
and the Court's interpretation of the same language to permit disparate
impact claims under Title VII suggests that the Court should likewise
recognize disparate impact claims under the ADEA." 12 Additionally, the
100. Id. at 1539-40.
101. See id. at 1540.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1546. Justice Scalia joined the four justice plurality in all but one part of the opin-
ion. Where Justice Scalia joined the plurality, I will refer to the "Court." However, in the part of the
opinion in which Justice Scalia differed from the plurality, I will refer to the "plurality."
104. Id. at 1540.
105. Id. at 1540-44.
106. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
107. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543-44.
108. See id at 1543-46.
109. Id. at 1542 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000)).
110. Seeid.
Ill. Id. at 1541.
112. Id. at 1542.
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plurality explained that the text of § 623(a)(2) highlights the effects of
the action, rather than the employer's intent underlying the action, which
also supports recognition of disparate impact claims." 
3
The plurality also traced the legislative history and congressional
purpose behind the ADEA to support its recognition of disparate impact
claims. The plurality stressed the Wirtz Report findings that age dis-
crimination arises predominantly from arbitrary discrimination, rather
than animus;' 1 4 and that certain institutional practices may adversely
affect older workers.' 15 In addition, the plurality acknowledged that, like
the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 116 opinion, the Wirtz Report recognized
that formal employment standards not related to job performance may
adversely impact racial minorities and older workers."
7
The plurality distinguished Hazen Paper v. Biggins, reiterating that
the Court in that case expressly stated it was not deciding whether dispa-
rate impact claims were available under the ADEA.II 8 Furthermore, the
plurality addressed the confusion in the lower courts surrounding the
reasonable factor other than age (RFOA) provision of the ADEA. '1 The
Court explained that for the RFOA clause to have any effect, disparate
impact claims must be recognized. 20 Otherwise, the RFOA provision
would be superfluous when used in tandem with § 623(a)(1) (disparate
treatment claims).12 1 Because, according to Hazen Paper, an employer
acting on any factor other than age would not be liable.' 22 However, the
plurality explained, the RFOA provision serves to protect employers who
would otherwise be liable under § 623(a)(2) if the employer based the
challenged practice on a reasonable non-age factor.'
23
The plurality also referred to regulations of the Department of La-
bor (DOL) and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
support its holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
ADEA. 124  Both the Department of Labor, which drafted the initial
ADEA legislation, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency designated by Congress to oversee the implementa-




114. Id. at 1540 (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 22).
115. Id. (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 5, at 15).
116. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
117. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541 n.5.
118. Id. at 1543.
119. Id.
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Next, the Court12 6 discussed the more narrow scope of disparate im-
pact liability for employers under the ADEA compared to under Title
VII, focusing on the RFOA provision and Congress's 1991 Amendments
to Title V1.127 The Court noted that the RFOA clause, not found in Title
VII, served to limit the coverage of the ADEA by permitting "otherwise
prohibited [employer] actions" which are "based on reasonable factors
other than age."'
' 28
Additionally, the Court noted that while Congress amended Title
VII to revise the Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio1 29 decision, Congress did
not similarly amend the ADEA.' 30 So, the Court reasoned that the Wards
Cove analysis, which allocates additional procedural burdens on the
plaintiff, remains applicable to the ADEA. 131 According to the Court, the
combination of the RFOA provision and the application of the Wards
Cove interpretation serves to narrow the scope of employer liability un-
der the ADEA in comparison to Title VII.
132
The Court reasoned that the more narrow scope of employer liabil-
ity under the ADEA follows from historical differences between age
discrimination and discrimination of protected classes under Title VII.
33
The Court discussed the fact that age is often relevant to an individual's
capacity to perform his or her job.' 34 Additionally, the Court explained
that certain common employment criteria may be reasonable despite their
adverse impact on older workers. 35 Finally, the Court noted that inten-
tional age discrimination "has not occurred at the same levels as dis-
crimination against those protected by Title VII.'
13 6
The Court demonstrated how to apply the RFOA provision by dis-
tinguishing it from the business necessity test. 37  The Court focused
solely on determining whether an employer's decision to adopt the chal-
lenged employment practice was based on a reasonable factor other than
126. The plurality joined by Justice Scalia.
127. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
128. Id. at 1540-41.
129. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
130. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
131. Id. According to Wards Cove, plaintiffs in disparate impact cases must first "isolat[e] and
identify[] the specific employment practice ... allegedly responsible" for creating the adverse im-
pact on the protected class. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). Additionally, plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion at all
times even regarding an employer's defense of the challenged practice. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
659. Placing these additional burdens on plaintiffs results in decreasing employers' potential for
liability in disparate impact cases. The Smith Court refers to this effect as narrowing the scope of
employer liability. See Smith, 125 S. Ct, at 1544-45. For a complete discussion of the effect of
applying the Wards Cove plaintiff burdens in the ADEA context see infra Part IIIB.
132. Smith. 125 S. Ct. at 1545; see also supra note 131 and accompanying text.




137. See id. at 1546.
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age.138  If so, the Court stated, the employer is not liable under the
ADEA.139 The Court stressed that this reasonableness test, unlike the
business necessity test, does not require inquiry into whether the em-
ployer could achieve its goals in another manner with less adverse im-
pact on older employees.1
40
In the instant case, the Court held that although the officers pre-
sented evidence of a wage plan which was less generous to older work-
ers, they did not identify specific employment practices responsible for
statistical disparities, as required by Wards Cove.'41 Additionally, the
disparate impact caused by the City's plan was based on what the Court
considered to be reasonable factors other than age: seniority and posi-
tion. 142 The Court explained that seniority and position are reasonable
given the City's need to raise employees' salaries to match those in sur-
rounding communities to meet its retention goal. 43 While the City may
have met its stated goal in another way with less impact on older officers,
the plurality found the City's chosen method was reasonable. 44 The
Court noted that the RFOA test does not require further inquiry into less
discriminatory alternatives that the City might have pursued to achieve
its goal of retaining employees.
45
D. Concurrence of Justice Scalia
The plurality held that disparate impact claims are cognizable under
the ADEA by focusing on the text and legislative history of the
ADEA. 146 Justice Scalia agreed that the ADEA covers disparate impact
claims, but differed from the plurality in his reasoning. 147 Justice Scalia
also joined in the plurality's interpretation of the RFOA provision and
agreed with the plurality's judgment in favor of the City.1
48
Justice Scalia reasoned that ADEA disparate impact claims are cog-
nizable under the ADEA because of agency deference principles. 49 In-
deed, Justice Scalia exclaimed that this case is an "absolutely classic case
for deference to agency interpretation. ' 5  Justice Scalia explained that









146. Id. at 1540-44.
147. See id. at 1546-47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 1546-49.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1546 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
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charged with rule making authority under the ADEA. 15 1 Therefore, Jus-
tice Scalia argued, because the EEOC reasonably interprets the ADEA to
cover disparate impact claims, the Court must recognize disparate impact
claims under the ADEA.1
52
To support his claim that the EEOC interprets the ADEA to cover
disparate impact claims, Justice Scalia cited EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.7(d) (2004).153 Section 1625.7(d) states that when an employ-
ment practice has an adverse impact on individuals within the protected
age group, and is claimed by the employer to be based on "a factor other
than age," it can only be justified as a business necessity. 54 According
to Justice Scalia, that regulation combined with the EEOC's subsequent
interpretation of that regulation, and its numerous court appearances, all
confirm the EEOC's position that the ADEA encompasses disparate im-
pact claims.'55 Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that this EEOC inter-
pretation is "eminently reasonable" based on the reasoning in the plural-
ity opinion.'5 6 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, the reasonable interpreta-
tion of the EEOC itself is enough to support the finding that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA. 1
57
E. Concurrence of Justice O'Connor, with Justices Kennedy and Thomas
Like Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy
and Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment for the City. 58 However,
unlike Justice Scalia and the plurality, Justice O'Connor, along with Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas, argued that disparate impact claims are not
cognizable under ADEA. 159 First, Justice O'Connor focused on the text
of § 623(a)(2), specifically the phrase "because of ... age" and inter-
preted it to mean that an employer is only liable for its adverse action
which is motivated by an individual's age (i.e. disparate treatment). 60 In
addition, Justice O'Connor took exception to the plurality's opinion that
the RFOA provision confirms disparate impact claims and instead con-
sidered it to offer employers "an independent safe harbor from liabil-
ity.
'161
Justice O'Connor noted that the legislative history of the ADEA,
which highlights the qualitative differences between age discrimination
and other types of discrimination, actually supports her interpretation that
151. Id.
152. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1547 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 1546-47.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1547.
156. Id. at 1549.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 1549.
160. Id. at 1550.
161. Id. at 1551.
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disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the ADEA. 162 In addi-
tion, Justice O'Connor interpreted the language "arbitrary discrimina-
tion" in the Wirtz Report as intentional discrimination (implicating only
disparate treatment claims). 163 Further, Justice O'Connor argued that
Congress intended the non-coercive measures prescribed by the ADEA,
such as programs to increase available positions and continuing educa-
tion, to be the sole means to address disparate impact age discrimina-
tion.' 64
Justice O'Connor rejected the plurality's presumption that the lan-
guage in the ADEA, mirroring the language in Title VII, should be inter-
preted similarly. 165 Justice O'Connor noted that because the Griggs de-
cision preceded the ADEA's creation, Congress could not have intended
a disparate impact interpretation in using language from Title VII in the
ADEA. 166 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor stated that when two statutes
have similar language, they should be interpreted consistently only in the
absence of contrary congressional intent; and between Title VII and the
ADEA, such contrary congressional intent does exist.1 67 Finally, Justice
O'Connor argued that the EEOC interpretation cited by the plurality and
Justice Scalia was an interpretation of the RFOA clause, not the prohibi-
tory section of the ADEA and, thus, irrelevant to the issue before the
Court.168
Despite Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas' objections, the
remaining five justices in Smith decided to recognize disparate impact
claims under the ADEA. 169 Additionally, the Court applied a new and
more expansive interpretation of the RFOA defense to such claims under
the ADEA. 170 Finally, the Court held that its Wards Cove analysis ap-




The Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. City of Jackson172 to rec-
ognize disparate impact claims under the ADEA was long overdue to
resolve the confusion pervading the lower courts in the wake of Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins.173 However, while the Court in Smith claimed to
merely narrow employer liability under ADEA disparate impact claims
162. Id. at 1552.
163. Id. at 1552-55.
164. Id. at 1554-55.
165. Id. at 1556-57.
166. Id. at 1556.
167. Id. at 1556-57.
168. Id. at 1557-60.
169. Id. at 1540 (majority opinion).
170. Id. at 1543-44, 1546.
171. Id. at 1545.
172. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
173. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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compared to Title VII disparate impact claims,174 in reality a disparate
impact theory of recovery could all but disappear under the ADEA as a
result of the Smith decision. The lengthy rhetoric of the plurality and
Justice O'Connor in Smith seeking to rationalize their opposing argu-
ments about disparate impact claims was a moot exercise because the
end result of this case, and virtually all future cases of disparate impact
claims under ADEA will be the same: the employee will be unable to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. In the unlikely event an
employee does establish a prima facie case, the employer will have a
justification under the broad reasonable factor other than age (RFOA)
exception. In addition, reverting to the plaintiff burdens set forth in
Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio'75 will further ensure the eradication of
the employee's disparate impact claim. Thus, older employees will be
left without adequate protection from the inherently discriminatory prac-
tices that purportedly motivated the Court's decision in Smith and Con-
gress's enactment of the ADEA.
This section will present a critical analysis of the Smith holding, fo-
cusing on the Court's over-expansive interpretation of the RFOA provi-
sion and its unfortunate decision to follow the Wards Cove analysis in
ADEA disparate impact cases. Additionally, this section will review a
few lower court cases applying the Smith decision to demonstrate the
detrimental effects of the RFOA provision and the Wards Cove burdens
on ADEA disparate impact cases. Finally, this section will examine the
Supreme Court's unpersuasive reasoning for providing less protection for
ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs compared to Title VII disparate impact
plaintiffs.
A. The Unreasonableness of the Reasonable Factor Other than Age Ex-
ception
As Justice O'Connor so aptly perceived, any disparate impact
claims "are strictly circumscribed by the RFOA exception" due to the
Smith Court's broad interpretation of the RFOA. 176 Indeed, courts and
commentators opposing the disparate impact theory of recovery under
the ADEA prior to Smith argued that the RFOA exception is inconsistent
with the recognition of disparate impact claims because the motivation
behind employment policies targeted by disparate impact claims: factors
other than age, are just what the RFOA exception permits. 77 Likewise,
commentators who argued against the recognition of disparate impact
174. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
175. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
176. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 639; Clemons & Bales, supra note 38, at 21; B.
Johnson, supra note 28, at 321.
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claims under the ADEA prior to the Smith decision noted that the RFOA
exception is logically inconsistent with the disparate impact theory. 
178
The Court in Smith disagreed with this interpretation of the RFOA
clause, stressing that the word "reasonable" gives meaning to the clause
and supports recognition of disparate impact claims.1 79  For in such
claims, the RFOA plays its "principal role by precluding liability if the
adverse impact was attributable to a non-age factor that was 'reason-
able."'' 180  However, the Court's over-expansive interpretation of the
RFOA exception in Smith ignores other courts' reasonable interpretations
of the clause, violates statutory interpretation principles, and will allow
employers to escape liability in the majority of disparate impact claims.
Furthermore, the Smith interpretation of the RFOA defense conflicts with
Congress's goal of eliminating arbitrary age discrimination in the work-
place.
First, the Court adopted a novel and significantly broader interpreta-
tion of the RFOA clause rejecting the circuits' long-standing interpreta-
tion of the clause. Prior to Smith, lower courts consistently applied the
business necessity test as a possible defense to employer liability under
the ADEA. 181 Some courts and commentators interpreted the RFOA
exception as a codified business necessity defense. 182 Others, as well as
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL), argued that business necessity or job relatedness
were underlying requirements for reasonableness.
1 83
The business necessity test is the defense to disparate impact claims
under Title VII introduced by the Griggs v. Duke Power Co.184 Court as
the "touchstone" to disparate impact claims. 185 The business necessity
test allows an employer to justify its use of the challenged employment
practice by showing it is job related or a business necessity. 186 The test
178. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 639 (citing Metz v. Transit Mix, 828 F.2d 1202,
1216-20 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
179. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544.
180. Id.
181. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 10, at 630; see LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 6, at
428.
182. B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 323, 326.
183. See id; 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2005) (EEOC regulation stating that when an employment
practice which has a disparate impact on older employees is claimed to be based on a 'factor other
than age,' it can only be justified as a business necessity); see also, Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost
of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L.
REv. 229, 302-03 (1990) (Department of Labor stated that to constitute an RFOA, criterion must be
"reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed" or "shown to have a valid relationship
to job requirements."). Incidentally, the Smith Court claimed deference to the DOL and EEOC in
support of its decision to recognize disparate-impact claims, but glossed over the fact that the DOL
and EEOC recommend a specific interpretation of the RFOA clause which conflicts with the Court's
interpretation of the same clause in Smith. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544, 1560.
184. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
185. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
186. Id.
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then permits the employee to present alternative practices which would
achieve the same legitimate business objective but with less discrimina-
tory impact. 187 However, the Court in Smith chose to defenestrate the
business necessity test, its self-proclaimed "touchstone" to disparate im-
pact recovery, and to replace it perfunctorily with the "reasonableness"
test.188 The Smith Court explained that the RFOA exception does not
require the employer to justify its discriminatory practice as being job-
related or a business necessity, it need only be "reasonable." ' 89 More-
over, according to the Court, the RFOA test, unlike the business neces-
sity test, does not involve inquiry into whether the employer could
achieve its goals without discriminating against older employees. 190
Second, the Smith Court's broad interpretation of the RFOA clause
violates a basic rule of statutory interpretation by rendering another
clause of the ADEA superfluous. Giving effect to all language in a stat-
ute is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation. 19' Given the Court's
RFOA definition, another ADEA exception, § 623(f)(2), would not be
necessary to the statute. Section § 623(f)(2) states that an employer is
not liable under the ADEA if the employers' challenged action or prac-
tice is observing the terms of a bona fide seniority system or employee
benefit plan.192, Certainly, a seniority system and employee benefit plan
are reasonable factors other than age according to the Court's reason-
ableness test. If Congress intended such a broad definition of the RFOA
as the Smith Court adopted, then it would not have needed to include §
623(f)(2) in the ADEA.
Third, the Court failed to acknowledge that its overly broad inter-
pretation of the RFOA clause will provide employers a defense in the
vast majority of disparate impact claims. 193 The Court contended that
while the RFOA defense narrows the scope of employer liability, it does
not preclude disparate impact claims altogether. 194  However, the
Court's new reasonableness test allows an employer to escape liability
from disparate impact claims without requiring the employer to demon-
strate business necessity or job relatedness. 195 Additionally, the reason-
ableness test prevents a plaintiff from presenting evidence that the em-
187. Id. at 658 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)); Clemons &
Bales, supra note 38, at 8.
188. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 134 (2004).
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (2005).
193. See infra Part IIIC discussing how lower courts are applying the RFOA defense to dismiss
ADEA disparate impact claims.
194. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543-44, 1544 n. 1I ("[I]f Congress intended to prohibit all dispa-
rate-impact claims, it certainly could have done so. For instance, in the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Congress barred recovery if a pay differential was based 'on any other factor' - reasonable or unrea-
sonable - 'other than sex."')
195. See id. at 1546.
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ployer could achieve its business goals by adopting a less discriminatory
alternative practice.1 96 Moreover, the Court did not propose any limita-
tions to this RFOA test, nor did it offer any factors to judge reasonable-
ness or any examples of what would constitute an unreasonable non-age
factor.
Indeed, the Smith case demonstrates the potential breadth of the new
RFOA exception. The Court in Smith found it reasonable for an em-
ployer, like the City of Jackson, to rely on seniority and rank to calculate
market wage adjustments for lower level employees in order to attract
and retain such employees even if such wage adjustments result in a
higher percentage increase for younger employees.1 97 However, while
the Court admitted the City probably had other less discriminatory alter-
natives, the Court stated that no investigation into such alternatives was
necessary.198
Thus, any "reasonable" justification will suffice to allow an em-
ployer to escape liability for its discriminatory practices. 99 There seems
to be no employer explanation which would not be considered reasonable
under the Smith Court's broad definition of the RFOA clause. Hiring
only less experienced workers for certain positions, company restructure,
and reductions in workforce are all likely to be considered "reasonable"
in light of an employer's need to cut costs, maintain efficiency and com-
pete in its industry. But, perhaps employment practices which are based
on clearly egregious factors would fail the reasonableness test.2°°
For example, the RFOA might not protect an employer who had a
physical fitness requirement for its applicants for accountant positions, as
that would have a disparate impact on older employees and would be an
outrageous employment test given the nature of an accounting posi-
tion.2°  However, if an employer adopts a test or policy and has a rea-
sonable explanation for it, a court would immediately reject the older
employee's disparate impact claim, even if the employer could have
achieved its business goals in another less discriminatory manner.20 2 For
example, the RFOA exception would likely protect an employer who laid
off its highest paid employees due to budgetary concerns, without look-
ing at whether the employer could have adhered to its budget by reducing
expenses other than wages, such as operating or marketing costs and,
thus, lessen the discriminatory impact on older employees.20 3
196. See id.
197. Id. at 1546-47.
198. Id. at 1546.
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 309-10.
201. See id.
202. See, e.g., Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
203. See J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1406.
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Arguably, the majority of employers today are savvy enough not to
engage in outrageous employment practices such as the physical fitness
requirement for accountant positions. Indeed, commentators suggest that
employers are becoming increasingly sophisticated in dodging ADEA
liability.2°4 Additionally, courts and commentators argue that employers
should not be allowed to adopt policies or practices that adversely impact
older employees without being required to justify the practice (for exam-
ple, by showing a business necessity or job relatedness, or the inability to
adopt a less discriminatory alternative). 205
However, the Court's broad new interpretation of the RFOA de-
fense will hinder a plaintiffs ability to challenge subtle discriminatory
practices (such as layoffs to cut costs) which adversely impact older
workers. An employer may escape liability by justifying its practice with
any reasonable explanation (no business necessity or job relatedness are
required).20 6 Furthermore, the plaintiff does not have the opportunity to
show that the employer could have achieved its goal in a less discrimina-
tory manner.20 7 By severely limiting the disparate impact cause of action
under the ADEA, the Court will effectively frustrate Congress's attempts
to protect older workers from arbitrary age discrimination in the work-
place.20 8
B. Regressing Back to Wards Cove
In addition to its expansive interpretation of the RFOA defense, the
Smith Court held that the burdens of proof and persuasion as defined in
Wards Cove, and long since rejected by Congress as unfair limitations of
Title VII, are now to be applied in ADEA disparate impact cases.20 9
Thus, in order to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, the plain-
tiff must identify the specific employment practice responsible for creat-
ing the alleged disparate impact and then introduce statistical evidence
204. Minda, supra note 3, at 538-39 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 335
(1995) ("By now.., employers have largely succeeded in purging such slogans as 'you can't teach
an old dog new tricks' from the vocabulary of their supervisory and personnel staffs.")).
205. See J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1406-08 (arguing that the ADEA must provide protection
for older employees who are downsized by employers attempting to cut costs, and that employers
should be required to justify decisions to impose cost-savings on older workers). See, e.g., Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that defendant was unable to adequately
justify its policy of hiring inexperienced applicants which disproportionately disadvantaged older
applicants and, therefore, was liable under the ADEA).
206. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
207. See id.
208. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. See also Minda, supra note 3, at 512-15
(asserting that opportunistic downsizing of older workers should be eliminated by age and pension
discrimination legislation to avoid rendering legislation, including the ADEA, meaningless. Addi-
tionally, if opportunistic downsizing is left unchecked, it could contribute to the impending Social
Security crisis and the downfall of the American work ethic).
209. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
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that the practice adversely impacts older employees.210  Then, the em-
ployer may either refute the plaintiffs statistical evidence or produce
evidence that its challenged practice is based on a reasonable non-age
factor.211 However, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at
all times.212 So, the plaintiff has the burden to persuade the factfinder
that the employer's justification is unreasonable.213
Ironically, Justice Stevens, author of the plurality opinion in Smith,
wrote a scathing dissent of the majority opinion in Wards Cove for the
decision to impose this burden on the plaintiff.214 Justice Stevens wrote,
"[t]he changes the majority makes today, tipping the scales in favor of
employers, are not faithful to those [ordinary] principles [of fairness]." 215
Justice Stevens' own arguments against the Court's adjustment of bur-
dens of proof in his dissent in Wards Cove are applicable to refute his
opinion in Smith.
In his Wards Cove dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the majority's
redefinition of the employees' burden of proof to establish a prima facie
disparate impact case, calling it unfair and unwarranted.216 Justice Ste-
vens predicted that the majority's requirement that employees isolate
specific employment practices responsible for the statistical disparities
would present serious difficulties for employees.217 Justice Stevens rec-
ognized that employers often consider multiple factors in making their
decisions and it would be nearly impossible to separate and challenge
each factor rather than the decision-making process as a whole.
218
Justice Stevens also asserted in Wards Cove that the employer
should have the burden of proof and persuasion for the defense of busi-
ness necessity in disparate impact cases.219 Following basic common law
pleading procedure, Justice Stevens stressed that the plaintiff has the
burden to persuade the factfinder that the defendant has harmed her, and
the defendant may refute any evidence the plaintiff presents.220 In addi-
tion, the defendant has the option of persuading the factfinder that her act
was justifiable. 22' Depending on which party is asserting a proposition,
the burdens of persuasion shift between the plaintiff and defendant.
222
210. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57 (discussing the prima facie requirements under Title
VII); see also Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying these same require-
ments to the ADEA).
211. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 673.
216. Id. at 672-73.
217. See id. at 673 n.19-20.
218. Id. at 672-73 n.19.
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Thus, Justice Stevens concluded, the business necessity defense in dispa-
rate impact cases is a "classic example of an affirmative defense."
223
Indeed, courts interpreted the RFOA defense as an affirmative de-
fense in ADEA disparate impact cases following Griggs.224  Further-
more, prior to Smith, commentators arguing for the recognition of dispa-
rate impact claims under the ADEA interpreted the RFOA exception as
an affirmative defense, based on the construction of the statute.225 Addi-
tionally, commentators recognize that because the employer has greater
access to proof regarding its own policies and practices, the burden of
persuasion for employer defenses to disparate impact claims should be
allocated to the employer.226
However, contrary to basic rules of civil procedure and statutory
construction, the Court in Smith decided to revert back to its obsolete
1989 Wards Cove decision and place what should be the employer's
"weighty" burden,227 squarely on the shoulders of the employee.228 Thus,
rather than requiring the employer to persuade the factfinder that its prac-
tice is based on a reasonable non-age factor, the employee is expected to
persuade the factfinder of the unreasonableness of the non-age factor.
So, in addition to receiving the benefit of the broad RFOA defense
under the ADEA, employers do not even have to persuade the factfinder
of that defense.229 Moreover, in order to establish a prima facie case,
ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs are now responsible for isolating spe-
cific employment practices and presenting statistical evidence that each
practice adversely affects older workers.23° Charging older employees
with both of these procedural burdens adds to the likelihood that em-
ployees' ADEA disparate impact claims will fail.
23t
223. Id. at 670 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)).
224. See Palochko v. Manville Corp., 21 F.3d 981, 981 (10th Cir. 1994); see Geller, 635 F.2d
at 1032, 1034; see also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 428 (stating that the defendant has
the burden of production and persuasion regarding the business necessity test (the predecessor to the
RFOA test)).
225. J. Johnson, supra note 7, at 1402, 1447; see also Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or
Not Wards Cove Packing? That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 819, 832-36 (1997) (arguing that the
ADEA's language pertaining to the RFOA exception indicates that procedurally, the RFOA excep-
tion is a defense, and thus the burden must be upon the employer to establish that it acted upon a
reasonable non-age factor).
226. See Jesse A. Whitten, Disparate Impact Doctrine Revisited: Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 396 (1990) (arguing that employers should bear the
burden of persuasion on the business necessity defense to Title VII disparate impact claims because
they have greater access to information about their business practices).
227. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. See id at 659 (majority opinion).
229. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45 (adopting Wards Cove analysis in ADEA cases).
230. See id.
231. See Niall A. Paul, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio: The Supreme Court s Disparate
Treatment of the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 127, 162-63 (arguing
that the Wards Cove decision including the statistical evidence requirement, business justification
test, and shifting the burden of persuasion of the business necessity issue to plaintiffs threatens the
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C. ADEA Disparate Impact Plaintiffs Losing in the Lower Courts
Lower courts applying the Smith decision have utilized the Wards
Cove plaintiff burdens, and the over-expansive interpretation of the
RFOA provision to eliminate ADEA plaintiffs' disparate impact
claims.232 These courts have consistently dismissed ADEA disparate
impact claims in the initial pleading stages either because the plaintiff
failed to meet the statistical evidence requirement, or because the defen-
dant pleaded a 'reasonable factor other than age' (RFOA) defense, or
both.233 Indeed, since the Smith decision, only one ADEA disparate im-
pact plaintiff has survived summary judgment;234 and no ADEA plaintiff
has prevailed under a disparate impact theory of recovery.235
In Slattery v. Peerless Importers,236 the court found the plaintiffs
ADEA disparate impact claim was without merit because the employer
based its challenged policy on a reasonable non-age factor.237  In
Slattery, the plaintiff, a salesperson employed by the defendant whole-
sale wine distributor, alleged that the defendant's policy to hire new
salespersons in its new division, rather than allowing existing salespeople
to transfer to that division, adversely impacted older employees.238 The
new division had exclusive distribution rights for a lucrative brand of
viability of Title VII plaintiffs' disparate impact claims); see also Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that
Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1190 (1993) (criticizing the Wards Cove decision for its
"revisionist treatment of the burden of proof" and its requirement that plaintiffs identify specific
employment practices).
232. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
233. Plaintiff failed to isolate a specific facially neutral employment practice and present
evidence showing a statistically significant disparate impact on older employees: See Mihalik v.
Expressjet Airlines, No. 3:04CV258 RV/EMT, 2005 WL 1787350, at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 27, 2005);
Aylward v. Hyatt Corp., No. 03 C 6097, 2005 WL 1910904, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2005);
Schaller v. Donelson Air Conditioning Co., No. 3:04-0545, 2005 WL 1868769, at *8 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 4, 2005); Chavarria v. Despachos Del Notre, Inc., No. CIV.A. L-03-96, 2005 WL 1515472, at
*6 n. I1 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2005); Ackerman v. Home Depot, Inc., No. CIV.A. 304CV0058N, 2005
WL 1313429, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2005). Employer based its decision on what the court
considered to be a reasonable factor other than age: See Slattery v. Peerless Imp., Inc., No. 04 CV
0275(JG), 2005 WL 1527681, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005); Duggan v. Orthopaedic Institute of
Ohio, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 853, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Wilson v. MVM, Inc., No. CIV.A.03-4514,
2005 WL 1231968, at * 18 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2005). Plaintiff failed to isolate specific practice and
employer's motivation constituted a RFOA: See Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 03-56255, 2005
WL 1799416, at *3, *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005) (not selected for pulication); Rizzo v. PPL Serv.
Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-5779, Civ.A. 03-5780, Civ.A. 03-5781, 2005 WL 1397217, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 10, 2005); Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No.04-C-563-C, 2005 WL 1389197, at *13-14
(W.D. Wis. June 13, 2005).
234. As of Aug. 26, 2005, Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200-JWL, 2005 WL
1801605, at *1 (D. Kan. July 29, 2005), is the only ADEA disparate impact case in which the court
denied a defendant's motion for summary judgment. However, the Williams court misapplied the
Wards Cove standard and stated that the employer had the burden to plead and prove the RFOA
defense and refused to consider the employers proffered factors other than age under this motion for
summary judgment. Id. at *3.
235. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. These are all the reported decisions
through Aug. 26, 2005 which cited Smith and involved ADEA disparate impact claims.
236. No. 04 CV 0275(JG), 2005 WL 1527681 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005).
237. Slattery, 2005 WL 1527681, at *8.
238. Id. at *1, *2, *7.
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wine which previously accounted for 30% of the plaintiffs commission
income.239 The court found that the employer's allegation that it prohib-
ited its salespersons from transferring to reassure its other suppliers that
an experienced sales staff would continue to support them constituted a
RFOA; and, thus, precluded the plaintiff's disparate impact claim. 40
The Slattery court noted that the Smith decision narrowed the scope
of employer liability under the ADEA from what previously existed in
the Second Circuit.24' The court further explained that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the RFOA requires only an employer's showing
that its disputed decision was reasonable.242 This reasonableness test, the
Slattery court pointed out, is much easier for an employer to satisfy com-
pared to the business necessity test which was the law of the Second Cir-
cuit prior to Smith.24 3
Additionally, in Townsend v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,244 the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on a disparate im-
pact claim with the assistance of both the Wards Cove plaintiff burden
and the RFOA provision.245 In Townsend, the plaintiff was an adminis-
trative assistant employed at the defendant paper mill company who lost
24her job as a result of the defendant's reorganization. 46 A total of eight
employees were laid off as a result of the defendant's reorganization; and
seven of the eight employees were over forty years of age.247 The court
held that the plaintiff did not isolate a specific practice which was re-
sponsible for the observed statistical disparity.248
However, even if the plaintiff showed that the defendant's reduction
in force (RIF) had a significant adverse effect on employees over forty,
the court could still grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant
based on the RFOA provision.249 The employer decided to terminate
older employees to relieve itself of the burden of those employees' high
salary or health care costs. 250 The court found that saving salary and
healthcare costs constitute reasonable factors other than age and, thus,
the employer would not be liable under the ADEA.251
In addition to the dismal results of plaintiffs' attempts to plead dis-
parate impact cases since Smith, litigators' commentaries highlight the
239. Id at *1-*2.
240. Id at *8.
241. Id. at *7.
242. Id. at *8.
243. See id. at *7.
244. No. 04-C-563-C, 2005 WL 1389197 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2005).
245. See Townsend, 2005 WL 1389197, at *1.
246. Id at *1, *6.
247. Id at *6.
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difficulties they expect plaintiffs will face in ADEA disparate impact
cases. 252 Litigators lament that "the existence of the [RFOA] defense
curtails disparate impact liability., 253  Additionally, litigators observe
that as a result of Smith, an employer may now adopt a policy to hire less
experienced (usually younger) employees and justify it as a cost-saving
mechanism to take advantage of the RFOA defense.2 54 Whereas under
the business necessity test prior to Smith, an employer's assertion of cost-
saving alone would not allow it to escape liability under ADEA disparate
impact claims.255
In short, no plaintiff has been successful in a disparate impact case
under the ADEA since Smith. Courts and litigators alike have com-
mented on how the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ADEA in
Smith, particularly the RFOA provision, has made it extremely difficult
for an ADEA plaintiff to succeed under a disparate impact theory.25 6
Further, a review of the initial lower court cases applying Smith indicates
that the Smith decision has made it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to
prevail on a disparate impact theory of recovery under the ADEA.
D. Discriminating Against ADEA Plaintiffs
According to the Court, the ADEA seeks to "broadly prohibit[] ar-
bitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age. 257 In addition, the
nearly identical language of the ADEA and Title VII supports a pre-
sumption that Congress intended to provide similar protection for em-
ployees against the types of discrimination included in both statutes.258
Commentators argue that due to the language and format similarities of
Title VII and ADEA, the ideal solution would be "to allow for co-
extensive causes of action and protection for covered plaintiffs under
[both] the respective acts. 259  Unfortunately, the Court's decision in
Smith does not further Congress's goal of broadly prohibiting age dis-
crimination, nor does it provide protection for older employees similar to
the Title VII protections. Instead, the Smith Court highlighted the textual
differences rather than the similarities between the two statutes, and arbi-
trarily adopted an interpretation which will result in significantly less
protection for employees subjected to age discrimination.
The Court's main reasons for affording employees less protection
under the ADEA than under Title VII included: (1) the existence of the
252. See Slattery, 2005 WL 1527681, at *7; LOuis A. JACOBS & ANDREW J. RUZICHO,
LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES § 2:8 (2005), available at LITADCS § 2:8 (Westlaw).
253. See JACOBS & RUZICHO, supra note 252, § 2:8.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id.; Slattery, 2005 WL 1527681, at *7.
257. TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985) (emphasis added); Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (emphasis added).
258. Smith, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (2005).
259. B. Johnson, supra note 28, at 343.
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RFOA clause in the ADEA but not Title VII; (2) Congress not mention-
ing the ADEA in its 1991 amendments; and (3) age discrimination's in-
herent difference from the other types of discrimination. 260  These rea-
sons are unpersuasive.
First, the mere existence of the RFOA clause in the ADEA but not
in Title VII does not support the Court's broad interpretation of the
RFOA clause (and narrowing of employer liability). Courts prior to
Smith were able to apply the RFOA defense without significantly nar-
rowing employers' liability under the ADEA.261 These courts utilized
the more stringent business necessity test and allowed plaintiffs to pre-
sent less discriminatory alternatives.262 Furthermore, this argument is
tautological given that the Court first selected a broad interpretation of
the RFOA defense and then used it as reasoning to conclude that em-
ployer liability should be more narrow under the ADEA.
Second, many commentators have opined and drawn a range of dif-
ferent conclusions about the meaning of Congress's failure to mention
the ADEA in its 1991 amendments.263 Some argue that Congress may
not have addressed the ADEA for the simple reason that Wards Cove
was a Title VII case, not an ADEA case.2 4 Others argue that Congress
actually intended for courts to follow the 1991 amendments for similar
statutes such as the ADEA.265 Still other commentators question whether
Congress even considered how the 1991 amendments could apply in the
context of the ADEA.266
Third, just because age discrimination is inherently different from
racial discrimination, for example, does not mean older employees
should not be shielded from needless discrimination too. In Smith, the
Court noted that "age, unlike race or other classifications protected by
Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual's capacity to
engage in certain types of employment., 267 While this is unquestionably
true, it does not support a ruling leaving older workers vulnerable to age
discrimination which has nothing to do with their ability to perform their
job. If an older employee cannot perform the job, then the employer may
either refuse to hire her according to the BFOQ exception, or terminate
her according to the good cause exception without incurring ADEA li-
260. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
261. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
263. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 420-21.
264. See Eglit, supra note 231, at 1174-75.
265. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 5, at 421 (A House Judiciary Committee report
stated that the laws modeled after Title VI1 should be interpreted consistently with the 1991 amend-
ments. However others contend that the House Committee's interpretation should not be followed
because it was not part of the Senate Bill which was adopted.).
266. See Eglit, supra note 231, at 1168-70.
267. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
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ability. 268 Finally, while older workers have not been exposed to a life-
time of discrimination like racial minorities, they still deserve freedom
from workplace discrimination.
CONCLUSION
A cursory review of the Court's decision in Smith v. City of Jack-
son,269 leads to the assumption of a victory for older employees. How-
ever, closer scrutiny reveals that although the Court held that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA, its expansive interpreta-
tion of the RFOA exception, and its use of the plaintiff burdens in Wards
Cove Packing v. Atonio270 will in effect preclude the majority of dispa-
rate impact claims. Indeed, not one plaintiff has prevailed in an ADEA
disparate impact case since Smith.2 7 1 Perhaps Congress will intervene
yet again to express its discontent at leaving workers exposed to arbitrary
discrimination. However, if Congress does not act accordingly, the
Court's ruling in Smith will eviscerate the main purpose of the ADEA
and leave elder workers without recourse against insidious age discrimi-
nation in the workplace.
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